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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION. 
II The worst of Rebels never arm 
To do their Kings or Country harm; 
But draw their Swords to do them good, 
As Doctors cure by letting blood." (1). 
The problems posed by the sufferings of the Royalists 
during the civil wars and Interregnum have troubled hist-
orians for centuries. Drawing the majority of their material 
from the Cavalier ballads, pamphlets, memoirs and letters, 
many of the earlier chronologists claimed that the delinquents 
were completely crippled by the anti-Royalist legislation. 
Hume alleged that, at the Restoration, " ••• the greater part 
of the Royalists still remained in poverty. and distress"2. 
This view prev~iled for ma~y years -·John Lingard, in the 
following century, asse~ted that "Since the year 1642, a con-
siderable portion of the landed property in every county 
had passed from the hands of th~'original owners into the 
possession of new claimants ••• ,,3. But it was not until the 
records of the Committee for Compounding were calendared 
towards the turn of the century (1889-92) that a detailed 
examination of the problem became possible. 
Hitherto the Royalists had been divided into two sharply-
defined categories: the victims of the Acts of Sale, and the 
1. "Rebellion", in Satires and Miscellanies, by S. Butler, 
(1928), p.262. . 
2. Hume, History of England, VII, (oxford, 1826) p. 348. This 
work was originally published between 1754 and 1761. 
3. J. Lingard, History of England, VII,(1829),p.358. 
-,-
2. 
average delinquents. This classification was intensified by 
the Restoration Settlement, which seemed to reverse all the 
former's forfeitures; whilst recognising the 'voluntary' 
sales made by the latter (in order to raise their composition 
fines). Thus the compounders were thought to have been 
crippled by these fines,:whilst those whose lands had been 
confiscated were seen as the fortunate few who regained all 
that they had lost. 
Recent scholarship has completely exploded this theory. 
Although Dr. Chesney, working directly from the Calendar of 
the Committee for Compounding,· claimed that many delinquents 
had been forced to sell their property, research by Professor 
Habakkuk and Dr. Thirsk has challenged this interpretation 
of the problem. Professor Trevelyan had already suggested 
that the Royalists "had not lost their lands or more than a 
certain proportion of their wealth by fines"l. Habakkuk en-
dorsed this view with his study of. thirty-two families in the 
counties of Bedford and Northampton. Dr. Thirsk dealt with 
the other side of the question and, from a selection of fifty 
families in the south-east, showed that although the vast 
majority of the Royalists recovered their forfeited estates, 
the cost could be - and was - sometimes prohibitive.· 2 
1. H.E.Chesney, The Sequestration of E~tates, l643-60 t (unpub-lished Ph.D. thesis, university of Sheffield t 1928}, passim. G.M.Trevelyan; English Social History, (l944), p. 252. 
2. H.J.Habakkuk, "Landowners and the Civil War" in Ec.H.R., 
2nd. series, XVIII (1965) pp. 130-151. I.J.Thirsk, The 
Sale of Delin uents' Estates durin the Interre num and 
t e Land Settlement at the Restoration, unpublished P .D. 
~hesis, University of London, 1950). At present, more 
work is being done on the subject. 
3. 
As yet, however, no detailed examination has been made 
of all the delinquents in any one 10cality.lThe value of 
-
such a survey is that it enables the compounders and the 
"traitors"2 to be treated together, where the same conditions 
(such as the efficiency and ability of the county committee) 
prevailed. For there was, in fact, no difference between 
these two types of Royalist. Those who did not pay their fines 
had their lands confiscated3, and conversely, the delinquents 
in the later Acts of Sale were offered the opportunity of 
compounding for their forfeited property. This thesis is an 
attempt to make such an examination of the Royalist gentry 
in the county of York, showing how they suffered during the 
years after 1645. 
Yorkshire is a convenient unit to use for a study of 
this kind. As a region, it is large enough to warrant an in-
dependent survey, yet small enough to keep that survey within' 
easy, manageable proportions. The advantage of using a single 
administrative area lies in the fact that the gentry and 
politically-consdous inhabitants were orientated around one 
regional centre, and were part of one local unit. Despite the 
nominal divisioftof the county into four (the three ridings 
1; Dr. Thirsk was concerned solely with 50 victims of the Acts 
of Sale, and Professor Habakkuk with 32 compounders. 
2. This was the term in the Acts, applying to. those whose 
lands were confiscated. 
3. There were five cases in Yorkshire where the delinquent 
never completed his composition, and thus lost his lands. 
In other instanoes, the Cavalier had never attempted 
to oompound. 
and the Ainsty), the gentry regarded Yorkshire as a single 
entity, with York as the political and social centre. 
Unlike some counties, Yorkshire was divided in allegiance. 
The Royalists, led first by the incompetent Earl of Cumber-
land, and later by the Earl' of Newcastle, were opposed by 
Lord Fairfax in the West Riding and Sir John Hotham at Hull. 
Both sides made an initial attempt to keep the peace, but 
after the failure of this Neutrality Treaty in September, 
1642,1 the county became a battleground between rival forces. 
Newcastle's mighty army2 was at first held at bay by the 
superior mobility and ingenuity of the Fa1rfaxes. Even after 
the latter had been defeated at Adwalton Moor in June 1643, 
the resistance of Hull kept the Parliamentary flame alight, 
and precipitated Newcastle's retreat from Lincolnshire later 
in the year. The conflict was essentially insular in character: 
the local gentry fought amongst themselves, and the course 
of the war was relatively undisturbed by events e1s~where, 
until the advent of the Scots army upset the balance of power. 
The size and relative independence of the county of 
York thus makes it a convenient unit to use for the study of 
the effects of the anti-Royalist legislation upon the Cav-
1. The Treaty was signed on 29 September, at Rothwell p Fair-
fax made his signature conditional upon Parliament's 
approval, and Sir- John Hotham refused even to sign the 
document (which Parliament later condemned). F.Drake, 
Eboracum,(1736), p. 160; C.R.Markham, The Life of the 
TIreat Lord Fairfax, (1870),p. 53-4; Reasons why Sir John : 
aotham ••• cannot ••• agree to the, Treaty of Pacification ••• I 
~ ! 
20 'Mighty' by local standards - 12,000 to 16,000 me~ (Lord 
Fairfax, Short Memorials (1676), p. 36; E.Broxap, Sieges 
of Hull ••• fi, in E.H.R. XX (1905) p. 470. -I 
~ 
" 
5. 
aliers. This is helped by the considerable amount of material 
covering the period in question (in addition to the central 
records). Although the committee books do not reveal much 
about the administrative organisation of the county, they do 
provide quite a lot of information relating to composition 
and the rack-renting of sequestered propertiesl • Several 
families have left sUbstantial archives, enabling almost half 
of the Royalist gentry to be traced during the decades in 
question. These sources are augmented by a wealth of second-
ary information from the pens of various antiquaries and 
local historians2 • 
This thesis is restricted to a study of the gentry: no 
consideration has been given to the yeomanry or nobility. 
These omissions have been made on purely practical grounds. 
Many of the members of the peerage owned extensive lands in 
several counties3 , and to single out individual properties 
. 
in one locality would obviously be unwise. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of all non-Yorkshire estates could create in-
accuracies in one direction or another, and limit the value 
of any such survey. The yeomanry have been excluded for ex-
actly the opposite reason. The majority were relatively un-
important in county affairs, and very few of their records 
1. committee Books:- PRO, S~28/215; SP46/l07; YorkSeques-
!ration Book, l645~. (York Reference Library). 
2. See note on sources, Appendix VIII. 
3. So did some of the gentry. 
6. ' 
remain, with the excepti~n of. casual mentions in the Compos-
ition Papers. By limiting the field of research to the gentry, 
it is hoped to avoid both ,extremes. 
Wi thin the ,ranks of the gentry, ho_wever, there were" 
great variations in both wealth and social status. The term 
was commonly taken ,to embrace all arm1ge!ous famil1esbelow 
the ranks of the peerage: those whose heads could justifiably 
call themselves gentleman, esquire, knight or baronet. The 
privilege of bearing arms. was hereditary, and descended to 
all sons - thus a younger member of a cadet branch might be 
far poorer than a wealthy yeoman. On the other hand, ~ pros-
perous squire could easily have a l~rger income than some of 
the peers. The ranks of the pre-war Yorkshire gentry included 
such extremes as Sir Arthur Ingram of ,Temple Newsam, who left 
estates worth roughly £12,000 a year on his death, and John 
Monckton of Northcliffe, who received a mere personal annuity 
of £lOl.But, although the term 'gentry' embraced such con-
trasts, it is a convenient means of limiting the subjects of 
this study to an easily identifiable group. 
. , 
Before the question of the Yorkshire Royalist gentry 
can be discussed, these three terms must be clearly defined. 
The distinction 'gentleman' was greatly abused in the seven-
teenth century; many people claimed to be entitled to bear 
arms, although they had no such right2• Thus Thomas Edmunds 
1. J.T.Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry on the Eve of the Civil 
War, 1603-40 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
London, 1960) p. 96. R.C.P., 'II, p.l8). Both gentlemen 
were heads of their respeciive families. 
7. 
of worsborough called himself • gentleman' when'he compounded 
in 1646, but he certainly'did not acquire this title until 
the following yearl. In defining the true gentry, I:,have 
followed Dr. Cliffe's example, and included only those who 
had definitely the'right to bear arms in 1642 2.It must be 
remembered that this definition has been used purely as an 
arbittary means of identifying a representative group of 
Yorkshire Royalists, and not with the intention of discovering 
a united class of people. 
The basic unit in this thesis will be the gentry family. 
Obviously such huge clans as the Constables and Saviles can 
not be regarded as'single families. The term has therefore 
been taken to include the head, his wife anddescend6nts, 
I 
unmarried brothers and sisters, aunts, childless male rela-
tives, and the widowed mother and grandmother. Where~ however, 
two male cousins were both over the age of twenty-one in 1642, 
their respective fathers,are regarded as the heads of two 
separate families. 3 
1. R.C.P.,II, 19. J.W.Clay, Dugdale's Visitation of-Yorkshire, 
III, 137 (hereafter cited as Dugdale). E.Elmhirst, Pec-
uliar Inheritance (1951), p.59. ---
2. Cliffe, OPe cit., 5-6. 
3. Ibid., 9-10. 
(£2~!~_f~~!_E~_§)· 
2. Arms were officially granted only by the College of 
Heralds. Dugdale, in his 1665-66 Visitation of Yorkshire, 
recognised arms which had been claimed by families for 
over a century (even if they had not officially been 
awarded). 
8. 
The second term to be defined is 'Royalist'. I have 
used the words 'delinquent' and 'Cavalier' as synonyms for 
this expression (as did the government), but it is clear 
that the Parliamentary definition of delinquency varied con-
siderably throughout the years and from place to place. 
Originally the term embraced all who had fought for, or active-
ly aided, the King; those who had left their normal residences 
to live in a Royalist stronghold (Whatever the excuse), and, 
in some cases, any who had refused to aid the Roundhead 
I . 
soldiers when asked. Ironically, however, those who had 
- -
voluntarily guaranteed a ~loan to the King in 1643 were not 
- 2 '. 
treated as enemies • For the sake of uniformity, I have taken 
Parliament's definition of Royalism, and applied it to all 
those accused of delinquency. Thus the signatories to the 
Yorkshire Engagement, the bondholders, and those who failed 
to offer a satisfactory explanation when accused of supporting 
the King, are all classified as Cavaliers. 
Finally, who were the Yorkshire gentry? Some families, 
especially those living near the border, possessed estates 
. 
in neighbouring counties. Laurence Sayer and John Errington 
held property in Durham, and Richard Braithwaite owned lands 
in.'Westmoreland.-The Yorkshire gentry are regarded as those 
1. see case of:Francis Layton of Rawden, R.O.P., I, p.30. 
2. See the Yorkshire Engagement, Chapter IV~ 
9. 
landholders who were normally resident in that county, or 
who, if peripatetic, were living in yorkshire when hostilities 
. 1 
commenced • Thus Sir Thomas Strickland, living mainly at 
Thornton Bridge in the North Riding, is considered to be a 
Yorkshireman, whereas Sir Gervase EYre of Laughton and 
Rampton, who dwelt principally on the latter estate in Nott-
MiN. . 
ingha" is not included. 
The Yorkshire gentry have been closely examined byJ.T. 
Cliffe in his excellent study, covering the ftrstffour 
decades of the seventeenth century2. In 1642, there were 
679 gentry families in Yorkshire, representing all levels 
of the social and financial scales. When the advent of the. 
civil war led over half of them to choose sides, the decision 
was certainly not made on any economic grounds. Both factions 
could claim the allegiance of wealthy landowners, as well 
as the support of the poorer gentry. Sir Arthur, the eldest 
son and heir of the .. wealthy Sir Arthur Ingram, became a 
Parliamentarian, whilst the two Middleton brothers, with a 
, 
combined annual income of well over £2500, fought for the 
King3• Nor was there a great difference in the composition 
1. The 'foreign' estates of these landowners have also been 
included .. in the survey, as theY'lla-e not extensive. 
2. Cliffe, OPe cit. 
3. Ibid, pp.·9~lO; J.Foster, Pedigrees of the County Families 
of Yorkshire (l874); west Riding; Leases of the Middleton 
estates are in PRO, SP28!2l5. -
10. 
of the two parties on any other grounds, with the obvious 
exception of political affinities and, to some extent, relig-
ious loyalties. The majority of both sides were Anglican, 
but Puritans were more likely to gravitate towards the 
Parliamentary service, and the government's strict, uncom-
promising anti-Papist legislation compelled all but the 
weakest Catholics to support the King, or to remain in 
- 1 benevolent, pro-Royalist neutrality. 
There were at least 288 -, gentry families who were conn-
ected to some extent with the Royalist cause2 • 229 of these 
families remained loyal to the King throughout- the war, but 
the remaining 59 either changed sides, or were divided in 
allegiance between the two factions3.Thedegree of Royalism 
varied greatly from the unshakeable Cavaliers to the profit-
eers and schemers who were only trying to be on the. winning 
side. Sir Henry Slingsby fought continuously for his cause, 
and was finally executed for attempting to undermine the 
- loyalty of the garrison at Hull during his imprisonment there. 
1. See Cliffe on civil war loyalties, OPe cit., Chapter VII, 
pp. 364-424. 
2. Some gentry who cannot be clearly identified are omitted -
e.g., Captain Scudamore who was captured at Selby (Rush-
worth J., Historical Collections,III,ii,(l692) p.6l9) 
might belong to either the Overton or the Leeds branch -
or neither. 
3. Cliffe cites 231 Royalists and 57 of divided loyalties. 
(op. cit.,p. 406). 
11. 
On the other hand, John Morris changed sides twice, each time 
being prompted by personal motives, whilst John Thornhill 
1 of Fixby gave assistance to both parties • 
The activities of the warring armies also encouraged 
several landowners to seek the support and protection of 
nearby garrisons. Some delinquents, had been in active service 
for only a short time: if their various protestations can 
be believed, there was a considerable floating force in the 
Royalist camp. Supporters drifted away at harvest time or 
whenever the campaign appeared to be faltering. This was en-
couraged by the practice of enforced recruiting - men who 
were compelled to act as assessors and collectors, or to 
fight in the Royalist army, naturally deserted as soon as 
Possible2 • 
The gentry involved in this struggle were.representative 
of all sections of county society. They ranged from the 
prosperous and influential landowners down to the insignificant 
younger members of cadet families, who-survived on very. small 
annuities. The 'particulars of estate' and surveyors' reports, 
(the latter made just prior to the sale of confiscated lands) 
1. D.N.B. (Slingsby); Historical Yorkshire Families (bound 
scrapoook of newspaper articles in the Yorkshire Archaeo-
logical Society Library) - Morris. . 
2. The Parliamentarians also seem to have used forced re-
cr~iting, but the Royalists, being supreme at first, were 
more successful. 
.. 
-----"" 
12. 
do not cover all of the Royalist gentry, but they do give a 
rough indication of the landed estates of over seventy per 
cent of the Cavaliers l • ~. 
Table I:- FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE ROYALISTS IN 1642. 
Annual Income Number 
Over £2,000/ year 5 
£1001 - £.2000 II 12 
£751 - £1000 .. 14 
£501 - £750 tt 23 
£251 - £500 II 48 
£.101 - £.2 50 " 63 
under £100 tt 47 
Total 212 
At one end of the scale, the three Hildyard brothers 
of Winestead shared at least £.2600 per annum, whilst Cuthbert 
Morley, Christopher Wandesford and Sir Michael Warton had 
much the same income. At the other extreme, Miles Newton 
received about £.26 a year, and Francis Withes a mere £.61 The 
richest gentry lived in palatial style, like the nobility, 
whilst the poorest delinquents were little better than hus-
bandmen, and could afford none of the luxuries of gentry life. 
It will be seen that the majority of the gentry came from the 
lower end of the income scale. 
1. The 'particulars' represented 1642 values, the surveys 
.1652 racked values. Wherever possible, allowance has been 
made for this. Both must be used with care, especially .. " 
the former, because of heavy bias. The table represents 
the inComes of the Royalists in each family, and not 
necessarily of the head Of the family (as quoted in Cliffe). 
i 
13. 
Besides presenting a cross-section of the financial 
scale, the Royalists presented a varied range of economic 
positions. Some were prosperous landholders, like Sir Henry 
Slingsby, or merchants, like Brian Cooke of Doncaster. Others 
were in a declining position, such as Arthur A1dburgh of 
Aldborough, whose manors were already heavily mortgaged in 
16421. The Composition Papers give a good indication of the 
pre-war position of the Cavaliers, but care must be taken in 
interpreting them, as the Royalists often took the opportunity 
of undervaluing their estates. The following table gives 
a surr~ary of the economic positionlof the delinquents on the 
eve of the civil wars, in relation to theirincomes2 • 
Table 11:- THE YORKSHIRE ROYALIST GENTRY IN 1642. 
Prosperous 55 ) 
50 % 
'Comfortably-off' 89 ~ 
Average 37 12.8 % 
Financially unstable 50 ~ 23.2% Declining 17 ) 
Unknown 40 14 % 
Total 288 
Thus the majority of the Royalist gentry were in a 
relatively stable economic position on the eve of the civil 
war. Some were rising, whilst others were declining. Most 
1. Slingsby MSS, DD56/121; R.C.P.,II,pp. 95-6; ~.,II, p.217. 
2. These terms relate income to economic position: a man 
with £600 a year might be better off than one with £6000, 
but who had heavy debts and liabilities. 
14 •. 
of them looked to the land for their support, although several 
were connected with trade and commerce, whilst a .. few, such 
:, " 
as Brian Cooke of .. Wheatley and Doncaster, owed their pros-
perity almost entirely to their financial exploitsl • 
. I • . 
The Royalist gentry'were also divided by thejr religious 
beliefs. 'Although the majority were' Anglican of one shade 
or another, there were a few Puritans and a considerable 
number of Catholics -in at least'63 families, one or more 
Royalists proved to be of the latter persuasion. The King lost 
a considerable amount of popularity through granting comm-
issions to recusants; and'thelatter were later to suffer 
very severely for their loyalty. Forty-five Papist families 
eventually had some, if not all, of their lands confiscated, 
although the remainder succeeded in 'avoiding the full penalties 
. .' : 2 
for their religion • 
The ranks of the Royalists3 included a considerable 
number of titled gentry: there were 52 famili.s where the 
Cavalier was a knight, 15 where he was a baronet~ and'g where 
he held both honours. In'the case of 15 families, at'least 
one delinquent had sat in Parliament before the war. As mem-
1. Cooke of Wheatley MSS, passim., 
2. The Methams, with Lord Fairfax's aid, succeeded in com-
pounding like normal delinquents. The remaining Catholics 
were never proceeded against. 
3. This term, unless otherwise specified; includes those 
who changed sides, and the Cavalier members ,of families 
who were divided in allegiance. 
15. 
bers of the gentry, those who served the King usually received 
commissions in the army - 101 of these families could boast 
of at least a captain who had fought for his monarch. 
Dr. Cliffe has closely examined the Yorkshire gentry on 
the eve of the civil war. With the exception of the Catholics, 
there was'no real division in the financial or social stan-
ding of the two parties. Both factions contained a represent-
ative cross-section of the gentry. The only principal diff-
erence between the two sides was in numbers. Omitting those 
who supported both factions, 229 families were Royalist, and 
1 
only 103 Parliamentarian. But, although Yorkshire had been 
geographically divided between King and Parliament during 
the war, there was no such regional distinction between the 
two parties. I had expected that the West Riding woollen 
towns and their immediate hinterland, having supported the 
Long Parliament during the conflict, would be a local centre 
for the Parliamentar~gentry, but in fact this is not so. 
The Royalist gentry were far stronger in the West Riding than 
their opponents. Admittedly, the inhabitants of towns such ' 
as Bradford and Halifax were loyal to London, but the surround-
ing district is scattered with the seats of Cavalier gentle-
men. The only distinctions that can be made in the location 
of the two partiesa~ in South Yorkshire (there~s a definite 
preponderance 'of Roundheads around Sheffield), ,and in tho, 
East Riding, where, with the exception of Beverley and South 
1. Cliffe, op.cit., p. 406. 
16. ~ 
Holderness, the hinterland of Hull was mainly populated by 
the parliamentariansl • 
The relatively large numbers of Royalists in the West 
Riding does not indicate that this area was a.centre of loyalty 
to the King; there were,simplymoi~ ge~try i~~he region, 
and the proportion of inhabitants who adhered to the Royalist 
cause was not noticeably higher than in the other ridings. 
" .... ." -'. ~ \ 
The concentration: of fighting around t,h~,.hastily-fortified 
river crossings and the woollen towns did not (contrary to 
~, . - ~ . ' 
my expectations) force most of the local landowners to take 
k. , ' 
sides in ordei.to protect their property. In fact, the 
. . . 
percentage of the gentry who remained:neutral throughout 
the conflict is one of the most constant features in the 
comparison of the ridings~. 
, 
It is, however, noticeable that the families who were 
divided in allegiance, or who changed sides du~ingthe' 
struggle, were not so evenly distributed: the majority lived 
near to centres of Parliamentary influence. Thus several gentry 
in close proximity to Bradford were uncertain of their loyal-
ties, as were four out of nine in the Beverley area, fifty 
per cent of those near Bridlington (the centre of Parliamentary 
1. See Map I (in pocket at end). 
2. pee Map I. The percentage of neutrals varied from 42.4 ~ 
~orth Riding) to 45.4 % (York). That of Royalists varied 
from 27.2 % (York) to 36.2 % (West Riding). If,however, 
the Royalists and the divided families are combined, the 
variation is considerably less - from 39.4 % to 45.4 %. 
1 
I 
\ 
17. 
influence here was at Flamborough, Sir William Constable's 
residence), and a number of families on the periphery of the 
Roundhead-held Vale of Pickering. In contrast, the Pennine. 
regions and Richmondshire, where Catholicism was still strong, 
were supporters of the royal cause, and several-families 
there suffered from the Acts of Salel • 
For the purposes of this thesis, I have divided the 
county into eight regional divisions2 • The following table, 
based on these areas, illustrates the strong preponderance 
of Royalists in the West Riding (due mainly, as explained 
before, to the large numbers of gentry in that region). 
Table III:- GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ROYALISTS. 
Area 
ull H 
A 
E 
R 
C 
P 
insty 
• Yorks. 
iChmond 
leveland 
ennine 
w. Yorks. 
S. Yorks. 
T otals 
Royalists 
12 
6 
29 
28 
38 
10 
80 
26 
229 
ange es ercen age Ch d Sid P t 
or Divided Total of whole. 
5 17 5.9 
4 10 3.5 
11 40 13.9 
3 31 10.8 
13 51 17.7 
-
10 3.5 
17 91 33.6 
6 32 11.1 
59 2C5C5 .1.00.0 
Not only were the Roundheads and Cavaliers linked by 
1. There are, however, a number of families who changed sides 
in the Ripon area -.this is difficult to explain, as Ripon 
was generally in Royalist hands, and was not a notable 
.. centre of action. 
2. See introduction to Appendix V for description and ex-
planation of thet& regions. 
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their common social and economic-background, bya common 
1 
education and the rOle they played in 'local government'-
they were also united by the bonds of marriage-arid descent. 
Although gentry of similar political and religious views 
(especially the Catholics) tended to intermarry, matrimonial 
alliances were generally made with families of the same 
social status, rather than for purely political reasons. 
Influence and good birth were the cardinal requisites for a 
satisfactory match, although wealth was occasionally"regarded 
as a substitute for breeding. la ' 
Thus the Royalist gentry, although"they were closely 
linked together,were also bound by matrimony and descent 
to their Parliamentarian neighbours. For example,' the twin" 
branches of the Armitages of Kirklees and Netherton were 
related to the Rock1eys, Stringers of Whiston and Danbys of 
Farnley (20yalist); the Arthingtons and the Saviles of Lupset 
(Parliamentarian) and to Thomas Thornhill of Fixby (who 
supported both sides). Roger Portington,who raised and 
commanded his own troop of horse for the King, was nephew 
to the ardent Roundhead~ Sir Richard Dar~eyof Buttercrambe2 • 
Clans such Bsthe Slingsbys, Goodrickes and Constables were 
divided in their allegiance, different branches supporting 
different sides. 
. 
1. See Cliffe, op/ cit., passim; and especially Chapter VII." 
2. Dugdale, II, 411 ff; 428 ff. 
-la. See Appendix VIr for the interrelationship between the 
two parties. 
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'Such ~1ht8rrelationship could have widely differing 
effects. Stephen Hutchinson of Wykeham, a firm supporter' 
of Parliament, disinherited his son because the latter had 
.. fought for the King. Sir Richard Maleverer, when he compounded 
in 1649, complained that his father, the regicide Sir:Thomas, 
had stopped his annuity of £500. 'Sir Thomas refused to pay 
any maintenance at all, denying that he was responsible for 
. 1 
a son whom he regarded as a traitor. 
On the other hand, close relations with the victorious 
side often worked to the Royalist's advantage. It seems that 
Sir John Goodricke received some financial assistance from 
his Parliamentarian cousins when he began to rebuild his 
estates. It was the regicide Sir William Constable who con-
tacted John Rushworth to act as the trust purchaser for the 
confiscated estate of his kinsman, Sir Philip Constable of 
Everingham. And the Republican Slingsby Bethe~"nephew of 
Sir Henry Slingsby, was largely responsible for the recovery 
of his uncle's estates from the Treason Trustees2 • 
It is not clear as to how far these family and pre-war 
social relationships modified official Parliamentary policy. 
The government had often considerable difficulty in getting 
its orders obeyed in the provinces, but such troubles occurred 
1. Dugdale, II, 439; R.C.P., III, 5-6. 
2. History of the Goodricke Family, by C.A.Goodricke, (1885), po 24; H.Aveling, "Catholics and Parliamentary Sequestra-
tions" in AmJleforth Journal {June, 1959)p'4' Ill; D. ' 
Parsons Cede Diary of sir Henry Slingsby (1836), passim. 
,.j ~ 
20. 
in strongly Parliamentarian counties, as well as in the centres 
of Royalism. Before 1649, the local committees were too in-
dependent - after their reorganisation, they lacked the 
authority to act quickly and efficiently. Around 1647, the 
composition of the Yorkshire county committee was modified, 
the ranks of the old gentry families being augmented by loyal 
merchants and lesser members of the squirearchy. This may 
have been to.some extent dictated by a search for a more 
efficient and obedient bureaucracy,but too little is known 
of the workings of the Yorkshire committee to give a final 
answer to the probleml • 
This thesis is intended to cover a fairly wide field -
in fact, all the anti-Royalist legislation from the beginn-
ing of the civil war until the Restoration. The selection of 
the two terminal dates is purely arbitrary. Only three Roy-
alists compounded before 1645, and hardly anything is known 
-
about any of them. 1665 has been quoted as the termination 
of the work, as 29 May of that year was the last date on 
which legal actions could be initiated for the recovery of 
-land confiscated during the Interregnum. However, wherever 
pOSSible, families have been studied up to about 1680 (and 
in some cases to 1700) to discover the long-term effects of 
the fines and sales. 
1. See Chapter II for a fuller study of'thequestion. Around 
1647-8, there were identical changes in the personnel of 
other county committees. 
I 
i 
• 
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The majority of the Royalists were faced with a fine~ 
proportionate to the value of their estates, its level being 
aetermined by their degree of delinquency. No detailed ex-
amination of the composi~ions has so far appeared, with the 
exception.of the work of Professor Habakkukl • Further regional 
studies of the fines (and their efficiency with relation to 
the local committees) are needed to give a fuller picture of 
the post-war situation. As far.as Yorkshire was concerned, 
however, Dr. Chesney was certainly correct .when he described 
the delinquent's r6'le as,"'seldom merely pa~sive. He knew how 
to fend for himself,,2. But was the situation in Yorkshire 
., 
typical of the country as a whole, or did the Cavaliers in 
strongly-Royalist areas .fare differently from their compat-
• w ~ - 't 
riots in Parliamenta~districts? Only when a great deal more 
work has been done on the fines can such questions be answered. 
The compositions are relatively well documented, with 
one important exception -the dates on which the· fines were 
paid to the.Goldsmiths' Hall Committee3 • We cannot definitely 
say how many of the delinquents neglected to pay their 
compositions on time, although the evidence suggests that it 
1. Dr. Chesney's opinions have been strongly challenged of 
late, and in any case, he treats the problem only generally. 
Habakkuk has published his findings, but with no detailed i 
statistics 0 M.Coate ... has also some figures on Cornwall in i! 
her Cornwall in the Great Civil War, 1642-60, (Oxford, 1933). 
2. H.E.6hesney, "The Transference of Lands in England, 1640- I 
1660" in T.R.H.S., 4 series, XV (1932) p •• 182. I 
3. The lists of overdue fines only tell us when th~w8re ~ j 
paid, and there are no lists before 1649. 
J 
; 
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was a considerable number. Nor do we know for certain if the 
threatened resequestrations were ever imposed for such delays. 
It is also difficult to gauge the, true effect of the 
- '-, ~ . 
fines upon the Cavaliers. The 'parti"?ulars.of estate' (stat e-
ments of ,income which the delinquents had,to submit to Gold-
- i- . 1r ., ~ • 
smi ths', Hall) were supposed to quote pre-war, income, yet ,the 
~ . . . ... ... .. . .. ' ., 
only general post-composition valuations with which they can 
b,e compared - the assessments -:, were concerned wi,th current 
receipts, at the time thatth~y were ~~vied. Thus the dif,fer-
ence does not represent th,e, consequences of the fines alone: 
allowance has to be made for war damage, over-generous gifts 
to the King, and the practice of putting estates into trust 
to evade further taxation. From such sources, it is difficult 
to isolate the individu~l ~esults of the composition fines. 
These 'particular~' can be used only tentatively for 
assessing the economic position o"f t~e Cavaliers prior to 
the civil war. Evidence placed before the Committee for Ad-
vance of Money shows that a number of delinquents deliberately 
undervalued their property" attempting to reduce the amounts 
of their fines. Where the ,'particulars' can be closely 
checked against es:tate records, there is often a slight under-
valuation (small enough to avoid detection, yet large enough 
J.. • • t' 
to make an appreciable difference to ,the fine), and in some 
cases, the size of the omissions is startling. Hidden assets, 
such as mines, debts owing to the delinquent, and investments 
in trading enterprises, were apparently also frequently con-
, 
j 
j 
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cealed. Brian Cooke suppressed nearly £3000 in debts for 
almost four yearsl. 
In theory, all Cavaliers2 were supposed to compound, 
but in actual fact many avoided paying anything at all. Some 
simply remained undiscovered, despite the encouragement given 
to informers; others, although their Royalism was well known, 
were never charged with any delinquency. Thus, whilst those 
who had fled for safety to a Royalist stronghold, or who had 
voluntarily contributed to the King's war effort, were reg-
arded as enemies, ironically the Cavaliers who signed the 
" ;" 
Yorkshire Engagement never suffered for their faults. In all, 
28 per cent of the families supporting the King evaded all 
punishments for their offences. 
Only 56 per cent of the Royalist families were fined 
for their delinquency. This was the principal punishment 
they had to suffer after th~ war, but two other exactions 
are Considered in this thesis, as they shed light on the 
Cavaliers' financial position in the post-war period. The 
first of these was the twentieth. This assessment was origin-
ally limited to London, but was gradually extended to cover 
the whole country. Later, its scope was restricted to those 
who had never financially aided Parliament, and finally it 
1. R.C.P-!., II, p. 95ff; C.C.C., pp. 945-7. 
2. With the exception of the Catholics, and those excluded 
from pardon, who were not permitted (at this stage) to 
compOund. 
j 
----.~---~ 
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became a tax upon the delinquents alone. But the twentieth 
differed from the compositions in one important respect - it 
was assessed on the Cavaliers' current financial situation, 
and not on their pre-war revenues. Thus, from the reductions 
in the levy, we can 'gain some valuable information as to 
the cumulative effects of the wars and the fines l • 
For some delinquents, there was an extra burden in the 
shape of the Engagement guarantees. Certain Royalists had 
- . 
vOlu,ntarily2 offered bonds as security for a loan to Charles I 
during the early stag~s of. the ,war. Parliament now .. confiscated 
these bonds (thus depriving the creditors of all hope of 
redemption),and demanded th~ immediate payment of the guaran-
tees. For several years it~had been evident that the King. 
would be unable to meet the debt, and therefore the signa-
tories of the Engagement would have to pay in any case. The 
. - '" . 
only hardship, ther.ef~r~, wa.s the compulsion .to pay the 
debts immediately, whereas the original creditors hadbee~ 
- , 
prepared to continue the loans almost indefinitely. In fact, 
. . . . . . " 
the goverz:ment was bi tterly di~s'appointed at the poor results 
of this tax, although the failure .was partially due to its 
own mismanagement of the situation. 
Therefore the only plilnish!nent that the average delin-
quent had to face was the composition fine3 •. The.twentieth 
1. See, however,pp. 22'3. War sufferings varied greatly ... 
2. A few, however, had been compelled to sign. 
3. The decimation tax has been omitted. No records remSain, 
except for a few scattered references in PRO, SP 2 • It 
came six years after composition, and mos~states would 
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was paid by almost all (including Parliamentarians and 
neutrals), and the Engagement was a (mainly) voluntary 
association entered into by a group of Yorkshire gentry. 
In this thesis, I intend to examine (as far as is possible) 
the financial situation of the Royalists before and after 
the war, and to estimate the effects of these fines upon their 
estates. 
Fifty-four of the Yorkshire gentry families (representing 
sixty-one delin~uents) suffered the extreme punishment of 
the confiscation and sale of all of their property. Early 
historians blandly assumed that such estates were restored 
wholesale at the Restoration, but the picture is far more 
complex than this. Dr. Thirsk's pioneer study of fifty vic-
tims of the acts in the south-east revealed that the vast 
majority of the Royalists recovered their lands from the 
Commonwealth purchasers, either before or after the Restor-
ation. But, except for isolated instances where Acts of Parl-
iament or brute force were employed, the principal means of 
recovery involved the use of litigation, or the direct or 
indirect purchase of the property, both of which could be 
very expensive. Recovery was not automatic - it depended upon 
the abilities of the individual Royalist, and the existing 
owners naturally employed every means at their disposal to 
(con!!_f~~~_E!_g12! 
be-able to bear it. Other isolated taxes, such as militia 
assessments, were only sporadic, and do not seem to have 
been excessively high. 
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retain the lands they had bought. 
The majority of these delinquents were Catholics, who 
were punished more for their religion than for their loyalty 
to the King. Fifty-two (85 per cent) were recusants, whilst 
only nine lost their lands for other reasons. Such a severe 
retribution was very unfair for most of these Cavaliers, many 
of whom were relatively minor gentry. Of the forty-five 
Catholic families, only twelve had incomes of over £500 per 
annum - the majority, thirty, received between £100 and £500 
a year. Parliament, in selling the estates of these poorer 
Royalists, was using a steamroller to crack an eggt 
Here, as Dr. Thirsk discovered, government policy was 
again modified by the activities of the delinquents themselves. 
Parliament, facing the problem of disposing of a considerable 
number of small estates, amended its original intentions, 
and allowed the majority of the "traitors" to compound for 
their lands at a high rate. The remainder immediately planned 
to use every possible subtefuge in their attempts to regain 
their property. 
Unfortunately, the sales are not as well documented as 
.. L ' 
the compositions. The proceedings leading up to the actual 
transactions were made under the aegis of the Treason Trustees, 
whose records have been lost, but the actual contracts are 
l· . 
nearly always recorded on the Close Rolls • However, once 
the new owner was in possession (providing that he had paid 
1. Occasionally there are no Close Roll deeds of a sale -
e.g., that of the estate of Marmaduke HoI tby of Ska'ekleton. 
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the full price), the government lost interest in the property, 
and this, together with the gradual decline of the central 
committees under the Protectorate, leaves a gap in the 
history of these estates. 
There is regrettably little .information concerning 
these lands at.the Restoration, at a time when information 
is badly needed. For the whole crux of the land question 
rests upon whether the Royalists recovered their property, 
and, if so, at.what cost. Much reliance has to be placed upon 
the indirect evidence of the law courts and central govern-
ment departments, as well as the material contained in Clay's 
edition of Dugdale's Visitationl • 
The question of whether the victims of the Acts of Sale 
recovered their lands is only half of the problem. The 
period from 1640 to 1660 had been a time of great expense 
for the delinquents: would they succeed in overcoming their 
difficulties, and regain their pre-war economic positions? 
This is a crucial part of the Royalist problem during the 
middle years of the century, and Cavalier propaganda in the' 
months following the Restoration painted a dismal picture 
which many earlier historians accepted at its face value. 
Some of these claims are erratic in the extreme. For example, 
Sir John Oglander suggested that a hundred Yorkshire gentry 
. . , '. 2 
families were beggared by the civil war .As there were only 
1. See note on sources, Appendix VIII. 
2. Quoted in Habakkuk, loc. cit., p. 131 .{See p. 277, 2nd.' 
quotation) • 
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288 Royalist gentry families, of which only 205 suffered 
composition or sale, Oglander~$ claiming that. almost fift,r 
per cent of the gentry were in such an unstable financial 
position that they were irrevocably crippled by a fine of 
three times their unimproved annual revenue, or the sale of 
their propertyt l 
Admittedly, the cost of recovering forfeited lands by 
repurchase was extremely expensive, far more so than the price 
of compounding. But, as I hope to show later in this thesis, 
the majority of the victims of the confiscations succeeded, 
~ . 
not only in regaining their lost properties, but alsoAmanag~ 
to afford the high cost of recovery. ,If such people were 
able to raise sums equal to half the capital value of their 
property (ten years' annual rental or more), the ordinary 
compounders must surely have been able to meet their own 
relatively small fines. 
However, it is extremely difficult to discover the post-
Restoration economic position of many of the delinquents. 
Evidence is scarce, and often not really to the point - most 
of the material is indirect information. The contemporary 
sources must certainly be treated with extreme care. After 
the civil war, the Royalists had a vested interest in under-
-'II' " f< • 
estimating their resources when they had to compound: thus 
the 'particulars of estate' . are not a good basis for assessing 
1. I have omitted those who did not compound or suffer the 
confiscation of their property, as their expenses would 
be no greater than those of the average Parlianlentarian. 
-~ 
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pre-war financial positions, and certainly not the future 
potential of the estates Following the Restoration the 
Cavaliers, in their propaganda and petitions to the King, 
exaggerated both their own services and their losses. The 
calculation that Sir Marmaduke Langdale lost £160,000 in 
the King's service obviously includes not only the lands 
which he was co~led to sell, but also war damage (which 
most landowners suffered), lost rentals, and probably the. 
lost profits on his pre-war offices as weIll. 
Thus the full post-Restoration situation cannot be 
accurately discovered. Some families have left no records 
(except for their brief appearance in the' annals of one','of 
the central committees), whilst others died out in the male 
2 . 
line or became totally. extinct. Only about half of the 
Royalist families can be traced after 1660"and even here 
much of the information is sketchy. Detailed family accounts 
are rare, and most of the evidence has to be gleaned from 
other sources3• 
The post-Restoration situation is an integral part of 
the study of the compositions and land sales. It mattered 
little to a Royalist whether he retrieved his confiscated 
1. F.H.Sunderland, Marmaduke, Lo~d Langdale, ••• ,(1926) p. 231. 
2. 12 families died out in the male line during the Interreg-
num, and another 10 soon afterwards; 10 became extinct 
by 1660, and 7 more shortly afterwards. 
3. See Appendix VIII. 
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property if the cost of recovery was going to bankrupt him. 
Nor would the compounder rush to pay his fine if he knew 
that he was unable to afford the expense. Contemporary sources 
, , 
claim that the compositions were really crippling: their 
bias is evident, but is there any truth in the statements? 
Professor Habakkuk has described the constant market 
in land, which is comparable to the constant movement of 
financial 
gentry families up and down the/&&e~~ scale, some rising, 
some falling •. The problem is to separate these normal occur-
rences from the effects of the composition fines and land 
sales. Were the sufferings of the Royalists the principal 
reason. ~ for the sale of property (for there certainly was an 
appreciable market in private land during the middle decades 
of the century), were they just one of a number of contribu-
tory causes, or had they little or nothing to do with the 
sales? 
More crucial were the resul ts o~ the confisca,tions upon 
the Catholic delinquents, and the other victims or the sales. 
Did they regain their property and, if ~o, at what cost? 
Did mortgages and crippling debts compel the early resale of 
the newly-recovered lands? Or was the Interregnum merely a 
brief interlude in the normal life of the times? 
The Restoration Settlement of 1660 allowed the victims 
of the Acts of Sale to recover their property at law, but 
sales made (or endorsed) by the 'voluntary' acts of the 
Royalists were not to be reversed. Several authorities, assum-
31. 
ing that the compositions had precipitated a flood of 'vol-
untary' sales, saw in the post-1660 rivalry between the 
'ruined' Cavaliers and 'prosperous' Parliamentarians the origin 
of the growth of political parties. "Throu~hout the nation 
the seeds of later quarrels were sown, for the alienation 
. the 
of royalist estates led to/establishment ~f rival landowners 
in practically every district, and thus provided ready-made 
, .' 
leaders of opposing factions in the years which were to 
witness the rise of Tory. and Whig"l. But was it the loss 
of estates which embittered the former Royalists, or was it 
merely the results of differing political views, crystallised 
during the Interregnum? 
This thesis is not concerned with the Parliamentarians, 
and therefore no attempt will be made to discuss the poss-
ibility of a 'rise of the Roundheads' in contrast to a 
'collapse of the Cavaliers'. Naturally, if the latter did 
not decline greatly as a result of. the anti-Royalist legis-
lation, the former cannot be said to have filled their 
pockets at their rivals' expense. But an attempt to differ-
entiate between the two parties is fraught with pitfalls. 
Even during the pre-war days, county society was split by 
petty jealousies and factions, each group attempting to 
benefit at their'rivals' expense. Such divisions continued 
into the sixteen-forties, even causing splits in the ranks 
1. P. Hardacre, The Royalists during the Puritan Revolution, 
(Hague, 1956), p. 169. 
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of the Parliamentarian county committees~, which sometimes 
- , 
worked to the advantage of,the Royalists. 
The aim of this thesis is to study the various punish-. 
ments inflicted upon the defeated side, ,and to estimate their 
effect upon the Royalists. Were the Cavaliers ruined by the 
composition fines? Did the martyrs of the confiscations 
succeed in regaining their estates, and,ifso, how? I do 
not propose to attempt an answer to the thorny question as 
to how far the Royalists' losses contributed ,to the post-
Restoration development of parties, but I hope to show to 
what extent, the Cavaliers' disgust at the settlement was 
based on actual losses, . and ,how far it was a [psychological 
reaction to the liberal terms granted to their old enemies. 
1. See Chapter II~ 
, , .. .; 
CHAPTER II - THE SHARKING CONlJ'I'TITTEE-MAN .1 
(The Anti-Royalist Legislation). 
Parliamentarian policy towards the Royalists was empirical 
in character: it developed slowly through trial and error, 
originating from the two main legacies of the civil war -
the question of how to deal with the defeated party, and the 
problem of meeting the cost of the conflict. 
That the Royalists should be punished was never in any 
doubt. In the Nineteen Propositions, the thirteenth clause 
demanded: "That the justice of Parliament may pass upon all 
; . 
delinquents, whether they be within the kingdom or fled out 
of it", and the following proposition called for a general 
I 
pardon "with such exceptions as shall be advised by both 
2 - . 
Houses of Parliament" • But Parliament itself had no concrete 
idea as to how this should be accomplished. The elaborate 
arrangement.~ of sequestration and composition developed 
piecemeal through the gradual accumulation of regulations, 
its final shape being very different from the original ideas 
of its founders. 
After the King had set up his standard at Nottingham, 
Parliament responded by declaring the punishment of the 
Royalists to be one of its future intentio~s3. During the 
1. Title of work by Sir Francis Wortley. 
2. S.R.Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan 
Revolution, 16~5-1660, (1958) p. 253. 
3. Hardacre, OPe cit., p. 18. 
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early stages of the conflict, those refusing to co-operate, 
~ 
or guilty of witholding their support, were treated as opp-
onents, and the revenues from their estates were seized for 
the benefit of Parliament's war effort - in other words, 
they were sequestered. The same punishment naturally applied 
to the Royalists, and both classes were encompassed within 
the broad category of delinquents~ 
But the definition of delinquency - a word which em-
braced "far more than the true Royalists - was vague, and at 
times seemed to become even vaguer. It was impossible to 
I " 
furnish regulations to cover every contingency, and therefore 
Royalistswith"a legal turn of mind, a good excuse, and the 
"" , 
correct degree of deference some·times avoided punishment, 
whilst the less fortunate suffered~ But for those in positions 
of responsibility there was no escape~ Members of Parlia-
ment were accused of delinquency for mere absence from the 
House, and if the case was proved, were deprived of their 
seats2 .When York surrendered in 1644, the members of the 
City Council who had been in office under the Royalists were 
dismissed, although, according to the articles of surrender, 
no fines were inflicted upon them, provided that they had 
engaged in no other subversive activities3 • 
1. Francis Layton of Rawden, who refused to aid either side, 
was treated as a delinquent; John Thornhill of Fixby, 
who supported both,·" was not. 
2. O.P.H., XII and XIII, passim; Firth & Rait, I, p. 458. 
-
3. C.J~,IV, 4, 80; L.J., VII, 120. 
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The great majority of delinquents had been in active 
service for the King, either on the field, or as contributors 
to the royal cause. But a number of people were prosecuted 
for relatively insignificant offences, such as fleeing to 
a Royalist stronghold ~o escape plundering soldiers, or neg-
lecting to contribute towards the Parliamentarian armies. 
The scope of 'delinquency' gradually extended, and in the 
prosecution of many minor cases, some important Royalists 
escaped detection. 
Besides the pecuniary measures inflicted upon the delin-
quents, the latter suffered considerable losses of rights 
and privileges. All who were convicted of Royalism were dis-
qualified from holding any office and lost their rights to 
vote: decrees repeating these provisions continued to be 
passed up to the Restoration. Limitations on their movements 
were made for the duration of the fighting, but even after 
the war was over, delinquents were liable to be restricted 
to their own localities, or ordered out of London and West-
minster during times of crisis l • 
The adoption of sequestration as a source of revenue 
early in the war was prompted not only by fiscal necessity, 
but also by the logical desire to punish the opposing side, 
and deprive the King of possible sources of income. On 
1. For example, on J April 1646 (O.P.H.,XIV,3l5; c.c.c., 35-6); 
12 December (c.s.p.n.,l645-7, 495; C.J.,V,ll) and 9 July 
1647 (L.J.,IX, 322). . 
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3 February, l643,:the Commons appointed,a committee to 
consider the sequ7stration of. the estates "of all such Per-
sons as have been, are, or shall be, in actual War or Arms 
against the Parliament"l. The basic sequestration ordinance 
followed on 27,March. Besides several named persons, all who 
aided the Royalists, plundered loyal Parliamentarians, or 
joined in any oath or association detrimental to Parliament, 
we~e to be sequestered. This meant~the seizure of all property, 
real and personal. The former was .leased year by year to 
the highest bidder, and the profits paid into the Treasury 
of the neWly-created central COmmittee for Seque~trationst or 
used to support local armed forces. Personal estate was 
. , , 
auctioned, the previous owner having been first offered an 
opportunity to repurchase it. Local co~~ittees for seques-
trations were appointed, and granted powers to administer 
the running of estates, as well as authority to demand the, 
payment of debts owed to delinquents, and to give legal 
discharges in return2 • A clause indemnified these officials 
whilst they were . carrying ,out their tasks: it proved of 
doubtful value at first, since the Royalists still controlled 
many areas, and the possib~lity of their victory was not 
1. O.P.H., XII, 162. 
2. Debts, as ~ersonal estate,could be seized by the state 
at any time before the delinquent petitioned to compound, 
- and even afterwards, if they had been concealed. Few 
debtors paid their debts to the government, unless forced 
to do so, because of the doubtful legality of the discharge. 
extinguished until after Marston Moorl. 
Regrettably, Parliament's constant demand for money 
led to the widening of the scope of delinquency. One of 
the classes originally included for sequestration comprised 
those who " • • • have voluntarily contributed (to the King) 
not being under the kings army at the tyme of such contri-
butiontt2 • Despite the pleas of many Yorkshire Royalists 
that only force had induced them to give money and assistance 
to the Earl of Newcastle, such persons were treated as 
delinquents. This was due to a much more severe ordinance of 
18 August, which added to the list of Royalists,all who 
would not contribute to Parliament's forces, who left home 
for a royal stronghold and did not return to offer a valid 
excuse3, or who concealed their estates from the assessors. 
The county committees were granted further powers, and an 
introduction was made to the nefarious practice of encouraging 
informers by offering a shilling in the pound for the dis-
covery of concealed property4. 
One benefit, however~ was granted to the delinquent in 
this second ordinance. A fifth of his sequestered revenue 
1. Firth & Rait, I, 106 ff; O.P.H.,XII,·227. 
2. spencer-stanhope MaS (Sheffield), 60263 (n.d.). 
3. A number of Yorkshiremen claimed that they had fled to 
York to avoid marauding soldiers (Royalists, of coursel) 
but had been prevented from leaving the city before the 
siege. The Committee, however, refused to accept this as 
a valid excuse. 
4. Firth & Rait, I, 256. 
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was allowed to his wife and family. In practice~ the county 
committees were often tardy in paying the sum, and frequent 
abuses led to the termination of the systeminl647. But 
while it lasted, this grant was instrumental in keeping 
many Royalist families above the level of extreme poverty. 
Thus sequestration was established. It relied a great 
deal upon the abilities of the local committeemenl • In 
counties under Royalist control, the ordinance naturally 
proved to be a dead letter at'first, but even where the 
Parliamentarians were in power, inefficien~y on the part 
of the county committee or its officers could ruin the 
scheme. It appears that these'latter had considerable diffi-
culty in administering estates under their authority: 'they 
were supposed to raise the rents to the highest possible 
level, but in practice had to be content to let matters stay 
much as they were2 • This lack of success is:understandable, 
however, for it was in the interests Of all parties concerned 
(except the commissioners) to undervalue the property. The 
Royalist hoped that some revenue might still come into his 
hands, the tenant wanted a low rent, and the prospective 
state lessee aimed for as great a profit aa possible. In the 
case of estates damaged during the wars, or where necessary 
maintenance had been neglected (such as the upkeep of the 
banks of the River Humber), the single-year leases gave 
1. See pp. 55 ff. 
2. C.C.C., Part I, passim. 
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insufficient incentive to occupiers to improve the value of 
the property, or to effect repairs. The county committees, 
as the agents in the middle, were attacked by both sides; 
by the local inhabitants for the unpopularity of their 
actions, and by the Committee for Sequestrations !or being 
(allegedly) sympathetic to ,the Royalists. 
It is not really surprising that. the income from seques-
trations was disappointing, and always seemed to be in arrears. 
The arrangements for paying the revenues to the Committee's 
treasury in London (at Haberdashers' Hall) were haphazard 
in the extreme. Local authorities were supposed to render 
their, accounts regularly, along with such funds as remained 
in their hands, and receipts for money disbursed locally. 
But a great deal of the sequestered revenues was spent in· 
the provinces. During times of war, all the profits were 
awarded to the local commander .. in· the area (who would prob-
ably have seized them anyway), which re~ulted in the central 
Committee losing not only the-money, but probably all trace 
of it as well l • 
In an attempt to increase the revenues from sequestered 
estates, Parliament issued comprehensive instructions, and 
, " -
aimed at preventing the widespread evasion ofits.ordinances. 2 
It is very doubtful whether these would have succeeded: the 
seventeenth-century government was hardly capable of admin-
• 'i 
1. BM - Add. MSS. 5508; ,C.C.C., p .• 15l. 
--- -. 
2. 25·Ray, l644.(Firth & Rait,I, 437); 8 December, 1646, 
(C.J~, V, p.4). 
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istering a system which needed a twentieth-century bureau-
cracy.The sequestration machinery was an immense and complex 
organisation, frequently on the verge'of breaking down. As 
an income-producing device, it was relatively inefficient; 
- Dr. Everitt has calculated that over half the total revenues 
received were employed in the administration of the estates 
concernedl • It provided ideal opportunities for fraud and 
peculation to,the unpaid local committeemen, although the 
vast majority of officials seem to have been fairly honest'. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore.;~ that the. system was 
I . 
super/eded by another method of penalising the delinquent: 
the composition fine., ' 
The development ot sequestration into some arrangement 
similar to composition was virtually inevitable. Some hist-
orians have pictured the transition as one necessitated 
principally by financial need2• Although the fiscal motive 
was ever-present, the continuance of sequestration on its 
own would have been a suicidal policy. Despite the impossib-
ility ot administering the system efficiently, as mentioned 
above, it otfered nothing in the way of an olive branch to 
the Royalists. They would have been financially annihilated, 
and any future move towards 'reconstruction' would have been 
doomed at the outset. Another factor to note is that, had 
1. A.M.Everi tt,; ,The County Cormni ttee of Kent, (Leicester 
Occasional Papers in Local History, no. 9, March, 1957),39. 
2. For example, S.J.Madge, The Domesday of Crown Lands, 
(1938), p. 68. " 
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financial need been the sole motive for introducing compos-
ition, the rate of two years' value for the fine was rela-
tively low - most Royalists were capable of paying consid-
erably more. After all, the assessment imposed by Parliament 
upon its own supporters w&sroughly equal to half the basic 
fine l • ' ' 
The reason for the swing to composition was most likely 
a combination ofa number of factors. Pa~liament wanted money 
. extra 
ur~ently!~and/t~~ high fines might have delayed payments); a 
more efficient method of raising revenue was needed; and 
. , ' 
it was hoped that generous te~s would induce the Royalists 
; . 
to leave the King's side. Thi's latter aim can b'e seen in 
the offering of lower fines to all who surrendered before a 
ceI1ain date. ' Despite'its success, the many Royalists who 
deserted the King during late 1644 did so mainly because of 
. . 
the collapse of the Royalist cause in the north, and proved 
unwilling to compound until after the King's final defeat 
in 1645~ 
The foundations 'of composition rested upon the "Declara-
tion of Both Kingdoms" of 30 January, 1644. This'offered a 
~ ~. 
free pardon to all common soldiers, but warned those of higher 
rank to expect some type of fine before they were fully par-
doned. Catholics, to whom most,of the past,troubles were 
, - 2 
attributed, were to receive scan~ mercy : 
1. Admittedly, the Royalists had to.pay the assessment as well, 
but this was not considered when the fines were calculated. 
2. C.C.C., Part Vt Introduction, vi-ix. 
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Originally, Royalists submitted .their petitions to com-
pound to Parliament, the first composition being ~hat of' , 
Sir Edward Dering on 7 February, 16441 • The Commons also 
took the initiative in offering·tms opportunity to imprisoned 
Royalists, who, were uS,ually quick to accept,. as it was their 
. 2 
only means of obtaining their freedom .,But,Parliament had I' 
not the time to administer the technicalities ot the system. 
itself - these it placed in the hands of a committee which 
. . 
soon became an object of hatred for the Royalists: the Com-
mittee of, Goldsmiths' Hall. 
Originally created to consider the raising of money 
to pay the Scots army, (2 Oc~ober, 1643)3, Goldsmiths' Hall 
Commi ttee had the control of c~mposi tions ,thrust upon it: " 
during the following th~ee ye~rs. On 13 September 1644 it 
was empowered to compound with delinquents in order to,raise 
£15,000 for a month's pay for FairfaX~s~my4. Throughout 
the next tifteen months, the Committee graduallY,obtained 
greater control over the administration of fines, , being made 
the sole authority for them in October, 16455• After 2_ 
December, pet1tionsto compound.had to be ,presented directly 
to Goldsmiths' Hall, instead of through the medium of Parl-
i , 
1. C.C.C.', Pt. V, Introduction, p. Ix. 
2. Ibid, p. 20: E.g., Sir John Goodricke (C.J., IV,492). 
3. c.c.c., p.l. It recommended the prosecution ot'compositions, 
with the sale of the lands of those who would not compound. 
4. C.C.C., p. 10. 5. Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
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iamentl. Finally, in 1646 and early 1647, the Committee 
was awarded powers to desequester estates, administer oaths, 
and summon and imprison those who were slow in compounding2• 
A set procedure had to be followed by Royalists wishing 
to compound. Armed with a pass to come down to London, the 
delinquent presented his petition, his 'particular o~ estate,3, 
and a certificate of his having taken the Covenant, to Gold-
~, 
smiths' Hall Committee. Here he took the Negative Oath 
(never to aid the King's forces without the permission of 
Parliament). Royalists who were physically incapacitated 
were allowed to take the oath before their local committees, 
and then compounded by proxy. A second oath was also im-
posed - the Oath of Abjuration, which sweepingly denied all 
the principles of Catholicism, and thus any who refused to 
take it were branded as Papists, and denied the right to 
compound. 
Some Royalists took these oaths well in their stride -
a piece of doggerel of the times illustrates the current 
attitude towards the Committee for Compounding (as Gold-
smiths' Hall Committee came to be called). 
1. C.C.C., Pt. V, Preface, Ix. 
2. O.J., V, 481; C.O.O., pp. 33-40. 
3. The 'particular"was a sworn statement by the delinquent 
of his real and personal estate, upon which his tine 
was based. - . . 
"Since Goldsmiths' Committee 
Affords us no pity, 
Our sorrows in wine we will steep 'em; 
They force us to take ' 
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Two oaths, but, we'll make " . 
A third, that we ne'er meant to keep;'em"l. 
It is not ce~tain what importance the Committee placed 
. .'. ~ . 
on the effects of these oaths, but ,it is significant that 
'. ~ ~ 
those Royalists who broke 'the Negative Oath, and fought for 
" . 
the King in the second civil war, were simply fined at a 
. I 
sixth (for sur~ender1ng after1'December, 1645), and received 
. " 
no extra penalties for their disloyalty. 
',had . " , , 
Once the oaths/been taken, the evidences of the Royal-
. , 
" . 
ist's delinquency, together with the particulars of his 
" , . 
income, were submitted to the Committee's lawyer, who pre-
1 
pared a report, summarising the value of the property, and 
recommending a fine. When the delinquent had paid half, and 
given security for the remainder, his sequestration was sus-
pended, . conditional,' upon payment of the. rest of the fine wi thin i 
six weeks of Parliament's approving the sum2• Similarly,.' 
within a month (a period later extended' to six weeks), the 
delinquent had to sue. out a pardon under the Great Seal',' or 
else his composition became invalid3• 
1. Quoted in Hardacre'~' op;h"ci t. ~ p; 22 :'._ .. , .. »..... .- __ ,n .•. 
2. Later, in March 1648,' those with fines', of' two:"thirds w~re 
desequestered upon payment of only a:-illiarter of the fine. 
3. C.J .,IV, 304; c.c.c., Pt. V, Preface; ·p.x~. Christopher 
Bttf considers \Eat the pardon was only granted after the 
. whole. fine had been paid ( "Agrarian Legislation ,.of.the 
the Interregnum", in E.H.R., LV (1940) p.231). However, 
out of the nine cases in Yorkshire where the dates of Doth 
final payments and pardons remain, the former precedes 
45. 
As the Royalist himself gave notification of his estate, 
the opportunities to undervalue it, or to conceal part, . 
were naturally great. The Commons endeavoured to prevent 
this by threatening dishonest compounders with the loss of 
all personalty and an-additional fine of four times the 
annual value of the real estate. This threat had little 
success, as the numerous informations of such practices show. 
Eventually, in March 1649, Parliament offered an amnesty 
for concealed or undervalued estates ~ they could be com-
pounded for at the original rate paid by the delinquent; ~ 
unsequestered '. Royalists paying the basic rate of a tenth1 • 
There, followed a wave of compositions, motivated· by these 
generous terms, but a considerable number of Royalists still 
remained undiscovered, and their delinquency was never 
revealed. 
The original rates of the composition fines had been 
mentioned in the Treaty of Uxbridge in November 1644. The 
. . 
average delinquent was to pay a tenth of his estate, but 
those who had been in positions of trust or responsibility. 
. 7 
1. C.C.C., 138-9. 
TC2Bt~ ft2! E~_!4J 
tne latter rn only one instance~ Ihen half the fine was 
settled, the delinquent signed a bond for the remainder: 
this made him merely a state.·debtor on a short-term loan. 
This principle was later amplified when resequestration 
for non-parment was replaced by interest charged at 8~ 
(see p.65 ). 
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.. , . 
," 
such as members of the clerical, legal and teaching prof-
" ,~.~ ... .,~ " 
essions, or who had sat in Parliament, 'were to be fined at 
thi..rd. -a~~. Catholic delinquents, Royalists engaged in the 
Irish rebellion, 'and fifty-eight named deii~que~ts were to 
, 1 . • lose all their'estates • These provisions were later modi-
fied to apply only to Royalists surrenderin'g before' '1 Decem-
" ber 1645; the rest were to be fined at a sixth and a half 
2 
respectively • ' 
, These penalties were somewhat ameliorated by the method 
of assessing thecapitsl value of the estates. At a tenth, 
this was calculated at twenty years~ pm-ehas'e', which meant 
" 
two years' income for land held in fee simple. For a sixth, 
the estate was regarded as eighteen years' value (three 'years' 
. ' " " - j 
income), and for fimes at a \third or~ ~"'half; the property 
, ' , 
counted as fifteen years' purchase (five and" seven-and-a-
half years' income respectively). In cases' ot land held' in . ~ 
tail, fines were correspondingly lower, depending on whether 
the estate fell to the delinquent's issue 'on his death. Com-
plicated tables were drawn up to allow for every possible 
contingency3. Where the Royalist was, by entail, the pros-
peotive inheritor of property, he had to compound for it "in 
1. Gardiner, Ope Cit., 278-81. The number of those excluded 
from pardon varied from time to time. 
2. C.J., IV,297, (4 October 1645); C.C.C.,.35"(31 March 1646). 
3. EEQ - SP 23/G249/ •• 70,71. 
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expectation": .this proved especially ·unfortunate if both 
father,and son happened to be delinquents. In situations 
where,the compound~r was engaged in litigation, and,did not 
want.to pay the fine before the estate was recovered, he, 
was allowed a "saving to compound .... This enabled him to pay 
(at the original rate) on regaining ownership, without any 
excess charges for concealment. However, this scheme was, 
soon adapted by the Royalists as another convenient method 
of concealing assetsl. 
At first, those with less than £10 a year in '.land or 
£200 in money were allowed a free pardon. Abuses of this 
system soon, led to its repeal: the result was a vindictive 
prosecuti?n of all delinquents, resulting in ridiculous fines 
2 
such as two-and-a-half marks and £1-3-4d •• 
. -' - . 
The process of composition proved expensive, apart from 
the fines. There was a set scale of fees for each official, 
, 
and every copy and ?rder had to be paid for by the delin-
quent concer~ed. Even, where the, charge of delinquency was 
dism1sse~, and the rents restored, the various agents were 
authorised to deduct their fees. A heavy waiting list of 
cases before the Committee offered a great incentive for 
bribery to obtain speedy decisions. Although the commissioners 
* '" , ! 
themselves appear to have been relatively honest, their poorly-
paid clerks were forever facing temptation3• 
1. ~ - SP 23/G l2/pp. 513-21. .. 
2. Marmaduke Monckton (R.C.P~, III 26); Christopher Metcalfe, 
(~. , III, 41). . 
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As the machinery of composition swung slowly into 
, , 
action, Parliament attempted to close the 'various obvious 
gaps in the system. One ordinance of 9 September 1645 denied 
•• >, • 
the fifth to families who were normally resident in Royalist 
." I' ',--
strongholds (and only left them to collect their allowance). 
This demand for evidence 'of a true change of heart often made 
it difficult to obtain the money, especially if the county 
, , 1 
committee was very anti-Royalist. Also, sequestered estates 
were forbidden to be farmed out to their delinquent owners 
unless the latter could prove that they were actually in 
• ' 2 . i 
the process of compounding • Thus the government attempted 
, " ~ i-
to employ financial measures to compel the delinquents to . 
surrender. Such orders were punctuated by frequent exhorta-
tions to the' local committees to tighten up on regulati~ns 
and administration, a well-nigh impossible task 'in some 
areas, where the countryside was atill suffering from the 
dislocations of war. 
Although,' as has been noted, many Royalists left the' 
King's side and surrendered during 1644 and 1645~.·compositions 
, , 
were not quickly forthcoming. The majority of these delinquents 
were waiting on the sidelines for the outcome of the struggle. 
Sir David Watkins, examining the work of the Committee, c 
advanced seventeen pOints whioh he oonsidered to be instru-
1. Firth & Rait,I,769; L.J., VII, 574. 
2. C.J.,IV, 718. 
3. The Committee for Compuanding was accused of many crimes 
by the Royalists, but there is little in the way of 
conorete evidence. 
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mental in obstructing the free flow of compositionsl • 
Besides the obvious reason that many Royalists wanted to see 
the King victorious, he suggested that there were two prin-
cipal causes for the hesitation in compounding. Firstly, 
the higher fines of a half and two-thirds would, when added 
to the debts incurred prior to and during the~war, leave 
little or nothing to the Cavaliers. Even where only a tenth 
was paid, the assessment which became due afterwards~ deterred 
many from compounding. Secondly, a combination of vague 
regulations and red tape slowed down proceedings which were 
already difficult enough, since the local committees had a 
tendency to emphasize their own independence. He added that 
the central committee had insufficient powers to check on 
the accuracy ot the delinquents' 'particulars of estate,3. 
All these points were quite valid - the empirical devel-
opment of the Committee had led it to outgrow its powers, 
and its authority in the provinces was weak. Therefore, 
during 1646, its powers were to some extent rationalised4• 
It received detailed instructions from Parliament, and was 
allowed to formulate policy in a limited way. But. to the 
very end of its existence, the Committee for Compounding was 
.' ,~ t 
1. See Chapter III for the rate of compounding in Yorkshire. 
2. See Chapter IV and pp. 70 ff. 
3. ? 12 August, 1645 ( C.C.C., 23-4). 
4. supra, pp. 42-3. 
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hampered by the need to ask permission over various matters 
from a Parliament which was ,unwilling to delegate full 
authority, arid yet rarely had the time to deal with the 
subject itself. 
The Commons characteristically attempted to expedite 
the payment of-compositions,by~orce~ Regulations were intro-
duced.'commanding all who surrendered before December-1645 
to compound by the following Februaryl. This time,limit was 
continually being extended due to the poor response. On 3 
September 1646, certain delinquents who 'did not. commence ~ 
proceedings'wtthin a month were threatened'with forfeiture -
again, (,Vto' no avai12:, Pollowing the' second civil' war, a 
similar campaign of nerves was "insti tuted; eventually; on 
the recommendations·ot Goldsmiths' Hall, the deadline was 
deferred so frequently'that:it went completely unheeded3• 
It was the ", collapse, ot the Hing' s cause in mid- and, 
late 1645, rather than'the'menaces of Parliament, which pre-
cipitated the great wave ot compositions in the following' 
year~ Now that there was'no'hope of reliet,.Royalists suftering 
from sequestration hurried to London to make their peace 
with the government. - . ; , 
'In this first flush of victory,' as the, revenues began, 
," -. 
• ~ i. 
1. December, 1645 - C.C.C., 29. 
2. C.J., IV, 661; C.C.C.,· 45. 
3. C.C.C.' 139, 144-5. 
, " 
to pour in, Parliament showed its erratic method of dealing 
with the financial· crisis. Despite heavy outstanding debts 
to City merchants, and the arrears of pay due to the troops, 
it liberally rewarded its successful generals, and freely 
granted compensation to all who had suffered-for the Cause. 
Thomas Stockdale of Eilton Park received £1200 from Sir John 
Goodricke's fine, and Sir William Lister of-Thornton-in-
Craven was accorded £1500 from,the estate ot a Gloucester 
Royalistl • 
Composition revenues began to decline in 1647, and slumped 
heavily at the time of the second civil war. The Committee 
for Compounding was also.finding that it was one thing to 
collect half the fine under duress trom the delinquents -
it was quite another matter to extract the remainder 1 {It is 
true that some Royalists were models ot propriety - probably 
the majority paid their fines on time, for where the 'com-
pounder obeyed his instructions, no·trace of any punitive 
action.!. remain. ~ It is only where the Committee for Compounding : 
had to take steps to collect the sbm that we are left with 
any records.). 
" But a considerable number of Royalists, in trying to 
avoid paying their full fines, collided with the authorities. 
Technically their estates should have been resequestered, 
but in practice this procedure fell into arrears, especially 
during the second civil war. After hostilities had ceased 
1. C.J. IV, 487; c.c.c., 38. 
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a new principle was therefore introduced: overdue fines would 
be charged interest at eight,per cent, plus a quarter of 
the original fine as punishment~ This had the immediate 
effect of hastening payments. But probably the most successful 
method of enforcing sett1ements\was the ~st.Act of Sale, 
of 16 July 1651. In~the following January, when everyone 
knew that a second act was passing through the Commons, the 
Committee challenged all sem1~compounded Royalists with 
their outstanding debts •. The result was astonishing. A'-' 
subsequent survey on the 5 May discovered.that nearly all 
had paid their, full dues - the writing on the wall had been 
plain to·seel 
One of the most unfortunate developments of the,compos-
i tion, syst~m, was the custom of. allowing a percentage of ' .. 
the profits to informers who discovered concea1ed·or under~ 
valued estates. This often meant that the poorer delinquents 
went·. undetected, whilst the richer Royalists were continually 
2 being subjected to the wildest accusations • The resulting 
wave of informations in early 1645, many of them false, led 
the Commons in April to demand that all would-be accusers ' 
gain Parliamentary approval before tendering their eVidences3 • 
. . ; 
1. Act, of 9 April, 1649: Firth &: Rait,II,57'ff~" 
" 2. Brian Cooke, a rich Do~ster alderman, carried on a runn-ing battle with Lieutenant Sanderson over the matter of 
allegedly concealed debts. ~, 
\ ' 
3~' C.C.A.M., 39 ff.; 29 Aprill645 (ibid., 4)-4); C.J. IV, 126. 
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Originally the informant was allowed between a half and 
a fifth of the profits of the finel • This share was not so 
generous as it appears, since the discoverer had to produce 
full particulars, including the names and testimonials of 
witnesses, and, at a later time, had to deposit a £200 bond 
in Parliament as evidence of his good faith2. 
Soon the proportion of the discovered estate which went 
to the informant was reduced (June, 1648) to five per cent, 
although soldiers with arrears of pay were generally allowed 
more favourable terms3 • The number of indictments dropped 
drastically, and the Committee for Advance of Maney (which 
dealt with informations) was bombarded with cryptic messages 
demanding at least a fifth as the price of discovery. This 
was finally granted,' but the increasing regulations surround-
ing informants prevented any improvement in the situation4• 
The unfortunate fact was that informations were necessary 
in this situation where the Committee for Compounding had 
to rely upon the honesty of the Royalist. But it lent an 
unsavoury note to the whole proceedings; the regulations 
suggest that there was much abuse of the practice, and that 
1. If an officer with arrears, the informer was usually 
allowed a half (and occasionally the whole fine); other 
informers generally received only a fifth. C.O.a.M., 
Introduction, p. x. 
2~ C.O.A.M.,· 41;ioil.,. Introduction, p. x-xi. 
3. c.c.c., 125~6. 
4. C.C.A.M., 97, 101. 
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the system was used to settle personal scores. As the reward 
<' for the ordinary informer was orily a'twentieth of the'estate 
(a third of the minimum fine the delinquent· would have'to 
pay)l, there was every incentive for blackmail on the part 
of the informant, and bribery on the part of his victim. 
But there is the other side to the matter. The Royalists 
could no doubt bribe witnesses as well as the informer, and 
discovering delinquents' esta.tes was' probably the only means 
the latter had of'obtaining his arrears'of pay for war service.: 
Colonel Alexander Rigby's touching appeal to the Committee 
for Advance of Money (that illegal informers were'depriving 
his men of their only way of earning their living) may be 
exaggerated, but it is certainly symbolic of the frustration 
. \ 
of those who had fought long for Parliament, and now felt 
2 
cheated of their just reward • 
The whole system might have been unbearable but for the 
fa1rness of the central committees. Royalists at the time 
viciously attacked them, but, in general, they interpreted 
the laws with studied honesty. If there was no concrete 
prodf of delinquency, the accused was d1smissed, with full 
arrears of rent. To prevent numerous ill-founded cla1ms of 
innocence, the Committee for Compounding demanded that half, 
1. The fine for concealed lands depended upon the rate ot 
original campos1tions, usually being raisEdone step:~us 
1110 rose to 1/6; 1/6 to 1/3; 1/3 to 1/2, and 1/2'to7~. 
C.C.C., Pt. I, Preface, p. xvi. . . 
2. C.C.A.M., 47-8. 
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the fine be paid before the case could be heard; where 
the charge was dismissed, full restitution was made. In 
several instances, the fine was reduced where the delinquent 
had compounded upon Articles of War, or where the estate 
was incorrectly assessedl • 
The Committee for Compounding was only one half of 
the administration - at the local level, there were the 
county committees. Each county had its general committee, 
usually nominated by Parliament from among the loyalists 
who had fought against the King. In Kent, however, the county 
authority developed from meetings of the deputy lieutenants 
which were gradually invested with the necessary powers of 
local rule. As each new piece of anti-Royalist legislation 
was passed, regional Oommittees for Assessments and Seques-
trations were created by Parliament, though in practice 
they proved to have the same personnel as the general assembly. 
The sole outsider was the Accounts Committee, which was 
firmly controlled from London, to ensure some measure of 
financial supervision over the county authorities2 • 
1. C.C.C., Pt. V, Preface, xvi-xvii. These Articles of War 
were not recognised in some cases, where the local com-
mander had had no authority to grant them, and even where 
they had been accepted, local committees sometimes attem-
pted to contravene them. 
2. In the absence of any study of the Committee of York, and 
since the committee books are relatively devoid of inform-
ation, much reliance for this section has been placed on 
works covering other counties. These are: A.M.Everitt, 
· IT ._ *f,~~ 
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Each of these county committees worked as a unit for 
the general administration of its area, but divided into 
sub-committees based on the major towns to maintain more 
direct control over the various divisions of the county.' 
Though there was only one such Oeneral Purposes Committee 
for Yorkshire, four separate bodies existed for sequestrations 
and assessments: one for each riding, and one for the City 
and Ainsty of York. (Occasionally Hull was also treated as 
a separate entity~) These latter worked on the same principles 
as the General Committee. They acted both as united assem-
blies,'and as 'individual councils of two or three members 
to 'deal with the organisation of their specific hundreds 
or'groups·of:parishes. 
The habit of nominating the same men to the different 
committees year by year gave the latter some measure of 
continUity, though it tended to overwork the members, (who, 
after all, had their own estates and private lives to con-
sider)1. After 1647, with the gradual decline in the numbers 
1. The weekly assessment of 24 February 1643 created a 22-man 
, ,committee in the West Riding. On the Sequestration Com- , 
mittee of 27 March, and five subsequent assessment comm1ttee~i 
1642-47, the numbers of the original members (and the ' 
total numbers) were as follows: 19 (22 total); 22(23); 
20 (22)t20 (26); 15 (30); 11 (21). 
1cont. trom ~. 55). 
sulloli-ana-ffie-~reat Rebellion 1640-60 (1961); and The 
County Committee of Kent; M.Coate~;t cr~"l:l ~l.,:;th.·.G6ir·"·! .. t-
Civil 'ari J. :Bitten, "Somerset Sequi!'ra'3:ons during the 
'Civil war , in Somerset Archaeological and Natural His~ 
society proceedin,sl IV (1854) ~p. 60.-77; XVI (1871) :pp;J.3-34; 
D H.Pennington i .• Roots, .(LeO __ ,".e at Stafford, 1643-
~ (staffordshire Historical Collections, 4 series, I,. 1957); 
and MaYo, C.H. (ed.) Minute Book of the Dorset Standing 
committ~, (Exeter, 1902). 
"' 
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of the Yorkshire Committee, its personnel also changed, 
resulting in an increase in the percentage of merchants and 
men of lower gentry status. This development is comparable 
with the transformation in the Kent Committee following the 
1648 rebellionl • 
The commissioners were aided by paid officials, who 
acted in capacities such as clerks, treasurers and agents. 
Most were allowed a small salary, but the assessment and rent 
collectors took a minute percentage of their net profits. 
There was considerable competition for such posts, which 
usually went to ex-soldiers, especially those with unpaid 
arrears. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, Parliament 
placed a limit on·the number of agents that each committee 
was allowed - this meant a great deal of work for officers 
in large counties, such as Devon and the west Riding. The 
agents and collectors led a hard life, spending much of their 
time in the saddle, collecting both rents and frequent abuses. 
The character of the county committees depended upon 
'I~ 
the character of the local gentry who staffed them. That of 
Suffolk was virtually controlled by the powerful Barnardistons, 
whilst Kent·~ was ruled in a dictatorial fashion by a small 
group of wealthy local gentry led, for part of the time, by 
Sir Anthony Weldon. A democratic custom prevailed in Staff-
ondshire, each of the members holding the chair in rotation. 
1. Everitt, Kent COmmittee, p. 27; lirth & Rait,pass1m (for 
the commi~tee members). 
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In Yorkshire, the nominal leader was Lord Fairfax, but 
since he took little part in county government, authority 
devolved upon a clique of York merchants and ex-soldier gen-
tryl. 
Theoretically,the county committees were supposed to 
be the agents and representatives of Parliament: in actual 
fact they all tried to be (and in part, succeeded in being) 
independent. The extent of their success depended largely 
upon the attitude and temperament of their leaders. Sir 
Anthony Weldon in Kent even challenged the authority of 
Parliament at times, but in general, the furthest most com-
mittees dared to go was in neglecting the instructions of 
the Committee for Compounding. Orders to desequester lands 
of delinquents acquitted of Royalism were ignored for several 
months, and the multitudinous demands of the central committees 
often ended in the waste paper basket.2 
The power and influence of the county committees in their 
own localities depended to a large extent on the strength of 
Royalist sentiment in the area, and the ruthlessness 'with 
which the commissioners were prepared to suppress it. Although 
they had nominal authority to employ the trained bands, this 
method failed in practice in strongly-Cavalier regions, 
1. Everitt, Suffolk, 26; Kent, 21-29; Pennington & Roots, 
Stafford, 24-5; Firth & Rais,I, passim. 
2. Everitt, Kent, 13; Pennington & Roots, 0E. cit., 31. 
Everitt cIiIms that the poor success of centralisation 
was due to the weakness of Parliament (Kent, 18). 
-
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where the soldiers sometimes refused to act against their 
1 former peacetime commanders. Where local sentiment led to 
difficulties in collecting sequestered rents, the commission-
ers were often accused by their superiors in London of 
being far too lenient towards the delinqUents2• This charge 
is certainly not borne out by the attacks of the Royalists 
upon their. oppressors: 
" ••• Now a Committee-man is a party-ColoUr'd 
officer ••• He out-dives a Dutch man, gets a noble 
. of him that was never worth sixpence; ••• He 
aliens a Delinquent's Estate with as little Remorse 
as his other Holiness gives away an Heretick's 
kingdom." 
" No matter what's the crime, a good Estate's 
Delinquency enough to ground their hate." 3 
. Most of theeeaccusations were unfair, although the 
delinquents had a case in that desequestration was often 
very slow. There certainly were some instances of injustice 
and personal vengeance: Sir Richard.Vyvyan Buffered from the 
depradations of the Cornish Committee, and Sir Robert Hild-
yard in Yorkshire had great difficulty in forcing the Oom-' 
mittee of Hull to relinquish some of his property.4 However, 
there were also times when the Royalists were quite prepared 
to take advantage of a dishonest official. Martin lIes, 
1. C.O.C., Pt. I, passim~ . 2. Ibid~, Pt. I, Preface,ix. 
3. "The Character of a County-Committee-Man" and "A Committee" 
from J. Cleveland, Works, (1699), 73-5; 208. 
4. Coate.', Cornwall, 228-30; O.S.P.D. 1645-7, 581. 
60. 
sequestrator of Skyrack parish, accepted a lease at,h~lf '., 
value from John Harrison of Leeds in return for not seques~ 
tering him, and when Harrison's delinquency was finally., 
discovered, Ilestr1ed,to.obtain his discharge. When this 
failed, he leased the sequestered estates,worth £200 ay-ear, 
o~ • .' 
to Harrison for twenty marks, and neglected to account for 
even this pittance. The informer of this fraud claimed.Yhat 
Iles "refrained from prosecuting those who would give him 
money". 1. • r 
Although accusations were. made, against officers. in other 
counties, and a committee was established to enquire into 
such matters2, local officials appear to have been com-
paratively honest-. at least" ,by seventeenth~·century stan-
dards. But tales of greed and peculation persisted. "1 find, 
upon inquiry, that Corney is only a surveyor of delinquents' c; 
lands, but has got a very great estate together, and ha.B 
lately married to a great fortune" 3. 
, (' 
But, from the government's point of view, the greatest 
failing of the'tocal ~oIDmitt~:s was their lack of 'efficiency 
i~ managing sequestered~~tate~~The're' ~eems to : have' been 
, !< ., 
li ttle trouble in discovering the d'elinquents' '- 'this part'" 
\ -
of the operation, assisted as i t'was by the 'informers, was" 
'.' '1 r-
1. C.C.A.M., 1327.' 
_ "<!l 
2. C.C.C., 400-401; 409; 512-3; C.J., IV, 244 (August 1645). 
-3. ·C.S.P.D. 1652-3, 443. '. _ 
4. See Anpendix I for the consequences of this upon rat~s-­
of composition. L 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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well organised. After all, even in Royalist Yorkshire, less 
than twenty per cent of the delinquents evaded sequestration 
at some time or' other. Parliament's main objection was 
that the administration of the estates was faulty - the 
revenues should have been much higher and far more promptly 
paid. 
In part, the blame lay at the government's own door. 
• • • > 
The local authorities had been created in a very haphazard 
fashion ~ duty had been piled on top of duty, and various 
acts and regulations had issued instructions, amended them, 
and cancelled them, with astonishing rapidity. Parliament 
. ,'. 
had neither endowed the county committees with'sufficient· 
authority to act independently, nor yet restricted them to 
the position of mere local representatives: thus, suspended 
half-way between power and obedience, they showed considerable 
diversity in the ways in which they carried out their ordersl • 
The commissioners were also badly 'over-worked, with 
insufficient staff, and appeals for more officers were 
. , 
firmly rejected. In the·' case of some of the agents, pay was 
determined by the sums collected or the numbers of journeys 
unde~taken: as the sequestration revenues declined with the 
2 increase in compositio~ these officials suffered accordingly. 
1. Badgered as they were~ by three separate central committees, 
(for Compounding, Sequestrations, and Advance ot Money), it 
is a tribute that these committees worked at allt 
2. Both COmmissioners and paid officials were allowed expenses;. 
Dr. Everitt suggests that they made the most of them. The 
Kent Committee's house at Knole was described as a "glor-
ious seraglio" by the Royalists (Kent, 37.) 
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Overwork and underpayment ,.led . ~o slackness in supervising 
the diechargdfof estates. The efficient administration of 
lands, which was n~cessary to 1ncre~se revenues, demanded a 
far ,closer ,control of their management_and,rent'collection 
than could "be provided by ,the over-extended county organisa-
tionl • The result was that the profits from the ,sequestered 
estates suffered. In some counties, the authorities engaged 
in a whirlwind of activity: in others, relatively little 
" ( 
was done. 
Even when collected, payment 'of the revenues to 'London 
; .' 
could be a lengthy matter. Although only a third of the in-
come was supposed to be retained by the county, in practice 
the' proportion was' much higher; and provincial disturbances 
, '. . ' . 2 
were used as' excuses for spending the money locall,. The 
~ '-', ~ . ~ 
method of conveying the moneys to London'appears to have 
be'e~ extrem~lY haphazard. Wh'en the majority of the Hull 
, ~ ~ 
c'ommitteewM i~capacitated by illness,and a request was 
made for a messenger to come and collect its 'revenues, over 
a year drifted by before'8.ny action was taken~:At'~ late; 
time,' a discrepancy' of 't'wenty'-fi ve per cent appeared between 
• , • ; -to - ... 
1. For-example, state farmers had to be carefully supervised. 
They were not supposed to raise rents, enclose lands, cut 
timber, etc." without proper 'authority. See survey of-
Willi toft, PRO - SP 231G 58/f .81 ff. ',,' 
-". .. 
2. Everitt, Kent, 35; Pennington '& Roots, op" cit., 27.': , 
3. Two 'appeals were made by 'the Hull Committee, 9 April &: 
in July, 1650 (C.C.C~, 197, 285). Action was not ordered , 
until 5 December (ibid., 367), but nothing was done until, 
7 May 1652 (ibid., 576). 
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the actual funds and the official receipts of the York-
shire Committee. The loss was attributed to the carrier, 
Alderman Beale who,· besides being suspected of secret Royal-
ism, had heavy debts and was living far beyond his means. 
Beale's estate was sequestered, but, from its precarious 
financial situation, it is doubtful if much of the money was 
ever recoveredl • 
After the first wave of compositions had subsided, and 
far fewer estates remained sequestered~ a marked decline 
'appeared in the efficienOy of the county committees. Too 
little is known of these bOdie's to offer a definite analysis, 
but they were apparently simply unable to meet the heavy 
2 
commlt\ments placed on them by Parliament. 
This fall in the profits from sequestrations, matched 
as it was by a corresponding decrease in the revenues of 
Goldsmiths' Hall, proved very embarrassing to Parliament, 
especially as these sources of income reached their nadir 
at -the time of a sudden increase in expenditure, in the form 
of the second civil war. If the example of Yorkshire can 
1. 0:0.0., 497, 507-8, ~20. ' 
2. There was also a conflict of authorities in local govern-
ment. The Sequestration Committee sequestered estates, 
but the Committee for Compounding tried the cas 9\ and 
ordered their desequestration. The Committee for Advance 
of Koney could also sequester lands on receipt of inform-
- ations. These central bodies were notoriously slow in 
informing their sister authorities of their decisions -
thus the Sequestration Oommittee might be demanding rentals 
from an estate which Go16smiths' Hall had discharged, 
but which had recently been resequestered by HaberdasherS',:. 
Hall as a result of (probably false) informationst 
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be accepted as any indication, few Royalists who had already 
compounded, took up arms a second time, but the defeat at, 
Preston led many hitherto-undiscovered delinquents to come, 
, 
to terms with,the government. In order to derive the maximum 
advantage from this, Parliament drastically overhauled the 
whole machinery of both central and local committees. '. 
, ," . ~,. . " , 1 
In August 1648, two ordinances issued fresh regulations 
for sequestrators,' demanding regular payments to London, 
and the keeping - and auditing'- of strict accounts. Lands 
were to·be let at their extreme value, and all feudal rents 
and profits, including manorial courts, were to be developed 
...... ... 
. . 1 
to their fullest extent. Regulations of 13 March 1649 est-
-'J " 
, . 
ablished new rules for compositions, reaffirming the fines 
o~ a sixth and a third, but adding the new rate of a quarter 
fcir Royalists engaged in both wars, and a half' for Catholic 
delinquents, and those who had previously been excluded 
from pardon. Delinquents were encouraged to compound "on 
their own discovery" for concealed or undervalued lands, 
for which they could pay at the level of their original fine 
.' 
(or;' if they had never compounded before, at a tenth)2. 
The times .established for payments in the above 
regttlations were quickly superded bya~. act. O.f. 9 AP~il. 
1: Firth &: R~it," I, 1179,ff; 1186 ff. '; . 
2: C.C.C., 138-9. The clause fining the delinquents at a 
quarter was never imposed (except for the case of Roger 
portington), nor were the Catholics allowed to compound, 
although a few tried to do so. ' 
~-----.---
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which ordained that half was to be paid within a fortnight 
, 4 
of the fine being set, and the re~inder six weeks later. 
Overdue sums were to be charged _v eight per cent interest, 
with a punitive fine of a quarter of the composition1 • A 
time limit was imposed for those coming in to compound - it 
proved to be a dead letter"as the gove!~ent·s uncomfortable 
financial situation and the delinquents' slackness in paying 
- , • - 1", 
2' 
necessitated its continual extens.1on • A ~1nal attempt to 
attract prompt payments was made in late May, when Parliament 
•• • .. ' < '. , 
offered the Lady Day rents to all '" who,~ compounded before 
1 July3. 
The full force of this wind of change was felt in late' 
1649. The local committees of sequestrations were abolished, 
being replaced by three commissioners for each county (and 
each riding of Yorkshire), with authority to lease estates 
for three years. This was followed by the liquidation of 
the central Committee for Sequestrations, and the transference 
of its powers to the Comm~ttee for Compounding. These combined 
functions were soon afterwards p1~ced in the ,hands of . a 
small body of seven men, none of whom were to be members of 
lar1iament(each cOmmissioner,receiving the comfortable salary 
of £300 ayear).4 
1. Firth & Rait, II, 51-8. 2. C.0.0.,138-9; 140;144;145. 
3. On 26 May, C.O.C., 143. Catholic delinquents and certain 
leading Royaiists were still excluded from composition. 
4. C.C.C., 162; Firth & .ait, II, 329; C.C.C., 167, 188; 
C.J., VI, 386. The old Committee for Advance of Money 
was later merged with this.body.(see pp. 77). 
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Administrative reorganisation was followed by more com-
prehensi ve regulations to enable the poorer Royalis'ts to' 
compound: As half the fine had p~evlously'to'be paid before 
the estate was desequeste~ed,' th~se with no ready money, or 
. ' . . 
who were unable to borrow on the security of a personal bond, 
could not start proceedings.' An act of 1 August 1650 relieved 
" 
this situation. With the Committee's permisaon, delinquents 
were allowed to sell or mortgage landprio'~ to paying the ' 
fine in order to raise the money. Another past difficulty 
had been that lands held by creditors as sec'urity for loans to 
Royalists were 'sequestered for the l~tter's delinquency, 
which 'suited neither party. Now these mortgagees were per-
mitted to compound for 'the mortgaged part of the estate, and 
to enjoy the lands Until fine,'principal and i~terest were 
repaid by the Royalistl .' 
As some estates remained sequestered,' however, Parlia-
ment made~ a bid' to incre'ase its annual revenues' by consenting 
to leases for up to seven years. This move 'was long overdue: 
tenants and farmers had been unwilling to accept single-year 
leases of any but the best properties,' since the annual'rent 
reviews would penalise them for any improvements.'On its 
part, the state had been'afraid that it would lose its share 
of increasing rentals. But it was now apparent that longer-
term leases were'the only means of'increasing the revenues 
from sequestered 8states2• 
1. Firth & Rai t,ll, 402; C.C.C., Pt t,', Preface, xxvii. 
2. 25 January, 1650 - Firth & Rait,II,331-2. 
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The new instructions" combined with the humiliating 
failure of the Royalist, uprisings, and the generous otfers 
concerning conaealed lands"precipitated a flood ot, compos-
i tions in 1649 and e,arly 1650, r~ yalled only by th~ record 
year of 1646. The vast majority of sequestered delinquents, 
and a considerable, number of, undiscov~red Royal,ists, hastened 
to pay their f~nes. But the attempt to r~~nv~gorate the 
administration. of, seque6tration~ and the discovery of delin-
, <10 .;. , ., 
quenta proved a .failure. The massive reorganisation, by making 
a single committee responsible for the Royalists, initiated 
a wave ot fresh instructions to the local authorities. The 
latter seem to have been completely bewildered - which is 
qui~e understandable, for there were two. fundlmental altera-:-
ti'ons to the system. The Committee for Seque8tratio~s and 
Advance of Money and for Compounding with Delinquents - the 
new monopoly in London - kept most authority in its own hands, 
leaving the county committees as mere local agents, instead 
of semi-independent powers. Secondly, the compounded delin-
., . 
quent, although deprived of all official positions, was 
increasingly being recognised .. a.o1~izen, with legal rights 
• > 
enforceable in courts of law. Complaints to the central com-
" ,I" ~ 
mittee were fairly heard, and restitution quickly made. 
Thus the local authorities were expected to raise as much 
money as possible, when,an error'in one direction could lead 
to an expensive legal wrangle with a Royalist,' and a mistake' 
, . 
~-------------
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in the other might result in;a heavy fine from the central 
, ~ 
committee. Receiving little praise but many reproaches, it 
is small wonder tha~ many committees sheltered behind a 
facade of red tape, requesting official approval for every 
actionl • 
Interminable requests were made for further instructions. 
If a delinquent had been dismissed as being worth under £200, 
was he liable to sequestration if'he unexpectedly inherited 
a large 'estate? And could the committee proceed against a 
Royalist for arrears of rent if he had been discharged by . 
Parliament?2 The Committee for Compounding did its best to 
satisfy these queries, showing commendable patience. But the 
key to the trouble was the main complaint of the county com-
mittees - their lack of authority. How could they expedite 
payments and discover concealed estates when they were not 
I 
empowered to pay witnesses' expenses, or to give a worthwhile 
percentage to informers?3 
The simple truth was that the central committee could 
not trust its local agents to obey orders without question 
and perform their duties efficiently and honestly. Besides _.' 
1. C.c.c., Pt. I, passim. 2. Ibid., 145. 
3. Much of the Calendar ot the Committee for compoundinf after 
1650 is filled with such complaints. The York Commit ee 
grumbled that "we sit to no purpose when we cannot have 
our deSires made good" (C.C.C.,,191). Soldiers and county 
offiCials distrained ren~s, and the committee had no 
powers to prevent them - see the case of Sir Edward Rhodes, 
the sheriff, in 1650 (Ibid., 211-8, 353, 500,' 601). 
-----
J 
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the obvious dangers of peculation, there was the chance of 
pro-Royalists beco~ing members of the committees, and that 
moneys would be squandered locally instead of being paid up 
to London. Painful experience with the independent and in-
subordinate pre-1650 committees led Parliament to swing to 
the opposite extreme. The unfortunate result was the swift 
deterioration of the effectiveness of its legislation. 
Thus, at the local level at least,·the anti-Royalist 
organisation was already grinding slowly to a halt. At one 
time, there was no North Riding Sequestration Committeel • The 
practice of appointing a new body each year, although the 
same people tended. to be re-nominated, led to the mislaying 
of documents, (which no amount of threats fro. London could 
prevent). The authorities at York complained'of the high 
charges involved in submitting accounts to Goldsmiths' Hall 
to be audited - it cost £2-l0s each time, and the committee 
had no funds with which to meet the expense. Sometimes these 
accounts were never sent, or arrived late, and demands for 
explanations met with excuses and evasions. Replies to 
letters took two months or more. Orders for interminable up-
to-date lists of sequestered Papists and delinquents proved 
to be too much for the local commissioners: the instructions 
had often to be repeated several times before they were 
obeyed, and many lists had to be returned as being unsatis· 
factory. The commissioners regarded these lists as being a 
1. C.C.C., 623. 
70. 
ridiculous nuisance -~-in any case, -the'.'number--of Catholics-
hardly'altered from-6n~'ye~r to-thene~tl: 
Exacerbated by such demands-and confrontations,'r~lationsr 
between the,Committee forlCompounding and~its-harassed-local 
subordin~tes ste~dilideteriorat~d.·They had"al~ays'been:on 
a coldly 'formal level,h ;but~ihe way in which cornmi ttees such .' 
as '. that of York' bluntly informed'~ GOldsmi ths' Ha.ll that its t:' 
instructions were "defective in 'several particulars"-wa~ 
not-likely tolead,to a more~micable atm6sph~re2. :Th~' 
central-coIYL'11ittee'had frequently-to 'reprimand its-agents: ~ 
for their _ inattention to these"'instructions,- 'and their-
dilatory attitude. The'York Committee replied to one"such 
letter with spirit: "Though-we are 'fallen' low in your eyes, 
we are not puil ty of a breach of trust".' This ~ caused Gold~' 
smiths'Hall to moderate its tone in an attempt to restore 
cordial relations3 • But the local committees' were fast' dis-
integrating, and developing into nests' of faction-fightirig 
and petty intrigue: the anti-Royalist campaign was fa-st 
dying on its feet 4 . . ... -. 
.; .. 
Thus far the activities of only the Sequestration and 
.~ .. 
Compounding Committees have been considered, but there was a 
third committee which was closely concerned with the del-
1'. C.C.C., 6)0,·687,' 421, ~469~70,485,370-71;)697."' 
< ~ , " 
2. 22nd. February, 1650 ':" Ibid., 175. 
3. Ibid., 550, ',-, 
4.- Ibid.,- 725; Everitt, Kent, 26. 
••• 
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inquents - the Committee for Advance of Money. This body was 
responsible for providing the extraordinary revenues needed 
to meet the increased costs of army and government. Originally, 
it taxed Royalist and Farliamentarian alike, but gradually 
it turned its attentions more and more towards the former. 
Parliament. had originally intended to augment its normal 
revenues by voluntary contributions (August, 1642), requesting 
those lending money to pay in three equal monthly instal~·: 
ments. Despite a promise of eight per cent interest, the 
response was disturbingly poor. Therefore, on 26 November, 
compulsory assessment was introduced for London and South-
warkl. This was to apply to all who had not donated volun-
tarily, and was limited to a twentieth of the estate. An 
assessment committee of aldermen was established to super-
2 
vise the operation of. the tax. 
Far more important for the future was Parliament's 
creation,on the same day, of the Committee for Advance of 
Money, comprising five lords and eleven members of the 
commons3• It was authorised to consider and improve ways of 
raising money for the war, but soon new regulations gave it 
control over the assessment, together with authority to 
impose that levy by force4• Financial need compelled Parl-
1. Firth & Raitt I, 24. 2. Ibid., I, 38. 
3. C.C.A.M., 1. This was the first of the Parliamentary com-
mittees. The permanent officers were allowed salaries, 
whilst the agents, such as collectors, received a com-
mission. (Ibid., Preface, .p. vi.) 
4. Ibid., 12, 17. 
-
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iamentto follow this with a weekly'tax to maintain the 
1, 0 • , 
armed'forces ,'~ut,'despite this new'impl1sition,·the enforce-
ment of the original assessment continued';' and'indeed,'was 
widened in" scope. In May 1643 it was extended to include 
all persons living' wi thin'-'twenty miies' of London, and 
eventually developed into a forced loan imposed upon non-
o 2 Parliamentarians alone • This move began with an order of 
6 August 1646, commanding Goldsmiths' Hall to'send particulars 
of all compounders to" the Committee for 0 Advance of Money 
so that these delinquents could be assessed3 .'Three weeks 
later, the tax was restricted 'to delinquents and those who 
had never'contributed to Parliament,:and'finally, on 5 June 
l648,its scope was further limited to comprehend only those 
Royalists:who were within the ordinance of sequestration4 • 
The assessment comprised a twentieth of the full capital 
value of land, and a fifth of personal estate. A detailed 
" . 
1. This must not be confused with the first-mentioned ass-
essment. The latter (i.e., the first-mentioned assessment) 
was a kind ,of ,benevolence raised only on.e, and calculated 
at· a twentieth' of real and a fifth of personal property.'. 
The m.on.:th:t,yassessment was imposed for varying lengths of ' 
time. To provide a given monthly' income, each, county was ';, 
ordered to raise a certain sum,every month, the ratios 
between the counties'being calculated 'on the highest 
return for a ,subsidy. The local officers then divided their 
quotas ,between, the varioushundreds,'and each constable 
assessed the individualeaccording to a kind of rateable 
valuation. It was this tax w~ch was to prove the back-
bone of. Interregnum finance. 
2. CCAK, 21. ' . , J, Ibid ;, 56. 
4. Ibid., 56 (25 August 1646); 70 (5 June 1648). 
* The monthly assessment replaced an earlier weekly assessment. 
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schedule of rates was calculated for assessing realty according 
to the length of tenure; no distinction,was made, how~ver, 
.. between land held in fee simple, and. th~t in tail, .both being 
taken as fifteen years' value (thus making the twentieth 
.'. three-quarters. of the annual income). Lands in trust. were 
charged upon the beneficiary, also at the standard ratel • 
Those paying wit.in ten days were allowed the public 
faith for repayment (although this provision naturally did 
not apply to the delinquents). Re-appraisal.was granted 
upon payment of half the original sum within.ten days; the 
sworn evidence of the assessed was_generally accepted, 
although the original fine would be rei~posed if the testi-
2 
mony proved to be false. Provision for such appeals became 
necessary, especially when the assessment was extended out-
side London, . since it was originally based on the parish 
Book of Rates, and made no allowance for war damage, or 
falling land values due to uncertain conditions3• 
1. C.C.A.M., Preface, vii. Ashley, Financial and Commercial 
POlicy under the Cromwellian Protectorate (1934), (p. 39), 
and M.A.E. Green are firm on thia pOint. 'However, 
Pennington & Roots (op. cit., 34), Hardacre (op. cit., 29), 
and W.P.Ha~er,(Public Borrowing, 1640-60, unpublished 
M.Sc.(Econ.) thesis, 1927, university of. London, p. 75) 
consider that the rate was a fifth of the annual revenue 
and a twentieth of personal estate. Note, however, the 
list of rates for the twentieth on land, C.C.A.M., p. 8. 
'2. C.C.A.M., 18, 23. 
3. Order of March ?, 1643, C.C.A.M., 18. 
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At first the assessments were paid slowly. Both assessors 
and collectors were unsure of themselves, and were rather 
reluctant to exert their full authority, especially if they 
met determined opposition., They received very varied reasons-~ 
for non-payment, some being as bold as' a blank refusal, or 
an ironic promise to pay when Parliament honoured its own 
debts1 • Even the amounts-charged on the delinquents, though 
they were ,prosecuted with greater energy, had little better 
success. The Committee excused 'itself to Parliament in the 
familiar way -by enumerating the obstacles in its path. The 
Royalists were periodically banned from London and there-
fore were 'unable to pay,', or, if they 'did, 'paid the sum to 
i 
\0 ~ I 
their local committees, which meant further delay in collecting 
the moneys. Even where the delinquent had the opportunity 
to contribute, he was generally 'unable to do so, because of 
the 'large debts incurred dUring the civil war, and through 
the payment of the composition fine. In fact, the Committee's 
relations with the Committee for Compounding became quite 
strained at one time, due to the resentment 'at the'preference 
given to the 1atter2 • 
But the major obstacle to the free 'payment of assess-
ments was the ordinance of 5 June, 1648, limiting them to 
sequestrable delinquents. The commissioners strongly objected, 
complaining that many semi-Royalists would be exempted by 
1. C.C.A.M., 8, 30-31. 
2. Note on Obstructions, 5 June 1648, Ibid., 70. 
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this new rule. These representations were ignored, and 
therefore the' Committee attempted to increase . its ., revenues 
by discovering more concealed Royalist estates. As early as 
February 1645, it had been responsible for dealing with' 
such informations, 'and during the years 1648 to ,1650, it' 
received waves of' evidences relating t'o uncompounded delin-" 
quents~l The subsequent restrictions placed on informers 
(because of the,high percentage of false accusations) were 
a severe blow to the Committee's revenues, from which they 
never really recovered. 
In actual fact, the vast majority of assessments were 
drastic~llY modified. Although war debts were not allowed 
by the Committee for Compounding, both these and the charges 
¥.. • 
incurred in paying the composition fine were considered 
when the assessment was calculated. Some assessments were 
discharged altogether in view of the indebtedness of those 
concerned. Of the 106 assessments imposed upon the Royalist 
gentry in Yorkshire, 5-2 per cent were reduced, and a further 
42 per cent were either wholly discharged or nev~r prosecuted. 
The Committee for Advance of Money recognised this indebted-
ness as a major cause of its unsatisfactory revenues, but 
it was never able to persuade Parliament to do anything about 
it. ' 
The twentieth never embraced anything like the total 
, . 
- " 
number of Royalists, or even non-Royalists. Examination of 
1. C.C.A.M., Pt. I, Prefaoe, p. x. See also supra, p. 52 ff. 
--, 
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the cases for Yorkshire shows that, of nearly 290 Royalist 
gentry families, ,only 92 were assessed. Even here, there 
~~several cases of an assessment being made, but never 
~. .,-
acted upon. In short, the Committee's attempts to make the 
, 
. ". 
twentieth a comprehensive tax failed lamentably, principally 
, t ... ' 
because of the continued limitation of the range of the ass-
.ssment. 
One other facet of anti-Royalist legislation adminis-
tered by the Committee for Advance, of Money can conveniently 
be mentioned here - namely, the Engagement bonds. The En-
. )1 gagements (of Yorkshire, Oxford and Newark were mutual' 
agreements by certain Royalists to stand security for money 
loaned 'to the King, in case there appeared no legitimate 
means of repaying it through the normal methods of taxation. 
Parliament obtained copies of these documents, and demanded 
that each Royalist should pay the sum for which he stood bound 
to the state. Ironically, being a signatory to an Engagement 
was apparently not regarded as being proof of delinquency, 
and those conoerned"were not forced to compound unless other 
charges of Royalism were proven. The Engagements were a dismal 
failure: the Royalists refused to pay, and the creditors 
1. The Yorkshire Engagement was signed by a large number 
of gentry from the county, whilst those of Oxford and 
" Newark were limited to their Royalist garrisons. The ' " . 
Newark Engagement only ooncerned a handful of delin-
quents, and is of little iaportance. See Chapter IV, 
and C.C.A ••• , pp.' ~5 ff. : 
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were most reluctant to surrender their bonds. In the face 
of united opposition, Parliament finally conceded defeat. 
The Committee for Advance of Money also fell victim 
to the reorganisation of early 1650. It disappeared as an 
independent body, and the Committee'for Compounding took 
over its functions. Communications had still to be addressed 
to the commissioners in their correct capacity, or they· 
tended to be ignored; but the \lnification of the a~thori;ty 
which dealt with the discovery of delinquents' estates, 
and the committ~e ~hich fined them, WB$ long overdue. 
This newall-powerful body fared little better than its 
predecessorsl • Its authority p~oved to be too limited for 
the task before it, but Parliament was too busy with other 
matters to remedy these defects. In any case, the death 
. ~ ~ . .. 
knell of the new body was soon to be sounded by the Act of 
Oblivion. 
A resolution to introduce such a measure had been passed 
in the Commons as early as 25 April 1649, and was shortly 
followed by the establishment of a commission to hear and 
judge cases concerning delinquents who were sued over 
actions committed during the civil war2. These moves to give 
. . 
relief to Royalists culminated in the Act of Oblivion, of 
1. C.C.A.M., Preface,pp. xi-xii. See pp. 65 ff. The Committee 
was all-powerful over its subordinates, but was still 
under the authority of Parliament, which had neglected 
to give it the authority and powers of punishment necessary 
for the enforcement of composl tions. . . .. 
2. O.F.H., XIX, 109; Firth & Rait,II, 148. 
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24 February, 1652. It pardoned delinquencies committed 
prior to the Battle of Worcester (3 September, 1'651), and 
acquitted those' who were not actually sequestered on 1 Dec-
ember of that year. Although it only applied to those who 
had taken the Engagementl , although it omitted a whole host 
. . 
of offences,'and although it d1d not include the many cases 
still pending before the various committees, this act'does 
not deserve the bitter and satirical comment hurled at it 
by contemporaries and modern historians al1ke. 
n For where there's money to be got, 
I find this Fardon pardons not; , 
, Malignants that were rich before,' 2 
Shall not be pardon'd till they~re poor." 
Admittedly, its greatest failing was its omission to 
cater for undervaluations and concealments. But it released 
many Royalists from the powers of the committees. Those who 
.' . ~-
had so far avoided discovery (s' considerable number) were 
henceforth free from fear of prosecution. The growing practice 
of 'seizing' the propei·ty of sequestered delinquents (simpler 
than sequestration, it involved the freezing of rents and 
taking double security for personal estate) meant that all 
such estates; being unsequestered, were now discharged. Even 
where the order for sequestration had been issued, it appears 
1. An oath to·be taken by all males over eighteen, and by 
all officeholders, swearing allegiance to the government 
as it then stood, without a king or House of Lords. It 
was nothing to do with the Yorkshire Engagement.' 
2. "Upon the Pardon Passed by the Rump" (1652), in W.W. 
Wilkins (ed.) Political Ballads of the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth centuries, 1,(1860) p. 98. 
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that if it.had not actually been carried·out, the case was 
dismissedl • Parliament and the Committee were both bombarded 
with . 
~I frantic appeals from informers, facedwithithe loss of 
weeks·of patient research.and.considerable expense. The ,~, 
local committees, now ,that their existing instructions had 
been rendered obsolete, appear to have been completely 
bewildered: they were also, considerably alarmed at the clause 
penalising officers who 'disturbed any person discharged'by 
the Act. This alone.was enough to seal the dea.th warra.nt" 
of the'anti-Royalist committees - all that remained for them 
to do was to complete the cases still before them - a process 
which dragged on into l655 •. But it is significant that no-
new charges were initiated against any Yorkshire Royalist 
2 
after the passing of the Act of Pardon • 
The processes of composition had been intended to em-
brace the vast majority of the Royalists, with two notable 
exceptions. Firstly, certain named delinquents were expressly 
'1 
I 
, 
I 1. There are several instances of appeals for guidance on 11 
such doubtful :pOints from the county committees (e .g., Ii 
O.O.A.M., p. 99). Even the central committee could not (i 
'reply, and referred the question to Parliament (C.C.C., 592) .11 
Unfortunately the answer is not known, but several in- j: 
di vidual cases show that the delinquent generally benefitted _I; 
, • I 
2. C.C.C., 607. S.R.Gardiner accepted the benefits of the I 
lct: "Nevertheless, after all allowances are made, the i 
Act of Oblivion :.li berated a considerable number of persons I 
from danger of, prosecution, and contributed to the ," i 
widening of the basis of the Commonwealth".(History of ! 
The'Commonwealth and Protectorate,1649-56, II, p. 82). : 
.. 
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excluded from pardon - the various peace propositions offered 
to the King ordained that such people should be pronounced 
guilty of high treasonl., Secondly, all Catholics were pro-
hibited from compounding: those only,guiltyof their religion 
suffered the' sequestration of two-thirds of their estate .-,-'" 
(although they were allowed to lease it themselves), whilst 
Catholic delinquents.had all their property seized. 'An order 
in Parliament of .. 26 October 1649 instructed Goldsmiths I 
Hall-that no such person could compound (unless on specific 
Articles of War), whilst. the Committee was to prepare an 
2 
act· for. the' sale, of their, lands • ,; 
The idea of the sale.of delinquents' lands was by. no 
means a new suggestion. The Committee· for Compounding had 
been ordered to consider. the possibility as early as July 
.1644, and later recommended it as the punishment for all 
who petitioned to compound but neglected to do s03 •.• On., 
'19 'August of the following year" the Commons passed an ord-
inance.to sell the estates of some delinquents but the Lords, 
reluctant to go too far in this direction,,8ubstituted the 
~. 
bishops' lands, with the addition of a few confiscated' 
estates, if. it should prove necessary4. Thus episcopal 
lands were committed to ,trustees, and finally sold on 17 
'1. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, pp. 278-80, 298-300. 
'2 •. C.C.C.,'161.'."· .. :_ ~.3. Ibid., 6,.8. 
4. C.J., IV, 163, 246; O.P.H., XIV, 51. 
, '; 
.' ~. 
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November, 16461 •. 
The expenses of the second civil war, combined with the 
eventual declining of revenues from Royalists, led to the 
disposal of the rest of the estates of Crown and Church. 
The abolition of the House of Lords removed the last obstacle 
in this field. Capitular lands were sold on 30 April 1649, 
the personal estate of the Royal Family on 4 July; Crown 
lands followed.on 16 July, fee farm rents on 11 March 1650, 
ecclesiastical glebe lands on 16 October, and the remainder 
of the King'S property on 17 July 16512. To.meet the ever-
1ncreasing expenses of army and government, the market was 
flooded with land, and act followed act in an attempt to ' 
'Remove Obstructions' and expedite the sales. 
Even while the above estates were being disposed of, 
Parliament was pressing forward with the First Act of Sale 
of Delinquents' Estates. It was already under.consideration 
in mid~1650, and during the remainder of that year and the 
early months of l65l;~debate continued over the names to be 
included. Most of the notable Royalists were inserted, to-
gether with a handful of catholics3 • Becoming law on 16 July 
1651, the act shocked·many who had believed confiscation to 
be an· idle threat4 • The Second Act was already". before the 
1. Firth & Rait, I, 887. 
2. Ibid.,'II, 81, 160, 168, 358, 429, 546. 
3. C.J., VI, 422 ff. 
4. For example, Sir HeDr7 Slingsby neveebelieved that Parl-
iament would go that far~ !he Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, 
ed. D.Parsons (1836), pp. 343-4. 
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House in November 1651, and finally passed on 4 July 1652. 
The Third and final Act~entered the statute Book on 18 
November, encompassing the remainder of the uncompounded 
delinquentsl • 
The sales were controlled by seven trustees, sitting at 
·Drury House. Most were merchants "-" men with experience,in 
,the~nipulatio~ of finances. They nominated surveyors, " 
who were to appraise the,size and value of the confiscated 
properties. When these had been checked and registered,a 
'. copy of the. survey (but not the ,,?,aluation) was posted pub-
l:M. 
lica11y, and afterAthirty days pre-emption offered to. tenants 
or del1nquents, contracts were made with the highest bidder. 
A minimum often years' purchase for land'infee simple 
was established by the F1rstAct of Sale. Half of this was 
to be paid within eight weeks of the contract, at which time 
thep~chaser signed a bond for the remainder, due after 
six months. If the full sum was not paid on time, the 
buyer forfeited a third of the total price, wkich was either 
. 2 
added to the contract or sequestered from his estate • 
The.vast majority of .the Royalists concerned in these 
three Acts of Sale were Catholic delinquents - men who had 
, 
been excluded from composition because of their religion3• 
1. Firth &: Rait, II, 520, 591, 623; C.J., VII, 40, 161. 
2. Rules in the Acts of Sale - see note 1 for references. 
3. There were also a handful of women, usually compounding 
for their dowry, inherited from a Royalist: e.g., Lady 
Katherine Girlington, widow of Sir John, Who remarried 
Adam Bland of South Cave. 
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Some had already attempted to compound,' but had been pro-
hibited from completing the payments (such as:Sydney Con-
stable of Sherburne and Robert Do_an 'ot'Badsworth)~ A 
handful of delinquents who had been unable to pay their 
tines were also included - for example, Richard Lowther of 
Ingleton. The remainder were the cream ot the Royalists, 
men like the Earl of Newcastle and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, 
who had been excluded from pardon because of their unswerving 
loyalty to the King,- or their implacable hostility to 
Parliament, (which was not necessarily the same thingl)l 
This general introduction is not the place for a detailed 
discussion of the complex regulations which gOverned the 
2 sale of estates • But it should be noted that, whilst total-
confiscation was an excessively harS'hpunishment for the 
crime ot religion, the acts were not as vicious as might 
at first appear. A Committee for Removing Obstructions had 
been established to consider the demands ot creditors and 
others with claims on the estates. The former bad to be sat-
isfied first, which not only discharged all the delinquent's 
liabilities, but also substantially reduced the government's 
, .- ¥ , 
pr~fit3. Full allowance was made for annuities, jOintures, 
1. It is not altogether certain whether Constable was pre~ 
vented from compounding, or whether he was unable to . 
raise the money. ' 
2. Both Dr. Thirsk and Dr. Chesney have treated the subject 
fully in their respective theses and articles. See also 
Chapter V. " ' ., 
, , 
3. For example, the-government received only 15 per cent of 
the total purchasepr1ce of Cuthbert Morley's estate - ' 
see Appendix III. 
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and reversionary claims. Estates in tail could only be 
sold for the life of the owner, and copyhold lands could 
not be sold at alII. The two acts of 1652 allowed the 
Catholics to compound at two.o.sixths· (six years' . purchase), 
. ~... 2 
provided~they sold·the estate and emigrated within a year. 
Thus the provisions of the acts greatly inoreased the ohanoes 
that the delinquent (or his heirs) would retain his lands 
in some form or another. 
In all, the three Aots of Sale oomprised the estates 
of about 770 Royalists: the First Act contained 71 names, 
the· Second 29, and the Third about 6703 •. Not all of these 
properties were aotually sold. In some cases the delinquent 
compounded, or the sale was negatived at the last minute 
(as happened to Richard Theakstone of Bedale). Sometimes 
the lands were granted as·a present to a Parliamentarian-
much of Sir Marmaduke Langdale's property was disposed of 
• ,,~ • f • 
in this fashion. Even so, the sales stretched throughout 
1653 and 1654 and beyond, in one case an estate only being 
disposed of in 1659 •. 
1. Slingsby MSS. Counsel's opinion to Sir Henry Slingsby; 
this view is supported by other evidence. 
2. O.P.H., XX,9l; Firth &: Rait, II, 623 ff. 
3. Firth &: Rait, II, 520, 591, 623. Mast authorities, whilst 
citing Firth &: Rait, follow Green (Preface to C.C.C.) in 
quoting the numbers in the acts as 73, 29, and·678. The 
correct totals from Firth and Rait are 71, 29, and 680. 
The Third Act, however, enumerates the delinqUents by 
countY,and repeats the name if lands were held in more 
than one county. In the oase of Yorkshire, five suoh 
duplications occur, and the same feature applies to 
other areas. But to gain an acourate total of delinquents 
8S • 
. These three acts were the last of the successful anti-
Royalist legislationl with one exception - the decimation 
tax. During the Protectorate, the attempt to 'reconstruct' 
the Royalists failed with Penruddock's rising. This was 
followed by the introduction of· the decimation, a tax in-
tended to support a militia which would keep the delinquents 
in check. It was to be paid by all Royalists who could not 
show sufficient evidence of a change of heart, and was 
assessed at a tenth of real estate over £100 and a fifteenth 
of personalty2. In actual fact, although hardly any records 
remain, it appears that very few Royalists were excluded 
on the grounds of having reformed. :But there are cases 
which suggest that lands in trust were regarded as the 
property of the trustee - thus certain forms of mortgage and 
entail would be exempt3 • Each case seems to have been decided 
1. The word ·successful" excludes the pathetic attempt to 
revive sequestrations and sales in 1659, following Sir 
George Booth's rising (C.C.C., 745). The attempted com-
positions with the catholics have .. been omitted, as not 
applying to the Royalists,although, strictly speaking, 
it did concern several Catholic delinquents such as Richard 
Forster of stokesley, who had managed to keep their 
delinquency secret. . 
2. C. C • C ., 731. 
3. Hardacre, 01. cit., 128. Francis Layton of Rawden was excused pay ng the tax on the grounds that his lands were 
in trust - probably also because the trustee was Francis 
Thorpe, a Baron of the Exchequer. (C.C.C., 1005). 
r£2~!~_!~2!_E~_~!1· 
in the Third Act, a complete cross-check will-have to be 
made with the C.C.C.; Firth & Rait, and the county 
visitation records •. 
~~~ ----~-----.- ... ~--"l 
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on its own particular merits. The attempt by Desborough to 
have the tax accepted as a permanent levy was eventually., 
defeated in Parliament by thirty-six votes l • 
During the Protectorate, therefore, with the exception 
of the decimation tax, and the nagging restrictions on 
i 
personal liberty and social life, the Royalists suffered 
relatively little. A feeble attempt was made by the emasculated ' 
Rump to reintroduce compositions and sales in 1659 - this 
came to nothing. In any case, by that ,time, the old county 
commi ttees had disintegrated, and most aspects of 10cal~. 
government were supine. Ex-Royalists had infiltrated into 
Richard Cromwell's Parliament of 1659, and there is good 
reason to believe that they already possessed some hold over 
. . that 2 
whatever local governmentfTemained. 
Thus the official attitude towards the Royalists grad-
uated from sequestration and composition through to confis-' 
cation and sale. The latter was only an extreme measure, 
inflicted on those who would not,.or could,not, compound, 
and on the fringe of delinquents'whom Parliament, could not 
trust - the ultra-Royalists and the Catholics. The latter 
could not be allowed to control their own resources,and' 
when the government found i tse1! unable to live '. on its 
1. On 28 January, 1657, (C.H.Firth, Th~ Last Years of the 
Protectorate, 1656-58 z (1909), I, 108-25, passim). 
2. Writing to the new Committee of Sequestration (created in 
1659), two members of the Yorkshire Committee plainly 
admitted that few people ever attended their meetings: 
(11 February, 1660; C.C.C., 776). 
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income alone, the confiscated lands had to go. 
Ironically, whilst most modern historians point to the 
frantic sale of ~ll capital assets as an indication of the 
penurious state of the government 1 , one foreign observer 
saw this as a sign of the wealth of the country. Pietro 
Ba·sadonna, Venetian Ambassador in Spain, commented in 1651: 
i ' 
." The revenue, which is the basis of all the 
rest, is now augmented by saving the cost of the 
royal family, by the spoliation of church prop-
erty and by the confiscation of the estates of 
royalists. It is reasonable to infer that with 
good management, upon which there is some doubt, 
the English might at this moment maintain double 
the force they now have and at the same time 
accumulate immense treasure." (2).· ' 
This thought is comparable to the hope expressed by an 
,. 
unknown Parliamentarian in l644,who considered that the 
revenue from the Royalists "could well bear the whole 
charge of the (civil) ·war~3. Both were wrong - although it 
might not have been fully evident at' that moment, the govern-
ment was living on borrowed time, realising its reserves of 
1. Habakkuk comments that the State could only be solvent 
by disbanding the army, yet without this protection, it 
would collapse. "The rigime was caught in a vicious 
fiscal system. The wonder is that it did so much and 
held together·so long". (npublic Finance and the Sale of 
Confiscated Property during the Interregnum", in Ec.H.R., 
XV (1962) p. 85.). .. . . 
2. Calendar of State Papers, venetian! 1647-1652, p. 187. 
Basadonna,however, recognised tha the government's 
stability rested on military force alone. 
3. c.C.C., 17. : 
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capital in return for temporary solvency. It mattered little 
whether Cromwell's :charge that ~the'Long,Parliamentwas 
£700,OOO,in debt in 1653 was true or,notl : the heart of 
the matter, was. that ~he ~ government had been ~ unable to 
support an army and pay. for the war out:of the 'annual revenue 
'. -,. ~.: 'f' ,; '.. • ... '": ","'I , '. . 
alone, and had 4therefore dispersed its conside'rabI'e "capi tal 
assets. Its legacy to Cromwell, irrespective of any debt, 
, , ;: ~:., ",,' . .- .- ~ ..' ' " • , ", l' ; 
was that ,of a revenue inadequate to meet the national ex-
, .~"'. ... 4 /, .:. '. ,,' • . ~ , 
penditure, with no financial reserves whatsoever, and a 
. ';-- ., '" " . " . 
~~. :' J ... " '"'. ..' ... - , 
heavy debt of unpaid securities in the hands of London 
., " ; •• <.~ ,", '. - .. , 
merchants ,and bankers. The expenditure was artificially 
inflated t~ keep the.Royalists in chec~~ yet the attempts 
of successive governmen~to pacify this section of the 
. , ~ " ... '2 ' -. 
community had failed • The Royalists might not have borne 
"., 
"the whole charge of the war", but they, together with 
! "'- "+ 
Church, Crown,and Catholics, had enabled the government to 
'" ". , 
be reasonably ,sol:vent up to 1653. Conversely, Royal.ist .-~n-
• r,~ _ ' • ~ 
transigence and non-:-cooperation doomed the Protectorate to 
! \, 
a life of sem1~solvency. Whatever financial effect the civil 
t' ,-' i. " J .. 
war was to have upon the delinquents, its economic aftermath, 
and the need to keep the peace, was to create nightmares 
. " l 
for every government from 1646 to the Restoration. 
'. '1,. 
1. Habakkuk, loc. cit.,'pp. 77-81.' -,,' 
2. It would be interesting, though unprofitable, to speculate 
on the outcome of events had the government continued 
with its original policy of sequestering all Royalists' 
estates. The resultant confusion would most likely 
have forced. it to turn ,to some solution akin to com-
position in the end. 
1 
1 
-CHAPTER III - COMPOSITION AND THE DELINQUENT. 
" Under the rose be it spoken, there's a damn'd 
, Committee 
Sits in hell (Goldsmiths' Hall,) in the midst of the 
city, 
Only to sequester the poor Cavaliers --
The devil take their souls, and the hangmen their ears." 
, '~ , , ' , ' ", (1). 
As soon as the Battle of Marston Moor was over, and 
the royal cause in Yorkshire doomed, the sequestration 
ordinances were put into effect. Naturally their scope was 
limited at first: in areas around Royalist strongholds, such 
as Pontefract or Skipton, the powers of the Yorkshire Com-
mitte~ we~e temporarily restricted. But, after their crushing 
- , 
defeat, most delinquents readily accepted the situation; 
the~joritys~rendered fairly promptly, and only a few 
held out in last ditch stands. 
The war had resulted in a certain amount of devastation, 
but apart from areas in close proximity to the main centres 
of fighting, (such as the regions around besieged towns, 
like York and pontefract, Bradford and Skipton) the damage 
had been relatively slight. The main culprits, according to 
most contemporary sources, were the Scots troopers: they 
seemed to regard Yorkshire as a foreign land to be plundered 
at will. The dislocation of trade (several of the market 
towns had been in different hands to their respective hinter-
lands) and the neglect of estates had led to a general fall 
in rents, so that the delinquents returning to claim their 
1. "Prattle Your Pleasure under the Rose" in The Ca w.l1er 
-8' . 
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lands had first to repair and reorganise their property after 
the dislocations of warl. 
Unfortunately for the Royalist, Parliament made little 
or no allowance for any such' war losses when assessing 
estates for. the purposes.of composition. The fines were cal-
culated from the pre-war values of land, plus all personal 
property then in the possession of the'delinquent. Although 
this meant that the latter would notcbe paying for stock 
and-crops which had been requisitioned ·(or.confiscated, as 
being personal estate), he still had to compound for realty, 
even if his lands lay waste,'or he had no implements with 
which,to till his fields. Mortgages made since 20 May 1642 
were not recognised, nor were any personal debts. Not only' 
did the fine include lands bought by the Royalist after the 
beginning of;the war, but'also (since a delinquent could 
not legally sell property) all estates disposed of since 
thattime. 2 ·No allowance was made for the depreciation in." 
land values caused by the uncertain times, or by lack of 
maintenance. (The necessities of war had led Lord Fairfax 
to flood large areas ,of land ift HelEier!'lee8 during the siege 
. . 
1. The question of war damage is considered more fully in 
Chapter VII. 
2. Usually, however, the purchaser of such property had to 
compound for it. 
(£2~!~_!!2!_E~_~2)· 
Songs and Ballads of England from 1624 to 1684 (1863), 
(ed. c. ~ackay), p. 66:. 
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of Hull, and many acres of property in Holderness were also 
under water.) 
'Some slight consideration was given to delinquents ,in 
war-ravaged areas, but only in the form of a, moratorium on 
their fines. Francis Nevile of Chevet was allowed a three .. 
months postponement; when this time had passed, he delayed 
payment for a further nine months by claimimg,that Scots 
raiders were active in the districtl • Henry Currer of 
Skipton was p€rmitted to withold payment of his fine until 
. , 
the Royalist garrison in the castle had surrendered. His 
lands depreciated nearly forty per cent in value due to _ 
2 damage resulting from the siege .' 
In addition to noting the more material effects, of the 
civil warSupon the defeated side, it should be remembered 
that the individual Royalist was in a very vulnerable position. 
The reliance placed on informations provided personal 
enemies with an ideal opportunity for revenge, bytdiscoveringt 
concealed estates or various offences committed during the 
" 
war. Even if Thomas Metcalfe of Bel1a:rby could claim" that 
he " is ready to satisfy for any wrong done-to'any ~an 
. . . 
whilst he so was' in arms, which he is confident no man can 
tax him of to the value of Sixpence"3, this~as'certainlY 
not the case with many others. Sir Francis Wortley the 
younger was charged with the murder of a prisoner-of~war at 
1. Letter of.2 June, '1646, R.C.P.,II,· 3 ff. 
2. Ibid., II, 52-3. 
3. Petition on 24 March, 1645/6, Ibid., ~I, 114. 
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Ashby'de la Zouche~ Sir Francis.had.been an officer in the 
garrison when,the prisoner was executed, but had.omitted 
to sign his name to .the Articles of Surrender (doubtless' 
hoping to avoid sequestration). He was 'discovered and arrested; 
after a long'period'inprison whilst his case was considered, 
he finally gained' his freedom, ; but only after a persona1-' ... 
appeal.to the Lord Protector in November,.l6571 • 
'Sir Hugh Cholmley, the turncoat governor.of Scarborough 
been 
Cast1e,;appears to haveAsubjected to a kind of semi-perse-
cution. The Commons specifically ordered the Committee for 
Compounding to ensure,that:Cholmley paid his full compos-
ition(7.February 1650), and later Luke Robinson"M.P. for 
Scarborough,was:given special permission to commence·any 
suit:against the Royalist, despite the Act ofL1m1tations. 
Sir Hugh.was also arrested on~a writ of outlawry' and tres-
pass:~fortunately his fr1endsstood.byhim,.and the.accuser 
2 had to pay £300 in damages • 
Despite their apparent vulnerability, the Royalists were 
not completely at the mercy of the authorities. When he 
compounded, the average delinquent had several opportunities 
~ n_ • 
to conceal parts of his property, and thus reduce his finel -
1. C.S.P.D., 1657-8, p. 160. 
2. C.J., VI, 358; 557; The Memoirs of Sir HUlh Cholmley, (1870), p. 46. These memoirs are extramely biased, and ' 
. it is difficult to discover whether Luke Robinson had a 
legitimate case. 
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especially as he'hims:elf declared his assets in his own 
·particular of' eata'te" • With very few exceptions, the report 
, , 
of the Committee's lawyer follows the Royalists' own state-
ments word for word. Although the local officials could have 
ch~cked the truth of the • particular~ ~ (and in so'me cases 
apparently did'so), such examples were extremely rare - it 
would have been physically impossible to investigate every 
est~te. And in the maj ori ty of ~ases where the report" does 
differ from the'particu1a~" it was because the delinquent 
had unlawfully allowed for war damage to his property. 
The Yorkshire Royalists used many and varied methods 
of undervaluing their'lands. Perhaps the easiest and surest 
Cc , 
way'was to ignore any money owed to them. The debtor nat-
urally appreciated the opportunity of extended credit, and 
was unlikely to inform the authorities, since Goldsmiths' 
Hall frequently confiscated all debts due to delinquents, 
irrespective of the original terms of the loan. 
A conspiracy of silence descended over many sUCh trans-
actions, broken only when an informer happened to disco';'er 
the tacit agreement. It is obviously impossible to estimate 
the number of debts suppressed in this way,except,of course, 
where they were discovered. But'it appears that such con-
t " ' " 
. 
cealments were not as widespread as'might be expected: a 
considerable number of creditors openly admitted their assets, 
although some of them qualified their statements by declaring 
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such debts to be 'desperate: - in other words, the debtor -
was, unable, or unlikely, '. to payl. 
,Other delinquents resorted.to the practice of under-
valuing rents, or om1tt~ng to mention small, outlying parts 
of their property. This method involved a certain amount 
of risk, as the majority of the· estates had, been sequestered, 
and therefore the county officials knew the~rapproximate 
value. But some Royalists found a means of avoiding this 
danger. They quit~honestly stated the pre-war,value ~f.the 
lands, but, declared them to be,r~ck-r~nted,.when in fact 
there was considerable latitude for improvement. Therefore 
< ' • 
the commissioners were given the correct 1642 rentals, which 
~ . 
were already.virt~a.llYiobsolete"as once the,delinquent 
had compounded,the annual revenue was,increased by squeezing 
the tenants and improving the estate. The Calverley rents 
were declared to be £505 per year, over half being.on the 
rack, and yet after,1648.th~y rose,by between,thirty and a 
2 hundred per cent; 
It is interesting to note that these • particulars' made 
hardly any mention of financial or trading ventures. Ad-
mittedly, one or two Royalists confessed to the ownership 
f 
1.It is possible that the delinquents who admitted'to being 
• c creditors were trying to confuse the issue by only 
revealing'pa%t of their assets, but there is no evidence 
of such prac ~ces. 
2. R.C .F.; II', 188-9. Yorkshire Archaeological Society Library, Is 527.'With the few other estates where the 'particulars' 
can be compared with actual rentals, the pattern of 
slight undervaluation continues. 
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- or part-ownership of ships, but there is relatively little 
',concerning the profits of mines or commercial undertakings. 
The latter" might be accounted for, by the laconic mention of 
"various credits owing to the delinquent, but apparently '," 
there were large-scale omissions of this kind. The ownership 
~of goods in transit was difficult to determine, as was the 
actual value '·or annual production of a mine ~ At least forty-
-two.- delinquents lived, within the workable coal belt in' the 
West Ridingl • Of the thirty-one 'who compounded, only two 
to the, 
mentioned coal mines, and a third admitted/ownership of iron 
_ works. None' of these three were . wealthy gentlemen. 'As the 
profits' of>'coal' were often used as a means of recuperating 
from composition fines, 'it is surprising that so few'Royalists 
should.have'been involved in mining - unless, of course, they 
were deliberately concealing such assets. 
Timber was another profitable source of revenue which 
seems to have been largely ignored. Naturally, an extensive 
park would almost certainly,be declared, but.references to 
small woods and copses are notably absent from the 'particu-
lars'. Timber had the added advantage of being a most nego-
tiableasset, and many delinque~ts cut and sold woods to 
satisfy an urgent need for money. The market in wood, part-
<-
icularly oak, was especially profitable, because of the 
1.J.U.Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry, {1932}, 
I, map of Ehglish coalfields at the end of the seven-
teenth century. 
repairing of the ravages of war, and the rebuilding and 
increasing of the navyl. 
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Apart from deliberate concealment, the Royalists had 
various other opportunities to avoid paying the full fine. 
Most- of these have already been mentioned in Chapter 112. 
Entails'gave some measure of protection, and the heirs of 
Royalists killed during the war had a good chance of·con-
cealing the estate. Bribery and force were also used where 
there was a chance that they would succeed •. 
A few Royalists managed to defer part of their com-
position almost indefinitely by requesting a 'saving to 
compound'. This enabled those engaged in litigation to delay 
their composition until' they recovered the d~puted properties. 
However, a sharp challenge to some defaulters shows that, 
once the lands were regained, the delinquents were in no 
hurry to admit the fact, and often attempted to avoid paying 
any further fine 3• 
It is clear that the Royalists had considerable oppor-
1. Admittedly, some timber would have been cut by the' seques-
trators, but surely not all of it ? Henry Calverley 
cut down his woods to raise money - he wrote from Lon-
don to his wife - " ••• ffor Gods sake if y. cann get 
the wod sold that I may end wth Goldsmith Hall & come 
home and monie is now soe hard to come unto that I 
thinke I shall let Sr Hugh Calverleys estate fall." EM, 
Add. MSS.274ll, p. 65. -
"I-
2. supra, Chapter II, passim. 
3. PRO, SP 23/G 121 pp. 513-21. 
-
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tunities to disguise the full value of.their estates. That 
a number of them did so can be seen from the records of the 
Committee for Advance of Money.' In Yorkshire, at least.40 
out~of the 195 compounders were guilty of-this - just-over 
20 per cent. The only means the-Committee:had.of·checking 
the delinquents' honesty was. either by making a direct,sur-
vey through.! ts own officers - (a clearly 'impossible task), 
or by relying on '; informers • The merits and drawbacks of the 
latter system have already been discussedl ; as a means of 
.t , 
ensuring full compositions, it proved a dismal failure. Most 
informers'aimed'~t- the more prosperous families: thus the 
> • mino~ gentry and y'~om'nry had a~ excellent chance of escaping 
i. ' '"' detection. The all-embracing red tape of Interregnum admin-
istration, the rivalry and lack of communication between 
the various central committees, and the subsequent paralysing 
regulations for informers because of the multitude of 
'. . 
false claims - all helped to protect the delinquent against 
discovery. Less than half ~f the certain undervaluations -. 
,~" • >. . <, ., 
16 out of 40 - were ever. diJ3covered. The rest, and p;obably 
,-
many more whose secret has remained hidden, were left in ~-
peace. 
, 
All the above factors had a direct effect upon both 
. . -
the progress of composition, and the ability of the -estate 
to recover from the fines2 • The value of the loan which a 
1. Supra, p. 52 ff. 
2. Infra, Chapter VII. 
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"Royalis~ could raise on the security of his property, and 
i 
, .. • j 
the rate of interest he'wouid have 'to pay,- depended not 
., '. l 1 "', r 0.1: ~ '<'» C - : ,I t • 
simply upon ,,' his; annual income", but, also upon the, actual con-
i ",,-'. 
,dition of his.lands after the war~ The,more'he'could'conceal 
; :', 
j ;.~
: from the eagle~eyes of the Commissioners for Compounding~ ~., 
~'" .. " <' , '-, > : • 
the more devious and unscrupulous Cavaliers fared much 
: better: than their more, honest nei~hboursl. 
" 
.. .~ " 
;, ~ 
" 
, - . The majority of the compounders, came from the north-
, ~". , 
eastern, eastern and central parts of the county 2 With • 
: _t. 
f 
the exception of the Ainsty (where a surprisingly large pro-
portion of,the delinquents remained undisturbed), the 
, , 
'percentage of Royalists who compounded'remained constant 
over the whole of Yorkshire. Th~ following table, illus-
trates the, re,lati vely modest numbers of Cavaliers who 
were forced to pay their fines. 
1. Francis Nevile of Chevet was one such untrustworthy Roy-
alist. Though an ultra-Cavalier, he later swung over to 
Parliament, trying to ensure that" if he suffered,every-
one else was going to do the same. If some sources are 
to be believed, he was not above using br1beryand for-
gery to gain h1s own ends. R.C.P.:.,. II, 3 ff; C.C.A.M., 
general proceedings about ,the Yorkshire Engagement"pp. 
895-907; House of Lords, MSS, Committee of Petitions, 
18 February, 1664/5.: ':' " , " ,,' '" " 
, ~ - - .l " '/". .. 
2. From the eastern part of the North Riding, the East 
Riding, and the central and northern areas of the West 
Riding. These areas were those which had the most delin-
quents ~ the A1nsty was the only region with an erratic 
percentage of non-compounders. 
. . ~ 
'. l' , . 
----------~----,-- ------,,-"---,-
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Table IV: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF CO~~OUNDERS. 
.a b c' . d e 
Total Roy. No. of ~b~ggf No. of % age of families Compoundg. Royalists total 
families (a) undisturbd _l}~yali ~~s ift .a.'I"U 
. 
ul1 H 
A 
E 
R 
C 
P 
insty 
• Yorks. 
iehmond 
1eve1and 
ennine 
w • Yorks. 
s • Yorks. 
17 11 
10 3 
40 23 
31 17 
,51 29 
10 6 
97 53 
32 19 
64 5 29.5 
.30 6 60.0 
57.5 8 20.0 
55.0) ,6 19.5 
}55 
57 ) 11 21.5 
60 ) " 3 30.0 ) 
.54.5)56 34 35.0 
59.5~ 10 31.0 
T ota1s 288 .. 161 56.0 (a • )83 '- 28.8 (a~ 
~ 
.. , 
.. 
Although there were naturally more compounders in the 
; 
m ost populous parts of the county, there were no regions 
, 
" 
w hich can be specially noted for their allegiance to Charles 
. 
Even though most Royalists left the King's service after 
the defeat at Marston Moor, few thought of compounding in 
the months that followed. Most delinquents were content 
1.1 
simply to surrender to some senior army commander, and receive 
a. certificate of their submission ,a:~pass to return home, 
and an order protecting them from molestation by the' 
soldiery. For it was still possible that a reversal of 
fortune might. lead to a Royalist Victory, and no ,one wanted 
1. Supra, Chapter I. 
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to be branded as a defeatist or a turncoat. But as the toll 
of Parliamentary successes mounted; and,the King's cause, 
collapsed in ruins, more and more Royalists decided to come 
to terms with the de facto government in London. 
,The decision to compound was prompted by several motives. 
Primarily there was the need to recover the family estates 
whilst there was something left to recover. If the sequestra-
tors had fulfilled their duties efficiently, the delinquent 
was denied all his sources of revenue,', except for the fifth 
granted ,to his wife and children,- a hopelessly inadequate 
income, and often 'allowed only after long negotiations with 
the' county authorities .'; -
Besides this financial motive, another reason can be 
found in the attitudes prevalent at the time. The Royalists 
had made their enemies suffer during their brief period of 
supremacy, and expected to receive similar treatment them-
selves.Any'undue leniency would no doubt have been inter-
preted as weakness, and could have led,to a fresh outbreak 
of fighting. Finally, there was the fatalistic view, as 
promote'd in Hobbe; Leviathan: service, to the' monarc~as 
due only so long'as he afforded some measure of protection 
in return. The final defeat of the King inl645 proved 
that the royal cause, was lost, and that. its supporters 
must needs make the best bargain they couldl • 
, " .. ;;. 
1; Hardacre, 0t.Cit., 14; G. Davies; The Early stuarts9 1603-1660, 6xford History of England, IX; Oxford 1 59); 
170. 
-- .. ,--
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The initial reluctance to compound is well illustrated 
by the attitude of the Yorkshire gentry. Despite the Roy-
alist collapse in mid .. 1644, hardly anyone attempted to 
negotiate for their fines before the winter of the follow-
ing year. This feeling was also strengthened by the - as 
yet - unformalised ritual of compounding. However, those 
who did pay their fines at the beginning generally benefitted, 
in that the sums assessed bore little relationship to the 
value of the property, concerned. Sir John Kaye of Woodsome 
quoted his estate as being £500 per annum, and charged with 
£3000 debts. His fine ,assessed in March 1645, was a mere 
£500: under the later regulations, (even had ,his debts been 
. ;; ;. 
allowed), the sum would not have been less than £100, and 
might well have been as high as £1000. There is' also good 
reason to believe that Sir John had considerably undervalued 
", 1 his property • 
, 
Only three members of the Yorkshire gentry compounded 
in 16442, - all of them after September, and in none of 
these cases do complete records survive. Four more followed 
in 1645. It is significant that, of these seven, four 
. , ' 
, changed sides and aided Parliament, whilst two more had been 
former Parliamentarians, only withdrawing their allegiance 
when the King's success had seemed assured. 
1. R.O.P., II, p. 1 ff. 
2. For the purposes of uniformity, 'the date of composition 
, is regarded as being the date on which the fine was set. 
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This hesitant beginning was followed by a flood of 
eighty-six compositions in 1646, after which the number 
decreased sharply during ,the subsequent two years. 1649 
saw a fresh wave, both from those who had remained intran-
sigent until the fiasco of the second civil war, and also 
from'a handful of Royalists who had already compounded, 
but had once more thrown their fortunes into ,the balance. 
From then onwards, the number declined swiftly until the 
compositions on the Acts of Sale in 1653. 
Table V· • COMPOSTIONS (excluding those on the Acts 
No. of People Compounding. 
1 
of Sal e) • 
. . 
'44 '45 '46 '47 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 '53 Totals 
F 
C 
S 
C 
T 
irst -
omps. 
econd; 
omps. 
otals 
3 
.. 
Due to 
-2nd war 
Due to 
, -
under-
valuatn. 
3 
4 86 28 
- - -
- - -
4 86, 28 
.. 
10; 39 12 11 2 - 195* 
-
6 
-
1 
-
" - 7 
,- 3 5 ·1 2 1 12' 
I 10' 48 11 13 4 1 214 
" 
As yet there is no other detailed study of compositions 
available, with the exception of Mary Coate's study ~fCornwall~ 
1. This table records the number of people, 'not families, 
compounding. ,'-, ' 
~ The widow of Francis Topham of Agglethorpe compounded for 
her dower in 1648, but her son only compounded for the 
rest of the estate in 1651. Thus the composition date 
'I has been set as 1651. ' 
Five people compounded for undervaluations in 1650, 
but there were six compositions, as Brian Cooke of Don-
caster had to pay twice for successive undervaluations. 
Thus there were 195 people (from 161 families) involved 
in compositions: 216 compositions in all, although, for 
the above reasons, only 214 are counted. 
2. Infra, p.122.ff. 
1 
I 
I 
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But the pattern in Yorkshire,_ of two principal waves of 
compounders in 1646 and 1649, mirrors the overall picture 
of the whole country as given in the Calendar of the Committee 
for Compounding. The high totals in these two years were 
the result of military events and administrative reforms of 
the previous months. 1645 and l648·saw.the decisive defeat 
of Royalist military power in the civil wars, and also the 
introduction of simpler regulations for compounders. In 
December. 1645, the administration of compositions was handed 
over to the Goldsmiths' Hall Committee, and firm rules of 
procedure were established. In l649~new regulations permit-
ted delinquents to compound on their own discovery at low 
rates, and thus tempted mor~ ROyali~1;~ to ~urr~nderl • 
. , . 
The 195 Yorkshiremen who compounded came from 161 
gentry families. Thus 127 Royalist families were not involved 
in primary compositions. Of 'these, 44 were in the Acts of 
Sale, but the ~emaini~ 83 ~ere ~ev~r punished at all: The 
majority of these latter avoided paying ':any..' fines through 
" . 
good'fortune, or their own natural abilities. Twenty-three 
1. C.C.C., 138-9. Only9.took advantage of the offer to com-
pound on their own discovery; among the lesser landowners 
(those who claimed to be gentry,' but could' offer no proof), 
the numbers were higher - l2~. This is understandable, as 
the lattu! '" smaller estates would be easier to conceal. 
2. There were actually 54 families in the Acts of Sale: these 
44, plus 5 families who commenced (but never completed) 
composition proceedings, plus 5 members of the gentry . 
who belonged to the same family as a compounder. 
104. 
were killed during the war, leaving entailed estates, or 
heirs who were overlooked by the local authorities. Thirteen 
more had signed the Yorkshire Engagementl , which was not 
regarded as proof of delinquency. The remainder, forty-seven, 
(16'per cent of all'Royalist gentry families), evaded com-
position through good luck or good judgement, or a combin-
ation of both." Some ·werediscovered,.but successfully claimed 
their" innocence, whilst others remained hidden until the 
Restoration, and can only be traced through their self-
glorification in the records of Dugdale's 1665-66 Visitation2• 
The composition fines were paid in two equal insta14" 
ments, the sequestration of the estate being suspended upon 
receipt of the first portion. It, was natural, therefore, 
that this should be paid as soon as possible; in some cases, 
. , ~ . 
almost immediately after the fine had been set. Sir Thomas 
, 
Bland of Kippax Park paid the first half of his £405-6-Sd. 
fine the day after it was levied, and Brian Cooke, the 
.. 
wealthy Doncaster merchant, took only three days to raise 
, 
£1l66-10s. Even the near-bankrupt Arthur AldbUDgh managed to 
find £200 within lS' days3. This alacrity shows a considerable 
.. 1. Infra, C~apter IV. 
~ . , " 
2. The percentage of those families who evaded discovery is 
surprisingly· high, expecially in such areas as Hull and 
.the West Riding, (see Table IV, p. 99). These families 
are families where at least one member was a"Roya1ist, 
but where no···one, was punished for delinquency •. There are 
many more families where the Royalist head compounded, 
although younger brothers and sons who had supported the 
King avoided punishment. 
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amount of borrowing by the Royalists, and suggests that many 
came down to London armed with ready supplies of money, or 
that London money-lenders frequented Goldsmiths' Hall, 
readily offering loans on the security of land.· The first 
half of the fine had to be raised on the security of a per-
sonal bond, to be translated into charges on the estate as 
soon as the setuestration was lifted. 
Some delinquents tried to raise loans from their friends 
and relations, occasionally securing the debt by settling 
an annuity upon the creditor. Arthur Aldburgh apparently 
borrowed most of his fine from local gentry and merchants, 
mortgaging hisa1ready heavily-indebted estates to meet 
the expense l • But such limited resources could not cope 
. -
-
with the vast demand, and much of the money was borrowed in 
the city. The development of this money-market was necessary 
for the swift payment of the composition fines, and eventually 
reached its zenith with the loans raised to regain confis-
. '2 '. 
catedlands in the sixteen-fifties. In fact, it is quite 
probable that the financiers who worked for the compounders 
were the same as those who advanced the money to the victims 
of the Acts of Sale. 
1. See case in Chancery, PRO, C78/600/ll. 
2. See Chapter V. 
(£~~!~_f~~!_E~_!Q!). 
3. R.C.P., II, 76-77; L.J., X, 199. R.C.P., II, 96. 
Ibid., II, 217; PRO, SP23/G 248/86. 
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,< The dates of .the initial payments ,on the fines are 
fairly easy to trace: they are mentioned in the individual 
pardons passe~.by the ,Lords, in orders to desequester estates, 
and in the various lists of those ~hose second payments 
were overdue. Of the. 195. primary compositions,. 74 cannot be 
. accurately dated in}ihis way. But ,the following :,tab1e ., ", 
illustrates the speed with which "the remaining ,121 primary 
compositions were paid: -'or,at least~ the first portions, 
~ ,-, . , .': . 
necessary for the desequestration o~, property. :'" 
~. - . " 
Table VI: PAYMENT OF THE FIRST HALVES OF PRIMARY COMPOS-
ITION FINES. 
D ate Total Noth- Time lag in payment after fine set: up to -
Comps ing 1 2 1 2 3 6 9 1 after Total known lNeek wks mth ms ' ms; me me, yr 1 yr 
, 
.. 
1 644/5 
.. 
7 3; 3 1 - - - - - - -
1646 86 29 20 4' 8 3 I' 9 4 1 '7 
1647 28 17 4 - 1 - - - - - '6 
1648 10 " 2 '1 - - - - 3' 1 2' 1 
1649 39 13 6 4 7 5 - 2 - 1 1 
1 650/1 23 9 6 3 1 3 - - - 1 -
1652 + 2 1 - 1 
- - - - - -- -
T otale 195 74 40 12' 18 11 1\ 14 5 5 15 
, , • c, 
Nearly sixty per cent, of thesefiret payments were' 
made within a month of the fine being set ~-over thirty 
, 
4 
57 
11 
8 
26 
14 
" 1 
121 
per cent within the first. week. It should be noted that the 
date taken for. the. setting of the fine is that of the first. 
--~---.---- -.• ~- --_._-----_. --- .. _--_ ... _----
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assessment: in some cases the sum was later revised,' but 
the delinquent had generally ,to deposit half the original 
fine prior to such a review. 
This early<Y! payment becomes the more significant when 
we consider the twenty-five oompositions (about twenty-one 
per cent of the total examined) which were paid over six, 
months after the date of the fine. The highest annual per-
oentage fell in 1647 and 1648 - at the time of ,the seoond 
civil war, which delayed compositions and disrupted payments. 
The Royalists who had not yet settled their fin~naturally 
hesitated to do so until the outcome of the struggle became 
clear. 
If we examine the financial situation of these twenty- • 
five Royalists, it soon beoomes apparent that laok of oapital 
was ,the major barrier to the payment of the first half of 
the compositions. One delinquent's estate had dissolved into 
economic ruin, eight were in a precarious financial pOSition, 
and four more possessed estates which were so small (little 
more than personal property) that raising money became 
extramely difficult. This accounts for thirteen Royalists. 
Of the remainder,' three were in debt (but little else is 
known about them), and three more, whilst owning extensive 
estates, had large financial commitments. Only six delin-
quents, therefore, were not in economic difficulties. One, > 
Sir Henry Griffith of Burton Agnes, had a very large estate, 
but the majority was entailed, and thus could not be touched. 
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Walter Hawkesworth and Jonathan Jenhi~wereboth hindered 
by the seizure of their personal property, war damage, and 
the billeting of troops on their'lands.·Robert SlingsbY,of 
Hemlington delayed his composition whilst negotiating over 
a saving to compound. Sir Brian Palmes was,prevented from. 
compounding by the fresh outbreak of hostilities in ,"1648. 
No satisfactory explanation can be offered for the.hesitation 
of·the'sole'remaining delinquent, Edward Copley, (a fairly 
prosperous gentleman), unless his procrastination (for six-
and-a-half months, until'the winter of 1646) was due to his 
hopes of a Royalist revival. ; , 
Financial instability did not always delay composition -
the relatively swift settlement of most of· the first instal-.··· 
ments proves this. HOwever, where the delinquent was already 
in debt, much must have depended upon the attitude of the 
principal creditor. If he was willing to advance further 
loans, then composition would swiftly follow. On the other 
.' hand, he might refuse more credit - especially if he had· 
already made an agreement with the local sequestration 
~ ~ ~ . 
. committee. Some creditors gained advantageous farms of the 
sequestered estates, and others, who held their security in 
the' form of trusts or annuities, would not be ar'fected by 
sequestration in any case • 
. 'In 1650, the government; finally settled this" anomalous 
situation. Mortgagees, and.others who had a financial. claim 
~ "i . ~. ",' .. - ·;1. ~ 
to sequestered property, were permitted to compound for 
--------------- ---- .. " "- -
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the lands, and to add the fine to the existing debts. This 
development had little effect in Yorkshire however; where 
the majority of the delinquents had already commenced com-
position proceedingsl • 
But the full weight 'of composition fell upon' the Roy-
. . 
alists' estates when the second instalments on the fines 
became due. Within six weeks of paying the first part, the 
delinquent had to raise a similar sum which was, on the 
average, equal to a year's rent. Admittedly, he now had full 
,. 
control of his own estate, and could exploit it to the full. 
. , 
But~ unless he was exceptionally fortunate, the only solution 
was to raise a further mortgage on his property. 
UnfortUnately, the records relating to such second 
2 . ' ,", 
payments are few ; only after the great reorganisation of 
1649-50 do detailed records appear to have been kept by the 
Yorkshire Committee3• But the absence of any mention of 
overdue fines prior to 1649·cannot be taken as indicative of 
their regular payment: Yorkshire was among the many counties 
1. Firth & Rait, II, 402-3; C.C.C., Pt. V, Introduction, p.xxvii; 
R.C.P., passim. 
2. Apart from the occasional receipts in family papers, the 
best evidence we have are the lists compiled by the county 
commissioners of those whose estates had been res~estered, 
or who had not paid their second halves. These only tell 
us when the fines were not paid, and rarely disclose the 
dates of the final payments. Even the individual case· 
histories often terminate in the middle of inquiries over 
the matter. 
3. Although the fines were paid to the Committee for Com- ' 
pounding, the local committees regularly sent up (or were 
supposed to send up) lists of sequestered and seized 
estates. 
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noted for their'slackness in tendering accurate lists and 
schedules to the central,committees. The records of the 
local committee go back no further than 1649 - earlier min-
I utes have either disappeared, or were'not kept at all. 
Only 86 of the 121 fines studied in Table VI can be 
traced through to the date of their final payment. Sixteen 
were paid in one single instalment,and thus do not add to 
the picture. It would be expected that the speed with which 
these second halves were paid would bear some relation to 
the economic position of the delinquents who paid them -
but such is not the case. Only one fine was settled within 
the required six-week. period - and only six more within 
six monthst In other words, at least 69 Royalists were over-
due with the second halves of their fines - 31 per cent of 
a11,first compositions. , 
Table VII: RATE'OF PAYMENT OF SECOND PARTS OF FINES: 
86 ROYALISTS. 
Date All paid Time elapsed after first half paid 
at once 6w 2m 3m 6m 9m lyr 2yr after~ta1s 
2 yr 
1644/5 1 '. 1 - - - - '- - - -
1646 4 
- -
-~ 1 3 3 5 ,20 ' "36 
1647 1 
- - -
1 3 - 2 4 11 . 
1648. - '. 
- - - -
1 ·2 2 1 6 . ' 
1649 3 
-
1 
- -
6 1 3 4 18 
1650/1 7 1 2 
- - - -
2 1 13 
1652 + - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
Totals 16 1 3 
-
3 13 6 14 30 86 . 
CFoot,. 0" .112. ~, p] 
I 
I 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
! 
. i 
I 
! 
i , 
I 
i 
I 
I 
i 
i 
! 
I 
: , 
j 
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The pattern indicated by the above table seems to 
argue that the delinquents. once they had regained their 
property (by settling half the fine), were generally reluc~ 
tant to payout any further sums of money unless they were 
forced to do so. TheAresequestration imposed for overdue 
fines was apparently very slack and ineffiCient. The Royal-
ists, therefore, naturally attempted to avoid both payment 
and resequestration for as long as possible. 
But, to discover whether financial reasons played any 
part in the delay in the payment of fines, I have examined 
the cases of the 63 Royalists'who, took over six months to 
complete their payments. Nearly half - 28 - were at least 
reasonably prosperous.prior'to the civil war, and should have 
had little trouble in raising the money. And yet there is 
no special pattern relative to wealth - the delinquents 
who delayed payment the longest were not, necessarily the 
poorest. 
" 
Table VIII: RELATION OF 1642 FINANCIAL POSITION TO THE 
SPEED OF PA~~ENT OF THE CO)~OSITION FINES. 
'1 
Economic Situation, 1642
1 
Time elapsed between 2 halves of fine 
. ' "" . . ." .... ' J6-9m• 9m-lyr. 1-2yr. 2yr + Totals I .. 0, I 
i 
! 
Prosperous 3 1 3 8 15 
•• Comfortably-off· 1 ,2 I . ~ 9 13 
Average 2 
-
6 6 14 
. i 
• Uncomfortably-off 
.. : 
6 3 4 3 16 , 
Declining '1 
- - 4 5 i 
Totals 13 6 14 30 63 
J 
The delay among the financially-unstable Royalists 
is easy to understand - their heavily-burdened estates 
could provide very little security for an additional loan. 
Lyon Bamford took over four years to raise the second half 
of his fine. His extravagance and the need to provide for 
a large family had already brought him to the brink of in-
solvency: composition dealt the final blow. By 1660 almost 
all of the estate had been sold,andthe family, who later 
.vainly attempted to recover the lands at law, were reduced 
to penury. Francis Danby of South Cave, in debt long before 
1640, was forced to mortgage his manor in order to raise 
the first half. of his fine. The creditor,Francis Harrison, 
refused to pay the full sum agreed, and thus the Royalist 
lost both lands and moneyl. It took Danby nearly thirteen 
months to find the £160 needed to settle his composition. 
But only a minority of delinquents were in a weak 
financial position. Two-thirds of the "slow-payers" were 
in no immediate economic difficulties, although some possessed 
very small estates- for example, the Cockerells of Whitby 
and John Monckton of Northcliffe. Such Royalists naturally 
felt the weight of composition more than their richer neigh-
1. Bamford:- R.C.P.,II,70 ff; L.J.,X,109; Spencer-Stanhope 
MSS (Sheffield) 60264; Elmhirst MS, MT/20 - 63302; PRO, 
C78/629/5. Danby:- R.C.P.,II, 160-61; Harrison-Bro&[!ey 
MSS, DDHB/42/6; Barnard of S. Cave MSS, DDBA/4/ll3; PRO, 
C54/3373/2;J.G.Hall, A History of South Cave, (Hull-;IB'92), 
pp. 14-15. . . . :. . . . . " 
(cont. from E. 110) 
1:-~lii-only-recorQs surviving are an order book of the Ainsty 
committee, 1645-52 (in York Reference Librarl), two order 
books of the county committee (PRO, SP28/2l5), and two 
of orders to the committee from~ndon (~, SP46/l07). 
---------.-~-.------- .... 
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bours, even though the fines were proportionate to their 
1 
resources • 
However, 45 per cent of the Royalists who ignored the 
injunctions of the Committee for Compounding, and postponed 
the completion ot th~rcomposition fines, were in a satisfac-
tory financial position prior to the war: their only app-
arent reason for delay was a desire to pay as little as 
possible. Arthur, the third son of Sir William Caley of 
Brompton, waited nearly three-and-a-half years before he 
settled his £150 fine. The family, prosperous North Riding 
landowners (whose head was an undiscovered Cavalier) remained 
.. . 
in the forefront of post-Restoration society, acquiring 
lands and possessions from t~eir less fortunate neighbours, 
even durin'g the Interregnum. Sir Richard Tancred of Whixley 
delayed ove~ five years before he paid the final instalment 
of his composition - yet in the meantime he bought some 
estates in Green Hammerton for £1455, double the amount of 
. 2 
his fine • 
In other words, the delay in the settlement of the 
second part of the compositions was not necessarily caused 
by financial reasons3• Many of the delinquents were quite 
1. R.C.P.~ II, 214; Ibid., II, 183. 
2. ,.C.Pe, I, 42 ff; York Wills, Registered Copies, vol. LIZ, 
• 116. R.C.P., I, 65 ff; L.J., IX, 78; ~, C54/3373/3. 
3~ With the payment of the first part of the fine, the 
recovery of the estate hung in the balance, and therefore 
the money was generally paid as., soon as possible. 
1 
--_._-_._-----------
. __ ~ ___ ~ ___ ._, .' _ ... .-J 
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able to meet the expense if necessary - but they were simply 
reluctant to spend money in support of a cause which they 
heartily detested. This ,thesis is supported by a brief com-
1 parison of the above gentry before and after the civil war • 
Unfortunately, there is sufficient information about only 
43 of , the people concerned, but·it is enough to illustrate 
. 
that the effort of paying the fines did not necessarily 
bring financial collapse, except in the ,cases of estates 
which were already on an insecure foundation~ 
Table IX: HISTORY OF 43'nSLOW~PAYERS", 1642-1660. 
E ffect of Composi ti,ons 
State in 1642 
--. 
F ine had little or 
no effect 
T emporary embarrass-
ment, then recovery 
Slight decline in 
F 
F 
fortunes 
inancial decline 
inancial collapse 
1642 Financial Positions. 
Prosp- Well- Aver- Unstable 
erous off age 
8 12 
. , 
11 10 
2 5 
- -
3 4 4 2 
3 2 5 2 
-
1 1 ~ 
- -
1 3 
Decli-
ning 
2 
-
, 
-
-
1 
1 
It will be noticed that the first two classes - the 
financially-comfortable gentry - survived reasonably well. 
. : . : 
The only exception was Roger Portington of Barnby-super-Don, 
who, after paying half his composition fine ,in 1646 (£175)," 
1. See also Chapter VII for a fuller treatment of the 
problem. 
.. ':) 
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supported the Royalists in the second civil war, and was 
assessed for a further'£l7l5 in 1649. The two compounders 
of "average" financial position in 1642 who found themselves 
in similar difficulties were Henry Calverley and Lyon Bam-
ford. Calverley, because of existing debts and bad estate 
management, began at a disadvantage: the bulk of his estate 
was also in tail, but was incorrectly assessed as being in 
fee. Instead of raising loans on the security of his 
property, Calverley panicked and began to sell large por-
tions of his estates. Lyon Bamford wasted his resources by 
reckless extravagance - he would most likely have gone 
1 bankrupt even if he had not had to compound • 
In contrast to the above, those Royalists who were in 
a precarious financial position in 1642 had less chance of 
surviving the ordeal of composition with their estates in-
tact. In such cases, it is always highly controversial to 
try to estimate what part the fines played in the economic 
downfall of such persons: some, undoubtedly, would have come 
to grief in any case. 
It can be seen that the delays in paying the second 
halves of the composition fines did not necessarily emanate 
from financial insecurity, or from the inability to raise 
1. Calverley: R.C.P., II, 188 ff; BM Add.M88 (Calverley MSS) 
27410-12, 27418-19; Calverley MS~(DD12); 
Bamford: see p. 112, n. 1. 
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loans. Indeed, the effects of compositions were not nec-
essarily fatal, except for those who were already in a crit-
ical financial position. The hesitation ,was more due to a 
. . , 
reluctance to ~ay the rest of the fine, where there was 
the sl~ghtest c~anceof avoiding detection. 
There were, in fact,several reasons for the slowness 
in completing compositions. In some instances, the delin-
quentwas negotiating for~a reduction in his fine, on the 
grounds.that no account had been taken of debts, or that 
lands in tail, had been assessed as though in fee simple. 
Such cases could drag on for many years, during which time 
the Royalist remained in possession of his lands, yet 
without paying any more ,of the fine. Sir John Mallory was 
assessed at half of his estate, as he had been Governor of 
Skipton Castle at the time of its siege. 'He appealed against 
this unfair punishment, but it was over two-and-a-half years 
before. the fine was reduced to a third. Mallory was for-
tunate, in that he was not compelled to pay half of the 
original fine prior to the hearing,although he was apparently 
permitted to enjoy at least some of the profits of his 
estatesl • 
The Committee for Compounding faced a long list of such 
objections, and at one time had to extend its sitting hours 
1. R.C.P.,II" 135 ff; York Sequestration Book, f. 115. 
shortly before the fine was readjusted, Mallory's trustees 
were selling lands (which they held as security for 
debts) - ~, C54/344l/7; ibid/3441/6. 
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to deal with the extra weight of business. In an attempt 
to limit the numbers of petitions, - the Commons decreeC\ in . 
May 1649,'; that, suc'h' fines a's wereal:ready 'appro~ed' by 
Parliament were to stand without any future alterationsl • 
~ , ',., t ,; ..,. 
Time was also spent on negotiations as to how the fine 
should be paid. In most cases it was in cash, but occasion-
ally part was in income or land. The Committee of Plundered 
Ministers was always looking for an opportunity to augment 
clerical salarles,'and to'this end'accepted annuities and-
the'revenues of impropriate' rectories as part of the fine: 
These were usually allowed at ten 'years' purchase' (if in 
perpetuity), with reductions for shorte~ periods. Thus Rich-
ard Harebred's fine of £350 was completely discharged when 
he settled £50 per:a~um'fromhis i~propriate rectory'of 
Wistow (which he held for three lives)'on'the minister there2• 
, ' . 
" ; The widow '- of Sir: Gervase Cutler promised to grant £30 
from her impropriate'chapelry of Dodsworth to the minister 
of Barnsley in return for a £300 reduction in her husband's 
fine. She later discovered that the property'was entailed 
to her son (a minor) 'and therefore ~ould. n~t' "be sold. Her 
Ladyship, however, kept silence about'this fact, and simply 
. ". . . " 
n.glected to make any'settlement. The deception was only 
discovered when the irate parishioners of Barnsley complained 
1.19 May, 1649, C.C.·C., 142-3. 
2. R.c.pi, II, 153. 
---~ 
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to London, four years laterl • 
Lady Anne, widow of Sir Edward Osborne of Kiveton Park, 
offered to oblige in a similar manner. In this case, £100 
a year was settled from the rectory of Seaton Rosse, and 
the finelggnsequently reduc;ed' byaOOO. When 'the heir, Sir 
~ , " " . , 
•• " c ... 
Thomas, came of age, he refused to endorse the grant, and 
his mother had to deposit a sum of money as alternative 
'. ' 2 
security. 
Thirty Yorkshire delinquents conveyed away impropriate 
rectories in ,this ,manner: in some cases,' more than one im-
propriation was involved~ Although this practice enabled a 
. , .,' 
considerable part of the fine to be written off without 
; ~. . . 't ,_' 
heavy debts on the estate, the Royalists were generally 
. , , 
opposed to such settlements, regarding them as virtual sales 
of land. As the revenues of the impropriation had been 
, 
assessed at between fifteen and twenty years' value (according 
, . 
to the level of the fine) for the purposes of compOSition, 
but were allowed at a mere ten years' income when settled 
!;'. 
on a minister, the delinquents understandably saw this arrange- ~ i 
ment as a kind of fraud. But in fact this system had its 
advantages - at the Restoration, all such impropriations 
were returned to their original owners, and the deeds of 
conveyance and settlement were negatived3 • 
1. R.G.F.; I, 232'ff. 
. . 
2. Ibid., II, 159;,0.0.0., 1027-8. At th'e Restoration; Sir 
Thomas was unable to regain the £1000 settled by his mother, 
. which had been seized by a penurious king, A.Browning, 
Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, l632-1712,(Glasgow, 1951), 
I, 19, 25. 
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A few Royalists were able to settle parts'of their 
~ . • ". I J ' 
fine with other kinds of property. Parliament had occupied 
Scarborough Castle, offering its ~wner, 'the Royalist 
Stephen Thompson of ' Humble ton, the alternativesof an annual 
rent or an outright sale. Thompson preferred the latter, 
b~t demanded the 'arrears of rent since 1642, which Parliament 
refus~d to pay witil Thompson" settled the outstanding por-
, . 
tion of 'his fine~ He declined to do'thie, fearing that 'he 
would thus lose a valuable'bargaining counter. A stalemate 
occurred until the Royalist" appealed to Cromwell in 1654, 
and was allowed to charge the outstanding arrears of ' rent 
against his fine. In another<instance, Henry Hildyard's 
, , 
house in Hull was bought by Parliament'and granted to that 
towit as a" reward for its 'valiant defen~e in the' ~i viI war. 
_ " 1 iI f • 
Hildyard was allowed £2230 in'payment, being the second 
half of his fine l • ~ 
. ' 
But, as suggested earlier, the principal cause of the 
delayed payments was a deliberate policy of non-cooperation 
on the part 'of the Royalists. In theory, the sequestration 
on a delinquent's estate was merely suspended when he account-
'ed for the first half of his fine, to be reimposed if the 
remainder was not discharged on time. In actual practice, 
1. R.O.P., I, 3-9; Ibid., I, 97-106 •. 
(~~~!~_f~~~_E~_!!~). 
3. Act passed 19 May, 1662, L.J., lI, 472., 
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the' authorities were generally' content to order the tenants 
to withold their rents until the matter was settled. Even 
this order was often delayed for a considerable length of 
time. As there might be up to six months before the next 
rent day, the delinquent had a substantial amount of lat-
itude, and in any case'could - and did - use threats to 
induce his tenants to continue paying their rents. 
Administrative troubles prevented swift and efficient 
control by the. county committees, whilst distance and over-
work limited the central committees' surveillance over their 
regional subordinates. These authonties, both central and 
. . 
local, were too understaffed, too overworked and underpaid, 
to provide full supe~ision over individual compositions. 
As a result, Royalists in distant localities could rely on 
several weeks, perhaps months, passing before any direct 
• c' . " 
action was taken. It was only natural that they should take 
advantage of the situation. 
Much of the correspondence between the central and 
local committees hinges around this pOint. Compositions 
could be delayed for a number of years'whilst some legal 
technicality was being argued out between Yorkshire and 
London. The new committees, as reorganised in 1650, proved 
to be no more able to expedite paymentsthan their predecessors. 
Therefore Parliament eventually decided to confiscate the 
, < '.' , 
lands of all who had not compounded, or had neglected to 
pay their compositions •.. On 16 January 1652, whilst '. the surveys 
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of lands confiscated in.the First Act of Sale were in pro-
gress, the Committee for Compounding demanded the immediate 
I 
payment 'of all outstanding fines. With the uncomfortable 
, . 
example of the confis6at~d estate~,be~ore their~yes, the 
Royalists needed no second warning. A subsequent report of 
12 May showed that,: with the exception of a fe~ near- : 
bankrupt families, the arrears had been speedily paidl •. 
, , 
Composition came slowly, and was directly dependent 
upon the fluctuations in Royalist fo~tunes during the civil 
wars. After the.collapse'of the King's cause in 1648-9, all 
but a few of the Yorkshire delinquents surrendered. The 
fines that they paid were by no means as crushing as has 
."> ' , 
. 2 
been suggested. It is perhaps a little light-hearted to 
,. 
••• regard the fine as the equivalent of an extra .daughter 
or so • • • ..3, . but it was extremely rare 'for them to exceed 
three years' annual revenue, even for lands in !ee simple. 
1. Apparently this final demand covered all compositions, 
both primary. and secondary, although the rules were 
stretched in some cases. When Francis Baildon neglected 
to pay his extra fine (for undervaluation), it was levied 
on his estate by the authorities: his quietus is dated 
1655/6. Leeds Reference Library, DDCS/45/7. 
. . 
2. Dr. Chesney has claimed that private sales, caused by the 
compositions, were very extensive -H.E.Chesney, The 
seruestration of Estates, 1643-60, (unpublished Ph:n7 thesis, 
Un versity ot Sheffield, 1928) p. 197. C.H.Firth believed 
the same - he mentiomemany private sales on a flooded 
market - "The Royalists under the Protectorate", E~H~R.i 
LII, (1937),pp. 639-40. Christopher Hill adds' that over' 
half of these sales were to creditors - C.Hill, "Agrarian 
Legislation of the Interregnum", E.H.R., LV (1940) p.230. 
3.·H.J.Habakkuk, "Landowners and the Civil War", Ec.H.R., 
2nd. series, XVIII (1965) p •. 136. .' . 
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Table X: '. RATES OF FINES LEVIED ON YORKSHIRE COMPOUNDERS. 1 
Rate ~nd annual revenue for fee simple). 
irst, F 
C 
i 
L 
C 
T 
ompos-
tions 
ater 
omps. 
otals 
, , 
Un-
known 
-
'2 ' 
2 
Dis- under 
chap.. 1/10 . 
ged 
2 2 
- -
2 2 
1/10 1/6 1/3 t (2 yr: (3 yrs (5 yr, ~i yr) 
rev. rev. ) rev. rev. 
" 
98 83 9 2 
4 13 1 
-
102 96 '10 2 
1 ' 
Thus 94.5 per cent of all Yorkshire fines were at 
~he level of three years' 'income or less. 
,- .~ 
- , j t 
, . 
Totals 
196 
20 
216 
There is no really detailed study of compositions for 
any other county, with the exception of Cornwall. Here the 
rate at which the fines were paid was even slower than in 
Yorkshire - only 30 outo! 274 estates were redeemed by 
1648, and only 27 more by 1649. (It is not stated whether 
redemption refers to. the full payment;of the fine, or merely 
to the first half ~) The grea.t ,'bulk of compositions followed 
, 2 
the Battle of Worcester in 1651 • 
In contrast, out of the 195 persons compounding in 
Yorkshire, at least 78 had paid the whole'of their fines by 
October 1649, and a further 34' by mid-16503 .-, Thus, by the 
1. These figures include ,the two extra compositions - Bee' 
Table V, p./Ol. supra. ' 
2. M.Coate, 0l.'cit., 237 ff. Professor Habakkuk has quoted 
no statist cs in his article. 
3. There is an account, dated 19 October 1649, of second 
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time that 20.8 per cent of the Royalists in Cornwall had 
compounded (1649), 40.2 per cent, or nearly twice~ as many, 
had compromised themselves in YOrkshirel • It needs, however, 
figures from other counties, such as Lancashire,' Devon and 
the Midlands, to give a clearer insight into the picture of 
compositions. The wide divergence in the figures for Corn-
wall and Yorkshire may be due to many factors, not the least 
of them being the relative efficiency of the individual 
local committees. 
In the face of such diverse evidence, it would be rash 
to suggest that either county could be regarded as typical 
of the country as a whole. I~ fact, it may eventually appear 
that there is no· nation-wide patter~, and the speed of com-
position depended upon purely local factors (although I 
. . . 
think that this is unlikely). But whatever maybe the final 
answer to the problem, it remains clear that 1646 and 1649 
1. M.Coate presumably includes all compositions, and not just 
the gentry, to whom this stuay-is limited. Even though 
it would naturally be easier to conceal a small estate, 
evidence in'Yorkshire suggests that the rate of composition 
. amongst the smaller landowners would echo the results' of 
the study of the gentry. However, an eighth of these yeo-
manry compounded after the second civil war, on their own 
discovery (in Yorkshire) - thus, because of my omission 
of both nobility and yeominry, the comparison between 
York and Cornwall must be treated with caution. 
I 
~!2~!~_tE2~_E~_!gg)· 
payments overdue from those ~who had· already paid their 
first instalments (PRO, SP23/G 248/f. 86). A further list, 
dated 18 April l650;:records fines still overdue, (ibid., 
SP23/G 9/pp. 45-6. 
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were peak years for compounders - a claim borne out by . 
the Committee for Compounding's own records. Another un-' 
doubted, fact was the vast difference between setting a fine 
and collecting it: the Royalists were'quite prepared'to pay 
half in, order to regain their estates, but once in possession, 
)-
they' used every' possi ble subte1fuge to, a.void paying any morel. 
t.. 
The Committee ,for Advance of Money never completely solved 
the problem of discovering concealed lands, and the govern-
ment only found the answer to the related question of col-
lecting.fines when it threatened to sell'all uncompounded 
property2 • 
. . ! 
The value of compositions has been variously estimated. 
! 
To Gardiner, they appeared as a fatal mistake. "From a modern 
, , 
... . ., " 
point of view, the most faulty part of Parliamentary finance 
was the exaction of the ROY~list compoations aM3 But what 
other alternative faced Parliament? To excuse the Royalists' 
.. 
completely was unthinkable - to the seventeenth-century mind, 
1. It would naturally be easier for Royalists in counties 
like Yorkshire and Lancashire (where many people had 
supported the King) to take advantage of the local Com-
mi ttees' overwork, .,.than in regions where there were only 
a few delinquents. The county authorities were only 
allowed a fixed number of staff, irrespective of the 
number of Royalists in their area, or the amount of 
ground they had to cover. 
2.'At least one· such estate, Ingleton Manor, was sold by the 
Treason Trustees because its owner had failed to com-
pound; 'However, where small properties had been under-
valued, the commissioners only sequestered them, leasing 
them to their delinquent owners at a high rent- no attempt 
was made to sell such undervaluations or concealments. 
3. S.R;Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, III, 196. 
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such action would ,have appeared as weakness, and could have 
encouraged the Roya,lists to continue their resistance. Apart 
from this point of view, Parliament desperately needed to 
j ... ; , y 
use the defeated side as a source of revenue to pay for 
the war. The failure.of sequestration showed the difficulties 
• • ~_ t'· 
in administering the~e~tate~ centrally, and ~o sell all -
or even a part.~ of them would,have upset ,the value of ,land, 
' .. ' . ~ I ..... " 
and created a social problem of the first magnitude. 
\ 1. • 
Compositio~ was the only ans~er: a fine of some des-
',. ~', '. . 'f '" 
cription, . calculated as a percentage of the estate, and 
gr~ded according to the degree of delinquency. Not only 
would it act as a most effective form ,of punishment, but it 
)"L ••• :. <';. " : ,I '.._ , • ~ ,: .~_. • _,_ "... 
would also limit the ability of the delinquents to cause 
any further trouble. ,There were excellent precedents for 
... '.. ~ , . , . , , .: . 
such a course of action - fines were the normal method of 
~ , ..... ' 
punishing those who deviated from the norm, and worshipped 
or,a<?ted in ,unorthodox ways. Defiance of , official authority 
in the past had generally been met with ,amercements or 
, . . , , '. ' " "~ . -, , 
confiscations. In short, a fine was the best solution. The 
. , . ) . 
reason why the system proved to be so unwieldy was not the 
> ... 
idea itself, but the means of execution. 
John stevens has estimated that the compositions 
produced £1,277,226,: £118,000 of this (about ten per cent) 
-", ,; . 
'. 1 
was raised from the Yorkshire gentry • Parliament relied to 
1. The proportion raised 'from Yorkshire is the tot'al ~f the 
sums assessed in fines - the· figure:' is necessarily vague 
as in some cases the fine is· expressed as one of two· " ' 
alternatives, and no final decision is recorded. ..' 
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a surprisingly large extent upon the profits wrung from its 
victims - stevens calculated that over a third of the 
(' 
revenues raised by the Long Parliament from 1640 to 1659 
came from this sourcel • 
Unfortunately t, Parliament was never able to take full 
,I • '; 
advantage of these profits -most of them were assigned to 
various uses long before they were collected. Except 'for 
. , 
the "boom" years of 1646 and 1649, Goldsmiths' Hall Treasury 
was generally empty, acting principally as a financial 
.- '.. _.' , 
clearing-house for the armed forces and government. The 
illusion that the revenues from the Royalists would be 
sufficient to abrogate all need for alternative taxation 
. . . : 
was soon rudely shattered. ' 
Despite the logical intentions behind'the policy, com-
positions had only a limited success. A large number of 
Royalists evaded sequestratid~, and remained anonymous through-I 
, . 
out the whole period. And even though the forced payment of 
the fines met with better success than 'the ill-fated attempts 
to impose the Engagement levies upon the Yorkshire delin-
quents, the latter'deliberately witheld payment for as 
long as possible, and thus helped to defeat Parliament's 
ultimate objectives. 
The reason for the difficulty in collecting fines was 
1. £35 million out of £95 million. J.stevens, The Royal 
Treasury of England, (1725), pp. 289-96. Maurice Ashley 
consIders that composition raised £1,304,957 - Financial 
and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, 
11934), p. 41. 
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both administrative and personal. The harassed local officials 
in counties where there were a large number of delinquents 
were generally several weeks,'if not months, behind with 
their work, which "often necessitated the persecution of 
.I 
friends and relatives. That the system under such conditions 
proved slow and grossly inefficient was o~ly to be expected: 
, • ." : ..i, :., • 
that it worked for so long, and acc'omplished so much, is 
a tribute to the ,honesty and tenacity of Parliament's t 
servants. 
It was the intention - and expectation - of Parlia-
ment that the delinquents should pay for the war. Had the 
money been forthcoming as was intended - the whole fine 
spread over not more than six weeks - the sums collected 
might have been put ,to good use. As it was, ,the fines were 
raised sporadically, and in small amounts" to be immedi8,t,ely 
swallowed up by the ever-hungry needs of the Parliament. 
With the exception of the years 1646 and 1649, ,Goldsmiths' 
Hall was generally bankrupt. It was" ,the tragedy of com-
position that, whilst i~ had a severe; effect upon the finan-
cial position of the Cavaliers, it provided the government 
with hardly more than a breathing space in its fight for 
economic survival. 
i , 
. " 
CHAPTER IV - ASSESSMENT AND ENGAGEMENT. 
"For there are agents sent abroad 
Most humbly for to crave 
"Our alms; but if they are deny'd, 
And of us nothing have; 
Then by a vote ex tempore 
We are to priso~sent, 
Marktd with the name of enemy, 
To ,King and Parliament: •••• It (1) 
Although compositions proved to be the Royalists' 
major economic headache, they were by no means the only 
financial burdens that the Cavaliers had to bear. Various 
fiscal experiments matured into regular features of taxa-
tion, weighing upon both Royalist and Roundhead alike. "In 
the taxes imposed by the parliamentary ordinances we find 
the germs 'of our subsequent fiscal system,,2. According to 
Dowell;' the country had never been so extensively taxed. 
"Under the commonwealth the taxpayers were rated by the 
local authorities at what they were really worth • • • 
Even if the landed est'ates were somewhat undervalued, they 
were assessed far more realistically than at any previous 
time •. 
The backbone of Commonwealth financ' was the montnly 
assessment. I shall not deal with it here, for it was never 
1. "! Mad World, my Masters", (1646) from Political Ballads 
of the Seventeenth & Eighteenth Centuries, (ed. w.w. 
Wilkins) (1860) I, p.20, verses 6 & 7. 
2. S.Dowell, ! History of Taxation and Taxes in England, (1888), II, p. 4. 
3. Ibid., II, p. 5. 
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intended as a·specifically Royalist tax~ and'always remained 
universal in its application. The only element of partiality 
in its' collection . lay in the fact that the· Royalists wo·uld 
be more accurately assessed than their ·late '·op'ponents, as 
; " 
the local officials already knew the approximate annual 
income 'of their estates from the days of sequestration.'The 
delinquents would naturally also feel the weight of the 
assessments more than' the non~compounders.·; 
. 'The tax which did'weigh heavily against the Cavaliers 
was the twentieth. This was originally created as a volun-
tary levy, and as 'voluntary' taxes tended to do, soon 
became compulsory~·Its ever-widening scope quickly enveloped 
the Home Counties, and in 1646 was extended to'include all 
Royalists. Parliament instructed Goldsmiths' Hall to send 
" ~ ~, 
particulars of all recently-compounded delinquents to ~he 
; , 
Committee for Advance of Money so that they could be assessed. 
This tax· was finally limited to the;Royalists alone, in : 
June 1648 (by which time all non-Cavaliers were suppo.sed 
. ..- ~ . ..' . .. .. 
to have contributed)l. 
In theory~ the twentieth was levied on persons with 
over £100 in property' (real or personal), special care being -. 
. ' 2 ' ". 
taken that no delinquents avoided,paying it • Despite this, 
many people - including a number of Royalists - apparently 
did s03. The assessment was not a universal tax - it was 
1. Orders of 6 August and 25 August, 1646, 5 June 1648 -
C.C.A.M., pp. 56, 70. 
2. Ibid., Preface, p. x. 
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only imposed on those who had not made a substantial 
contribution to the Parliamentary. cause. Even some Royalists 
. . 
could claim exemption on these grounds - Richard Legard had 
donated £50 (his ~rue twentieth) to Lord Fairfax before 
he. had defected to the Cavaliersl • 
By no means all of the Yorkshire Royalists - even all 
of the compounders- were assessed. On1Y'106 delinquents; 
representing 92 families, were faced with the twentieth. 
It is noticeable that a mere 7 of these". were non-compounders, 
. . 
of which only two actually paid their assessment in any 
, 
.! 
case. (Of , the remaining"five, three had been deliberately. 
excused from the levy,'; and the others were pardoned as .their 
whole estates were fo'~fei ted by the Acts of Sale2.) The 
", A,. 
1 
1. R.C.P~, "II, 7; C.C.A.M., 81l~ 
, . 
2. The two who paid were Sir John Wolstenholme (who had been 
fined for being a customs farmer), and Sir Robert Strick-
land . (whose son had compounded). Wolstenholme's fine is 
well . summarised in W.P.Harper,Public Borrowing, 1640-60, 
(unpublished M.Sc. thesis (Bcon.) , UnIversity of London, 
1927), pp. 103-121. 
(Q~!!!!._f!:~!_E.:._!g~)· 
3. Without full examination of all the records of the Committee 
for Advance of Money, lying uncalandered in the Public 
Record Office, no firm decision can be given on this pOint • 
. The three volumes of the Calendar list only the following 
assessment cases: 1) Titled people (knights and above); 
2) Assessments of £1000 and over; 3) Ministers of churches; 
4) Men prominent in legal, literary, official or dip-
lomatic circles; 5) Cases where there are many papers; 
6) ,Cases in the later order books, thereby presuming that 
theparties are delinquents. A note of the uncalandered 
records (C.C.A.M., Preface, pp. xix-xxiv) indicates that, 
almost all of the delinquents' papers have been calendared: 
for the purposes of this chapter, I have assumed this 
to be so. . 
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Committee for Advance of Money, despite its own organisation 
for tracing concealed delinquents, relied heavily upon 
Goldsmiths' Hall for the names of its victims. Thus those 
who evaded composition had a good chance of .avoiding the 
attentions of Haberdashers' Hall as weIll. 
The Royalists who compounded earlier were more likely 
to be assessed than those who surrendered after 1647. This 
was possibly due to a gradual decline in the efficiency of 
the Committee for Advance of Money, as it became burdened 
with other responsibilities, such as ,the gathering of inform-
ation against delinquents. Another reason lies in the fact 
that the ~riginal assessments were often grossly inaccurate, 
and thus had to be extensively revised: the Committee was thus 
. ." . ~ . 
still',working on the twentieths of the earlier compounders 
when it-should have been dealing with new cases • 
.. 
Table XI: CHRONOLOGICAL COMPARISON OF COMPOSITIONS & 
ASSESSMENTS. 
44/5 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 t Non- Act of 
compdrs Sale 
N o. who 7 86 28 10 39 12 11 2 v. many 61 compounded 
N o. of 
above who 4 70 16 0 6 1 2 0 6 2 ere w 
assessed 
p ercentage 57 81 57 
-
15 8i 18 
-
? 3 
Without other studies on the twentieth, it is impossible 
to say whether this marked decline in the assessment of 
1. This only applies to the north, where the assessments 
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compounded delinque:nts was a purely local feature, or whether 
it represented the national scene as a whole. Until this 
is known, we cannot with any certainty discover its cause. 
But, as suggested above, the excessive concern with 
current cases seems to have prevented the Committee from 
pressing'forwards with the prosecution of the later com-
with 
pounders. This development can be compared /' the gradual 
decline in the efficiency of the Committee for Compounding, 
as its bureaucratic organisation slowly collapsed under, 
1 the weight of steadily-accumulating business • 
1. The decline is not due to the omission of later cases, 
as M.A.E.Greenspecifically includes all such material: 
~ee note) on p. 1)0). 
(£~~!~_!~~~_E~_!~!)· 
were not· .full;t irnpo~jed until 1646 and later. In the 
south, especially in London and Middlesex, everyone 
was heavily assessed. Haberdashers~' Hall was the 
London headquarters 'of the Committee for Advance of 
Money. 
, 
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Table XII: RATE OF ASSESSMENT AMONG COMPOUNDERS. 
Dates when compounded, &: no. of compounders. 
, 
' I 
D 
A 
m 
ate of 44/5 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 .. Non- Total 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
ssess-
ent 
644/5' 
646 
647 
648 
649 
650 
651 
652 t 
un known 
T otal 
-
1 
3 
-
-
-
, 
-
. -, 
-
4 
3 2 -
15 
- -
25 1 ' ' 
-
1 
- -
19 9 
-
5 2" 
-
-
2 
-
1 
- -
1 
-
' -
7G 16 
-
compdrs 
'1 
- - -
6 12 
1 
- - -
' - 17 
-
1 
- - -
30 
- - - - -
1 
1 
- - - -
29 
- - - - -
7 
3 - 2 - - 7 
- - - - -
1 
- - - -
1 2 
6 '1 2 
-
7 106 
As can be seen from the above table, the early'e~~iciency 
. 
of the Committee in seeking out and assessing delinquents 
(in some cases, before they had compounded), was not main-
tained. Before 1646, all twelve cases handled by the Committee 
were of uncompounded delinquents (although, admittedly, 
most of these were notable delinquents whose Royalism had 
long been known). In 1649, however, 65 per cent of the new 
cases brought before Haberdashemt Ha1l were of Cavaliers 
, ., 
t' 
who had compounded at least three years before. 74 per cent 
of those who compounded before 1648 had to pay the twentieth -
less than half that proportion of the later compounders 
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were assessed. This steady decline in the efficiency and 
supervision of the anti-Royalist legislation is typical of 
all the punitive committees of this period. 
, , 
It is interesting to note the geographical distribution 
of those who were assessed. On an average, '32 per cent of 
the Royalist families paid the twentieth - if only those 
who compounded are considered, 55 per cent of such families 
had at least one member assessed. Yet in some areas the 
Cavaliers were, more likely to be disturbed than in others: 
the,following table illustrates the regional distribution 
, . ' 
of the,twentieth among the compounding, families. 
Table XIII: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSESSMENT BY 
FAMILIES (only compounding families considered). 
Area , Total of No. of assessed Percentage 
compounding belonging to 
families these families(l) ,--
» Hull' 11 9 82 
Ainsty .3 1 33 
, 
E. Yorks. 23 13 56* 
Richmond . 17 7 , 41 
Cleveland- 29 11 38 
Pennine : 6 2 33 ' , 
w. Yorks. 53 - 31 58 
s. Yorks. 19 14 74 
" 
Totals 161 88 541- (av.) 
1. This refers to the number of assessed families, and not 
'. to the total number of assessed persons. 
, 
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The assessment of compounded delinquents was. clearly 
the most efficient in the easily accessible areas of York-
shire - the East Riding,Hull, and the lowland districts 
of:the west Riding. The only exception to this is the 
AinstY'of .York, (which has.generally proved to be a statis-
tical anomoly~in all matters ,relating to the Hoyalists). 
~ , . " 
J :",,~ .' 1 ~ 
The actual levying and administration of the assessments 
<k $ '- ~ 
illustrates the shortcomings of the Committee for Advance 
of Money. The bureaucratic'organisation was excellent in 
theory, but frequently proved to be inadequate in practice. 
~.: ~. ' .. _" • ,~ '.i t! 
To calculate each iildi vidual contri b'tition~ the government . 
established a schedule of rates at which various types of 
" " .. ',;" ...... .. '1" 
property were to be assessed • Lands, both in fee simple .. 
and tail; were appraised' at "three-f4;uarters of their annual 
revell~e. Impropriations 'were valued at slightly' less -
twelve years' purchase (~ven though such property was still 
"J l ; ., 
only rated' at ten years' value if it was confiscated, or 
taken in' part payment of a. composition fine). Estates held 
, ~ 
for a period of years, or a number of lives, were allowed 
" , . ,"! . 
at proportionately lower rates. 
~ ", 
The ~ajoritY 'Of these original assessments were round 
. . 
sums, usually a multiple of fifty pounds, and apparently 
based solely on t~e Committee's opinion of each delinquent's 
capacity (or liability) to pay. They bore very little rel-
f • " .~' ~ '" c .. :," .,; I .' " " 
ationsh1p to the Royalists', estates, either before or after 
, ~:' 
1. 'O.O.A.~. ,P.' 8 (De~ ? 1642) .... ' Y' 
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the war. In March 1649, Parliament modified the system, 
ordering all assessments to be calculated from the 'part-
iculars of estate'. The Committee for Advance of Money 
- . '. . 1 
was to decide whether or not to allow personal debts • But 
" . 
. , 
even after this ordinance was passed, the sums 'levied (and 
those actually collected) bore little relationship to 
the 'particulars' in many cases. 
It is therefore not surprising that a considerable 
number of these assessments were modified when the true values 
, 
of the estates were considered. In fact, many were never 
collected at all - 45 out of the l06~ In 16 of these cases, 
all proceedings ceased, and no attempt was made to obtain 
the m'oney. Six other delinquents were discharged because they 
~ I ~ 
had completed their compositions and had paid the full 
" 
amount of the fine. (Not all of those who had compounded 
,-
pleaded their completed fines as an excuse - Francis Bunney, 
assessed in 1647, meekly settled his twentieth although he 
had rec'ei ved his acquittal from Go1dsmi the' Hall the previous 
year2.): S,~x mor,e we~e' excused because they had surrendered 
on specific terms, such as the Articles of Oxford, although 
they were only a~,~owed such benefits if they had already 
commenced composition pro~eedings3. 
1. 13 March;'164~ ~ C.O.A.M., p. 74. 
2. Ibid., p. 735. 
3. Article XI of the Articles of Oxford allowed those who 
had compounded to " ••• enjoy their Estates ••• discharged 
of Sequestrations, and from Fifth and Twentieth Parts, 
and other Payments and Impositions, except such as shall 
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": The other discharges were made for various reasons. -The 
Hothams had been assessed when their treason was discovered, 
but the impositions were removed,after their execution. 
Two more Royalists had died before assessment leaving en-
tailed estates, and were therefore acquitted. Three were 
discharged on the Act of Pardon, and four more for individual 
reasons. The remaining six Royalists had their assessments 
removed because of indebtedness. 
" In addition to the considerable number of absolute 
discharges, fifty-five of the assessments were reduced 
upon review. There were two principal causes of this. The 
majority of compounders were still suffering from the after-
effects of their fines: but even if they had no debts, the 
twentieths, especially those made before 1649, were far too 
" 1 high, valuing the estates at completely unrealistic ,levels • 
The,fat that the-assessments followed close on the 
1. The reductions in the assessments were generally due to 
a combination of indebtedness and inaccurate assessing. 
t£2~!~_!~2~_E~_f~~)· 
be general, and common to them with others." - J.Rush-
worth, Historical Collections, IV,i, (1701) p. 283. 
An administrative error led to Robert Haldenby being 
resequestered, despite his legitimate discharge on the 
Articles of Oxford, 25 July, 1649. The Committee'con-
fused lists of those who were J.iable for payment, and 
sequestered Haldenby's property on 26 December, 1649. 
C.C.A.M., 1042, 1041. 
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heels' of composition must necessarily have found the Roy-
alists in an unfortunately weak economic position. Mort-
gages and annuities to creditors, settled on their estates 
to repay the debts incurred in compounding, naturally in-
creased the delinquents' liabilities, a fact well realised 
by the Committee for Advance of Money. The latter openly 
complained to Parliament that the low receipts from assess-
ments were directly due to the general indebtedness caused 
by the prior payment of compositionsl • 
But the large number of reductions due to debts does 
not necessarily indicate that the Royalists as a class were 
crippled by the fines. Some certainly were, but in most cases, 
as the twentieth was demanded fairly soon after the delin-
quent had compounded, -the loans raised to settle his fine 
would not have been repaid. Half of the fine was usually· 
paid with alacrity, in order to regain the sequestered estate2• 
The debt involved was equivalent to at least one year!s 
income and, whilst not necessarily embarrassing the estate 
in any way, would take several years to discharge (depending 
on the size of the property and its post-war condition). 
Even the unpaid half of the fine, as it was acknowledged by 
a bond in the hands of the Committee for Compounding, could 
be classed as an outstanding debt. 
1. Note on Obstructions, 5 June 1648, C.C.A.M., 70. 
2. See supra, P • 1011, ff. 
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In such cases, the Royalist's own sworn statement was 
accepted as evidence of.his financial position. This naturally 
provided ample opportunities for over-valuing liabilities, 
and.thus minim1sing.the'amount that had to be paid. It is 
difficul t to. estima.te · .. the extent of such practices, as there 
are no means of checking the statements of debts against 
established facts. Theref'ore, except in the few rare ca.ses 
where enough reliable alternative evidence exists to make 
a comparison, it is impossible to judge the amount of such 
evasions. 
A certain amount of undervaluation was definitely prac-
tised. George Dawson of Azerley stated in his 'particular' 
that his estate was £50 a year with £100 in reversion, and 
charged with a £40 annuity and £1000 debts. As the sum in 
reversion was his mother's dower (two-thirds of the estate?), 
his own inc.me seems surprisingly small. He compounded in 
1646 for £203, and three years later was assessed at £100. 
This was completely discharged because his debts, estimated 
at £2128, exceeded the total value of' the estate. Apart from 
the suspicious increase in indebtedness, Dawson's will, made 
in 1653, left a £1000 portion to his daughter, even though 
his mothe~O was still living and receiving her dower. Such 
, 
sudden affluence suggests that Dawson had considerably over-
estimated his liabilities (and probably also undervalued his 
estate): it would be impossible to raise £1000 on the security 
140. 
of land already crippled with debtl • 
The other major cause of the wholesale reductions in 
the assessments was the wild inaccuracy of the original 
estimates. Admittedly, those made after 1649 were more real-
istic, but the earlier twentieths bore little relationship 
to actual fact. Sir Hugh Cholmley was assessed twice - at 
£3000 (July' 1644) and £1000 (October 1646), but was finally 
discharged on paying a mere £40. Henry Hildyard's £3000 
(October 1646) was gradually scaled down to a more realistic 
£400 (May 1649)2 •. 
In fact, a mere six of the original assessments were 
left untouched. In only one of these cases is there any 
definite evidence of payment: Henry Calverley's £200~was 
settled just 'over a month after it was demanded. (This was 
apparently a modified version of an earlier unrecorded ass-
essment.) None of the five remaining cases are complete -
the records terminate whilst proceedings were 'still in pro-
gress'before the Committee for Advance of Money. It is there-
fore quite possible that even these assessments were finally 
amended in some way3. 
1. R.C.P., II, 158; C.C.A.M., 1042; will, 15 July 1653 -
Somerset House, Alchin (1654) f~337. The reference to 
the debts being 1500 and £500/year is obviously a clerical 
error for £500 and £500 settled by a~ annuity. 
2. Cholmley: C.C.A.M., 423,729-30 (his final assessment was 
made on an undervalued 'particular'). Hildyard: Ibid., 733. 
3. EM, Add M~ 27411, f. 172 • 
...... 
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The reductions and discharges on the twentieth resulted 
in a great decline in the Committee's estimated revenues. 
Had the first assessments been enforced, over £60,000 
would have been collected from the Yorkshire gentry. But 
by the time that the demands had been modified, the sum 
, 
. ' " .' . 1 
total was a mere il3,155-1-0d •• The Committee ~owever, 
sometimes used these.reductio.ns to its own advantage. In 
several cases, the lower assessment was offered only on 
. . 
condition that it was paid within a stated time limit, 
usualiy a month. This, although by no means guaranteeing 
" 
immediate payment, expedited the collection of the tariff 
in a number of cases. 
Unfortunately there is relatively little information 
on the payment of assessments. Some were definitely paid 
fairly quickly, whilst others were equally certainly not 
settled for many months. Most Royalists (unless they were 
offered special conditions for prompt payment) preferred 
to delay until the final threats of sequestration Qr dis-
traint. They comtemp1ated the assessment with the same 
grudging acceptance as they regarded composition - as a 
necessary evil, made bearable by the fact that ,- in theory -
everyone had to pay it. But soon afterwards Parliament em-
barked upon an operation which proved to be an unqualified 
failure - the attempt to extract the moneys lent to the 
1. It must be remembered that these figures relate solely to 
the Yo?kshire gentry Royalists. The Parliamentarians 
and neutrals were also supposed to contribute unless 
they had previously aided Parliament. 
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King under the guarantee of the various Engagements. 
The Engagements had arisen out of the King's urgent 
need for money. In the case of the"Yorkshire agreement, 
the value of Charles' credit was so low that he was unable 
to borrow money without concrete secUrity. Thus a number of 
Yorkshire gentry offered to' guarantee the loan in case there 
was no legal means of settling the debt after the war. On 13 
February 1643, the Cavaliers1 signed a document to this 
effect', pro~ising to pay between aoo and £500 each (accor-
ding to the value of their estates) should the King default 
on his liabilities. They also signed bonds which were 
handed over to the various creditors who had advanced the 
money. 
Unfortunately, Parliament discovered a copy of this 
covenant, an~ sequestered the debt as a punishment for 
, 2 
lending money to the King. Thus began the long and com-
plicated struggle over the Yorkshire Engagement'- one 
battle that Parliament did not win. 
Two similar agreements were discovered and treated in 
the same way: the Oxford Engagement, and the pact of the 
Newark Garrison. The latter involved a mere eleven guarantors 
1. The'Yorkshire Engagement was also Signed by a number of 
, peers and non-gentry. All of the signatories were York-
shiremen, or held substantial lands in the county. 
2. Debts were normally se"questered only if owing to a delin-
quent. The creditors suffered as th~had advanced the 
money, but surprisingly the guarantors were not affected. 
Neither were prosecuted as normal Royalists, and forced 
to compound. 
and five 'creditors,' who had endeavoured to raise money to 
maintain the defence of, the town during the final stages of 
the' w'ar. But that for Oxford closely resembled the Yorkshire 
Engagement:" 84 creditors' advanced the' money, the loan being 
guaranteed by 27 prominent Royalists: The former included 
men of all'classes,-fr~mLord Capel (who besides standing 
as a surety;: als'o' lent £2500) to William Mason~ a clothier 
froll Northley'(who advanced £8}. Little documentary evidence 
relating to'either of these engagements has survived, but, 
as with the Magna Charta of Yorkshire, the government had 
considerable difficulty in collecting the debts guaranteed 
, ,~ "1 in the agreements • 
There is no: one complete and exact record of the signa-
toriesto the Yorkshire Engagement. 107 people are catalogued 
. , . -by the Committee'for, Advance of Money, whilst two other 
ao'counts give 103 ", and 120 names respecti vely2. The latter 
is probably'the most authentic and'accurate list. Not'all of 
the signator1'es were Royalists however - a few had been 
forced to sign. Both ChristopherPearcehay'and John Dodsworth 
were prominent Parliamentarians who -, had' added' their names 
only after long periods of imprisonment and threats of the 
1: C:.C.A'.rd., ,~8l-'5 (Ne~-ark); Ibid.: 99€;-10?5 (O~ford) ~ 
2. Ibid.',' 907-8 gives III 'names, , but four are father-son 
comblnations,guaranteeing one sum. Attorney-General 
Prideaux mentions 113 names (id., 907). Other lists give 
103' (Dib-Lupton MSS, DB/204/1, pp. 215-6) and 120 (Went-" 
" worth of Woolley MSS, (University), Box 16). 
~ ~.... ; ! 
- --------~=" """""---..,,3 
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destruction of their property. Both were excused from all 
penalties because of their considerable past services to 
parliamentl • 
The sum borrowed on the security of the estates of 
these Yorkshire gentry amounted to £14,800, raised by the 
Corporation of York, the Merchant Adventurers, and twenty-
eight individuals. The total of the thirty-five bonds held 
by these creditors was, however, £18,235-6-l0d; even when 
.. 
due allowance ',is made for interest, this suggests that the 
original~an was somewhat larger than was at first realised. 
The.amount guaranteed by the Yorkshire gentry was in the 
region of £25,000,whic~ meant that each individual would 
2 have to pay about thirty per cent less than the sum promised • 
. The government.apparently discovered a copy of York-
shire's Magna Charta in 1646, but no action was taken until 
mid 1648. On 21 July of that year, it was suggested that 
the guarantors should pay "the sums due into the Treasury of 
Haberdashers' Hall, and would have their bonds cancelled 
in return. 3 The successful operation of such a sequestration 
presupposed two things. Firstly, the creditors who were 
1. C.C.A.M., 918, ·929~30. 
2. Ibid.,89,. This mentions £14,800 debttbut this is else-
where stated to be £19,455* (id., 896). A list of bonds 
and bondholders appears on p.~3 of the Calendar. The 
amount guaranteed was £25,000 (id., 895) but note total 
of promises as £24,400 (Dib-LuptOn MSS, DB/204/l, p. 215-6) 
and £26,100 (Wentworth of Woolley MSS (University) Box 16). 
3. C.C.A.M., 895. Commong order to compound with signatories, 
16 June 1649 - id., 896. 
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being p~ished for lending money to the King would have to 
surrender their bonds, which meant the loss of their debts. 
Secondly, the government bad to discover a method of differ-
entiating between those who had signed the Engagement 
willingly, and the victims of force. Although the Committee 
.;.,.. .,; 
for Advance of Money was able to fulfil this latter require-
ment, it never managed to collect all the bonds from the 
, . 
creditors, and, in fact, could not even force ,the delinquents 
>< , 
to pay their debts. 
The Committee again requested the aid of informers. A 
fifth wa~ pr~~isedt? any who could discover new bondholders 
or signatories, but there is only one instance of any such 
. . 
intellig~nce.l 'In any case, the government had a fairly 
accurate list of the guarantors, and had managed to trace 
nearly all - if not all - of the creditors. 
On 20 March 1650, the reorganised Committee for Advance 
of Money began its attempt to collect the Engagement debts. 
The gua~antors were ordered to pay the amounts due into the 
Committee's treasury within three weeks, under penalty of 
. ' , 
distraint. In May, due to the poor response, the order 
was repeated - this time half the sum was to be paid by 
. '. .. ~ ~ 
24 June. The creditors were also instructed to surrender 
, , 
their bonds,so that the guarantors could be given a full 
. 2 
and legal discharge • 
1. C.C.A.M., 895-7 :(the only information was on 7 June 1654, 
ibid., 904).' 
2. Ibid., 896. 
The Committee intended to distinguish between those 
who freely admitted ,their,signatures and willingly paid 
the sums demand~d, and the delinquents who denied all know-
ledge of the Engagement1 • As ,the sum guaranteed exceeded the 
total debt, the,commissioners apparently planned to charge 
the recalcitrant delinquents the full amount of their pledges, 
and make a consequent reduction in the debts of the more . 
amenable Royalists. Such promises led a number of the sub-
scribers to pay the first part of their liabilities fairly 
promptly. But the response to these instructions was gen-
erally not encouraging. In fact, when the signatories were 
ordered to pay half of their debts (or to give a good 
reason to the contrary), only 42 admitted signing, 22 denied 
it, and the remainder simply ignored the summons to appear. 
A few even changed their evidence during examination. Roger 
portington confessed to signing, but later contradicted 
himself; Sir Andrew Young first pleaded his innocence, yet 
subsequently admitted signing voluntarily; whilst Thomas 
Beaumont, though steadfastly denying the accusations, dec-, 
lared that he was quite ready to pay if his guilt could be 
2 proved • 
Even by mid 1651, the situation had hardly improved. 
Thomas Fowle, Parliament's solicitor, recommended that all 
the first halves should be paid before ,the second portions 
1. C.O.A.M., 896. 
2. Ibid., 907~8, 930, 933, 911. 
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were collected. This would not only ensure that any surplus 
moneys could be fairly distributed among the signatories, 
but would also prevent the more submissive Royalists from 
1 feeling discouraged • But whilst this suggestion was 
admirable in theory, 'it proved to be well-nigh impossible 
to enforce the payments when both debtors and creditors were 
firmly in opposition to government policy. On 31 July 1651, 
the Committee wrote 'urgently to the local authorities at 
York, instructing them to sequester,the estates Of all 
recalcitrant delinquents, lest the example of government 
inaction in the face of ,defiance should prove damaging to 
2 the,State •• 
It was only natural that many subscribers to the 
Engagement should deny their signatures. The Royalists con-
sidered that they had exp'iated'their crimes (if they re-
garded them as crimes) by compounding, and since they had 
received pardons for their delinquency, strongly objected 
to 'paying any more'money. They were offered an official 
discharge if they paid their debt to the State: many regarded 
such an acquittal as having little value, especially as 
several of the creditors had not yet surrendered their bonds 
to the Committee. 
It is ',unlikely that any of the Royalists had already 
paid their debts - certainly none pleaded this as an excuse 
1.,27 May 1651, C.C.A.M., 897. 
2. Ibid., 898. ' . " 
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when their case was examined, There is little doubt howeve~ 
that, had they done so, they would have been discharged, and 
the money recouped directly from the creditors. The 
Committee for Advance of Money, despite the doubtful legality 
of its whole proceedings, attempted to act with scrupulous 
honesty wherever possible. But the whole process of the 
Engagement was cloaked with such suspicion and so many 
glaring anomllies that it is small wonder that many of the 
debtors refused to pay any money at all. 
The government's policy received an equally unfavourable 
reception from the thirty bondholders. For the offence of 
lending money to the losing side, they were to have their. 
debts sequesteredl • The fact that a number of creditors 
were also compounded Royalists who had already received a 
full pardon from Parliament for their delinquency was ignored. 
In the face of this semi-legal procedure, the majority of 
the creditors at first simply refused to surrender their 
bonds, despite all the Committee's threats. Some claimed 
that they had been forced to contribute, others that they 
had lost or mislaid their bonds, and a few denied lending 
any money at all. Parliament, for the first time in its 
experience of dealing with delinquents, was faced with an 
almost solid wall of opposition. 
It is interesting to note that the majority of the 
1. However, it could be considered that they were lucky not 
to be forced to compound, as had some other creditors 
of the King. 
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~reditors'petitioned that they 'had 'been forced to': lend the 
~ori~yto·the:Royalists.~ How true this ,was we shall probably 
never know':! whilst' the Cavaliers were "qui tecapable of 
competlin'e-- the bondholders to advance,the money nco.inst. 
'their willI, 'the latter w'ere equally likely to try: and lie 
theirway'outof trouble. Eventually the Committee recovered 
most of' 'the bonds';" or' obtained' -releases" where they had'.~ 
been iost~~ut thermajority ~f the creditors-6nly submitted 
after many'threat's" arid some later succeeded in proving. 
their i'nnocence"whereupon they were reimbursed from the 
t 2 -pI" oceeds cjf the Ent"8gemen '. The government· never recovered 
all of the bonds' ~some had apparently genuinely been lost, 
. otheracould not be traced, and a few ~were kept hidden3 • ' 
. ' How'ever, the Coml!li ttee /8ooridiscovered~that possession 
'of the bonds did 'not facilitate collection of the Engagement 
debts in any way. The subscribers still resisted its demands, 
; delaying ':mattersby 'peti tionine for a retrial of thp.ircases, 
'(which could'take many months). Past experience had taufht 
the :Royaliats :that 'all central 'conirni ttees were unwilling 
to' -delegate: au thori ty, fand tr'i;ed to consider each case 'per-
:son~lly~'In this way,"a jude~ment'could be delayed almost~ 
, -' , ! 
,1. But, if this was the case, would the Royalists have 
" bothered :·to e;uarantee the' debt? · " 
2.:For:the case'of,the creditors, see C.C.A.M., ,933 ff. 
3. This could result in post-Restoration proceedings - see 
,William ,Lowther's case, ffi~C, VII, (House of Lords MSS), 
,'p 117.' " " " " .' -,.' ~ - '1 ." 
"\ . .. ~ . , 
" ~'" 
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indefinitely by petition and counter~petition,whilst the 
delinquent remained in possession of his property. 
Not all of the gentry proved stubborn, however. A few' 
probably as many as a half - settled the first part of their 
debts in accordance with the demands of the Committee. 
But when it appeared that their fellow guarantors were not 
being fully prosecuted for their refusal to pay, some of 
these Royalists refused to co-operate any further,' whilst 
others actively aided Parliament in an endeavour to ensure 
that, if they had to pay, so did everyone else'. 
One such person was'Francis Nevile of Chevet - he was 
to become a principal actor in the Engagement drama. The 
Committee for Advance of Money pOintedly informed him that' 
if, many delinquents managed to disprove 'their signatures, 
the remaining gentry would have to make up the loss. ~his 
was the reason why the full ',' amounts of the pledges were' 
being collected, although they exceeded the debt by over 
£8000.) Nevile,immediately recommended:that all: those accused 
of signing be 'forced to pay'haif of their debts before their 
defence was heard. He also advised that the second halves 
of the bonds be paid six months after the first parts, (but 
, ' 
only so much as would be needed to satisfy the ,sequestered 
loan). Entails should not be allowed, and the sons of the 
siin,atories' ought to be liable for their late fathers' debts l • 
'. * 
1. Letter to Nevile, 5 September 1651; notes on his reply, 
15 September: C.C.A.M., 898-99. 
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Besides these practical suggestions, Nevile requested 
that a definite distinction be made between those who were 
willing to pay their bonds, and the more reluctant Royalists. 
He s~ggested that, in order ... to discover who were the volun-
.tary subscribers, the Committee should examine Edward Stock-
dale" a prisoner in the Fleet who (as one of Newcastle's 
late officers) could attest to the authenticity of the sig-
1 natures. . Nevile's advice was taken, and Stockdale and 
William Watts were questioned about the Magna Charta 2. Their 
evidence supported Nevile' s.suspicions· - all those accused 
of signing the Engagement had, in fact, done sO in person, 
and none of the signatures were forgeries 3 • 
The government soon lost patience with the hopelessly 
slow rate of payment - less than half of the delinquents 
had paid their first halves by the end of 1651. Despite 
Fowle! s;~ advice, the Committee for Advance of Money declared 
that the final instalments were now due4• The result was 
exactly the opposite to that intended: with a handful of 
.exceptions, nobody paid anything at all. Those who had 
already contributed refused to honour the remainder of their 
1. C.C.A.M., 898-99. 
2. Order for the two Royalists to be examined, 26 September, 
1651, ibid., 899. 
3. Letter, Nevile to Committee for Advance of Money, 23 
Sept., 1651, ibid. 899 •. 
4. Nevile's statement, 26 November, ibid., .900. Order to pay, 
3 December, ~ 900. 
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pledges until everyone had paid some part of the debt. 
The rest of the delinquents, however, still continued adamant 
" 
in their refusal to make any payments at all •. 
The context of this ill-fated order suggests that many 
of the delinquents had not been punished for "their diso~ed- . 
ience. l 'Despite the Committee's frequent exhortations to 
Josiah Beverley (the Yorkshire Committee's agent) to take 
action, virtually rio~e of t~eoffenders were 'ever sequestered, 
and apparently'only a few suffered the lesser penalty of, '-
seizure2 • Beverley had little more' s'uccess' in' his attempts 
to force the creditor~ 'to surrender their bonds. 
AlIthia time, the central Committee'had been attempting 
to increase its income from:the Engagement by dividing one 
section'of the Yorkshire gentry against the other. The 
authorities' continually reminded'Nevileand his COlleagues 
of the e~tra'amourit they would have 'to' pay for'each delin-
, , 
quent ~ho was' acquitted. Early in 1652, Nevile'repeated his 
plea to Martin'Dallison, the committee'S registrar, for a 
distinction between the willing and the reluctant debtors. 
He urged that the former be encouraged'bY'reducing their' 
that . 
shares, or ~the latter be forced to pay - by ,seizure and' 
, .1 
1. None of the signatories to the Engagement appear in the 
lists of those sequestered in l650~ '1651,1652 or 1655.· 
However, there is no way of telling whether their estates 
had been seized or not. There are a number of letters 
'amongst the Engagement proceedings from Beverley, telling 
.. the Committee of those he had. warned or sequestered. 
2 •. For an explanation of these terms, see supra, P.7~3*. 
-
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distraint if necessaryl. 
There was sound logic in this argQ~ent. The threats 
of Goldsmiths' Hall had not led to swifter compositions:. 
it had been the added inducements of lower fines and the 
repayment of back rents (combined with the Royalist military 
defeats) which had encouraged most delinquents to compound. 
This principle might have had some success with the Engage-
ment, but the central Committee never put it into practice. 
In fact, its peremptory demand to the more submissive del-
inquents to 'settle the remainder of their debts lost it 
what few supporters it had. 
The Act of Oblivion of 24 February 1652 threatened to 
terminate all Engagement proceedings, as,many,of the sig-
natories had not,been sequestered since the previous Dec-
ember. Parliament debated the question, and in October 1652 
excluded all those who" had been ordered to pay their debts 
2 ' , 
from the provisions of the act. But the central Committee 
was finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the 
~ , ~ ,-' ,. ~ . 
numerous petitions, and many cases had been virtually in, 
abeyance for a considerable time. Nevile, in a fit of disgust, 
wrote to Dallison that "If the committee forgive those who 
have not paid, but petitioned, I shall heartily thank them, 
and am only sorry. that I,did not petition before I paid"3. 
1. 27 January, 1652, C.C.A.M., 901. 
2: 15 October, "1652, i,bid. , 901. 
3~ 20 December, ,1652, !.2.:.~ 902." ; (, 
, 
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With the advent of the Protectorate, and Cromwell's 
brief honeymoon with the Royalists, the Committee for Advance 
of Money suspended its activities whilst it enquired about 
its powers under the new r~gimel. Almost immediately there 
was a reaction in Yorkshire. 'Sir John Kaye, Francis Nevile, 
and other ,"trimmers" appealed to the Protector. Only half 
'of the gentry had paid 'any part of their bonds, and although 
" ••• Much pains were taken to 'settle all interests justly ••• " 
the lapse of the old Committee's authority had terminated 
all 'actions. They begged that the Committee's powers be ' 
revived, and recommended the full payment of the Engagement 
subsidies, by force if necessary ~ In response to these' 
requests, the new Committee was empowered to continue all 
suits over the Engagement, and to arrest those who did not 
pay their full debts2• 
These tactics continued sporadically until the-Rest-
oration,. a.lthough few individuals were prosecuted after ' 
1655. As late as May 1656, some creditors had still not 
surrendered up their bonds3: the government never managed 
to collect them all. It did not even succeed in its object 
'of raising the £14,800, the debt which it had originally 
sequester~d. In the'fac~~of opposition from all Sides, 
Parliament eventually had to concede defeat. 
1. 9 May ,1654 , C. C • A. • M • , 903. 
2: Petition of 25 May, 1654 (ibid.~903); orders of June l654? 
and 7 June '54, id., 904. 
3. id., 906. 
-
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An admission of this failure was made on 8 May 1658, 
over eight years after the 'first demands for payment.' 
Attorney-General Prideaux gave a-brief summary of the pro-
ceedings over the Yorkshire Engagement. Of thell3 names on 
Parliament's list of signatories; 25 had been officially 
discharged, (over half because they had been 'in the Acts 
of'Sale,and therefore had no 'estate' of their own). Only 
2 had paid in full, 4'in part, 48 had settled half of their 
debt, and the remainder - 34 - had paid nothing at all., The 
total sum for which these people stood boU?dwas £24,500:, 
-', :, ';-" "', '1" " " 
in actual fact, only £6300 had been collec,ted • Parliament 
responded to this dismal tale with a half-hearted attempt 
4 " '" _ 
to revive the Engagement fines, but met with no success. 
The principal, cause : of the government's failure was 
that official policy ran contrary to the interests of all 
~ , I.. ...... _ l.. ' ,f 
... 
parties co~ncerned. ,The creditors, sever,al of whom !lere prom-
inent Royalists, had lent money to the King in good faith, 
, \ ' '. , -, 
and did not intend to lose it without a struggle. Some" 
:'- ',' 
such as Maulger Norton and Sir Roger Jacques, had already 
compounded and received a full pardon for their delinquencies • 
.' > -. 
" 
" . 
And, of course, it was the ~vowed intention of all Royalists 
... . . .' , ~ , 
~ . 
to pay as little a,s possible as sel~om as, possible. 
No doubt the declining efficien~y of,the Yorkshire 
Committee also hindered the collection of the debts. The 
... ;" 
effect of the, ill-fated reorganisation of both central and 
, , , 
, ~,.: . 
1. 8 May, 1658 - C.C.A.M., 907. Of the £6300, all but £1000 
had been paid before November 1651 ';"ibid., gOO •. 
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local) authorities has' already been discussedl • The county 
commissioners, many of them members of several bodies, had 
'to de'al with the non-payment of 'composition fines, seques-
"M.Ol'>t;My 
trations, twentieths, the weekly assessments, and the admin-
" istration of the Yorkshire Engagement,all at once -with 
unfortunate consequences. Their gradual decline under the 
sheer weight of business and lack of independent power must 
have greatly encouraged the Royalists' resistance. 
The majority of the 107 guarantors l,ist~d by the Com-
, 
mi ttee for Advanc~ of MO,ney were members ,of the gentry - 83, 
,coming from 80 families 2 • I have decided to concentrate upon 
these delinquents, who presented a clear cross-section of 
ability andinge~uity. For both ability and ingenuity were 
needed in negotiations with the central Committee. Some 
, , 
Royalists relied upon bureaucratic inefficiency - they 
, , 
, 
ignored all instructions and waited for the authorities to 
take action - but many of the delinquents depended upon their 
,powers of invention. The principal excuse was that of com-
pulsion: the accused claimed that he had been forced to 
> ~: -
sign ( an~ occasionally,,~h~t his signature was a forgery). 
At first, over 40 of t~e guarantors used this excuse. The 
majority were most likely lying, as nearly all of the sub-
~; scri bers to, the 'Engagement were staunch Royalists3 ~ 
1.' See supra, 'p':l.lFJ. : 
2. Peers:" 10; , , lesser • gentry': 7; Parliamentarians: 3; 
, unclassified: 4. ' 
3. C.C.A.M., 907-8. Also, Stockdale attested that all the 
signatures were genUine, even if some, were compulsory," ( , 
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In some cases however, the allegations were true - both 
Christopher PaQrcehay and John Dodsworth were enemies of 
the King who had been compelled to sign. Francis Childers 
of Doncaster pleaded the same extenuating circumstances - the 
only corroborative evidence he could produce were the sworn 
statements of two otbersignatories, each using the same 
defence. Surprisingly, the Committee accepted this~self­
supporting evidence, and all three were acquittedl • 
Sir Walter Rudston of Hayton also petitioned for a 
discharge.on the grounds of force. His only other delin-
quencyhad been_to entertain the King in 1642, when Charles 
had been preparing to besiege Hull. After long deliberations, 
the Committee finally accepted his protestations, and his 
2 
estate was discharged. 
Besides these simple denials or allegations of force, 
(which'Stockdale and Nevile were soon able to disprove), the 
Royalists depended upon a variety of excuses. Both Sir. 
FranciS Cobb and Sir Paul Neile pleaded that they had surren-
dered on the Articles of Oxford, which exonerated them from 
any further enquiries into their wartime. activities. They 
each had to pay half of their bonds before their cases were 
considered, but apparently their petitions were allowed3 • 
1. C~C.A.M., 914-5. Finally discharged on the Act of Pardon, 
17 March 1654/5, ERQ, SP 19/A 45. 
2. C~C~A.M., 930-31; G.E.C., Complete Baronetage, (Exeter, 
1900-1904), II, 194. 
3. C.C.A.M.~ 911, 926.' 
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In a few instances, the accused managed to avoid pay-
ment by simply confusing the issue; and 'losing the COnlmittee's 
officials in a maze of conflicting and diverse evidence." 
Edward Copley of Batley 'was ordered to pay the:£100 share 
of his elder brother John, who 'had been killed duringt~e 
war. Copley claimed that the signatory was not 'his brother, 
but John Copley of Doncaster, member of another branch of 
the family, who ,had been firmly loyal to Parliament. This 
latter indignantly denied the charge, "whilst Edward reaffirmed 
his ownbrother's innocence. The result was that no 'one 
paid John Copley's share of the·debtl ., 
Such attempts to confuse the Committee between two 
possible subscribers, if firmly prosecuted, could lead to 
" , 
both persons avoiding payment." Francis' Rockley, as executor,' 
was charged with the late ,FranCiS Burdett's £100, but alleged 
that all, Burdett's personaiJestate was in the hands of his 
2' widOW, who had'recently married Sir John Kaye. Bothparties 
claimed extensive debts on the lands, and-denied responsibility: 
and neither apparently paid anything. The case of the late 
Sir Christopher Dawney's bond for £500 followed exactly the 
same pattern. The heir, Sir John, and the widow's second' 
husband, Sir Thomas Strickland, each asserted that the other 
was liable far the charge; and -both -refused" to' pay3. 
1.,C.C.A.M., 9l5~, 
2. ,They 'were engaged'in a laWSUit-over the debts on Burdett's 
estate at this time. 
3. C.C.A.M., 912-3; 918. 
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Sir Ferdinando Leigh evolved an even more Gilbertian 
excuse. When his £100 was demanded" he claimed that he had 
been ill at York" and with such pains in his head that he 
knew not what he did". He could not remember signing the 
Engagement. The sceptical Committee ordered that his estate 
be sold to raise the debt; but over two years later the sum 
l' 
was still unrecovered • 
A handful of delinquents were also able to avoid pay-
ment on the, grounds that the signatory had died before the 
Engagement was declared to be a debt to the state. The 
heirs of Sir Ralph Hansby, Sir Jordan Metham and Sir John 
Reresby all pleaded this as an excuse. Unfortunately, none 
of the cases are complete, but 
, , ' 
ever paid, even if ~he charges 
it appears that no money was 
were not officially dismissed. 2 
.;- ,. 
In other instances where the original signatory was dead, 
the heirs often claimed ignorance of any association with 
., . 
the Engagement, and added that, due to entails and the lack 
of any personal estate, they had inherited none of the del-
inquent's property. 
No account was taken of most of these claims. It was 
.. 
resolved at Haberdashers!, Hall that the heirs of agnatories 
should bring up their 'particulars of estate', and pay the 
Engagement without any special con~essions3. Despite this 
1. C.C.A.M., 924. 2. Ibid., 922, 926~ 930. 
3. Wentworth of Woolley MSS (University), Box 16 (1' June, 
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order disallowing entails (based on Nevile's recommendations 
in 1651), at least one person was discharged on these 
grounds - the widow of Michael Fawkes of Farnley. Her· husband 
.had died before the Engagement was made payable·to the state, 
and as her son was a minor, she was declared responsible for 
the debt. She successfully pleaded that, due to entails and 1 
debts, she had inherited nothing from her husband, and was 
·therefore not liable for his responsibilities.' Other similar 
.cases do not record the final decision, but the lapses in . 
. proceedings suggests that they were not prosecuted very 
11 1· . 'energetica y. ~. i'; 
Apart f~om such varied claims and counter-claims, the 
i 
most frequent excuse offered for non-payment was that of 
" .'. ,,", " 
indebtedness. As with the assessment, the Engagement debt 
came soon after composition, and found the Royalists in a 
, . 
strained financial position. But, surprisingly - and perhaps 
l ~ ~ , 
significantly - few delin~uents claimed that their insolvency 
was the result of compounding - i~ was more usually caused 
J. ~ ,. 7. .. ~ . 
by the 'confiscation of their estates. Only three people who 
, . -' .. , . 
. , 
pleaded'indeb~ednesswere not Catholi~s or.in the Acts.of 
·Sale: Rich~rd Horsfall, Sir. John Mallory and Sir. John Wol-
~ .' . -" '.. • " • ,'t 
;stenholme. Two of·these had.been in a delicate economic 
:p6~iti6~prior,to the war: Horsfall had personal debts 
\ • 1.' l-
- . 
1. Recommendation of 15.Sept., ;1651 ";.C~C.A.M., 899. The 
delinquent could only dispose of entailed property during 
his life and could not bequeath it - therefore his heirs· 
had technically inherited nothing from him, except per-
sonal estate (which usually meant a pile of debts). Cases.· 
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amounting·to, four times·his annual income which had not 
been allowed against his composition fine, and Mallory's 
estate had been swaying on the brink of insolvency for 
several decades. Wolstenholme's pre-war prosperity swiftly 
declined into bankruptcy when he was heavily fined for his 
activities as a customs farmerl • " 
The remainder of. those who pleaded indebtedness were, 
with the exception of the Catholic Ralph Crathorne, in the 
Acts of Sale. Francis;Nevile indignantly claimed that these 
catholics," ••• are as able to pay as we,'but (he added) if 
the Committee think fit to acquit them, they have (the) 
power •• ~"2. (Nevile was quickly losing patience with the 
incomprehensible twists and turns of 'official policy.) The 
Royalists pleaded that the bonds of those 'who had suffered 
confiscation should be paid by the State: Parliament rejected 
the request, and ordered'that their shares be divided amongst 
the rest of the Yorkshire gentry3. 
1. Horsfa11:- R~C.P., I, 164; C.C.A.M., 923. Mal1ory:-
Ibid.,925-6; R.C.P.~ 11,135-7; V.C.H~, North Ridi" 1,(1914): 
1'.404; Clarke-Thornhill MSS, DDI2/34/29; will of W lliam : 
Mallory (1645)- York wills (Registered Copies) vol. 48, f.161. 
Wolstenholme:- C.C.A.M., 921-2; PRO, C54/3783/8; W.P. 
Harper, Public Borrowln~, 1'p. IOJ-'-r,-., ' 
2. Letter to Dallison, 22 Jan., 1653, C.C.A.M., 902. 
3. 18 July, 1655, ibid~, 905. 
(£~~!~_~~~~_E~_!~Q~) 
on these gro~dainclude Fawkes, C.C.A.M.,920-l; Killing-
beck and Aldlurgh;'pp. 908-9; Fayler, p. 929,.etc. 
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In fact, the Committee for Advance of Money was reluctant 
to excuse anyone from paying the Engagement. Unlike com-
position, where the fine was arbitrarily assessed on the 
estate at a rate which was relative to guilt, ~ot to any 
ability to pay), ~he sums vouched in the Engagement rep-
resented free l admissions of ability and desire to aid .the 
King. Naturally. a guarantor would .only offer what he could 
afford. Thus the Committee saw no reason to reduce any fines, 
and only discharged them where the debtor proved to .be 
innocent, or was obviously incapable of paying the sum. 
Apart from those who were in the Acts of Sale, there were 
only seven certain discharges granted to the gentry signa-
tories (excluding the two Parliamentarians). Richard Aldburgh, 
Michael Fawkes and Michael Warton had all died, leaving 
entailed property and no personal estate. Richard Horsfall 
was insolvent, Francis Childers and Sir Walter Rudston had 
been forced .to sign, and, Edward Copley managed to have his 
debt transferred ~o John.Copley of Doncaster. But, in addition 
to these seven Royalists, a considerable number of the sub-
scribers (although not officially discharged) never paid 
anything, and were not seriously prosecuted2 • 
1. (for the most part). 
2 .. C.C.A.M., 908-33, passim. Sir Edward Payler was discharged 
on the Act of Pardon, but we do not know whether or not 
he had paid anything. Nor is it certain if Cobb's or 
Neile's pleas~' were accepted. 
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The Yorkshire Engagement was a dismal and unfortunate 
episod~ in ,the history of the county gentry. The whole event 
. . 
is full of unexplained contradictions. The creditors who 
had lent the, money on,the security of the Engagement were 
,,~ , '" ~ " 
treated as enemies, and lost their bon~s without hope of 
redress. Those who.had signed as guarantors received a less 
',' ~ 
harsh punishment: ,they would have had to pay the money anyway, 
, -1 ' ' 
and thus lost nothing by the .transaction. The sequestration, 
; - 4 
of the debt could not, be, justified on normal grounds, aS,the 
creditors were not sequestered or forced to compound like 
'. 
normal Royalists. The debtw8s seized simply because it. was 
a useful source of revenue from those who had aided the King. 
Yet,.despite t~eassumption of,anti-Parl~amentary 
activitie~inheren~ in the sequestr,~tion of the Engagement 
debts, neither those who had signed the covenant, nor the 
. '- . ~ 
bondholders, were treated as Royalists in any other way. 
No composition was extracted from any person connected with 
~ _, .) c'" 
the Engagement unless he had indulged, in other Royalist , 
activities. Sir Christopher Dawne; and Sir Edward Payler, 
William Grimston and James Ellerker - these and more were 
, 'the 
parties to: ~~gagement, but never compo~nded • .In all, 
twenty of the signatories paid no fines - nine were active 
Royalists known to the Committee for Compounding, who had 
been saved by death and entailed estates. But the remainin~ 
. . , 
eleven were never charged with any delinquency. As Francis 
.. 
Layton of Rawden had been branded as a Royalist for merely 
. 1 
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refusing to aid either side, it is surprising that Parlia-
'. 1 
ment did .not take the advantage offered by the Engagement • 
It was certainly not a belated sense of justice - the guaran-
tors were just as guilty as the creditors, yet it was the 
latter who were selected for punishment. 
, ' 
The Engagement also illustrates the split in the ranks 
.. 
of the ex-Royalist gentry. Nevile, Kaye and Sir George 
Wentworth, though 'firm and loyal supporters of the King during 
. 
the war, had been swift to make their peace with the ruling 
;.,. « 
powers. All paid the first half of their covenants fairly 
promptly: but when the rest of the debt was demanded before 
hardly more than, half of the signatories had contributed, 
they strenuously objected to the unfairness shown towards 
obedient Royalists. If they were going to pay, so was every-
one else~ Nevile was th.e most forward'in providing inform-
ation for the Committee for Adva.nce of Mri>ney, ,and encouraged 
the collectors in every possible way. When the powers of 
the old Committee lapsed, he led the petition to revive its 
. , , 
authority. To such people, the right cause was apparently 
the winning cause. 
Little is known about Sir John Kaye, but Francis Nevile 
of Chevet was, according to most reports, a most unpleasant 
person. Originally an active Royalist (he conscripted men 
into Newcastle's army, and lent Sandal Castle to the King's 
party), he surrandered voluntarily in August 1644, and 
1. L~yton's delinquency was that " ••• he refused for to assist 
the Par11amts fforces att bradford when they sent for him 
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immediately began to aid Parliament. At his composition, he 
must have fallen foul of ' the presiding official, who rep-
orted that he ','answered very impudently that he had done 
all the mischief he could". Later, he tried to ingratiate 
himself with the authorities by. offering information, and 
actively aided with the.Engagement (though not without 
making sure" that he was paid for his trouble). He, begged 
that he sh.ould," ••• not be looked on as an informer, ·but a 
servant to both parties". And, if John Levett's petition 
to the Lords in 1665 can b~ believed, Nevile was also 
quite prepared to forge documents and bribe judges to gain 
his own endsl • 
For all the trouble and acrimony that it caused, the 
Yorkshire Engagement produced a very disappointing result. 
It illustrated the futility of attempting to enforce a 
measure against almost one hundred per cent opposition. 
, . 
Some of the gentry refused to pay anything at all, and the 
Committee's attempts at coercion met ,with very little success. 
Those who had paid half their debt refused to pay any more 
until all had paid their half: a logical precaution, as 
the debt was less than the sum guaranteed, and the difference 
was to ,be subtracted from ,the final payments. Most delin-
1. R.C.P.,II, 3. Letter to Dallison, 22 Jan., 1653, C.O.A.M., 
, 902. House of Lords MSS, Comt. of Petitions Book, 18 . 
. Feb., 1664/5. All the above evidence against Nevile is 
highly biased, and it is not certain what value can be 
placed on it. 
(cont·_f~~~_E~_!~!~) 
--t~-iOyne (them) •••• " , R.C.P., I, 30. 
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. , 
quents were convinced that if ,they paid the full sum, they 
would never receive' any rebate from the Committee's' Treasury. 
The creditors regarded the whole proceedings as unjust, 
and simply refused to co-operate whenever possible. 
The episode showed that Parliament had not yet learnt 
that there was Q limit to 'the 'amount of taxation 'that 
'people would stand, especially if they believed it to be 
unjust. The failure to enforce the debts'by sequestration 
and seizure emphasized the conclusions that were slowly 
becoming painfully evident: it was one thing 'to levy a tax -
'i t was qu~ te another to collect it. The weight of business 
on the local committees prevented them from performing any 
single task with efficiency. In the absence of any new 
sequestrations, it appears that the penalties ordered for 
the non-payment of the Engagement were as difficult to 
~nforce'~s th~ debts themselvesl • 
The problem of the Engagement rose again after the 
Restoration. A proviso was added to the Act of Indemnity to 
exclude the signatories from paying their debts if they 
had already contributed to the Committee for Advance of 
2 Money under penalty of sequestration. Cressy Burnet and 
other bondholders also petitioned that Francis Nevile, Samuel 
,I. See supra, n. 1, 'p.IS<. 
2. 11 June, 1660, Proviso no •. 37 ,- HMC, (House of Lords MSS),~ 
p. 97. 
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Moyer and the various collectors and committeemen should be 
made to repay the losses they had caused by the seizure of 
1 the bonds. Some other creditors employed more direct 
methods of recovery: William Lowther attempted to exclude 
his debtors from the benefits of the Act. Led by Sir Thomas 
Gower and Sir Paul Neile, the latter appealed to the Lords, 
demanding a fair hearing2 • 
The actual Act of Indemnity made no direct reference 
to the Engagement, but its broad ,provisions encompassed the 
case of t~e guarantors. Anyone who was accountable for moneys 
received since the outbreak of war until the execution of 
the late King, and who had " ••• beene robbed or plundered 
by souldiers or others of the moneys in their hands, or of 
any Notes ••• then the Oath' ·or Oathes of such party or 
part yes ••• shall be a good discharge for soe much of their 
accompt."3 This not only covered royal officials who had 
been forced to surrender their revenues to Parliament, but 
could, with little difficulty, be applied to the guarantors 
of the Engagement. In any case, there was no disp~te over 
the covenant after the Act was passed. 
Had the twentieth and the Yorkshire Engagement been 
enforced in full, many of the de1inquents~ would have been 
1. 11 June, 1660, petition no. 5, HMC~. (House of Lords,' MSS) ,-a 
p. 95 
2. 13 July 1660, ibid. VII (ibid.) p. 117.' 
3. 12 Car II, cap. 11 - Statutes of the Realm, V, (1819), 229. 
,168. 
faced with a fine equivalent to over half their composition. 
The twentieth rated realty at an average of three-quarters 
of annual income, but. made no concession for entailed 
property (which Goldsmiths' Hall normally assessed at a 
lower value). The su~s promised on the Engagement were 
mainly voluntary, but each Royalist who subscribed generally 
offered as much as he could comfortably afford. Together, 
1 following on the compositions, the assessment and Engage-
ment could have seriously embarrassed the Cavaliers. 
But, unlike composition, circumstances enforced a 
considerable modification of the original demands. Most 
assessments were pared down to a reasonable amount, considera-
tion being taken of war debts and the aftermath of the 
fines. The modifications on the Engagement were unofficial, 
but by no means less substantial. The Committee for Advance 
of Money refused to make any allowances, so the delinquents 
themselves ignored, excused or manipulated themselves out 
of paying the debts. Their success is as much an indication 
of the declining efficiency of the anti-Royalist committee 
system, as a tribute to their own ingenuity. 
2 In short, the economic effects of the assessments and 
1. The assessments on the Yorkshire gentry ran (generally) 
from 1646 to 1650, though most of them were crowded into 
the eras after the two civil wars. The collection of the 
Engagement debts began in March, 1650, and payment con-
tinued sporadically for two-and-a-half years, then lapsed, 
reviving briefly from 1654 to mid·,l655. 
2. Themonth~y assessment was paid by all: like the twentieth, 
it was based on current values, and would therefore 
make allowance for war debts, etc. 
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occasional impositions placed upon the delinquents were by 
... . . 
no means as severe as the burdens of. composition. Their 
amendment, both official and unofficial, reduced them to 
reasonable sums which could be - and were -,left unpaid for 
, 
as long as possible, until the family estate was better 
able to deal with them. 
CHAPTER V - THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT. 
(The Confiscation & Sale of-Royalist Estates.) 
"About this time they Passed another act, which as 
that struck at the Root of the Royalty of England, 
so this lopt the Branches that clave to it, viz 
an Act for the Sale of Delinquents Lands ••• v--
"You are in the greate __ booke of sellinge Estates, 
& manie frends your name had when it was voted 
against you, therefore let not your Estate be . 
ruinated, nor your woods felled, etc: but cum 
. vp & sollicit it your selfe, & I am assured by one 
of your frends that yet it may be saved yf you 
came in time. Once againe ,let me desire you to 
cum vp spedily, ••• " (1). 
The three Acts of Sale were intended as the ultimate 
. , 
punishment for those who had been guilty of political or 
"", - , 
religious treason. With few exceptions, the victims were 
.. . ,- . 
either Catholic delinquents (representing the great majority), 
- . 
or the principal military and titled leaders of the King's 
party. A handful of Royalists also suffered because they 
,-
had been unable - or unwilling - to pay their composition 
fines. 
Parliament had adopted the policy of confiscation 
fairly early in the civil war. The Declaration of Both 
Kingdoms, of 30 January 1644, blamed the hostilities on 
Catholics and the "wicked and divellish spirits" who were 
to be excluded from pardon if they did not surrender within 
1. J.Heath, A brief chronicle of the late intestine wars in 
the Three Kingdoms ••• , 1637-63, (1663) p.535; Lord 
'1auconberg to sir Henry Slingsby, 12 January, 1650, in 
The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, ed~ Rev. D. Parsons (1836), 
p. 343. 
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a'monthl • These qualifications were clarified in the Prop-
ositions of Uxbridge, 'and became scardinal pOint of Parlia-
ment's peace settlement2• At this early date however, the 
government had no firm plans for the disposal of such con-
fiscated estates - they were simply farmed as a means of 
augrrienting the normal state revenues. -'. 
Whe'n composition was introduced, Parliament still 
retained control of the forfeited lands. Their revenues were 
collected by the loc'al sequestra tors , and p~id into the 
treasury of" the Committee for Compounding at Goldsmiths' 
Hall. They were simpler to administer ) .. ~ than the estates of 
the normal delinquents, as the tenants paid all their rents 
to the local authorities. Since"the owners were forbidden 
to compound, there was no question of overdue fines, under-
valuations; or resequestrations: the only detail which con-
cerned the county committees was the payment of the fifths 
(if allowed),' and the granting of annuities.· 
The reason for the ultimate sale of these lands was 
had 
essentially financial: the second civil wa~left the govern-" 
ment with very heavy debts. Parliament found'that it could 
no longer raise money on the guarantee of anticipated revenue 
alone - bankers and merchants alike demanded some sort of 
tangible security. The Commons tried to meet this need by 
disposing of their capital assets: house,S, palaces, lands, 
1. C.C.C., Pt. V, Introduction, pp. vii-ix. 
2. Gardiner, Constitutional Docmnents ••• , 278 ff.; Proposi-
tions of Newcastle, ibid., 298 ff. 
,... --.:.~ 
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timber, and the personal estates of the Royal Family were 
ali put up for sale. Each in their turn; the estates of" 
Church and Crown were sacrificed in an'attempt to regain 
national solvency: the future" was mortgaged to ":meet the 
needs of the present. And 'once these lands'had gone, 'Parlia-
ment turned'without hesitation to theforfeited'estates of 
the ROyalisis1 • ~ 
~ 1651, the government had considerable experience in 
the disposal of confiscated lands. The first mistakes o~er 
the sale of episcopal property had led to improved methods, 
so that the machinery established by the three acts'of 
1651-52 was quite comprehensive and relatively effident. 
Each of the different groups of land - Church, C~own or 
Royalist-had its own organisation, with a hierarchy of 
offiCials to govern the sales," survey the lands, copy and 
record the contracts, and collect the money. Seven trustees 
were responsible' for the Royalists' estates, 'having authority 
to contract with individuals for the sale of the confiscated 
properties. Under them was an elaborate network of officials, 
each with his own responsibilities and powers clearly defined 
by parl1ament2 • 
1. See supra, pp. 79-:.83., , 
2. The First Act, of 16 July 1651, established the machinery, 
which'the subsequent acts simply adopted and used. 
Firth & Rait, II, ~p. 520 ff; 591 ff; 623,ff •. 
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Not all of the lands seized from the delinquents were 
intended to be sold. Rectories and impropriate church prop-
erty were excluded, their revenues being transferred to the 
Committee for Plundered rtinisters, in a laudable attempt 
1 to augment incumbents'~ salaries • And occasionally specific 
properties were reserved by Parliament for certain people _ 
Laurence Maidwell was granted half of Cuthbert Morley's 
extensive estates as a reward for his part in their dis~ 
covery2. 
other provisions safeguarded the rights of the Royalists' 
families. Entailed property could only be sold for the life 
of the delinquent concerned, and reverted to the next heir 
on his death. Dowers and other annuities settled on the 
lands before 20 May 1642 were recognised, provided that they 
were claimed and allowed within a certain time. 3 And,~although 
not specifically mentioned in the acts, '. copyhold lands were 
also excluded from the sales. John Latche gave his legal 
opinion on Sir Henry Slingsby's estates in the manar 'of 
Knaresborough: the general words of the First Act of Sale 
1' •. These awards of impropriate property have been omitted, 
as they were not within the province of the Acts of Sale. 
They remained sequestered throughout the Interregnum (the 
profits gOing to certain members of the clergy), and 
were restored to their original owners on the Restora-
'tion. (Firth & Rait, II,' 524). . 
, ' 
2.'Ibid., II, 540-41. 
. , 
3. By 1 November for those in the Second Act, and 1 Pebruary 
'for the Third Act (Ibid.~ II, 593, 643). 
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1 did not settle copyhold on the Treason Trustees , nor did 
it attaint anyone by which such lands would be forfeited. 
Thus Sir Henry would retain his title to the property (al-
though its revenues remained sequestered)2. 
The authority which considered such claims was the 
Committee for Removing Obstructions. This body3 was empowered 
to pass judgement on all vested interests, and its decisions 
were legally binding upon the Drury House Trustees. Each 
act of sale established a certain period. for bringing cases 
before the Committee. A similar time. limit ~as imposed for 
all reversionary claims - tenants in tail had to be in actual 
possession of the lands (through the death of the delin-
quent) by 25 March 1652, or else their title was forfeited4 • 
The Committee was also responsible for determining the 
rights of creditDrs and mortgage-holders to the confiscated 
properties. The question of such liabilities was solved by 
granting parts of the estates to the appellants in full 
settlement of their debts. The remainder of the lands could 
then be disposed of, free from all incumbrances.5 Some 1 
1'. The Trustees for Selling Confiscated Lands were commonly 
known as the Treason Trustees (as they sold t'trai tors' II 
lands) or the Drury House Trustees (from the name of 
their office building). 
2. Note of 11 March 1651/2, Slingsby MSS, DD56/l07. 
3. Created by the First Act, it had 49 members, with a quorum 
of. 5 (Firth &: Rait, II, 523-4). 
4. Ibid., II, 596-7, 648-9. 
5. Tenants holding seven-year leases remained in possession, 
(until their leas~expired), but paid the rent to the 
purchaser. This was possibly~ reason why some purchasers 
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~. 
estate~ however, were occasionally. s'oli~ C1iarged with 
liabilities (such as annuities to the delinq~ •• t's relatives), 
, 
these being allowed for in the purchase p.oe.'"" example, 
Gilbert Crouch and others bought the Manor of Marrick. and. 
other estates for £2126-13-ld., on condition that they -~~~d 
£4277-l9-6!d.-worth of debts on the propertyl. 
" . ( 
These allowances, although they were necessary to 
protect purchasers, considerably reduced Parliament's income 
from the sales. The majority of the victims were Catholics, 
who had learnt from past experience the value of having an 
entailed estate. Nearly half of those whose lands were con-
fiscated - twenty-nine out of the sixty-one - had some type 
of reversionary claim on their property. The estates of fif-
teen were entailed, seven had jointures settled on their lands, : 
five more had large debts or mortgages, and two were com-
pletely discharged because of various settlements. Through 
I 
such methods of tenure, a number of Royalists either retained 
part of their estates, or at least passed on a reversionary 
claim to their heirs2. 
1. Sale of 13 July, 1654: ~, C54/3785/40. 
2. The above cases are those where the jointure or claim was 
actually allowed by the Committee for Removing Obstructions. 
There were claimants to parts of the estates of nearly , 
every Royalist, but many of them were not officially 
recognised. 
(cont. from ~. 174.) 
--were-unwIllrng-to buy the lands: the price was based on 
the survey, which was generally considerably higher than 
the value of the lease. Thus a purchaser would have to 
pay a high price, but would be unable to recoup much 
profit until the lease expired. 
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The Acts of Sale established regulations for the survey 
of all confiscated estates, so that their values could 
be calculated as accurately as possible ..... l'he surveyors, 
appointed by the Trustees, were authorised to examine ,the. 
tenants (by force if necessary), and to assess the lands at 
their highest possible value, irrespective of the current' 
seven-year leases. This presented the danger that the tenants 
would undervalue their farms, in the hope of making future 
use of their pre-emptive rights. Even so, the surveys were 
far more accurate than the delinquents' 'particulars'. 
Robert Doleman of Badsworth, attempting to compound in 1650, 
had declared his income to be £537-15s. a year, whereas the 
lands were valued at a minimum of £683 per annum in '1652, 
, 1 
whilst the l653 surveys were even higher • 
.. . .:..... 
Such a deliberate attempt to squeeze the sequestered 
estates led to a meteoric rise in rents. This was especially 
I." 
noticeable when seven .. year leases were introduced in 1652: 
previously the lands had been let separately each year, so 
that the rents could be kept under constant review. But, 
with the introduction of long-term contracts, many delin-
quents or their agents tried to regain control of the proper-
ties, and the subsequent·cross-bidding pushed up the prices, 
quite apart from the aims of Parliamentary policy. The 
.1. R.C.P., III, 22. 1652 leases - PRO, Order Book of county 
commr~tee, 1651-2, SP28/215. The-I'653 surveys for the 
whole of the estate are not known. 
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Manor of Plumpton rose from £168 a year (165l)to £225 (1652); 
1 that 'of Ruffarlington from £35 to £70 • The 1653 surveys 
valued these lands at even higher rates - £428 and £89 
respectively. How accurate such assessments were is difficult 
to say - when the,P1umptons repurchased their estates,' 
Ruffarlington waslet'at,over£100 per annum, and Plump~ 
ton'at sums varying ,from £3l6'to £420 per year2. 
The lands were to be sold at a minimum ,price of ten 
, 
years' purchase (based on the official surveys), with con-
sequent reductions for property in reversion, or for one 
life only. Altho~gh these rules were generally adhered to, 
,> e-
there were some exceptions. William Bulmer's lands in Tirring-
ton were sold slightly under the prescribed rat,e (at nine-
and-a-half years' value) - probably because of an allowance 
• • .1_ 
for war damage. The latter part of Sir John Lawson's con-
tracted price was remitted because of the Royalist's acute 
financial distress; and Lord Strickland, after paying only 
, " 
half the sum due for Matthew Boynton's lands, was granted 
,. : 
the remainder by P~rliament i~ recognition of his past ser-
vices3 • 
1."The leases of sequestered estates appear in the Yorkshire 
Committee's order books - PRO, SP28/215. Post-war leases: 
., Gascoigne MSS, GO/EIO/l, passim.' . 2: surveys -' PRO, SP23/G 58a/ f .42:> f't'.post.o'60 leases :.. see 
n. 1. ' 
3.' Bulmer:- PRO,: SP23/G.58a/ 349. sale', for £324-16s., ide 
C54/3783Ji57 'Lawson:- C.J.,VII, 315, 335. Boynton:----
PRO, SP46/l07 (first book) f.164. 
-
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But most of the prices' were equal to, or above, the 
ten years' purchase. Ludlow'proudly asserted that H ••• such 
was the good opinion that the people had conceived of the 
Parliament, that most of those lands were sold at the clear 
1 income of fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen years; ••• " • If 
this was an exaggeration, it is still true that the lands 
were otten sold above the official minimum rate. The Manors 
of Plumpton and Ruffarlington each sold at twelve-and-a-
half years' purchase, whilst Robert Doleman's Manor of 
Badsworth realised £9949-B-6d. - over . twenty-three times 
the annual rentl There must have been some valuable assets 
on these lands, ~nknown to the Treason Trustees, for the 
Commonwealth purchaser, John Bright, had just bought the 
estate and title from the ex-owner for £8600 2. 
After the estates had been surveyed and valued, notice 
of the impending sale was officially posted, together with 
a copy of the survey. The Drury House Trustees were respon-
sible for making contracts with the respective buyers, the 
first half of the purchase price fa~ling due eight weeks 
after the cont;act had been signed3 • Whe~" the lands had 
1. Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, esq., 1625-72, (ed. C.H.Firth); (Oxford 1894), I, 231. 
2. Plumpton:- survey - see supra, p. 177, n. 2. Sales- PRO, 
054/3835/31, ~_!/3832/33. Doleman:- Bright MSS, BR-r94, 
sale, PRO,'0547J663/3; id./374B/39. . 
3. Before the lands could be offered to private purchasers, 
there was a thirty··day pre-emption, period for either ten-
ants or Royalist ex-owners. 
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actually been conveye~ to the purchaser, the estate was 
offered as security for the remainder of the sum, due in 
six months. As none of the properties were-repossessed by the 
Trustees, it appears that all-the contractors paid the 
, -, 
money within the prescribed periodsl • 
11 
The government borrowed £.1,050,000 (by means of. -d-oublin~) 11 
ti 
on the security of these estates, guaranteed at six per 
cent interest2 • Unfortunately,- the revenues we're not as 
substantial' as had been expected. The provisions made for 
creditors and other claimants on the lands considerably 
reduced the acreage to be sold. Even so, doubling proved to 
be highly popular - indeed, manY State creditors saw it as 
their only opportunity to recover their debts from the 
government. Professor Habakkuk has illustrated that the 
majority of the money raised by the sales was in the_form 
of doubled bills: thus a large proportion of Parli~mentts 
profit was merely the cancellation-of outstanding debts3 • -
1. contracts are -listed in the book of orders received by 
the Yorkshire"Committee~ PRO, SP46jl07, second-book, 
1652-55, passim. _ . - , , 
2. £250,000 on the First Act, £200,000 on the Second, and 
£600,000 on the Third. Firth & Rait, II, 531, 594-5, 647. 
3. Doubling was where State creditors, on advancing a sum 
equal -to their original loan plus interest, could have 
the whole debt counted against their-purchases of con-
fiscated property. For a clear summary of the problem, 
see H.J.Habakkuk, "Public Finance and the Sale of Con-
fiscated Property during the Interregnumtt , in Ec.H.R., 
2nd. series, XV (1962), pp. 70-88., especially pp. 78-9. 
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The first two Acts of Sale included the names of a 
hundred delinquents, principally those of the prominent 
Royalist political, military and social leaders. It was, 
however, the Third Act, containing 680 names,which was the 
most significantl • Virtually all of the victims of this 
final proscription were delinquents of no special distinction, 
who had suffered because of their re'lig1on.! or their refusal 
. 
to pay any composition fines. Not all of them can be traced, 
.. 
as some are incorrectly named, or their estates are not 
,. -,-
recorded. But two counties stand out prominently for their 
extreme degree of Royalism: 213 delinquents carne from Lan-
~ashire', and 118 from Yorkshire. The rest of the country 
was a long way behind by comparison - the next highest 
totals are Somerset (34), Northumberland (30) and Chester (29)~ 
1. Although 680 names appear on the. lists, some are repetit-
ions, as a delinquent is sometimes listed separately 
for each county in which he held·: lands, (with the exception '. 
of members of the peerage). It is virtually impossible . 
to arrive at a correct total without undertaking a com-
plete survey of -the whole country, and therefore, for 
the purposes of this brief comparison only, I have 
taken 680 as the basic figure, and have made no correct-
ions (except to enter some Lancashire delinquents, listed 
under Derbyshire, in their correct placings).' . 
2. The figures for the rest of the country are as follows:-
20 delinquents each (Durham, Devon); 16 - Lincs.; ;i 
15 - Cumberland; 13 - Monmouth; Dorset, Rants; 12 - Staffs, ,,!, 
Worcs.; 11 - Westrnorl'd, Wales; 10 - Cornwall; ;;,',j 
8 - Essex; 7 - Norfolk, Suffolk, Derby; 6:- Hereford; 
Gloucs.; 5 - Shrops., Kent; 4 - Notts., Oxon., Sussex, ~ 
London; 2 - Hunts., Surrey, Middlesex, Northants.; 5 
1 - Berks., Herts., Rutland, Leics.; Untraced = 11. ~ 
(Wales is treated as one area, though Monmouth is regarded ~. 
separately; London is also treated as an individual !I 
region. ) 
i81~ 
Together; the ~ six ,northern counties 'accounted for '401 .: " .-' 
delinquents.- 1nearly.60 per cent'of.all.those mentioned.in-! 
the:ThirdAct~·The.majority oflthe:victims wererecusants' -
and,·in:the.north,.where 1 Cathollcism,was still a force to be 
reckoned 'wlth, cthey'provided'the government~with a(considerable 
amount .~ of, revenue •. 
~~1"~In·Yorkshire, B2~per centof~thelvictims~of confiscation 
were. Catholics:- 50.out of i the. 61 ~members of the gentryl. 
Their .. heaviest. numbers came -'from the '.East .Riding - here ;~. 
many. mambers ~ of. the 'various branches: of",the Constable and::' 
Doleman rfamilies :had supported .the :K1ng. In "the West Riding 
(excluding the-, Pennines) , ~the -delinquents ,came from the 
2 
north-east 'of~thereg1on ... : 1.: ::.': ... ' ~ ?- . ~ . ~: \! ~ ; . 
~. .. ", 
t... t· . l' • "'~~ , ... C '1 :! c· t:", . 1'~ .. . f 
Table XIV:- DELINQUENTS IN THE THREE ACTS OF SALE: 
:~'" ,(a) ,:' 
Area 
Hull'~' . I 
East Yorks. ~J, 
~'(bi; families). " v . 
• ,.: (b) \;:' .. ,.'i:·.~:' .. · (c), ,'; .. 
Total Roy. Families in 
families 'Acts of Sale 
.:10 . _ .:!';l 
,. 
• i 
~;;.," (d) 
Percentage t (c) of (b) 
10' 
.. 30 .' 
---------+--- --_-t-__ -'c--_._ .......... ."... '~__il----------..-
, .~ '~.' .~. Ii; ;~,::. ~,; 21*·" ,I Cleveland '" '.,.'. 
'" 
51 ( >. '.' '. ; .. , 
.. 
Pennine 10 .. " .... ,.')-:-.. ~ 30 
~------------~--.~'<------~~----------------~-------------1 1 . • , 
west Yorks." .'.' ;: 97 : ,. .. ' J: '1 ' • L : ~ .. ~,~' :,:.~ : . ~2 .~ .:. '; ,: ", ,'. ,'. ~: 12'; 
----...;.-.---+------'--~---...:.---.--.-'---'.-~.-.-'-------
South Yorks~' ':;' '.:.' 32' ,.:. '.,. "4 '~'("'A ; :"'··'12!· 
----.------~~r--,----------~--
Totals 288 54 18t (av.) 
(Footnotes - see p. 182) 
-182. 
In actual fact, theOatholic delinquents suffered less 
, 
than is'normally supposed. By:a'combination of good fortune, 
skill, and government li berali ty,. ", they succeeded in evading 
the "worst provisions of the statutes, and many were able to 
:recover their estates ~ ,But it is doubtful' if they could 
'have accomplished any of this, 1 had it not been ',for the 
, relatively generous terms of the three acts, and the way in 
which Parliament chose'to interpret them.' 
,The 'acts were not simply designed for the benefit of 
the government's creditors, whose demands had been instrumen-
tal in precipitating the sales., With its novel minure of 
opportunism and social'justice, Parli~ment attempted to 
associate first tenants, and then the "traitors" them-
Bel ves, in the purchase of confiscated property ~ The First" 
Act allowed thirty ,days pre-emption to immedate tenants, 
, 1 but 'in Yorkshire, no,.:one took advantage of this offer. 
1. There were three exceptions, but none were true tenants. 
Thomas Hescott and William Taylor had purchased'lands ' 
from Henry Marshall during the war: the Trustees did not 
recognise the sale, and therefore the two,·tenants· had 
to repurchase the title from Drury House. The same thing 
happened to Richard Fawcett" who had bought lands from', 
the Dolemans (PRO, SP23/G 5~/ll; 054/3755/6; c.o.c., 1749.) 
. -
;·t~~~!!.~f::~~!.;,.!~!l·' . 
1. These delinquents represented 54 families. Five had already 
commenced,but not completed, composition proceedings~ 
These 61 delinquents are from all three Acts of Sale. 
2. North of Barnsley and east of Leeds. See Map II., 
In the following table, the families listed in-the third 
column are located in the various districts by the 
:residence of the senior Royalist who suffered from the 
"Acts ,of Sale. 
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The t~o acts of 1652 permitted the delinquents to compound 
for their own estates at two-sixths (or six years' 'purchase), 
on condition~that any Catholics sold their lands within a 
year, or became liable to the full weight of the recusancy 
laws. l On the surface this appeared to be a severe penalty _ 
after a year, the compounded estates would still be saddled 
with heavy debts, and in a flooded market, it was most 
unlikely that the Catholics would be able to obtain a fair 
price. Alternatively, the resequestration of two-thirds of 
the estate (for recusancy) , when the remainder of the property 
had been mortgaged to pay the fine, would simply bankrupt 
the unfortunate Royalis~ 
Despite this, thirteen of the delinquents named in 
the Third Act compounded for their estates, of which all but 
one were Catholics2.Five more compounded for parts of 
their property. Only one of the former definitely sold his 
lands: this was John Constable of Kirby Knowle, whose 
small estate was already heavily mortgaged. Soon after paying 
the fine~ 'his three co-heiresses were forced to sell the 
dilapidated property to their creditor, James Danby of York3• 
1. The provision to allow delinquents to compound is not 
expressly mentioned in theSecond·Act, but it was approved 
by the Commons, OPR, XX, 91; C.J., VII, 156 (20 July 1652); 
Firth & Rait, 11;-044-47. 
2. Henry Marshall's brother compounded for that part of the 
estate which had not been sold early in the war. For rea-
'sons mentioned supra, ~. 182, n. 1), parts of the lands 
he had sold were resold by the Treason Trustees. 
3. R.C.P., III, 60; V.C.H., North Riding, II, 46; PRO, CP25(2)/ 
Bundle 614, Trinity 1654.. ---
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The other Royalists apparently conveyed their estates in 
trust to payoff their compounding debts, like William 
Constable of Cathorp. His small but reasonably prosperous 
estate was burdened with expenses of £1050" all incurred 
during the period 1653-41 • 
These compositions were, in fact, much the same as the 
'. 1" 
normal fines imposed upon the a~erage. Royalists, even though 
they were much higher. The sum had to be settled in two 
separate halves - the first part within sixty days, and the 
remainder within six months,of, the return of the survey to 
London2 • ~hese later fines were, ,however, based on the 
Commonwealth valuations, and not on the highly inaccurate 
'particulars of estate' (which, even if honestly representing 
the 1642 rentals, greatly ,underestimated the potential of 
the property). But the fines; administered by Goldsmiths' 
Hall,were in every ot~er respect parallel to the earlier 
compositions: reductions were made for entailed property 
and other such allowances on t~e estates. The late Henry". 
Marshall's lands were compounded for by his brother and 
heir Samuel, who was ordered to pay a fine of £228~0-4d. 
After half had been paid, the remainder was remitte,d, as 
the Commissioners for Compounding had just rec9gnised the 
claims of Anne, Henry's widOW, to part of the estate. Two 
1. R.C.P., III, 73; Constable MSS, DDCC/l33/22. 
2~ Firth & Rait, 11,'644 ff. 
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portions of the property were in fact sold - to William 
Taylor and Thomas'Hescott. They had each bought some lands 
from Henry Marshall during the civil war, but the sale was 
not recognised by Parliament, and therefore both had to re-
purchase'their property from the Treason Trusteesl • 
Charles Thimelby of Snydal represents a typical example 
of a compounding "traitor". Within five months' of his fine 
being'set,~he was completely discharged, and soon afterwards 
the whole estate was conveyed to John Wolstenholme and 
Thomas Stringer (close neighbours and friends) to create a 
trust, and thus prevent any further sequestrations. Thimelby 
received'an income from the lands during the rest of the 
Interregnum, 'and also farmed his still-sequestered tithes 
of Carlton, Tanshelf and Snydal from the local committee for 
£54 a year. With careful management, his estate swiftly 
recovered from the ill-effects of composition~ and was 
in its pre-war condition by the mid-1660,s2. 
Although'those Catholics who compounded were apparently 
faced with the grim choice of selling their estates on a 
buyer's market, or suffering a'crippling sequestration for 
their'recusancy, the majority succeeded in avoiding both 
evils by settling" their lands on trustees. This was ostensibly 
1. R.C.P., ;III, 58; PRO, SP23/G 58/11; C54/3755/6; C.C.C., 
pp. 2857 -8 • --:- :" ' , 
2. Survey:- 'PRO, SP23/G 58/48; compounds:- R.C.P.', III, 59; 
leases sequestered lands:- PRO, SP28/215, account book 
of 1655 farms. ---
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to repay their debts, but in actual fact it enabled them 
to evade resequestration. During the year's grace after the 
fines were set, the compounded Royalists were not prosecuted 
for either delinquency or recusancy, and there was thus no 
legal barrier to prevent them from conveying their lands 
. . - , . 
to whOnsoever they Wished. 
On examination of the records of the estates sequestered 
in 1655,1 it is clear that the government never fully imposed 
the measures threatened in the Third Act. The Long Parlia-
ment had rigidly sequestered two~thirds of the estates of 
. 2 
all recusants , but whilst normal Catholics still suffered 
this punishment, no delinquent or papist delinquent was 
resequestered fo; not' selling his la~ds3. 
Only two of the eighteen Royalists who compounded in 
whole or in part were ever charged with recusancy during the 
remainder of the Interregnum, and ,in both in.stances ,they 
were fined on the Recusancy Rolls in the traditional manner. 
The result was that their estates were ridiculously under-
valued. Charles Thimelby was assessed at £35 for two-thirds 
of his Manor of Snydal - less than a seventh of its true 
worth. John Vavasour of Willitoft, whose lands had been 
1. PRO, SP28/2l5 "Book of A/cs for t year ending Mich 1655" 
(rentals of estates sequestered from Catholics and Cath-
olic delinquents). 
2. Dom Hugh Aveling, ,"Catholics and Parliamentary Sequestra-
tions", in Ampleforth Journal, (June, 1959), p. 103. 
3. The estates sequestered in 1655 consisted of the under-
valuations made by normal delinquents, and not compounded 
for; two-thirds of the lands of recusants; andimpropriate 
tithes, etc. 
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surveyed as £80 a year, was charged a mere £6 for his rec-
usancy. These extremely low valuations had little effect upon 
the Royalists concerned, and it seems unlikely that they 
, 1 
were ever paid • 
It is therefore clear that the threatened recusancy laws ,I' 
were never really imposed upon the Catholic compounders. 
Thus the only burden that these Royalists had to bear was 
their heavy fine. No doubt this affected them severely, but 
for those with no appreciable debts, it could not have been 
too difficult to raise the money. There was also no question 
of interference from the Committee for Removing Obstructions -
where the delinquent compounded, the creditors received no 
preferential treatment, and could not claim any p~rt of the 
, 2 
property without a legal cause. 
The remaining five compositions were for only parts of 
confiscated estates3 • In each case, the Royalist deliberately 
, . 
compounded for a specific portion of his lands, and not 
simpl~ for what he could afford. Robert and James Ayscough 
paid 'for the property which they had recently inherited from 
their Royalist father, and Sir Philip Constable compounded 
for some lands in Holderness which had been granted by Henry, 
. -, 
, 
, , 
1. PRO, SP23/G 58/48, 81; 'recusancy rolls: -' E!Q" . E377/61.. . 
-2. The money was raised in very much the same way as the 
normal compounders raised it - see Iupta, p.M.,ff When -
compounding ~n this way, ., the delinquen s could notl doubled bills. ~ 
3. William and Thomas Doleman also petitioned to compound,~ 
but apparently never paid, as their lands were sold. 
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VIII in tail for his family. George Metcalfe recovered his 
mother's dower lands, confiscated through the delinquency 
of' her second' husband, Marmaduke Frank. William Bulmer 
and Thomas Tankard each compounded for that portion of their 
lands which was not settled in tail to their respective heirs~ 
It is significant that sixteen of these eighteen com-
positions (whether for all o~ part of the forfeited estate), 
were made for lands which were held in fee simple, and 
could therefore be sold in perpetuity. In the other cases, 
abnormal circumstances dictated the necessity for composition. 
Mrs. Frank' s '. dower from her first husband was to be sold for 
the delinquency of her second, unless sOJJ.e action was taken. 
r 
f 
" f 
I And the Constables, who were planning to repurchase their lands Ii \, 
,through trustees, ,had discovered that part of ' the estate, 
due to its peculiar entail, could not be sold, and would 
therefore remain sequestered ,if no fine were paid. Thus 
the o~portunity to compound was eagerly grasped by those 
who were not protected by entails - six years' purchase 
by fine was considerably less:than ten, years' purchase by. 
contract with the Treason Trustees2 • 
1. Ayscough:- R.C.P., 
f. 129. 
III, 83-4; PRO, SP46/l07 (Second Bk.) 
Constable:- R.C.P., III, 88; Aveling, OPe cit., 111. 
Bulmer:- R.C.P., III, 79 (rest of lands were mortgaged). 
Frank:- R.C.P., III, 69-70; PRO, Index 17349, f. 36. 
Tankard:- C.C.C., 1119-20 (an-irror for T. of Brampton); 
PRO, Index 17349, f. 71. 
-
,2. Where the estates were entailed, the delinquents.doubtless 
expected that the property would pass to the next heir, 
and that therefore they would have to pay no fine, and 
the lan~8 would no~ be sold. 
l: Ii 
fi 
~ 
[i i I 
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On the expiry of the thirty days pre-emption period, 
the estates were sold to the highest bidder. However, even 
at this late juncture, three delinquents were fortunate enough 
to have their lands completely discharged. In two cases, 
the Royalist had died, and the entailed property was vested 
in his heirs before 25 March 1652 (the latest date for the 
recognition of reversionary claims). Philip Anne's lands were 
all in trust: Burghwallis entailed to his son and heir 
Michael, and the Frickley estates mortgaged to settle £2400 
debts and £1800 portions. Richard Theakstone's Manor of 
Bedale had actually been sold for the delinquency of his 
grandfather, but Theakstone successfully pleaded that both 
father and grandfather had died before sequestration: thus 
the Committee for Removing Obstructions cancelled the sale, 
and restored the propertyl • 
. 
The third case of discharge is rather an unusual one. 
Little is known of the victim, Peter Pudsey, 'who' was distantly 
related to the Pudseys of Bolton and Stapleton. His small 
estate,-consisting of a'quarter of the Manor of Sandhutton, 
was sold to James Nelthorpe, but James Harwood claimed the 
property on the grour.dstbat his wife was Pudsey's sister. 
Since the Royalist'did not die until 1676, it is not clear 
on what grOUnisthe Committee for Removing Obstructions dis-
charged the lands, but the sale was certainly cancelled. 
1. ANNE:- PRO, SP46/l07/ First Order Bk, f. 192, 194; ~, 
C5/19/3; C.C.C., 2933. 
THEAKSTONE:- PRO, C54/3750/25; id., Index 17349, f. 72; 
H.B.McCall, Tne-Early History or-Bedale, (1907), 67-70, 
c.c.c., 3071-2. 
-
190. t' 
. '. "- ", ~ . • ,... .... • t..·· r I -I"~ to 
.... ~ Exactly who finally . gained the manor, Pudsey or Harwood, 
is uncertain. The~ Victoria County History notes' the latter· 
. . .. .' :- (\ ~ 
as being in possession in 1655 and 1677, 'yet Pudsey was 
, i ; , ,".'''' ~'.!' '" / 
deforciant to a fine on the lands in 1663, and l~ft:his 
estates in S~ndhut~~n (whether these inciuded .the m~nor is 
' .. 
not known) to Edward T;;tt:~r '~nd Walter Vavasour in: his 
~, ~"J'_ . l .:. ) f ! 
will in 1676. It ,seems likely that the manor, or some part 
, :" .. : i :.. ,I.l. f 
of it,was offered as security for his'sister's portion, 
• -" "" -..'~ J J 
and thus James, Harwood could cl~im a"n interest' in the property. 
But, whoever owned the estate after 1653, it is certain that 
,',' ; ~ '1 ' 
it was never sold • 
. , . The remainder of; the delinquents ..... f.orty-fi ve -. suffered 
the: ,sale of all or. part of t,heir es.tflotes., The si ze, of these 
properties' varied considerably, ,'":'. fr.om ,jihe eie;ht manors of 
Sir Henry Slinesby to ~he fe,!, .acres ,of ,William Brigham' of 
wyto n. , Al toeether, ,the. confisca,:ted lan~s; of. the. Yorkshire. 
gentFY' ,totalled .. at.least~ 103, manors, a,nd 108 other parcels 
of land. :The follo~ine;. table illustrates the considerable 
amount. of., propertY,that was f}.nally sold. 
1 •. PRO,.C54/3749/31; C.C.C., 1992;.VCH, North Ridine;,.II, ',J 
'9"5T Fine, PRO, C)25(2)n52, Hi 1 aryl, 662!3, no. 6. 
!)~ Will:- (18 April 1676)t~Y.W.,vol.· 57, f.189 •.... ,·. 1 
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Table XV:- NUMBER OF ESTATES CONFISCATED BY PARLIAMENT. 
Confis- Compdd. Dis- Not sold 1S01d. 
cated chargd. because of 
copyhold, 
entails, 
,. etc.(l) 
No. of People 61 13 3 
-
45 (+ 5 in par ~) 
~ 
Manors 103 13 3 .. 5 82 
Non-manors; 108 16 9 9 74 . 
. 
Total of 211 29 12 14 156 
'estates . 
. 
The majority of the estates confiscated -nearly 74 
per cent - were sold by the Treason Trustees. But:of these, 
°a considerable number were for life only, due to entails or 
reversionary claims on the property. This not only meant 
that the delinquents' heirs would :recover the prope.rty on 
the deaths of the Royalists, but also lessened the value 
of the estate as an investment. State purchasers naturally 
preferred to buy lands in fee simple, where they could 
gain an absolute title in perpetuity. 
In all, 35 manors and 31 other parcels of land sold 
by the Drury House Trustees were for life only - over 42 
per cent. The majority tended to be grouped in the possession 
of a few rich delinquents; for example, the Middletons' 
seven manors were entailed, as were seven out of Sir Henry 
1. These represent lands which were definitely held by ~he 
family, but which were not sold, because of some form 
of entail, or because they were held in the nam~of people 
other than the Royalist. Such were reversionary claims 
to dowers which did not fall due before 1660. 
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Slingsby's eight, all five of Sir Philip Constable's, and 
Thomas Tankard's three. But, despite the certainty of ultimate 
reversion, these Royalists still attempted to recover 
their lands from the Trustees: in this, they had the advan-
tage of buying on a limited market. 
There were four broad classifications of pu~chasers 
for these 156 estates. The majority were bought by agents 
acting for the Royalists or their heirs. A few were directly 
repurchased by relations of the delinquent. Some fell into 
the hands of creditors or grantees, and the remainder 
were acquired by outside forces, either speculators or 
people hoping to enlarge their own estates. The following 
table illustrates the various classes of purchasers. 
I ' 
~ . 
I j 
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Table XVI:- CLASSES OF PURCHASERS OF CONFISCATED LANDS. 
, , 
purchasers Total Manors Non- No. of persons 
manors affected(l). ' 
whole part of 
'"' . - estate estate 
. , 
Royalists' 88 42 46 18 3 agents 
-
Possible Royal- 14 11 3 4 1 ists' agents " ., 
Direct repurchase 3 3 - 2 -
Creditors (for debt~ 
" 16 10 6 4 1 
Creditors (buying) 2 ,1 1 1 -
Gentry: local 5 3 -Z 2 2 
London 8 4 4 2 2 
other 4 2 2 1 2 
Non-gentry: local 8, ' -2 6 4 J. 
London 3 - 3 - 2 
Grantees 5 4 1 1 1 
> 
Totals 156 82 74 39 15 
,45 
A large number of estates were bought by agents acting 
for the delinquents. Most of these were London lawyers or 
merchants - men with experience in land conveyancing and 
.. 
the handling of money, who were better able to contract with 
the Treason Trustees. The expense of travelling'to London 
and staying there whilst the sale was negotiated could be 
quite considerable, and much time might be lost by.someone 
1. When the whole of an eBtate went to one class of pur-
chaser, it'is entered in the "whole estate" column; when 
two or more classes of purchaser took the property, an 
entry is made in each of the relevant "part of estate" 
colwrlns. 
, 
.. 
.. ; 
, 
, 
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unacquainted with official procedures. The use of agents to 
handle these arrangements was quite natural, but under the 
impetus 'of the Royalists' attempts to regain their lands, 
, ,1 it developed into a wholesale trust' system, • 
Dr. Chesney saw these middlemen as mass speculators, 
buying'and re-selling on a huge scale for their own profit2 • <> 
Certainly some speculators were involved in the sales (it 
would have been surprisingly abnormal had there not been any), 
.-
but many of the bulk purchases were made by the delinquents' 
representatives. Contemporaries realised what was happening -
Lucy Hutchinson arraigned John Wildman as " ••• a cunning 
, 
person, Major Wildman, who was then a great manager of 
papists' interests, ',,3 • • • • Without the help of such people, 
-" -,. 
it is very doubtful whether the delinquents could have 
> 
regained so great a portion of their'estates. It was the 
, ' 
1. The class of "possible trust purchases" embraces those 
estates which were bought by an ex-Royalist or a close 
friend, and were back in the hands of their,original 
owners after the Restoration, 'but where the fate of the 
lands cannot be discovered immediately after the sales. 
2. Dr. Thirsk, in her study of the Royalists in the south-east, 
first suggested the role of these agents in the recovery 
of confiscated estates. See I.J. Thirsk, The Sale of 
Delinquents' Lands, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London, 1950', Bassim; H.E.Chesney, The Sequestration 
of Estatesi 1643-6, (unpublished Ph.D. ,thesis, Oniversity of Sherrie d, 1928) pp.186 ff. :' , 
, . 
3. Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of the life of Colonel ,Hutchinson, 
(ed. C.H.Firth) (1906), 282. "Wildman's 1ack ,o! any 
violent religious convictions enabled him to act, 
without worrying, in several business deals as an agent 
for Roman Catholic families",M.Ashley, John Wildman z 
Plotter and Postmaster, (1947), p.72~ 
,I' 
'I 
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agent's name and reputation which secured the loans from 
the London merchants, and it was he (or his. bailiff) who 
managed the property during the rest of the Interregnum, 
1 paying an annuity to the Royalist ex-owner. It is unlikely 
that the delinquents were using these trustees to disguise 
the fact that they were repurchasing their lands: the govern-
ment must have realised what was happening, and accepted the 
2 
situation with good grace. The real value of men like 
Crouch and·Rushworth was that they simplified the purchase 
procedure, and safeguarded the estates against future re-
sequestration3 • 
It is clear that the greatest part in regaining con-
fiscated property was played by Londoners. Even Slingsby 
Bethell, though a relation of Sir Henry Slingsby, lived in 
the City. Most of these agents were lawyers, ~ike John Blunt, 
Gilbert Crouch and John Rushworth~ or merchants,· (such as 
John Fullerton and Slingsby Bethell). Wildman was an ex-
ception - a soldier who had apparently first speculated in 
confiscated lands, he later turned to the equally profitable 
(but. far less hazardous) profession of buying. in trust for 
the delinquents4 • 
l~ Rushworth managed the Constable estate (Constable MSS, 
iassim), whilst Crouch did the same thing for William, 
lundell's lands in Lancashire (M.Blundell (ed.), Cavalier: 
Letters of William Blundell to his friends, 1620-98,(1933), 
pp. 41 ff). 
2. The government had permitted the Catholic delinquents to 
compound - it apparently treated trust purchases with the 
saIne benevolence. 
3. See Appendix II b. 
4; See m!!! (Rushwwrth, Bethell, Wildman); Adiley, Wildman, 72. 
. I 
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Thus the London trustees were chosen mainly for their 
legal or commercial connections. The local agents, howeyer, 
were a far less cohesive group. Bellas~is, Byerley, Cobb, 
Gower, Ingram, Strickland and Wentworth were all ex-Royalists 
who were apparently.helping their friends out of embarrassing 
situations. Certainly, the. lands they bought were recovered 
by the Restoration. Troutbeck, a Parliamentarian army sur-
. , 
geon, had already farmed much of Sir Walter Vavasour's 
estate in trust for the ex-ownerl • Thompson was a prominent 
York merchant, who tried to keep in touch with both sides, 
whilst Prickett and Humphreys were both members of the 
local gentry who gave assistance to the families with whom 
they were closely connected •. 
Apart from Slingsby Bethell (whose activities were 
limited to his uncle's estate), the two greatest trust 
purchaser~ were Gilbert Crouch and John Rushworth. Both 
were mainly concerned with the north" of Engle,nd. Little is 
known about the former, except that he was of northern origin, 
and settled down in the North Riding after the Restoration. 
He was related by marriage to the Catholic Salvins, and 
thiS, together with his legal background, was probably the 
'origin of his career as an agent. Altogether, he bought, 
38 properties (15 of them in conjunction with other trustees), 
amounting to over 23 manors and 36 other parcels of land2• 
1. H.Aveling,·"The'Catholic Recusants of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire, 1588-1790" in proceedin~s of the Leeds Phil. 
and Literary Society, Part VI, p. 34. 
2. C.C.C., 3161, & passim (for the purchases). 
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John Rushworth had had a very varied career before he 
turned to land purchase. A Northumbrian with Yorkshire 
connections, he was educated in the law, ~nd called to the 
bar in 1647. He became cleark-assistant to the Commons in' 
1640, a Parliamentary messenger during the civil wars, and 
later secretary to Lord Fairfax and Cromwell. His purchases 
,..., 
,/ . 
consisted of 16 manors and 21 parcels of land, as well as 
eight acquisitions in association with Gilbert Crouchl • 
Other such agents included Samuel Foxley of Westminster, 
Major-General John Wildman (who collected 62 estates in 
various parts of the country, mainly Lancashire), and John 
Fullerton,' a clothworker of St. Martinis-Ie-Grand. Some of 
the local trustees were equally prosperous and important 
men: Sir Francis Cobb and Sir Thoma~ Gower, both com-
pounded Royalists, bought lands in Saxton and Biggin for 
the owner, Sir Philip Hungate2 • Altogether, these agents 
rescued at least 88 (and probably 102) manors or parcels 
of land from. the hands of the Drury House Trustees. 
The success of such trust-buying naturally depended 
upon the financial stability of the delinquent's estate. The 
money was secured by a mortgage on the property, and the 
agent then administered it himself, paying an annual main-
tenance to the late owner. This not only avoided the possib-
1. D.N.B., and C.C.C.,passim. 
2. EEQ, C54/3760/15. 
.. ---' 
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ility of resequestration for recusancy, but also secured 
the steady cancellation'of the debt. The only instances 
where the delinquent was fined for his religion occurred 
where he had secured the seven-year lease of the property, 
and was therefore the definite tenant. Such leases, being 
with "traitors", became technically void when the lands were 
sold; but in the case of trust purchases, the agent usually 
allowed the late owner t~ remain in possession. l When the 
delinquent only received a maintenance allowance from his 
'estates, he was hardly ever molested for his recusancy~" 
There is, unfortunately, not a great deal of information 
covering the raising of money to buy the confiscated lands. 
Professor Habakkuk has suggested that the majority of the 
sales were made with doubled bills2.'The creditors would 
naturally take this chance - probably their last - of 
obtaining repayment in some concrete form. Habakkuk mentions 
. . 
that all but 1.2 per cent of the moneys raised by the sale 
of Royalists' lands were secured in this way3~ 
1. For example, Philip Hammerton and John Ryther each retained 
their leases, and were fined as recusants (on the Recusancy 
.. Rolls) in 1655: PRO, SP28/215 (2nd Order Bk, for leases), 
id., E377/61. -
2. See supra, p./~~~, for an explanation of. this term. 
3. H.J.Habakkuk, OPe cit., in Ec.H.R., XV (2nd. series) (1962), 
pp. 71-74. Since a large number of the delinquen~were 
using trustees to recover their lands, yet almost all of 
. the money was paid in doubled bills, this indicates that 
,the Royalists' agents were raising the money from the 
London speculators. This could be one reason why relatively 
few speculators appealMin Yorkshire - they could make 
safer (and sometimes larger) profits simply by lending 
the money, and thus getting rid of their useless public 
faith bills. 
, 
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Dr. Thirsk endorses this opinion that public faith 
bills played a major part in the sales. There had been con-
siderable speculation in these government securities - bills 
were bought and sold at deflated rates, ,the smaller creditors 
being forced to sell in order to recoup at least some part 
of their losses, whilst the richer accumulated them in 
the hope that one day they might be honoured. Walker mentions 
that debentures were bought up at five and six shillings 
in the pound, and used to buy confiscated lands: tI •• they 
purchase upon such easy particulars, as brings it down from 
ten years purchase '(the price of forfeited lands) to two or 
1 three years purchase" • This "doubling" substantially reduced 
the government's profit on the sales - its capital assets 
were only realising a quarter of their value in fresh 10ans2• 
In only one instance of trust purchase can we be sure 
of the origins of the money. John Rushworth, buying Sir 
Philip Constable's estates, borrowed the capital from Richard 
Shireburne of Stonyhurst (in Lancashire), who raised most 
of it in the City at six per cent interest3 • Apparently some 
1. C.Wa1ker, The compleat History of Independency, (1661), 
Pt. I I , P • 20'7.' ; , ' 
2. I.J.Thirsk, The Sale of De1in~uents' Lands, (unpublished 
Ph.D.' thesis, University of London, 1950), pp. 171-179. 
The new loan repr~~nted only half of the purchase price, 
which was itself/fat ten years' purchase) only a half of 
the ~5pi ta~,va1tie of the lands. 
3. Dom Hugh Ave1ing, "Catholics and Parliamentary Sequestra-
tions", in 'Ampleforth Journal, p. Ill.' 
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of the money was in the form of public faith bills. This 
was the ob.vious way to raise loans for the repurchase of 
confiscated estates, and necessitated the services of agents. 
The City merchants ad.vanced the money (if possible) in the 
form of doubled bills - for them, it was the ideal solution. 
They thus disposed of these dubious securities (making a 
handsome profit if they had bought them at deflated rates) 
without being burdened by lands, which tied up their credit 
in the form of a questionable title. The debt was secured 
by a mortgage on the property, and the careful administration 
of the agent or his bailiff guaranteed the regular repayment 
of the loan plus the interest. The fact that almost all of 
• 
the purchase money was in the form of doubled bills shows that 
the majority of the agents used this methodl • 
Sir Henry Slingsby's lands were most likely bought in 
this manner by his nephew, Slingsby Bethell, in association 
with a close friend, Robert Stapleton. Writing to his uncle, 
Bethell mentioned the cost of the lands which, as life 
estate, " ••• cost six yeres purchase, and ••• your estate 
comes to a great summe ••• the whole as contracted for with 
the State amounts to £ll,220-l6-7d~ which I reckon is money 
£6400 ••• ,,2., This strongly suggests that the remaining .£5000 
was paid in the form of public faith bills, bought on the 
I 
) , 
i j 
, ' 
I 
1. Habakkuk mentions that H •• the total raised by doubling Ii 
amounted to £604,934-8-3d.:( i.e., that amount in money, 
and an equivalent sum in bills) the money received in i 
ways other than doubling amounted to only £l5,048-l-6d: I,,' (H.J.Habakkuk, loc. cit., in Ec.H.R. (2 series) XV, p. 73. 
2. Slingsby Bethell to Sir Henry Slingsby 13 March 1651/2 
inW.Wheater, Knaresburgh and its rule~s, (Leeds:1907) 243. 
I, 
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London market. 
The use of Yorkshire agents for the repurchase of some 
, . ~. " 
of the lesser properties suggests that part of the money 
was raised locally. Certainly, the York merchants were < 
quite capable of advancing enough credit to buy the smaller 
estates. The difference in the ,size and amounts contracted 
. . 
for between the London and' local trustees appears to indicate 
~.' " 
that the former were'employed principally for their connec-
>' .' 
tions with the London money market. Their guarantee that 
the estate would'be settled as security for the loan was 
needed when large sums of money·were'involved. In lesser 
cases however, '. the delinquents preferred to' employ friends 
and relations. 
. . 
Although the money was raised in the name of the Royalists, 
the agents were apparently mainly responsible for negotiating 
the loans. Sir Henry Slingsby left' all the transactions 
over his estates to Bethell and Stapleton, while Sir Roger 
Bradshaigh and Gilbert Crouch (who also acted as trustees) 
• 
advanced the funds needed to repurchase William Blundell's 
landsl • This direct interest was natural, as the agent would 
be the person to suffer if he could not pay the price on 
the day appointed. However, John Rushworth, when he acted 
. . 
in this r6le, usually left all the financial matters to the 
2 delinquents themselves • 
1. The Diar~ of Sir Henr~ Slingsbi' (appendix on letters), 
passim; .Blundell (e .), Cava ier, pp. 40-41. 
2. Both Sir Philip Constable and Robert Doleman (Rushworth's proteg'e~)i' had to make their own ~rrangements: Aveling, 
op.cit., 1 1; Bright MSS, BR 185(b) v/ll2. 
'\ 
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Once the money had been raised and the estate recovered, 
the lands were usually mortgaged to the agent or his 
creditors as security for the loan. Sir Philip Constable's 
property was saddled with a £12,488 debt; £7500 to pay the 
Treason Trustees, and the rest to settle the baronet's own 
personal liabilities. Some of the debts were transferred 
into life or per~onal annuities, and gradually the residual 
mortgage was reduced. But even in 1671, the charges on the 
'.. , 'I ' • ' .. .' • ' , "", , 1 
estate stood at £6230, carrying £375 interest • 
. , 
As soon as the first half of the purchase price was 
paid, the rents and other dues fell to the new owner. Some 
, , 
of the agents paid these first instalments fairly soon after 
the contracts were signed - in a few cases, within a fort-
'2 ' 
night • As most of the surveys o~ the Third Act of Sale 
took place in early 1653, prompt action could secure the 
Lady Day - or at least the Mayday - rents. If the estate 
was in fee, and therefore assessed at ten years' purchase, 
the yearly rate of interest for the sum borrowed (at six 
per cent) would be over half the annual rental of the property. 
, ' 
Thus an extra quarter's rent would be a most welcome asset. 
Bethell and Stapleto~ adopted this practice with Sir 
Henry Slingsby's estate. The first half of the price was 
paid well before it was due, in order to gain the rents on 
1. Constable MSS, DDEV/56/408. 
2. List of contracts with the Treason Trustees, PRO,SP46/, 
107,' (Second Order Book), passim. 
", ! 
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203. 
the property. "Wee haue for payment eight weekes for the' 
first halfe, and sixmoneths after for the second moyety. 
But because it is our designe to saue lady-dayes rents, 
and if wee will doe that wee must pay in our first payment 
before the 25th Mche, I haue therfore made use of my credit ••• "l 
Other purchasers also used this method - there was 
a wave of premature payments in the weeks preceding Lady 
Day, 1653. After this, few people bothered to expedite their 
instalments until the first days of S~ptember, just before 
the Michaelmas rents fell due. When there was no immediate 
financial inducement, the buyers usually took the full two 
months before they settled their accounts with the Drury 
House Treasurers. 
The use of agents did not always guarantee the recovery 
of the lands. In a few cases, the delinquent was unable 
to raise enough money, and the estate had to be sold soon 
afterwards. This was no reflection upon the abilities of 
the trustee - he did not, unless he was a close friend, 
pledge his own credit. It was the Royalists' lands which 
were bound as security, and if they had suffered during the 
war, or were burdened with debts, the question of raising 
money naturally became a problem. 
Robert Doleman of Badsworth was unfortunate in this 
respect. He had attempted to compound in 1650 but had been 
prevented from dOing so, either 'through debts or because of 
1. Bethell to Slingsby, 13 March 1651/2, in Wheater, OPe cit., 
243. 
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his Catholic religion. When he appeared in the Second Act 
of Sale, he contracted John Rushworth to act as his agent. 
But Doleman could not raise the money, and had to sell parts 
of his estates in order to recover the rest. The Parlia-
mentarianJohn Bright of Carbrook bought Badsworth for 
£8600, and then purchased this manor from the Treason 
Trustees, using Rushworth as his agentl. 
, Rushworth's letter to Bright indicat~s Doleman's 
precarious financial position. "1 understood this day by 
Mr Doleman that you are inclinable to buy Badsworth: of him: 
Wh(ich) hee must sell, or some other land, to redeem the 
rest:' .... the estate is contracted for in my Name; for the 
use of his'wife and children. & I should be very gladd, to 
passe the Interest to you: but there must bee nor delayes 
iri the business~ for hi~ 2 moneths (between contracting 
and paying) is almost expired; & (I) must pxocure moneys 
some other way ••• 1 can say nothing of ye value of ye land, 
but of a clean title you need not doubt ,,2 • • • • 
Even with these additional funds, Doleman was unable 
to meet the high cost of recovering his lands (which, being 
in fee, were valued at a minimum of ten years' purchase). 
He had to allow his manors of Gunby and Weedley to be bought 
1. PRO, C54/3148/39; Fine CP25(2)/6l4 (Hilary 1652/3); C54/ 
Jbb3/3; Bright MSS, BR 185 (b) v •. 
2. Bright MSS, BR 185 (b) v/112. 
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by Robert Cutts of Grays I Inn, and later sold his title 
to the property. In the end, the only parts of the Doleman 
estates which were recovered were the Manors of Waplington, 
Boulton and half Pocklington, purchased through Rushworth 
for £3l05-l7-4!d 1. 
Marmaduke Cholmley also lost some of his estates in 
this way. Both his manors of Brandsby-cum-Steersby and 
Brafferton were repurchased through the services of Gilbert 
Crouch, and were later mortgaged as security for the cost 
of their recovery. Brandsby remained in the hands of the 
Cholmley family, but Brafferton fell to Ralph Rymer, a 
member of the Yorkshire Committee. When Rymer was attainted 
for his involvement in the abortive Farnley Wood Plot of 
1663, Brafferton escheated to the Crown, and Cholmley 
petitio~for its restoration. The estate, however, was 
eventually restored to the Rymer family, and the Royalist 
never recovered it2 • 
The only other person who was forced to surrender a 
recent trust purchase was Sir Marmaduke Langdale of North 
Dalton. At the time of the c'onfiscations Langdale was in 
exile, whilst his three daughters attempted to protect his 
interests. Much of the family's property was granted to 
1. PRO, C54/3663/10; i~, C54/3748/12; id, 054/3665/1. 
- - -
2. PRO, C54/379l/8, 10; id., C54/3792/2l; id, C54/3840/17. 
Rymer's attainder, PRU;-E178/6556; CholmIey's petition, 
C.S.P.D., Addenda, !bC0-70, 694; !£li, North Riding, II, 100. 
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Parliamentary supporters, but the Manor of North Dalton was 
put up for sale. It was bought in 1652 by Robert Prickett 
of Allerthorpe, who later married one of Sir Marmaduke's 
daughters. Although Prickett raised the money with little 
difficulty, the family had hardly any means of subsistence, 
and the manor therefore had to be sold the following year 
to Edward Barnard of Grays' Inn for £2150. When Sir Marmaduke 
returned in 1660, he endorsed the sale and guaranteed 
Barnard's titlel • 
Twenty-one delinquents recovered all or part of their 
estates through the intervention of agents, and another five 
probably regained' their property in the same manner'. This 
involved them in very heavy debts, and in two cases led to 
the almost immediate resale of some of the lands concerned2 ; 
. -
The remainder of these Royalists succeeded in retaining poss-
ession, at least until 1660, by which time their lands were 
in a much more healthy position. The enforced social isolation 
during the Interregnum, and the careful estate administration 
of the trustees or their representatives~ contributed in 
a large measure to the repayment of the outstanding debts. 
Thus those who were able to repurchase their property through 
1. PRO, 054/3659/20; id, 054/3756/23; id, CP25(2)/6l4 (Trinity 
!b;4); ~, OP25(2)7752 (Trinity l66UT. 
2.,These two examples are Sir Marmaduke Langdale and Marm-
aduke Cholmley. Robert Doleman is not included, as the 
, three manors that he lost were not", in fact,: bought by 
trustees (even though Rushworth had been employed to act 
as an agent). 
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a broker had an excellent chance or retaining their lands 
intact. 
The trustees doubtless charged some commission for 
their services, although it is not certain in what form it 
was paid. Apart from any profits they could make by using 
public faith bills, such middlemen probably received sub-
stantiallegal fees as agents and estate managers. Their 
'services were available' to all ra'nks of society: '- not only 
the peerage and gentry, ,but also the yeome.nry employed trus-
tees to recover their estates. The ubiquitous Gilbert Crouch 
bought lands in Bishopton and Swillmire for Thomas Staveley, 
and estate's in Markington for James Singletonl • Dr.' Chesney 
visualised a land revolution, with people like Crouch and 
Rushworth, Wildman and Foxley, in the guise of speculators2 • 
In fact, such persons were performing exactly the opposite 
rele - they were preventing a land revolution. Sixty-five " 
per cent'or,all the lands of the gentry sold by Drury House 
were purchased by agents or probabl~ agents, and only two 
per cent of th~se were lost before 1660. 
There was another way in which the Royalist might regain 
his lands prior to the Restoration - by direct repurchase 
from the Treason Trustees. This was, in fact, an extension 
"1. PRO, C54/3767/3;' id., C54/3783/20. 
- -2. H.E.Chesney, "The Transference of Lands in England,,1640-
1660", in T.R.H.S.,(4 series) XV (1932)pp. 196-7. . 
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of the trust purchase system,-where the agent happened to 
be the heir, or a close relation, who had avoided the stigma 
of delinquency. Only two families recovered their estates 
in this manner - the Lowthers of Ingleton and the Washing--
tons of Hampole. 
Colonel Richard ,Lowther, Royalist Governor of Ponte-
fract Castle, had died in 1645, and his heir Gerrard failed 
to complete his father's composition, being unable to pay 
the fine because of heavy debts. When the estates were con-
fiscated, Lancelot (the second son) repurchased them in 
September 1653 for £1707-l5-5fd. Besides this forfeited 
property, the family had only the mines on Ingleton Moor, 
and from such slender resourceswaa quite unable to raise 
the necessary credit: Ingleton Manor was therefore mort-
gaged to Anthony Bouch of Cockermouth (Gerrard's brother-
in-law) for £1800. But the exp-ense of recovering the estate, 
combined with war losses, bankrupted the family. All their 
, -
interests in the coal mines were sold in 1658, and when they 
attempted to redeem the mortgage on Ing1eton, they were 
unable to pay the £3000 for which the manor then stood 
security. As a result, the whole of the family estates passed 
-,- - 1 
away into the hands of creditors. 
The Washingtons were more fortunate. Their two manors 
of Adwicke and Hampole were bought by the merchant Robert 
Washington, second son of the delinquent Darcy the elder. 
1. PRO, C54/3750/16; ~,C54/3750/9; I.A.S., DD123; PRO, CIO!468/132. 
-
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The money was apparently paid promptly, 'and the lands were 
entailed to: pr6tect them in the f~iure. The:~ill of 'Richard 
Washington, Darcy's 'grandson and heir (proven in 1678) 
mentions debtswhic'h exceeded his persori.al' estate, 'but there 
is no direct evidence as·to'whether these were the result 
of confiscations, "or of later expenses. Hampole had' been 
'mortgaged for £1000, and the context of the 'Will suggests 
that the family were in some fina~cial difficultie~~ 
. ' , 
Although the lands had been valued by the Commonwealth 
I ' 
surveyors at 'about £333 a year, Richard restricted 'his son's 
. , 
income to £50 per annum until the outstanding debts were 
paid ~ This seems' to indicate that the Washingtons, too, 
were suffering somewhat from the 'aftermath of the Interreg-
1 ., . " , 
num • 
In ,the remainder of the" sales, the purchasers were not 
acting,directly for the Royalist,~x-owners. Virtually all 
of the delinquents who were unable to regain their lands 
by composition or repurchase were limited from taking such 
,action by external circumstances. They were either in exile, 
like Cuthbert Morley and Sir Marmaduke Langdale, or were in 
a straitened financial position due to having a small 
estate or extensive debts. They therefore had no ~ption but 
to leave their lands to the mercy of the Drury House 
Trustees. ~.,' 
1. PRO, SP23/G 58/65-7; i~, C54/3785/41; i~, C54/3800/2l; 
!:W., vol. 59 f. 386 •. There is no evidence that the losses 
from the war contributed to this indebtedness, but it 
seems likely that,~ would hav~weakened the estae. 
tf,fj a.t leaSt 
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In a number of instances, the delinquent held the seven ... 
year lease on his own property. If it was in his wife's, 
or a relation's name, he could continue to enjoy the revenues, 
although there would be considerable rents to be paid to 
the Commonwealth purchaser. Thus Jane ~l.umpton, grand-daughter 
of· the Catholic delinquent Sir Edward, held the leases on 
- .. 
all of her father's and grandfather's lands (with the sole 
exception of Plumpton Manor), and from this favourable 
. 1 
position was able to rebuild the estate. But the majority 
of the delinquents had leased their property in their own 
names, and when it was confiscated,their title, being that 
of a "traitor", became invalid. John Baker, surveyi.ng 
Robert Doleman's estate, reported: " I conceive this is 
Robert Doleman the delinquent to whome the Lease is granted, 
2 & if soe ••• then the Lease to be voyd" • Therefore, unless 
the Royalists had cautiously bought theleasmthrough an 
agent, they forfeited all interest in .the property. 
The employment of such representatives to act as 
tenants was not always to the delinquent's ultimate advan-
tage. Whilst it gave him some sort of revenue for the follow-
ing seven years, everything depended upon the agent's 
honesty •. There could obviously be no open arrangement as 
this, being technically illegal, would immediately invalidate 
1. See infra, p.2JO. 
2. Bright MSS, BR/194; ~, CIO/69/68. 
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the "settlement. Therefore the transaction had to be one of 
mutual trust and respect. 
Occasionally however, the trust was all on one side. 
Marmaduke Holtby. of 'Skackleton made a gentleman's agreement 
with Thomas Reynolds of York, by which the latter would 
take up the lease on the Manor of Skackleton at £102 per 
annum, paying the profits to Holtby. Soon afterwards, Rey-
nolds broke his word, and ceased all 'payments. After the 
Restoration, Holtby sued him in Chancery, and managed to 
recover the arrears of rent (although it is not known whether 
or not he regained the manor). In November 1661, he petitioned 
(' 
the King for a commission to fell old trees in Rockingham 
, ' 
Forest ~\',in: recognition of his services during the wars: 
, 1 
another victim of the sufferings of the Interregnum • 
Apart from such occasional leases or agreements, the 
delinquents ,who were unable to recover their lands had to 
survive on credit (or the charity of their neighbours), for 
their lands were sold by the Commonwealth2 • The largest 
single group of new owners were the Royalists' creditors -
they accounted for eighteen parcels of land, belonging to 
six delinquents. In act~al fact, half of these estates were 
the property of one man, Cuthbert Morley of Seamer. His 
1. R.C.P.,III, 116; PRO~ SP28/2l5 (2nd Order Bk, showing 
lease); i~, C10/5~~; id, 078/624/10; Calendar of 
Treasurylj'ooks," I, 173.-,' , 
2. When the lands were sold, no allowance was made for any 
dependants, unless there was some dower or entail 
settled upon the estate. 
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father had built up a considerable domain in the North 
~ , , 
Riding just prior to the war, and many of the loans raised 
'unsettled: 
to buy the lands were as yet I:!' .:<':':~(-. Thus the maj ori ty of 
Morley's estates went to satisfy his creditors, the govern-
ment receiving only £3714-2s. out of the total purchase 
, ... ' :', "", .:. .. 1 " i\" 
price of £28 ,154-:,3-1lid. , ~, 
, , 
The estates of four of the other five Royalists went to 
creditors almost, in their entirety, and only one - the 
1 . , I 
lands of Marmaduke Frank of Knighton - brought any substan-
, ,,,". ....,., • ,"'0 • 
tial gain to the government. In this case, William Colegrave 
;. ".Ii' l! ~ ~..... .l-"\'. I "- ,.- ~. • :, .; 
and Henry Savage, ag~,~ts for the creditor (the Marquis of 
.' ,~ , " 
Dorchester) purchased the ~mnor of Knighton and lands in 
'; ~ \ ., 
Sandhutton from the Drury House Trustees for nearly £2000. 
, " 
There was a mortgage of £1500 settled on the property, 
1 ' .., • .. I'~, 
~ i , 
redeemable at any time as long as £120 a year interest was 
regularly paid. During the Interregnum Frank, deprived of 
his lands, fell, into ar~ears with the payment,s, and had 
, , 2 
considerable difficulty in regaining his lands after 1660 • 
This arrangement for paying creditors out of the con-
fiscated estates was admirable in theory, but bad its limita-
tions in practice. One of the m~jor drawbacks occurred in 
. r, . 
cases where the property was insufficient to meet all the 
respective liabili ti,es. Lands were normally valued at between 
1. See' Appendix III, p .il-1ff for a summary of the' Morley case. 
2. PEO, 054/3834/34; i~, 010/119/41; i~, 010/120/35. ~ 
pemaiBiBg ease was=that of JOAR PlamptoR, WHose laRes 
(aalf tae family estatcs) wcrc DcoQPod fop POptiODS a~d 
debt&~ T~QY r&pr8&&~t&~ 18so thaA 50 pcr OCRt, of t~c 
~otal laNace wcalta of tao family. 
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fifteen and twenty years' purchase, but the Trustees sold 
them for only ten times their annual revenue. Thus estates 
heavily in debt might be inadequate to meet all the various 
claims. 
This question arose in the case of Sir George Rad-
cliffe of Thornhill. He had fled to the continent, and his 
estates were confiscated and marked for sale. The government 
had allowed £1900 out of the profits of these lands to 
, 
Henry Stewart and James Grey, as compensation. - for their 
sufferings in Ireland. However, Richard Elrnhirst of Hound-
< 
hill, a prosperous ex-Royalist yeoman, also claimed a share 
. . 
of the property in settlement ·of the debts Radcliffe owed 
him. He alleged that Sir George had borrowed the money to 
buy the Manors of Colton (Cowton) and Fairburne (the lands 
in question), of which nearly £5000 still remained unpaid. 
As he had already, compounded for these manors, ,Elmhirst 
was quite justifiably annoyed when the Committee for Com-
pounding gave judgement in favour of Stewart. ' , 
In response to the Royalist's petitions, the case was 
reopened, and this time the Committee decided in favour of ' 
Elmhirst. He was to have the Mano~ of .. Colton, and half that 
, . 
of Fairburne, until his debt was settled: the other half of 
Fairburne was sold to a syndicate of three Londoners. 
Despite all her pleas Agnes, stewart's daughter and heiress, 
never received any more' of her inheritance, nor even the-, 
debts which Radcliffe owed to her fatherl • -
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The Committee for Removing Obstructions only awarded 
property to creditors if the latter could produce concrete 
evidence ofa debt which was actually settled on the estates 
prior to the war. Since such lands were already secured 
for legitimate debts, they were obviously unredeemable at 
the Restoration - unless the delinquent was prepared to 
adopt the mortgage, and repay the charges on the estate. 
\., A.. 
This method of satisfying creditors proved very satisfactory 
J • • 
to the mortgagees, but was a source of great embarrassment 
to the Royalists, who were threatened with the irreplaceable 
loss of their lands. Fortunately however, some de~inquents 
" 
were able to make agreements with their creditors, by which 
the latter treated the property as a funded mortgage, using 
!. ~ ... 
the profits to offset the outstanding debtsl • 
... ~ 
pariE of the estates of two delinquents were presented 
to various loyal Parliamentarians as a reward for their 
services, or in compensation for war losses. Five properties 
were granted away in this fashion. The Manor of Holme in 
Spaldingmoor was presented to Sir William Constable of 
Flamborough, who had sold it to the Royalist, Sir Marmaduke 
1. As in the case of Cuthbert Morley (Appendix III). See 
also p~~for the attempted recovery of such lands. 
( £~!!!.:._!!:2!_E.:._gf~) .,,' 
1. Apparently stewart was also one of Radcliffe's creditors: 
Letter from Sir G.R. to John Hodgson, 8 March 1647/8, in, 
T.D.Whitaker, The Life and Original Correspondence of Sir 
George RadCliffe! etc. (1810), 258-9. See also R.C.P., 
III, 105-7; 1(1, ,224-8; C. S.P .D .. 1657-8 , 158; PRO, 
SP46jl07 (2na-Order Bk) 184 tt. ---
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Langdale, in 1633. Most of Langdale's other lands experienced 
the same fate. The Manors of Pighi1l and Molscroft were 
presented to Isaac Knight by an act of 1 May 1650, in com-
pensation for his sufferings at the hands of the Court of 
High commissionl.cGatenby, originally destined to provide 
for the 'Cavalier's family, found its way into the possession 
of John Lambert~ Parliament regarded Langdale as one of the 
leading malignants, and therefore used his lands to com-
, 2 
pensate those who had suffered at the hands of the Royalists • 
The remaining grantwas'of lesser importance. Colonel 
Matthew Boynton, late Governor of Scarborough Castle, who 
had been killed in the Battle of Wigan, had his lands bestowed 
upon Lord Strickland3 • These awards took no account of any 
charges on the estates, and the Royalists' dependants 
suffered considerably. Theoretically, the grantees continued 
to pay a maintenance portion of a fifth for the delinquents' 
families, but in practice the latter frequently had to seek 
for other sources of income. 
The remainder of the confiscated lands were sold to 
independent purchasers. Thirteen of the properties went to 
1. Alum. Oxon.; Ca1amy, II, 447; Ca1amy Revised, 311. 
2. W.Smith (ed.) Old Yorkshire, II, 237; W.H.Dawson, Cromwell's 
understud~ (1938), 406-410; F.H.Sunder1and, Marmaduke, 
Lord Lang ale, passim; (see also n. 1, supra); C.C.C., 243; 
D.tloyd, Memoires of ••• excellent personages ••• , (1668), 
549; C.J., VI. 407. 
3. PRO, SP46!l07(lst. Order Bk) 164 • 
........ 
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Yorkshire people, eleven to London buyers, and the remaining 
four to non-local provincial gentry. With the exception of 
Edward Greene of Mattherne and Thomas Redshawe of Ripon, 
I none of the above were large-scale buyers • Some were Royalist 
in sympathy, whilst others had supported Parliament during 
the war: It is impossible to make any generalisations: each 
bought lands for-his own'particu1ar reasons~ It is possible 
that a number of these purchasers were buying estates as 
agents for the Royalists, but this is by no means certain. 
The non-Yorkshire provi'ncial contractors were all 
buying for their own advantage. Edward Greene had acquired 
the Manors of Landogga and Mattherne from the Trustees for 
the Sale of Bishops' -- Lands, and he now bought Sir Edward 
Plumpton's two Yorkshire manors. A syndicate of three Derby-
shire landowners took Robert Doleman's small estate in Wake-
field, whilst Sydney Constable's lands in Brompton fell 
to Anne Godschalk of Plaistow in Essex~ Greene was almost 
certainly a land speculator,- whilst the 'other two were also 
acquiring property in their own interests. ' 
The motives of the London purchasers are harder to 
define. Like some of the Yorkshire gentry, they may -, have ., ' 
been acting as trustees. Robert:Cutts purchased the Manors' 
of Gunby and Weedley, yet willingly combined with the late 
owner, Robert Doleman, in reselling them to-a Hullmerchant2 • 
1. Both had purchased ex-Church landS, ColI. To~ et Gen., I, 
3 ff. Thomas Redshawe was apparently related to the 
Royalist Redshawes of Ripon. 
2. See supra, p ."O'l--S'. 
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Unless Cutts was merely an agent for Doleman, it is difficult 
to explain the alacrity with which the latter sold his 
.title (unless the Londoner had paid him sUbstantial compen-
sation). William Toomes, William Moseley and John Pratt, .who 
each purchased a part of Cuthbert Morley's estate, were. 
certainly working;for their own advantage. Toomes held lands 
in· Normanby after ",the, Restoration, and had'developed. 
financial connections with a number of leading Yorkshire 
fami1ies1 • 
Little is known of the other three London buyers. 
': Philip Brace of St. Giles~in-the-Fields" Middlesex, purchased 
the Manor of Cold Ing1eby from the Drury House Trustees, 
and soon afterwards also bought the title from 1tslate 
owner, Thomas Beckwith2• Unfortunately the estate cannot be 
traced after 1660, and we do not know whether Brace recovered 
. the property (although it is highly unlikely). Neither of ' 
; the remaining London purchasers, William Arscotte or Henry 
. Rawlins, bought lands of any considerable:s1ze. 
The purchasers whose motives are the.hardest to analyse 
are the Yorkshire gentry and merchants.So~e were certainly 
acting as agents, and have been classed as such: ~or example, 
Thomas Wentworth and Toby Humphreys combined to buy the con-
1. PRO, C7/580/106; C.C.A.M., 464; C.C.c., 2530. 
-- ? 
2. The manor had originalllbeen sold for life only~ aait 
was entailed. PRO, C54/3754/3; CP25(2)/614 (Trinity, 
1654) no. 81. ---
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fiscated estates of John Percy of Stubbs Walden. Humphreys 
was a close friend of the family, and had acted as a trustee 
in 1653 when the lands had been entailed to provide a 
portion on the marriage of one of Percy's .daughtersl • Apart 
from such clear cases, however, there are several instances 
where it is impossible to ascertain if the purchaser was 
buying in his own right, or on behalf of the late owner. 
Joseph Micklethwaite of Swyne, a newcomer to the ranks of 
the gentry, with extensive trading and commercial interests, 
bought the Manor of Acomb Grange from the Trustees, yet 
2 in 1662 the original owner, Robert Gale, was back in possession. 
There is no decisive evidence either way in the above 
case, but there are firm grounds for the belief that some 
of the Yorkshire gentry were buying lands in trust for their 
friends. The classification of "probable trust purchasers" 
embraces such cases. Anthony Byerley, a Royalist, bought. the 
lands of both John Danby and Michael Metcalfe, but no trace 
of the estates remains. until they appear in the hands of 
their original owners in 1660. It is almost certain that 
BYerley was acting for his fellow-Cavaliers, but unfortunately 
there is no concrete proof that such was the case3 • 
I.EEQ, C54/3785/43; Langdale of Holme MSS, DDLAI7I7. 
2. PRO, C54/3752/20; Everingham MSS, DDEV/l/36 (letter to 
~rburne); PRO, C54/4161/l2.~edshawe m1ght also have been 
3. PRO, C54/3755/29; id., C54/3781/26. buying in trust.) 
- .-
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But some of the local gentry and merchants were 
apparently concerned solely with their own profit - and these 
were not necessarily Parliamentarians. Francis Driffield of 
Easingwold, who came from a Cavalier family, bought some 
of the lands of the Dolemans in wellambriggl • Such local 
buyers, trying to enlarge upon their own estates, were 
naturally limited by their resources, and most of their 
acquisitions were of minor significance. With the exception 
la 
of the two possible trusts mentioned above, only two of the 
eleven purchases were of any considerable size, and in both 
cases a firm title was involved. John Bright of Carbrook 
bought the Manor of Badsworth from the Drury House Trustees 
soon after he had procured the title from its original owner 
at twenty years' purchase. The Manor of Roundhay was acquired 
by William Lowther of Leeds, an extremely wealthy Royalist, 
who almost immediately bought the full title from the late 
owners, the Tempests of Broughton. With'these exceptions, 
the 'rest of the properties gained by Yorkshiremen were 
either small, or of little value2• 
The 28 estates which were bought by independent purchas-
ers belonged to 12 gentry families. Several of these proper-
. 
ties were only lost because of their owners' inability to 
1. PRO, C54/3756/l. ~ 
2. See supra, p.~.~ ; PRO, C54/3755/29; id, CP25(2)!614 
(Easter 1654) no. 22:--
la. I.e., the estates bought by Micklethwaite and Redshawe. 
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make alternative arrangements~ Seven of the families were 
in an uncomfortable economic position. William Brigham, the 
Dolemans of Duncotes,l and Ralph Pudsey each possessed very 
small estates which would be poor security fora loan or a 
mortgage. Stephen Tempest of Broughton, the Plumptons and 
Cuthbert Morley of Seamer were all in delicate financial 
situations - the two latter had substantial parts of their 
property sold to meet the demands of their creditors. Robert 
Doleman of "Badsworth attempted to regain his lands through 
agents, but was unable to meet the high costs involved. 
The reasons why the five remaining families lost their 
lands are more difficult to explain. Marmaduke Holtby (like 
cuthbert Morley) was in exile, but had arranged for his 
estate to be maintained by an agent - an agent who betrayed 
his trust, and turned the lands to his own use. The majority 
of Sir John Redmaine's estate was bought by William Dodsworth, 
. . 
'r , 
who, as the husband of the Royalist~l daughter by his first 
marriage, successfully claimed the property against the sons 
of a later alliance. Little is known of the remaining three 
Royalist families - Constable of Sherborne, Gale of Acomb 
Grange and Beverley of Oold Ingleby: not enough is known of 
the history' of their lands to give any definite answer. 
1. Thomas Doleman had sold SOIDe lands to Richard Fawcett, 
in an attempt to raise enough money to compound. Later 
hiB widow, Mary, claimed her dower on this property. 
PRO, SP23/G 58/85; ide, C5/398/26; 0.0.0.,1749; R.C.P., 
!1"!, 65 ff. -" 
. . , 
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~t is notable that, through composition, open repurchase, 
or trust buying, the delinquents regained 134 properties 
from the Drury House Trustees. These represented 73'per cent 
of all lands which the Committee for Removing Obstructions 
1 had authorised to be sold. In cOntrast, Dr. Thirsk 
discovered that in the four counties of Essex,' Hertford, 
Kent and Surrey, only 25 per cent of the estates were re-
purchased by Royalists or their agents. The following table 
illustrates the relative percentage of purchasers between 
Yorkshire and these four southern counties2• 
Table XVII:- COMPARISON OF PURCHASERS BETWEEN YORKSHIRE 
AND FOUR SOUTH-EASTERN COUNTIES. 
p urchasers 
, 
R 
R 
p 
a 
oyalist agents, 
oyalists (& 
robable Royalist 
gents). 
C reditors 
arliamentary p 
gr 
L 
S 
L 
T 
antees 
oca1 people 
trangers (i.e., 
ondoners & others 
otals 
No. 
Yorks. 
, 
.. , 
< 105 
18 
5 
.,13 
15 
156 
of parcels Percentages. 
of land. 
S-E. Yorks. S-E. 
9 67.3 25 
,. " 
4 11.5 11 
4 3.2 11 
13 8.4 36 
6 9.6 17 
36 100.0 100., 
1. 26 properties were either discharged, or remained seques-
tered, because of entails. 
2. I.J.Th1rsk, OPe cit., figures from Table IV, p. 130 
(reproduced oy kind permission of Dr. Thirsk). Dr. Thirsk 
omits one unidentified purchaser •. The Yorks. figures 
exclude compositions. 
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The most noticeable fact is the great contrast between 
the percentag~s ~f estates bought by Royalists or their 
representatives. In Yorkshire, such people completely,dom-
.... . _. ~ . 
inated the sal~s.- in the four.~outh7eastern_counties, 
, , 1 
there was no "such ,picture • Parliamentary grantees and in-
dividual purchasers played a far,larger part in the southern' 
sales than in the north, where there seems to have been. " " 
hardly any rus~ to acquire the forfeited lands. 
Some sugges~ions can be offered to ,account for these 
differences. Dr. Thirsk's survey includes a number.of peers 
and other leading Royalists, some of whom were in exile in 
the early sixteen-fifties, with therefore little opportunity 
to contract for their P!operty. Lands near to the capital 
were much more attractive to the London merchants and 
government. creditors than scattered. estates in the provinces. 
Although such purchasers were quite willing to speculate 
in properties in the north, they naturally. preferred to 
acquire, lands for their own personal use within easy reach 
of the City. And, where the Royalist ex-owners were 
willing to repurchase their own estates (as in Yorkshire), 
it was far more profitable for. the speculators to lend them 
money or act as their agents, than to try and bid for their 
. i 
1. The figures for the four counties of Berka, Ranta, Oxon, 
and Sussex show that 25 out of 64 estates (39 per cent) 
, . were recovered through agents. However, the overall 
picture for Dr." Thirsk' s area of study shows that, by 
"1660, only 45 out of 179 parcelsof land. (25 per cent) 
.had been recovered - Thirsk, op: cit.,- Tables II'&: X, pp. 
III &: 270. 
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landsl • 
These south-eastern counties were mainly'Parliamentarian 
in allegiance. There were a number of indigenous gentry~ 
many of them on the local committees, who were quite ready 
to profit at their Royalist neighbours' expense2 • This 
contr~sted' strongly with Yorkshire which, with' a few regional 
exceptions, was basically Royalist', and where family relation-
ships spanned the gulf between Roundhead and Cavalier. It 
was the regicide, Sir William Constable, who urged John 
Rushworth to act as an agent for his kinsman, Sir Philip 
Constable of Everingham3• " Blood was thicker than water, 
and, with the exception of a few who turned their coats 
according to the political climate4, it was the ties of blood 
that shaped Yorkshire county life during the Interregnum. 
But the main reason why more of the independent pur-
chasers were unable to buy these Yorkshire lands' was that 
they had very little opportunity to do so. Many of the 
properties were entailed, and therefore lending money to the 
delinquent was more profitable than buying the lands. Of 
the 156 estates sold or granted away,. 66 were held in some 
form of trust. The majority of Royalists quickly found an 
1. Most of th'e speculators seem to have been getting rid of 
their public faith bills by selling them to delinquents 
or their agents - see supra, p. "911.. 
2. Thirsk, OPe cit.,-pp. 123-32. 
3. Aveling, loc. cit., p. Ill. 
,: . 
4. Such as Francis Nevile, Richard Richardson, etc. These 
"trimmers'I were generally fairly loyal to whatever side 
they happened to be supporting at the time. 
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agent to contract for their lands. By the time that the 
copies of the surveys were posted, those" delinquents who 
had been able to raise· the money had already completed their 
arrangements. 
Prospective purchasers only learnt of the value of the 
forfeited lands when the surveys were officially' posted at 
Drury House, and were not allowed to bid for them until the 
thirty days' pre-emption period had expired. The Royalists, 
knowine the probabl~ contents of the surveys even before 
they were made, had a considerable time in which to arrange 
for either the composition or repurchase ofth~~property. 
The London merchants, local gentry and speculators bought 
so few estates because they never had the opportunity to 
purchase any more'. Where the delinquent wanted to regain 
tho.t his lands, (providea~they were not financially encumbered), 
circumstances favoured him in every possible way. 
The Yorkshire Royalists who suffered confiscation were 
generally successful in regaining their lands directly from 
the Drury House Trustees. Some were unable to do so, because 
their lands were presented to Parliamentarians, or awarded 
to mortgagees. Out of all the 185 estates marked for sale, 
nearly 12i per cent passed to Parliamentary grantees or 
creditors, and 15 per cent to independent purchasers. The 
rest - 72'! per cent - were redeemed at first hand by their 
1 
ex-owners • 
1. These statistics include the 29 estates which were com-
pounded for. 
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Where the lands fell into other hands, the reason usuallJ 
lay in the physical or financial inability of the delin-
quents to regain them. But such misfortune did not 
necessarily preclude their eventual'recovery, any more than 
the repurchase of lands through agents signified their 
inalienable redemption. The fortunes of ~he delinquents 
during and after the Interregnum governed the future of 
their estates just aS'much as their ability to manipulate 
the purchase of the property at the time of its confiscation. 
Each Royalist attempted to recover his lands (for no-·one 
could forsee the Restoration), and the majority of them 
did so. But the years after 1653 were extremely critical 
ones for all who had suffered the axe of confiscation, and 
tested to the full the delinquents' abilities of self-
preservation. 
" 
CHAPTER VI - THE LAND SETTLEMENT. 
"And because, in the continued distractions 
of so many years, and so many and great revolutions, 
many grants and purchases of estates have been 
made to and by many officers, soldiers, and 
others, who are now possessed of the same, and 
who may be liable to actions at law upon several 
titles, we are likewise willing that all such 
differences, and all things relating to such 
grants, sales and purchases, shall be determined 
-- in Parliament, which can best provide -for the just 
satisfaction of al~ men w~o are ~o~cerned.~ (1). 
The land question-loomed prominently at the"Restoration; 
it affected virtually all' of the Royalists. Thosewh~se 
property had been confiscated demanded vehemently that 
they should be indemnified- for their losses. In contrast, 
the purchasers asserted their rights - some-had acquired 
the lands at secGnd-hand (from the original Commonwealth 
buyers), and had thus paid a fair price for what they 
believed to be'a secure title. To this clamour of dissident 
voices were added the petitions of the ordinary delinquents, 
each Cavalier claiming compensation for the'fine he had 7 
been forced;to pay for his loyalty to the late King. 
-Clearly no one single formula could satisfy every 
appellant - the only hope was to attempt to please as many 
people as possible. Both Charles II and Clarendon realised 
that the country's prime need was a firm and lasting 
settlement.-:- something that would be unattainable if.the 
- .. 
1. The Declaration of Breda: (section relating to estates) 
4 April 1660, .in S.R.Gardiner, Constitutional Documents' 
p. 466. ' 
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Royalists were allowed to launch a fresh wave of vengeance 
against their former opponents. It was far better that some 
Parliamentarians should go unpunished, than that all the 
dormant hatreds and jealousies of the civil war be resurrected 
in a fresh conflict. 
The land situation in 1660 presented a considerable 
problem: the position had hardly altered si~ce the time of 
the sales. Although a considerable number of Royalists had 
regained. their lands through agents, many properties were 
still in the hands of their Commonwealth purchasers (or 
, 
their later purchasers). Only 25 per cent of the lands 
actually sold in the south-east had been retrieved by 1660, 
although in Yorkshire as many as 67 per cent were back in 
. , "I 
the hands of their former owners • 
The majority of'these properties had been recovered 
directly from the Treason Trustees, though there had been 
.J • 
some changes in ownership since the Parliamentary sales. 
BY judicious care and the husbanding of scarce resources, 
a few Royalists had succeeded in regaining their lands by, 
direct repurchase from the Commonwealth buyers. These were 
only a limited number - all who could easily raise the 
necessary money had already compounded or engaged the services 
of an agent. But one estate in each of the counties of Essex, 
1. Thirst, o~. cit., Table,X, p. 270. This is the only work, 
on the au ject which is as yet available. (Dr. Chesney ., 
only summarises the problem.) The figures for Yorkshire 
omit compounded estates, so that they can be compared 
with the south-east. . 
-., • --~ "<~"" ., . .,.----.-~.-~,~, ... -~ 
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Kent, and Hampshire was recovered in this wayl, and in York-
shire the PlumPtons,nUcceeded in retrieving three of their 
properties from .their new owners. 
There had also been some movement in the opposite 
direction - a few of the Royalists had relinquished all 
title to their confiscated estates, in return for some 
financial consideration. Most delinquents were extremely 
., 
reluctant to.take this final step, but for those who had 
little hope of repurchasing their lands, and could forsee 
no chance of them being legally restored, it must have seemed 
the logical thing to do. Thus they sacrificed all future 
. , 
possibility of regaining their property by attempting to 
fulfil their present needs: 
" From duresse, and 
Who, famisht by a 
Compounded it for 
their dolefull tale, 
lawless sale, 
cakes and ale, 
God bless, etc." 2. 
In this way, five Royalists surrendered their title to 
lands they had been unable to recover. Robert Doleman lost 
three of his manors, Thomas Beckwith his estate in Cold 
Ingleby, and the Tempests sold Roundhay to William Lowther3 • 
In addition Faith, the sister and heiress of Ralph Pudsey 
of stapleton, disposed of all her interests in her brother's 
lands to Richard Marshall. The fifth delinquent, Richard 
1. Thirsk, OPe cit., Table'II, and a comparison of Tables 
IV and x. 
2. "The Cavaleers Litany" (25 March 1660), from Mackay (ed.), 
Cavalier Songs, p. 206. 
3. See supra, pp. 203-5, 217, 219. 
229. 
Vincent of Great Smeaton, had already sold his manor to a 
creditor, but now he was blackmailed into excusing the, 
buyer from the outstanding purchase moneY',in return for 
i 1 a small annu ty • 
',. Such a sale of tit Ie, being officially, regarded as 
'voluntary', cancelled any'claims that the late owner had 
upon the lands. But it did not necessarily terminate ,all 
controversy over the ownership of 'the property. Elizabeth, 
the widow of Ralph Pudsey, was deprived of her dower When" 
the Manor of Stapleton was sold to Richard Marshall. She 
therefore sued the new owner~ and succeeded in obtaining' 
her jointure, which , continued to be paid~ even after 1660, 
when'Sir Marmaduke (now Lord) Langdale established his 
right to'a lease 'on the property. The ambitious widow began 
to demand a larger portion, alleging that in fact her dower 
was two-thirds of the estate, and ,that her claim was 
superior to Lord Langdale's mortgage on the property. Although, 
the outcome of the suit is not known, there 'seems little 
doubt that Elizabeth's scheming', plans' had ,little foundation 
2 in law, and that therefore she would lose'the.case • 
In addition to these sales of title, a number of the . 
Royalists who had recently regained their lands were forced 
-
to resell them almost immediately.-Both the'Lowthers of 
, 1 
1. pudsey: PRO, CIO/97/1l4; VCH, North Riding, I, 167-8. 
Vincent: VCH, North Riding, I, 198; PRO, C~4/3894/4; 
~, CIO/4~57. ---
2. Claim for· jOinture, 4 Sept., 1651 - C.C.C., 2355; suit _ 
~, CIO/97/114; see also note 1, supra. 
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Ingleton and Marmaduke Cholmley of Brandsby mortgaged their 
estates so heavily that they were unable to redeem them, 
whilst Robert Prickett (who had bought Sir Marmaduke Lang-
dale's Manor of North Dalton) wasocompelled to;sell it in 
order to provide for his wife and sisters-in-Iawl • But.the 
majority of the Cavaliers who had already recovered.their 
lands managed to keep hold of them, although a few families 
went bankrupt·in the years following the Restoration. 
The delinquents who were in a better financial position 
had the opportunity of attempting to repurchase their estates 
from their new owners. Few were, in fact, able to do this -
without any security they could not raise the money, and 
their previous revenues (from the septennial leases on sequ-
estered properties) had been confiscated at the time of the 
sales. Only one Yorkshire family 8ucceeded in redeeming its 
estates during the Interregnum - the Catholic Plumptons. 
This family was in an exceptionally advantageous position, 
as they held the leases on all their forfeited estates, with 
the exception of Plumpton itself. In 1652, the head of the 
clan, Sir Edward, had been over seventy, and as the heir 
was only nine years old, Jane Plumpton (Sir Edward's grand-
daughter) became the official lessee. Being innocent of any 
delinquency, she retained the title ,after the property had 
been sold, and could thus begin the slow task of rebuilding 
the shattered family. fortunes. 
1. See supra,p. 205 ff •. 
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As sitting tenants, the Plumptone were in a more favour-
able position than the Commonwealth purchaser,' Edward 
Greene. He had bought the Manors of Ruffarlington and ~ 
Plumpton at twelve-and-a-half years' purchase (based on 
the official surveys), but he only received the profits of 
the 1652 leases, which were considerably less than the 
/ 
surveyor's estimation of the property. Thus, if we consider 
his actual income for the first five years (until the leases 
expired in March 1659), he had paid sixteen-and-a-half 
years' purchase for Ruffarlington, and over twenty-three 
years' purchase for Plumptonl • Greene did not, however, 
keep the lands for long - within a year, both manors had 
been sold, Ruffarlington to George Rhodes, a London stationer, 
and Plumpton to John Floyd and Sir David Watkins2• 
By early 1657, the Plumptone were ready to begin the 
·slow repurchase of their lands. William Worthington, whose 
son Thomas had recently married Jane Plumpton, was put in 
charge of the management of the estates, and became largely 
responsible for their recovery.- Although Watterton (in 
Lincolnshire) and most of Uslett 'and Wolfeparke had fall.en 
to creditors,(as satisfaction for the late JohnPlumpton's: 
many debts), some of Uslett had been bought by Richard 
.' C .: _ ". ~ 
t .0" ~ • ~ 
Rhodes of Knaresborough for £291. On February 20th, 1657, 
1. Seven year leases - PRO, SP28/2l5 (2nd Account Bk); sale -
id., C54/3835/3l; id., -m-4/3832/33. . ' .' "" 
- - - " 
2. PRO, C54/3834jl4; (CP25(2)/614 (Trin. 1655) no. 26); !!, 
C54/384l/33 (CP25(2)/6l4 (Hil., 1655/6) no. 72). 
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Worthington repurchased these lands for £300, the money 
being borrowed from Francis Gedlow. Ruffarlington soon 
followed, being bought by Worthington's agent, Sir David 
Watkins, for £8911 • ' 
The final achievement was the recovery of Plumpton 
itself. This manor had been acquired by Watkins and Floyd 
in 1655 through an arrangement with Worthington, by which 
the family were to have the rents in return for £400 per 
annum. But this sum proved to be far too high - Worthington 
was unable to maintain the annual payments. Therefore, in 
early 1660, " ••• N.y ffather (i.e., worthington), perceiveing 
that 400li ye yeare could not bee payed to M~ ff10yd according 
to the bargaine without utter destruction of the woods 
• • • 
made a new agreement. The annual premiums were reduced to 
£200, with an initial fine of £1100, and a final' payment 
of £2700 in 1666 to complete t~e.transfer2. 
" 
Needless to say, these transactions involved the family , 
in a great deal of expense. The interest on the sums 
borrowed, amounted to, ?ver, £350 each year (sometimes including 
interest on overdue interestt), although the debts were 
gradually repaid. In 1660, Uslett and Watterton were recovered, 
'" • . I • 
1. PRO, 054/3965/8; Gascoigne MSS, GC/E10/l (Plumpton A/c Bk), 
rr7 23, 29-30. ' 
2., PRO, C54/384l/33; id., 054/4063/27; < Gascoigne 'MSS,' GC/E10/l, 
rr: 46, 48.h.JS Rufrar1ington was bought at £250 less ", 
than GreeneApaidforit, (and P1umpton at £1700 less), 
it appears that Greene was buying the property with doubled 
bills acquired at considerably less than their face value. 
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along with Wolfeparke, and returned into the hands of the 
trustees who had originally held them,(as security for 
debts and portions) since the death ?f John Plumpton in 1644. 
Even though these lands were eventually sold to meet 'the 
aforementioned liabilities,' the family still had to face 
the heavy mortgages involved in the recovery of the main-
estates. In 1669,' Robert Plumpton's will mentioned that 
" I found my estate charged with neare five thousand pounds 
debt occasioned wholly by the sequestracon and miserable 
times". The property was mortgaged to the hilt - woods were 
cut down and sold to meet the interest payments. But the 
one thing that Robert Plumpton refused to countenance was 
the'sale of his patrimony -.the entail on the property 
automatically deprived anyone who tried to sell any part 
of the lands of all his interest in the estatesl • 
Such a recovery by purchase from the new owners was 
basically the same as a direct contract with the Treason 
Trustees (or a repurchase through an agent) - in both cases, 
. . 
• 
the family was involved in very heavy expenses, and had of 
, ,.... 2' , . . , 
necessity to make stringent economies. But at least it 
meant the restoration of the family estates, upon which a 
new life could be built. The success of the Plumptons in 
1. Gascoigne MSS, GC/EIO/l, f. 51 ff.; PRO, CIO/63/l02; id., 
C78/693/l2 ; id., C5/52/87; icl., 078/68472". Will of Robert 
Plumpton - y-;W., vol. 50, r. 211. ". . ',' 
2. The money was raised in the same way - through London' 
and local merchants and financiers. Samuel Foxley, Gilbert 
Crouch and 5irDavid Watkins all played a part in the 
recovery of the Plumpton estates.' 
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regaining their property, despite their already heavily-
encumbered estates, illustrates that such an operation 
was quite possible, provided that the Royalist could avail 
himself of the services of men of the calibre of William 
Worthington and Sir David Watkins. 
The only Yorkshire estates recovered from their pur-
chasers before the Restoration were these three properties 
of Sir Edward Plumpton; they represent a mere two per cent 
of the estates sold by the Drury House Trustees. Dr. Thirsk 
also discovered that only a small proportion of the confis-
cated estates in the south-east were regained in this way -
three out of a hundred propertiesl • This low recovery rate 
was principally due to the economic situation in which the 
remaining delinquents found themselves: all those who had 
wanted to keep their estates, and had the financial resources 
to do so, had already repurchased them (either directly or 
through agents) from the Treason Trustees2 • 
For some Royalists, there was another possibility that 
they would regain their patrimony before the Restoration. 
Entailed property could be sold for life only - therefore, 
on the death of the delinquent, it would pass, freed from 
all incumbrances3, to his next heir. Sixty-six Yorkshire 
1. Thirsk, op.cit., Table II; cf. Tables IV and X. 
2. See su~ra, pp.I9J~ A few delinquents relied on agents to 
rent t eir estates (a.g. t Holtby), or on litigation and appeal (e.g., Theakstone).. . 
3. The seven·year leases, if still running, would naturally be honoured. 
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estates were secured in this way, but only three were sold 
to independent purchasers - the remainder were regained by 
the Royalists themselves through direct repurchase or the 
intervention of agentsl. Where the new tenant was merely a 
trustee, it mattered little whether the estate was entailed 
or not - if the Cavalier died, the agent transferred his 
interest to the son and heir, who then adopted the outstanding 
mortgages on the property. Sir Henry Slingsby, Sir John and 
William Middleton, Sir George Palmes and Darcy Washington -
all perished before 1660, but the change in nominal owner-
ship made no difference at all to their estates. 
Therefore the existence of entails had no noticeable 
effect on the situation in Yorkshire - no lands were 
recovered through the deaths of any convicted delinquents. 
The total of estates redeemed by 1660 thus varied only 
slightly in number from that of the lands regained directly 
from the Treason Trustees - a change neatly counterbalanced 
-by the number of properties sold after recovery. Three 
were retrieved and, conversely, three were resold2 • 
Whereas in Yorkshire 105 estates (67.3 per cent) were in the 
hands of their original owners on the eve of the Restora-
tion, only twenty-five per cent had been regained in the 
south-east3• Thus the question of unredeemed lands still 
1. The three entailed properties thus sold were Cold In~leby 
(Beckwith)l Bishop Wilton (Dolema~}j_ and Skackleton (Holtby~ (rIO,. OJ- tiMS&: ......... S~Cft .c.Cd. '"'fU1'C. -.re». 
2. The three resold belonged to the familes of Langdale, 
Cholmley and Lowther. The ten estates waere the title 
was sold have been omitted, as the actual property was 
never recovered. 
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presented a considerable. problem, which affected both Roy-
alists and Parliamentarians alike. 
As the inevitatility of the Restoration became clear to 
l . ~ , ;'. 
everyone, the old forms of government crumbled'into chaos. 
Local county committees, long dormant, but briefly revived 
,. . 
by the Rump's return to power, collapsed completely, and 
their members either withdrew to their own homes or joined' 
in the demands 'for a"free Parliament, a.ccording tothei~" 
loyalties. Royalist hopes ran high, but soon turned into 
bitterness when the predicted Utopian settlement was shown 
, ' 1 
to be a piece of cold political calculation. 
Not only was there the problem of the lands to be 
settled - there was also the question of the fate of the 
regicides, and the other anti-Royalists, to be considered. 
-r O 
In Yorkshire, however, time and the exigencies of political 
necessity had removed many of the leading Parliamentarians 
from the scene. Some were dead, whilst others had changed 
their allegiance in time to welcome the victor. Thus John . 
Bright and George Marwood, who had both fought against the 
late Xing, were created baronets in recognition of their 
, ~ 
{ Z31 If. 1. Infra, pp 249ff. For good summaries of the settlement, 
, see Thirsk, OPe cit., pp. 228-294; Hardacre. ope cit., 
pp. 136-156; and D.Ogg. Enpland in the Reign of Charles 
II,' (1955), I, 142-4. 153-64. 
(££!!!!._f!:~~_E!._gl2!.) . 
3. In Yorkshire, however, the titles to 5.2 per cent of the 
estates had been surrendered to their purchasers before 
1660 - therefore only 27! per cent of the Yorkshire lands 
remained to be Bettled. 
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services in~ediately preceding the Restoration. The regicide 
Sir John Bourchier having recently died, his lands were' 
granted to his son and heir Barrington, who had also 
supported the King's return. Sir Henry Cholrnley, another 
. , 
anti-Royalist who had opportunely changed sides, smugly 
requested compensation for his losses from the fine that 
the King would doubtless lay upon young Bourchier's estatel • 
• t 
\ ' 
..... ' .. 
Nobody believed that all the eX-Parliamentarians would 
be punished for their p~st offences, nor was it generally 
expected that lands sold voluntarily to pay composition 
fines, or to repurchase confiscated property; would be returned~ 
But most of the Cavaliers hoped to receive some compensation 
in the form of positio~s of preferment,advantageous leases 
of crown lands, or farms of various royal revenues~'For . 
over two years after 1660, the King was swamped by floods 
of petitions and requests for offices and emoluments. It was 
impossible to'satisfy everybody - there were simply not· 
enough vacant positions, n ••• so there was little regard had 
to men's merits or services,·3. The angry reaction from the 
disappointed Cavaliers at this supposed lack of recognition 
found expression in attacks on the late Parliamentarians, 
1. PRO, C66/2923/ll; id., C66/2928/3. M.Noble, Lives of the 
~liSh Re~icides,-r1798), I, 102-4; C.S.P.D.,1660-61, 
ilil , 501. 1o, c66/2962/4l'- . 
2. Compulsory sales were those made by the government, in-
volving the forfeited lands of-the "traitors". Voluntary 
sales were those made by the owners themselves, whether 
purely, voluntary, or under d~ess.·Hardacre, Ope cit., 141. 
, . 
3. G.Burnet~, History of His Own Time, (1833), 296. 
I 
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who were accused of filling all the posts at court, using 
their ill-gotten gains to bribe their way into the King's 
favour. 
"For he that is wise, 
And means to rise, 
He -must be a Turn-coat too." 
" ••• Calmly I did reflect; 
'Old services (by rule of state) 
Like almanacs grow out of date, - , 
What~ then can I expect ?'" (1) .' 
It was only natural that many of the Royalists should 
feel bitter and disappointed. They could obviously not all 
. ' 
be satisfied by the King's generosity, and it was physically 
. " 
- and legally - impossible to reverse the, voluntary sales 
made by some of th~ delinquents to pay their composition 
fines. The number of these has been greatly overestimated -
most of th~ C~valiers (like'all landowners of the time) 
resisted the pressures to sell th~ir estates for as long as 
possible2 • But even where'th~'propertYhad been sold, it 
was wholly imp~acticable to reverse the position. The 
purchasers had 'bought the lands in good'faith - wer~ they 
to be punished for buying from a delinquent? And what would 
1. "A Turn-Coat of the Times" (1661); and "A Cavalier's 
Complaint" '-in Wilkins , Political Ballads, pp. 171, 164. 
2. Dr. Ohesney'sopinion that there were a 'considerable 
number of voluntary sales (Chesney, "The Transference of 
Lands in England,' 1640-60" in T.R.H.S.,· 4 series,XV (1932) 
taSSim, and The Sequ~ration Of Estates, 1643-60, p. 163 ff) 
as been strongly challenged by Professor Habakkuk in 
. "Landowners and the Oi viI War" (Ee.H.R., 2 series ,XVIII, 
(1965), 130-151). Habakkuk pOints out that the sales were 
really an indication of families already on the decline. 
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happen to people such as the Wentworths of Woolley ? 
Although Royalists, they had added to their already large 
estates by acquiring property from the A1dburghs, Brettons, 
and Wheat1eys, all Cavalier families who had been severely 
hit by ~ompoundingl.How could such a problem be resolved? 
Clearly there was no solution to this enigma, nor did 
the government ever try to find one. The losses that Charles 
I's supporters had suffered in his cause were to be forgotten: 
the new administration could not afford to'meet them, and 
it would have been suicidal 'to attempt to collect them from 
past enemies. Thus the King and Parliament limited themselves 
to the dual problems of pardoning the Parliamentarians, and 
settling the question of the confiscated lands. 
The Declaration of Breda had promised a full amnesty 
to all who acc~ptedit within forty days, "excepting only 
such persons as shall hereafter be excepted by Parliament, 
those only to be exceptedn2 • The question of the land 
settlement was also left in Parliament's hands: although the 
Declaration promised that the former opponents of the King 
should not suffer for their past offences, "either in 
their lives, liberties or estates " th' ••• , 1S was qualified 
by a later provision which agreed that" ••• all such 
differences, and all things relating to such grants, sales 
1. Wentworth MSS, DD57/d/Old Deeds,II, no. 361; Y.A.J., XII, 
p. 162. 
2. Gardiner, ,Constitutional Documents, 465-466. 
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and purchases, shall be determined in Parliament, which can 
best provide for the just satisfaction of all men who are 
concerned". 1 
The two questionJpf the land settlement and the amnesty 
were closely allied. Each'Roundheadwho was excluded from 
pardon would provide more 'compensation (in the form of fines 
and forfeited estates) for the King's supporters. The 
Royalists would not, however, benefit greatly from the 
restoration of confiscated lands bought by these people: 
relatively few of the prominent Interregnum officials had 
, 2 
acquired confiscated estates • 
The new Parliament's first steps were to legitimise 
its own existence, and to recognise the legality of all 
pending lawsuits). Soon afterwards, the Commons turned to 
the question of the indemnity: ,n ••• private passions and 
animosities prevailed very far •• "in the debates - at 
one time it was suggested that all past members of the 
judiciary, decimators and abjurors should be prohibited 
from official positions; and it was only the King'~ 
known hostility to this recommendation that prevented it 
1. Gardiner, OPe citi 466. The sale of the forfeiYed lands 
was de facto inva idated by the non-recognition of the 
Interregnum governments,but no act specifically rest-
ored them to their late owners. 
2. Only 10 per cent of the lands in the south-east were 
bought by Parliamentarians in official positions,' or 
acquired by grantees (Thirsk, OPe cit., Table VIII, p. 161) 
and only 5 per cent in Yorkshire. This excludes Parliament-
arians acting specifically as trustees. 
3. W.Cobbett, The Parliamentary Histor~ of England, 1066-
1803, IV (1808), p. 64 (1 June 1660 • statutes of the 
ReaIm, V, 119, 180. 
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from becoming lawl • 
The Indemnity Bill finally passed the Commons on 
11 July 1660, ~nd the .Lc:ds ,began to repeat the pro,ces,s of 
giving detail.ed, considez:ation to the names of all ex-Parl-
iamentarians, before allowing them the benefit of the 
amnesty. The King b~came al~rmed at the slow progress~ the 
bill, and urged t~e Upper House to expedite its passage 
as much as possible2 • The Lords returned the measure to 
the Cownons on 10 August, and after four conferences between 
the two Houses, it was finally presented for the royal 
assent on the 29th. of that month3 • 
The Act, tn i.ts final version, wa.s fairly liberal in 
scope. Apart from felons such as murderers and pirates, 
the principal miscreants .to beexcl?~ed from pardon were 
,. ..•.. "1,' 
those who had been engaged in plotting the Irish Rebellion 
(with certain exceptions), traitors (who had to be prosecuted 
i ' 
before 25 April 1662), and forty-nine named persons connected 
with the execution of Charles I. The ordinary Parliamentarians 
were completely acquitted - all offences not specially 
mentioned in the act were granted a general pardon4 • 
1.E.Hyde, E. of Clarendon,- The Life 'of Edward E. of Clar-
endon, .(Oxford, 1857) I, 398; Cobbe~t, OPe cIt., IV, 76-7. 
2. Cobbett, OPe cit., IV, 88. 
3. Ibid., IV, 92~111, passim. 
4. statutes of the Realm; V, 226 ff. Cobbett " op. c1 t ~', IV, -' 
gO. The Act also discharged all gr~ts of wardships since 
Lady Day 1641. Charles himself had already cancelled all 
arrears of rents on the Crown lands. 
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This measure precipitated a wave of criticism against 
the generosity with which the ex-Roundheads were being 
treated. The Royalist whose estates had been severely burdened 
by his composition fine now had to endure seeing his erst-
, " 
while opponents exonerated froin all their past misdeeds. 
This act of "indemnity for the king's enemies, and of 
",," 1 
oblivion for his friends" launched a flo'''~'d of satirical 
" 1 
ballads and songs aimed at the Roundhead politicians, who 
were regarded as the principal cause of all the Cavaliers' 
sufferings. 
" " 
"From pardons which extend to woods, 
Entitle thieves to keep our goods, 
Forgive our rents as well as bloods, 
God bless, etc. 
From judges who award that none 
Of our oppress ours should attone 
(The losses sure were not their own), 
God bless, etc." 
"' 
"But truly (at court) there were swarms 
Who lately were 'our chiefestfoes, 
of those 
Of pantaloons and muffs; 
Whilst the old rusty Cavalier 
Retires, or dare not once appear, 
For want of coin and cuffs." 2 
The Royalists found the land settlement,which followed 
upon the heels of the Act of Indemnity, even more objection-
able. Few can really have expected the return of the estates 
1. Quoted in T.H.Llster, The Life and Administration of Edward, 
1st. Earl of Clarendon, (1837-8),II, 36. 
2. "The Cavaleers LitanY", in Mackay, Cavalier Songs, 205-6; 
"The Cavalier's Complaint"" verse 5, in Wilkins, Polit:i:a.l 
Ballads, 163. 
they had voluntarily'sold,. but many believed that they 
would receive some sort of financial compensationl • 'But the 
pardon granted to the Parliamentarians precluded such a 
settlement, and the King was certainly not'going to endanger 
his solvency ~ paying his father's supporters from his 
own resourcest ., 
However,a separate solution was envisaged for the 
confiscated lands. By not recognising the legality of the 
Interregnum governments, Charles invalidated their acts. 
(which included the forfeitures and sales). But the problem 
was exceedingly complex - confiscated lands·were held.in'many 
forms of tenure. Some were in the hands.of their original· 
owners - in fee simple, in trust or mortgaged; others were 
in the possession of Parliamentary grantees; creditors, friends ' 
and relations, or various private purchasers. The question 
of title was just as. complicated as that of actual possession: 
several Royalists still retained their nominal rights to 
the property, whilst." others had mortgaged or sold their equity 
to the Commonwealth buyers •. Clearly no: single settlement '. ~ 
could be fair and ,impartial, and whatever cour~e .,i.~i ';' . ., :. 
the government was to take, it would be attacked by some 
faction or other. 
The unsettled political situation in earlyl660 had 
led to considerable chaos over the ownership of the con-
fiscated lands. With a restoration steadily growing nearer 
1. £60,000 was provided for Cavaliers in extreme poverty, 
to be raised by a tax on offices (C.J.,VIII, 403, 433, 501). 
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every day, the tenants were most unwilling to pay their 
rents to the Commonwealth landlords, especially as the 
Royalist ex-owners seemed likely to recover their property. 
The unknown temp~r of the future government encouraged the 
latter to press for the restoration of their lands, and 
the purchasers in their turn offered to buy their absolute 
titles. Whilst the local officials who should have maintained 
law and order remained supine; before the growing tide of 
Royalism, bo~h sides contended for control of the confiscated 
estatesl • 
The King attempted to settle the immediate problem by 
retaining the current owners in possession of their property 
"till Our Parliament shall take Order therein, or an 
2 Eviction be had by due Course of Law" • ,This royal proclam-
ation was greatly resented ,by the Cavaliers: a foreign 
observer noted, that -
"This severity greatly distresses many depressed 
families which have been in want during his Majesty's 
exile solely because they remained loyal to him, and 
who with his return hoped to enjoy their own. They 
now have the mortification of seeing themselves still 
shut out and unable to claim anything until it pleases 
parliament to decide, and God knows what decision it 
will take upon this." (3) 
The long-awaited Bill for the Confirmation of Sales 
was introduced into the Commons in'July 1660: it soon became 
evident that it would have as difficult a passage as its :' 
1. The number of Royalists in Richard Cromwell's Parliament 
shows the changing tide; 25 per cent of the Yorkshire 
members were Royalists or the sons of Royalists. 
i 
" 
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twin brother, the Indemnity Bill. Members who had been unable 
to deprive their enemies of the benefits of the latter 
now sought revenge by voting for the restoration of con-
fiscated estates. At one time, the Commons'. Committee for 
Sales recommended the sunIDlary repossession of all lands 
bought by any of the prominent Interregnum officials, ' 
irrespective of whether their title had been confirmed by 
the late ownersl. 
This bill had 'very little hope of succeeding - there 
were too many members who wished to include their own part-
icular reactionary or revolutionary measures. The royal 
estates had already been withdrawn from the Commons' juris-
diction2, and it soon became increasingly doubtful if the 
House would ever reach a united solution. Each party had 
already been active in publishing its views: one author 
claimed that the purchasers had been constrained to accept 
the confiscated lands, asbeine the only way in whic~ the 
government could discharge its debts. Many of the present 
-1. O.P.H., XXII, 415 ff. 2 • Cobbett, OE. • cit .It 82. 
(£~~!~_f~~~_E~_g!!)· 
2. 29 May, 1660 - L.J ., XI, 46. 
3. F. Giavarrina to Doge and Senate of Venice, 18.June1660, 
Cal. S.P.Venetian, 1659-61, 159. The King and Commons had 
also to act to prevent the clergy from making new leases 
of Church lands before the question of ecclesiastical . 
property was fully settled {6 August 1660, O.P.R., XXII, 
417) • \ . 
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owners had bought the lands in good faith, paying a fair 
price for the property. This allegation was answered by 
William Jackson in The Free-Born English Mans Plea for 
Justice: he claimed that the authority which confiscated 
the lands was ttscarce half the Parliament". 'The problem 
ought to be left to' the true Parlia:Tlent to solve; how could 
those who had been trafficking in stolen lands ...... hope 
that so !ree a Parliament as this is, can make good the 
receipt of their roberies , ,,1 • • • 
The Bill had progressed no further when the House 
recessed on 13 September: the matter was therefore referred 
, 
to a Commission under the Great Seal. The Commons hopefully 
urged all interested parties to give the commission an 
2 " 
opportunity to evolve a solution to the problem. But the 
subject was, in fact, quietly dropped - Charles and Clarendon, 
realising the explosive nature of the land contro~ersy, 
had already reached the conclusion that the Bill woul~ 
create more problems than it settled. Thus the question of 
the restoration of the forfeited lands was left principally 
to the arbitration of the Courts of Law. 
Some definite measures were, however, taken in the 
form of the Act for the Confirmation of Judicial Proceedings. 
1. 
2. September o • P • H. , XXII 'P~ 476. 
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This statute legalised common law decisions, and such routine 
matters as fines and recoveries which had been taken during 
the Interregnum. It also dealt briefly with the Royalists, 
reversing their impeachment for treason, although clause six 
deliberately excluded the forfeited property from the compre-
hension of the act. But some progress was made in a 
negative sort of way - those with claims or grievances 
dating from pre-Restoration times were allowed five years 
(until 29 May 1665) in which to commence legal action for 
the recovery of their confiscated estatesl • 
Thus the Royalists were allowed to recover their lands 
that 
at law, provided~they had not sold the title during the 
Interregnum. The Cavaliers were bitterly disappointed by 
these limitations ~ some had expected the automatic return 
of all confiscated property, irrespective of any subsequent 
surrenders of title. 
There was, however, one type of forfeited estate which 
was directly'restored to the original owners by act of 
Parliament. Grants of advowson were invalidated, as were 
the sequestrations of impropriate tithes and rectories, 
whether awarded voluntarily (as part of the compositiotlfine) 
or confiscated by the late government. During the Interreg-
num, these estates.had been used to augment clerical salaries, 
but upon the Restoration thp.y were returned without question 
~ 
to their pre-war owners. No~·one had ever paid any money for 
\ 
1. statutes of the Realm, V, 234 ff. 
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these lands, and therefore nobody (except the vicars 
... 1 
concerned) suffered • 
The land settlement was admittedly unfair, but it is 
difficult to see what alternative faced the government. 
Charles had promised a free pardon to all except the extrem-
ists, and thus there could be no wholesale proscription 
from which the Royalists might be compensated. It was 
clearly impossible for the King to recompense all his 
supporters ,- their collective losses were far too gre~t to 
be settled in this way. But it is unfortunate that the 
actual terms of the Act for the Confirmation of Judidal 
Proceedings weighed heavily against'those who had ,already 
succeeded in recovering their lands through their own 
efforts. To regain parts of his estates, Robert Doleman 
had been compelled to sell his three manors of Badsworth, 
Gunby and Weedley: had he left his lands to the mercy of· 
the Trustees, he might possibly have reclaimed them all in 
1660. This could equally apply to the other families who 
had lost land at the time of the confiscations in their 
attempts to regain some part of their patrimony2. 
Thus,the Restoration Settlement only went a little way 
1. 19 May 1662, L.J., XI, 472; statutes of the Realm, V, 420. 
See also supra, pp. "71; • 
. '2. It is obviously impossible to predict if such families 
would have regained their estates in 1660, had they not 
sold the title. Doleman was heavily burdened with debts, 
.. and the Lowthers were also seriously embarrassed in 
this way. 
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towards remedying the Cavaliers' legitimate grievances.,' 
It restored confiscated estates to those who had done 
that 
nothing to alienate their ,title (provided;they could afford 
the legal expenses involved), but gave no compensation to 
others who had been constrained to sell lands in an effort ; 
to retain some part of their property. Nor did it make any 
ttlstincticn between voluntary sales and those made by the " 
Royalists under pressure of circumstances: neither could 
be recovered. In the face of this bleak future, some Cavaliers 
'-L: 
turned to satire, attacking the courtiers (especially Clar-
endon)l; to whO~ th~y -attributed all their present troubles. 
Gone was the old spirit: 
, -
II Though we are beggar'd so's the king •••• 
Tushl poverty's a royal thingt." (2) 
, 
Ini t's place, the Royalists accused the courtiers of 
cynical opportunism,' and alleged that all the principal 
offices of state 'were filled by time-serving eX-Parliament-
arians: 
'II Poor'knaves (Cavaliers), they know not how 
To flatter, cringe and bow, 
For he that is wise, 
And means to rise, 
He must be a!urn-coat too." (3). 
-
such claims were wild exaggerations - the majority of 
't ~! > 
the places at court went to Royalists, or to those who had 
1. Lister, Clarendon,~36. 
2. Mackay, op.cit~, nThe Royalist", p. 10. 
3. Wilkins, OPe cit., "A Turn-Coat of the Times" (l66l) p. 171. 
" 
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been instrumental in ass~ing the Restorationl • T~e King 
deliberately tried to soften the harsh effects of the"Inter-
, . , 
regnum by ,using the pro,fits of off~ce as compensation. But 
there were relatively few offices compared to the number 
of Royalists, and several of the positions had to return to 
their pre-war occupants. As a result, the majority of the 
Cavaliers received ,neither ,compensation nor reward for their 
past services ,and losses. 
Thus the Royalists 'were left largely to fend for them-
selves. Provided that they had not sold their titl~ they 
could always regain thei~ lands at law. Even so, not all 
''c", I 
of the Cavaliers ~ere" successful in r'ecovering their estates, 
or even in retaining 'them, once recovered: Some 'were unable 
to meet the high legal expenses involved, whilst others 
were 'severely hampered by" past debts. In any case, the 
, . 
Restoration Settlement tended to favour the party with the 
longest purs'e '- a purchaser could always ensure that 'a case 
- i 
dragged on for several years, and then offer to buy the 
title from the impoverished Royalist. 
, ' 
, It is not always possible to trace t.he estates at the 
Restoration. Manors can be identified fairly easily through 
fines, recoveries, and the Hearth Tax r'ecOJ.ds2,' but small" 
1. Ormond calculated that, out of 298 post-Restoration 
servants in the Household, only 2 were ex-Cromwellians 
Hardacre, OPe cit., 147. 
2. The Hearth Tax records list the head of 'the house and the 
number of hearths - it is usually easy to identify the 
manor house (and thus have a rough indication of the 
ownership of the manor). However, these records must be 
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parcels of land are exceedingly difficult to trace. Apart 
from the wills of purchasers and the delinquents themselves, 
(and the evidences mentioned above), the principal sources 
, ' • I 
for the recovery of lands are the records of the law courts • 
.t. ..4 
Dr. Thirsk discovered the use of writs of trespass and 
\ ?' ~ ~ 
ejectment to challenge the title of the Commonwealth 
f. ' ; l. 
tenants; the only evidence of this in Yorkshire is in the. 
case of Cuthbert Morley, who attempted to regain some lands 
in Lackenby and' Normanby. 'Such writs led up to 'a trial at 
the local assizes - unfortuna~y, no such records remain for 
. 
the county of York. Thus the principal source of inform-
ation rests in the Court of Chanceryl. 
The advantages of Chancery were twofold. The procedure 
granted a firm title, which could then only be questioned 
before the House of Lords; it also allowed the plaintiff to 
claim for past rents and compen'sation for any damage' to 
. . 
the property. (However, such compensation would only be 
granted if the appellant succeeded in proving that there 
, {.' I, I 
had been some prior agreement over the distribution of the 
profits, 'as in the cases of Cuthbert Morley and Marmaduke 
1. Other sources include private acts; the records of the 
House of Lords; the Interregnum and 1660 Recusant Rolls; 
indirect evidence in Chancery bills and answers; Dugdale's 
1665-66 Vis:Bation; family papers and deeds, etc. 
(£~~~~f!~m_E· 22Q~) . 
analysea wr~fi care; especially in populous areas, and 
they are quite useless in this context in towns.' 
252. 
Hol tbyl.) ~ ,. 
The majority of the delinquents had regained their 
lands at the time of the Ac~s of Sale through the services 
2 
of agents • ,All that was necessary was for the property to 
be transferred to the direct ownership of the Royalists 
concerned, there now being no need for any sUbt~Uge. Thus 
51 manors and 49 other parcels of land passed into the hands 
of their original proprietors (or their heirs), having been 
in the unofficial custody of these Royalists' representa-
tives ever since their sale3 •. · 
Of the properties recovered by direct repurchase, the 
Manors of Hampole and Adwicke remained in the possessio'n: of 
the Washingtons. Henry Lowther, the heir to Ingleton, made 
an abortive attempt to recover his patrimony at law, but 
although a Chancery decree granted him an equity of redemp-
tion, he was unable to raise the necessary capital, and 
thus the manor remained in the hands of Anthony Bouch, the 
mortgagee4• The Plumptons, who alone had succeeded in re-
purchasing some of their property from its Commonwealth 
buyers, also retained possession of their estates. 
1. See supra, p.2ll.; also Appendix III. 
2. See Chapter V, passim. 
3. These figures include the probable trust purchases -
11 manors and 3 non-manors. Two manors were sold soon 
after recovery - supra, p. 205-6. 
4. Supra, p .208. PRO, C10/468/132 .. 
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There is, however, greater difficulty in tracing the 
lands which passed to grantees, creditors, or independent 
purchasers •. This is'especially true,where the,property con-
cerned was relatively small:. eleven of the twelve estates 
which cannot be detected after 1660 were non-manors. The 
problem of identif,ingthese lands is also increased ,by 
. 
the fact that their owners were generally minor gentry, who ", 
have left hardly any records behind them. 
The simplest properties to recover at the Restoration 
were those in the hands of Parliamentary grantees. Sir 
, , 
ltarmaduke Langdale regained all his four manors. Holme was 
. :. 
{ . '" forfeited as part of the lands of the regicide Sir William 
Constable (and was regranted to Langdafe by the Kin~),' 
, , 
whilst Pigehills (Fighill) and Molscroft, which had been 
. 
given to Isaac Knight, had been restored by the time that 
the minister was expelled from his cure in 1662. Gatenby, 
, ,. 
belonging to John Lambert, was also confiscated, and returned 
to its original ownerl ., ' , 
Colonel Matthew Boynton's estate, which had been granted 
>, 
to Lord Strickland, cannot be traced after 1653. The 
Royalist, who had been killed during the Worcester campaign, 
left no male heirs: his widow and daughters each received 
a pension at the Restoration,. ~n~ the two girls later married 
., 
, 
into the peerage, but no trace can be ,found of their father's 
"i 
1. sunderland, Langdale, 231; VCH, North Riding I, 359-60; 
, 'Beverley Record O?fice, - DDI7ff5/3. . " .. ' 
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lands l • 
Property granted to creditors was more difficult to 
reclaim as the Royalist had to adopt the outstanding debts 
on the estate. In many cases, after a long period in strait-
ened financial circumstances, this was quite impossible. 
Thus"Cuthbert Morley's lands in Haxonby and Northchurch 
remained in the possession of the creditor, William Commondell 
Of'Ormesby. Morley had, however, made an agreement with' 
another mortgagee, Jeremy Elwes, by which the latter was to 
hold the lands (and use their revenues to cancel the debt, 
as well as paying a small annuity to the Royalist). After 
Elwes' death, his son broke the agree~ent, and turned the 
estatesto his own use. Morley sued him in Chancery in 1662 -
the result was a nine~year.long lawsuit which bankrupted 
. 2 
both parties • 
In genera~ however, the Royalist whose lands had'been 
used to pay his debts never recovered them or, if he did, 
sold them soon' afterwards to meet outstanding liabilities. 
The trustees for the young Robert Plumpton, when they regained 
the estates vest~d in them by Robert's father, were ordered 
by Chancery to sell' the" properties and settle the pressing. 
demands of the impa~nt creditors3 • Miles Newto~ never redeemed 
1. PRO, 066/2999/24; C.S.P.D. 1660-1, 502; Dugdale, II, 147-8; 
. Boynton's estate is always referred to as the estae of 
Matthew Boynton - it is never specifically identified. 
2. PRO, 054/3664/5; i~, 054/3724/20; 1~, 05/42/69; id~ C78/ 
7'45/5. See AppendIX III. - -
3. ~, 078/693/12; i~, 05/52/87; id, C78/684/2. The lands 
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his lands, which had fallen to London moneylenders in their 
1 
entirety • 
The temporary 'loss of property was sometimes caused more 
by the opportunism of the creditor, than by the financial 
had position of the debtor. The Earl of Dorchesterjbought the 
forfeited lands of Marmaduke Frank from the Treason Trustees, 
and this loss prevented the Royalist from paying the annual 
interest on the mortgage which Dorchester held. The purchaser 
then claimed that Frank had forfeited his equity of redemp-
tion: :the result was a Ohancery lawsuit in 1666, through 
which Frank (or his co-heiresses) eventually recovered 
thelands2 • 
In another instance, Richard Vincent had sold his 
estate in Great Smeaton to a creditor, Henry Simpson, on 
the understanding that he would remain in possession, enjoying 
the rents, until the full purchase price had been paid. 
Simpson used this debt to claim an interest in the forfeited 
property, and immediately ousted Vincent, arbitrarily forcing 
1. Except for some copyhold, which could not be sold; PRO, 
Index 17349, f. 57; id, 054/3891/32. ---
2. PRO, 054/3834/34. Frank held some lands in Knighton in 
IO;5 (inquisition for debt, PRO, E159/495 (Mich '55) r. 3), 
but apparently not the manor:-1d, 010/119/41; 010/120/35. 
The estates were eventually recovered - VCR, North Riding, 
I, 194-5. 
(£~~!~_f~2~_E~_~2!1· 
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.' had originally been sold to the use of creditors: PRO, 
. 054/3828/5; id., 054/3844/18; i<1, 054/3832/31; ~, 54/3786/14. 
256. 
a new agreement upon the Royalist. Simpson's son and heir 
even broke this bargain, refusing to pay anything at all, 
and thus deprived the victim of both money and lands. 
Vincent's consent to the modified sale prevented him from 
recovering his estate in 1660, but he hopefully attempted 
to win some compensation in Chancery in 16711 • 
Of the six Royalists whose lands - or part of them -
went to meet the demands of creditors, only four recovered 
any portion'of~their estates. Cuthbert Morley's case is an 
exceptional one, and will be dealt with separately~ . The' 
Plumpton family regained their possessions in Watterton, 
Wolfeparke and Uslett, although the property was almost 
immediately sold to meet the demands of the various creditors. 
The ease of recovery can be explained by the fact that 
most of the lands were not directly granted to creditors, but 
fell to purchasers, who contracted to discharge the debts 
and annuities on the property3. 
The other two delinquents who recovered their lands 
from the hands of moneylenders were Sir George Radcliffe 
and Marmaduke Frank. The former had already attempted to 
seize his patrimony from the mortgagee, Richard Elmhirst, 
claiming that the debt had long since been paid. The lands 
1. C.C.C., 1291-2; PRO, Index 17349, f. 76; id, C54/3894/4, 
c10/492/157. The-result of the Chancery suit is not known. 
2. See infra, Appendix III. 
3. Sale: PRO, C54/3828/5, C54/3786/14, C54/3844/18, 054/383 2131;; 
Sold by order of Chancery, PRO, C78/693/12,C78/684/2. 
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were finally restored by Act of Parliament and, as there is 
no trace of any subsequent lawsuit, some amicable arrange-
ment was apparently worked out •. Marmaduke Frank, although 
he did not redeem his estates within the statutory five, 
year period, succeeded in obtaining an ,equity of redemption 
to the property,and eventually either he or his heirs 
1 
regained the whole estate •. 
Financial instability was the principal cause of the 
difficulty in recovering such lands, but there was another 
possible reason. Some of the mortgagees had been only too 
eager to seize the opportunity.to acquire land at a sub-
stantial discount, for the Drury House Trustees' method of 
assessing property enabled such claimants to make a comfort-
able profit. Whereas estates were normally valued at twenty 
years' income, the Trustees had sold them at between ten 
and fifteen years' purchase. Richard Vincentia lands in 
Great Smeaton were disposed of for only eight times their 
annual value, and the Manor of Watterton, bought by Samuel 
Foxley, at justwer sixteen years' purchase. Thus, when the 
creditor could obtain property at such reasonable rates, 
and with a fairly secure title, there was every incentive 
for him to try and retain the estate despite all·the 
2 Royalist's attempts to reclaim it • 
1. PRO, c5/22/98; statutes of the Realm, V, 319-20; PRO, 
TIIrr/ll9/4l, C10/120/35; VCH, North Riding, I, 194=57 
2. Great Sme~ton: PRO, C54/3894/4; Watterton: id, C54/3828/5. 
- -
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Where the Royalist's lands had been sold to an indep-
endent purchaser, there was no such obstacle to his recovering 
the property. Provided that he still retained a legal title, 
the ex-owner could regain his possessions at law. It is, 
. . 
however, sometimes very difficult to trace all the steps 
by which such estates were redeemed, although in most cases 
it is possible to discover the final result of the action. 
A few of the Royalists simply used coercion to recover 
their estates. The royal proclamation of 29 May was intended 
to stop this growing use of violence, whether or not it had 
the semblance of legal backing. Aided by Royalist syrnpathisers, 
. 1 
and by the collapse of the county committees, some delin-
quents had been forcibly ejecting the Commonwealth tenants 
and replacing them'by their own nominees. Althou~h there is 
no actual evidence of such compulsory acts in Yorkshire, 
the fact that the King had to intervene shows that it was 
widespread enough to cause concern for the peace of the 
country. 
This proclamation limited the Royalists' fields of 
activity to the sphere of the courts. The ex-owners could 
sue out a writ of trespass and ejectment, claimi~g that 
the present tenant had gained his lease by illegal means. 
This led to a trial at the local assizes where witnesses 
attested to the past ownership of the, land and the validity 
of the present tenant's title. As the latter's claim to the 
1. See supra, P.H·~. 
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property rested upon its (now illegal) confiscation and sale 
during the Interregnum, the judgement would normally be in 
favour of the plaintiff. 
Cuthbert Morley attempted to recover his lands in 
Hawnby, Lackenby and Normanby in this way. He received a 
favourable verdict in the case of the first two estates, 
but John Hill, a lawyer who held the Manor of Normanby, 
. . 
succeeded in delaying proceedings: this encouraged the tenants 
of the other two estates to complicate matters by suing out 
writs of error. Morley petition~d the Lords to ,make an order 
installing his tenants so that the CO~Jonwealth purchasers 
should not benefit from their delayine tactics. Their Lord-
ships .refused to oblige, and instructed the Royalist to pro-
ceed at Co~~on Law. Despite this,Morley eventually retrieved 
1 the lands in question • 
Where the Common Law proved insufficient, the Royalist 
could turn to Chancery or, in the last resort, to the House 
of Lords. Cuthbert Morley and his heirs bankrupted the~selves 
in a long legal battle with the Elwes family. Marmaduke Holtby 
used the Court of Chancery to recover the revenues he had 
2 lost during the Interregnum • Dame Sarah Redmaine~ however, 
was less successful: she failed in her attempts to regain 
the fa.mily estates from her step-daughter, Mary Dodsworth. 
1. HMC, VII (House of Lords MSS), 147. All three properties 
were in Morley's hands at a later time - PRO, CP25(2)/755 
(Hilary 1670/71) no. 34). ---
2. See supra, p. 211. There is some uncertainty as to 
whether he regained his manor. 
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The essence of the Redmaine-Dodsworth case was that, 
although Dame Sarah's dower was allowed, the remainder of 
sir John Redmaine's estates went by purchase to William 
Dodsworth, the husband of fI'Iary, Sir John's daughter by his 
first wife. Sarah and her son John petitioned in vain for 
their title to the lands, and the family were reduced to 
living on the widow's dower. The Redmaines sued Mary 
Dodsworth in Chancery in 1662 and 1668: they alleged that 
she had gained a lease to the sequestered property, but 
had omitted to pay any maintenance to Sir 'John's widow. 
Mary counter-claimed that this had been her only means of' 
receiving her portion, which her step-mother had refused to 
pay. Despite the apparent justice of their claim, it is 
clear that the Redmaines never recovered ,the alienated 
la.ndsl • 
Some of the more influential Royalists by-passed the 
Courts of Law, and gained immediate restoration of their 
property by means of a private act. This method was not 
, " 
necessarily used b~cause the alternative "means were ineff-
icient - for those with large estates, it was far simpler 
a.nd . cheaper than suing each individual purchaser in 'turn. 
And, as Parliament was the highest court, a private act 
removed the danger of long.legal battles in Chancery over 
. 2 
the various claims and interests on the property. 
1. R.C.P., III, 103; C.C.C., 1765-6; PRO, C7/290/25; w. 
Greenwood, The Redmans of Levens a~Harewood, IKendal, 
1905), p. 167. 
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The King became ala.rmed at the number of these bills -
especially as they were delaying work on more important 
issues - and suggested that "the good old rules of law are 
the best security"l. Partly because of this royal warning, 
and partly because the majority of the applicants had 
already been satisfied, hardly any more bills .were presented. 
With few exceptions,' only the more important Royalists, such 
as the Marquis of Newcastle, availed themselves of these 
measures. The only Yorkshireman whose estates were returned 
by Act of Parliament was Thomas Radcliffe. His first bill, 
introduced on 20 November 1660, was rejected, but Radcliffe 
presented another in July 1661: this passed .the Commons on ' 
2 3 July, and became law later in the.same year. 
. , 
In a few cases, the Royalist ex-owner recovered his 
lands through some private agreement with the Commonwealth 
: , 
purchaser. Cuthbert Morley's Manor of Hawnby was bought by 
, .. 
Robert Dowker and Henry Pounall, but the Royalist regained 
. 'I 
1. Clarendon, Life, I, 576. 
~ ... . " . 
2. Whitaker, Radcliffe t 262 ff.; L.J., 'XI, 188; ID~C,VII, (House of Lords MSS), 135; C.J.,Vl1i, 269, 28~Statutes 
of the Realm, V, 319-20. 
(£2~!!._!:!:2~_E!._g§Q.:.) ' .. 
2. Ogg suggests that the acts were due to the legislation 
being inadequate (op. cit.,I, 162). Clarendon says that 
there were cases where a hidden trust was abused by the 
trustee, and an act was ,the only remedy (Life, I, 573-4). 
But Morley and Holtby each successfully used the law to . 
defeat dishonest trustees, and the majority of Royalists 
were able to recover their lands without using acts.' . 
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the estate at the Restoration. His heirs were still in 
possess~on in 1670, when the property was mortgaged to Sir 
Thomas Stringer. Yet Henry Pounall had been tenant of the 
manor during this time: this strongly suggests that he 
was granted an advantageous lease as compensation,and as 
a consideration ~o prevent him delaying Morley's recovery 
of the lands by legal actionl • 
As mentioned before, it is easier to ascertain which 
Royalists recovered their property than to trace the means 
by which such a recovery was effected. Sydney Constable's 
Manor of Sherborne was sold to Francis Cobb" (probably in 
trust) - in early 1660, Francis (Sydney's brother and heir?) 
held lands in Sherborne, and by 1672 was in possession of 
the manor itself. The property, being entailed, would 
naturally-have fallen to him on Sydney's death, but it is 
. I " .' 2 
uncertain whether this was before or after the Restoration • 
Some of the smaller properties are impossible to trace 
~ter their confiscation and sale. William Brigham's lands, 
forfeited for his Catholic delinquency, proved to be only 
a small maintenance portion, as his father was still alive. 
The father died in 1656,and it is impossible to tell whether 
the Manors of Brigham and W,yton (inherited when they were 
desequestered in 1660) included William's small estates. 
1. PRO, C54/3894/5; VCH, North Riding, II, 33; PRO, CP25(2)/ 
7;; (Hil '69/70) no; 34; Pouna!! was marked as tenant of 
the manor in the 1662/3 and 1670 Hearth Tax returns -
PRO, EI79/2l5/45l, E179/2l6/46l • 
......... 
2. The genealogy of this branch of the Constable family is 
very vague. 
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Philip Doleman recovered his sequestered rectory of Lund 
in 1660, but no tr~ce can be found of his minute estate 
in Bishop Wilton. Where such small properties cannot be 
identified, tliereason' generally lies i'n the lack of evidence, 
due to the insignificance of either the estate or the 
family concerned. 
Forty-seven per cent of all the lands sold" to individual 
purchasers, creditors or grantees were eventually redeemed 
by their late owners. 
TableXVIII:- ESTATES RECOVERED AFTER THEIR SALE: 
(excluding purchases by agents or relations.) 
R 
N 
U 
T 
ecovered 
ot recovered 
ncertain 
otals ' -
Before 1660 
rdanors Non-manors 
2 1 
- -
- -
2 1 
After 1660 
Iy]anors Non-manors 
16 5 
7 8 
1 11 
24 24 
Total 
24-
15 
12 
51 
There were two principal reasons for the non-recovery 
of the fifteen parcels of land - both stemming from the 
financial insecurity of their Royalist owners. In the case 
of all seven manors and three other estates, the title had 
been sold by the late owner to the Commonwealth purchaser, 
either to raisecapital for the recovery of other lands,or 
in the belief that the money received was worth more than 
s 
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a dim hope of regaining the property in the future. Three 
more small properties had fallen to creditors in settle-
ment of their debts, and the Royalist had been"unable - 'or 
unwilling - to recover the lands. The remaining two estates 
were those ,which had devolved upon Mary Dodsworth and her 
husband when Sir John Redmaine's lands were sold. 
A very large proportion of all the estates confiscated 
by the Rump were eventually recovered. Some were regained 
immediately, bY . ..-C0mposition or direct repurchase through 
agents, friends or relations, whilst others were only re-
possessed after the 'Restoration. Of the 185 parcels of land 
forfeited during the Interregnum, 145 were in the hands of 
their original owners (or their heirs) by the end of 1660, 
. 1 
and 9 more were redeemed at a later date • If the com-
pounded estates are omitted, this means that 80 per cent 
of all lands sold py the Treason Trustees were in the poss-
ession of their Royalist owners after the Restoration2 • 
Unfortunately, this record could not be held for long -
in fact, it was never really attained. Some of the Cavaliers 
did not succeed in regaining their lands for several years: 
Frank around 1666, and Morley not until the mid·1670's. But 
1. These figures include the 29 parcels of land compounded 
for. 
2. These figures allow for the sale of estates soon after 
recovery, before the Restoration, but they include all 
lands regained after 1660, even if they were not recovered 
for some time. If the untraceable lands are omitted, 
the percentage of lands recovered by 1660 (or soon after-
wards) rises to 87.5 per cent. 
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a number of Royalists sold their lands almost immediately 
after the Restoration. Just as some of those who had bought 
their lands through agents had been constrained to sell or 
irretrievably mortgage them, so several of the estates re-
deemed in 1660 were sold fairly soon afterwards. By the 
time that Thomas Radcliffe had"recovered his lands in 1661, 
Robert Gale's Manor of Acomp Grange was passing into other 
hands. The expenses of regaining property at law, coupled 
with the debts incurred through living on credit during the 
Interregnum, proved fatal to several of the poorer Royalists. 
The following table illustrates the incidence of 
recovery and sale among the estates of the Yorkshire gentry. 
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Table XIX:- THE RECOVERY AND SALE OF CONFISCATED LANDS. : 
a I g h 
Fate Lands Fate before 1660 F'ate after Not Fate 
to be b c d 1660 f- recoV- uncer-
sold ~ ered - tain. Recov- Sold Title Recov- Sold (excl. ery after sold ery after 
recy. before recovy those mentnd recovy. under 
\ I d I 
, 
COMPOUN- 3-16 13-16 1-0 DED . - - - - -
TRUST 2-46 42-46 2-0 
- -
6-8 
- -PURCHASE 
QUERY ) 
TRUST ~ 1-3 ? ? ? 11-3 - - -
PURCHASE 
DIRECT 3-0 3-0 1-0 - - - - -PURCHASE 
SOLD TO 4-1 
- - -
4-0 
- -
0-1 GRANTEES 
SOLD TO 11-7 0-1 - 1-0 10-3 4-2 0-3 -CREDITORS 
SOLD TO ) 
OTHER ) 11-17 2-0 - 6-3 2-2 2-2 0-2 1-10 PURCHAS-) 
ERS ) 
., 
TOTALS 95-90 60-63 4-0 7-3 27-8 12-12 0-5 1-11 
(N.B.: The hypAenated figureSahg~~~,te manors and non-
The cost of redeeming his lands was sometimes too 
much for the Royalist ex-owner. Robert Gale of Acomb Grange 
" , 
regained his estate from Joseph Micklethwaite of Swyne, 
but almost bankrupted himself in the process. Rather than 
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mortgage the whole property, Gale preferred to sell the 
title outright. He wrote to Robert Shireburne at Everingham: 
"You may very well conceive that it' (= selling) is much 
against my disposition,:for ther is smaull pleasure in 
paying every halfe years rent for that which was my owne 
inheritance ••• I have R desire to bargain with you rather 
then any other in respect of being Catholicks"l. The manor 
was finally sold at' sixteen years' purchase (Gale had hoped 
for eighteen)' to Henry Marwood, for £38002 • ! 
Another delinquent· who was forced' to sell his property/-
was Cuthbert Morley of Seamer. Soon after he had recovered 
some of his; smaller estates in Lackenby and Hawnby (several 
of which had fallen to creditors), a'bill appeared before 
the Commons to place parts of those lands in the hands of 
his creditors until they had recovered certain moneys due 
to them. And after a long legal battle with the Elwes family, 
Morley's heir, Bernard Grenville, was forced to part with 
'I 
the bulk of the property he hadregained3 •. 
Even those whose estates were bought by agents some-
times had to sell their title. Laurence Sayer's lands were 
purchased by Gilbert Crouch from the Treason Trustees, but, 
1. Letter to R.S., 8th.,??, 1661, Constable NISS, DDEV/l/36. 
2. PRO, C54/4l61/12. 
3. C.J., VIII, 374, 394, 420, 445. See also Appendix III. 
Grenville was not in possession of the lands, 1685 -
PRO, CIO/223/13. Seamer was sold, 1687 - VCH, North 
~ing, II, 292. . ---
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as the various claims on the estates illustrate, Sayer was 
not in a healthy financial position. Many annuities had been 
granted as security for loans, and the expenses incurred 
in recovering the properties proved to be the final blow. 
Sayer's son described his father as " ••• having bin totally 
ruined in his Estate for adhering unto his majte during the 
late Rebellion &.being indebted unto severall ~sons in sev-
erall greate & considerable somes of mony ••• ". The family 
was involved in lawsuits over unfulfilled obligations, and 
finally had to sell most of ,the lands to Sir Ralph Ashton 
in 16711. 
Another person bankrupted by a combination of debts 
and the effects of his delinquency was ,William Bulmer of 
Marric}lr. His estates.in the North Riding had been heavily 
mortgaged to Thomas Swinburne in 1650, but the cost of 
repurchasing them for over £6000 administered the coup-4e-
grAce. Bulmer could not even maintain the interest payments, 
and in 1662 Swinburne took possession of the property after ' 
an action in Chancery2. 
The cost of recovering lands could be almost prohibitive -
and two types of Royalist suffered the most: those who had 
redeemed their estates on their own initiative (either with 
or without the intervention or 'agents) and the Cavaliers 
1.' PRO, C54/3804/19, C54/378l/4, Index l7349"f .65-6; Meine11 
uaTendar 'A: passim; PRO, C7/179/117, C5/55l/77, c675 780, 
CP25(2)/755(Hil '70/71)7 , 
2. PRO, C54/3785/40, C8/3l7/148. 
-
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whose 'property had been used to settle considerable -debts. 
In neither case did the victim receive any consolation from 
the Restoration Settlement: the one had already paid "for 
his estate, and the other had still to satisfy the demands 
of his creditors. 
The Royalist who had repurchased his property had 
usually managed to rise above his financial difficulties by 
the time o~ the Restoration. Careful estate management and 
the husbanding of resources had already repaid some of the 
loan by 1660 - those who were unable to meet the cost of 
buying the lands usually collapsed within a few years of 
the sales1 • Care was still needed in the post-1660 era, but 
the Royalists who had not been in severe financial straits 
in 1642 had usually overcome the w'orst effects of the 
forfeitures by the Restoration. 
i· . Where the Cavalier recovered heavily-indebted estates 
from his creditors, the debt had to be satisfied, which 
frequently forced the Royalist to' resell his property"almost 
immediately. The main reason for the trouble taken to recover 
such lands was that they could then be sold at a higher 
value: and the debtor might hope to prove that the interim 
profits during the' Interregnum had fully' ( or at least 
partially) discharged his li~bili ties.' F~r the same reason, 
, ; '" 
1. With the exception$of Bulmer and Sayer. Both had to be 
propped up by the financial assistance of their agents -
, in fact, Crouch was still the official trustee of 
Sayer's estate when it was sold in l67lt 
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the creditors were usually reluctant to surrender the lands 
in question which (in some cases) they had acquired at a 
considerable undervalue. The Marquis of Dorchester refused 
to allow Marmaduke Frank an equity of redemption on his 
property, Jeremy Elwes attempted to retain the lands he 
held in trust for Cuthbert Morley (alleging that they were 
insufficient to cover even the initial loan), and Henry 
Simpson swindled Richard Vincent out of,part of the value 
of his estatel.lt took the intervention of Chancery to 
settle these quarrels, and, in each case where the result 
can be traced, the Royalist was allowed the Interregnwn profits 
as part-payment of the interest on the lands. 
'Unfortunately, most Cavaliers were in no position to 
saddle themselves with additional financial burdens. Many 
had incurred heavy debts through living on credit, or on the 
insubstantial'allowance made to their wives. Therefore, 
where estates were recovered from creditors, they were normally 
resold again with alacrity to meet their ex-owner's debts. 
Of the 156 estates sold by the Commonwealth Trustees, 
144 can be accurately traced. 129 of these were recovered 
by the Royalists either before or after the Restoration, 
(although three were sold immediately after recovery, prior 
to 1660). This, becomes all the more significant when it is 
1. Frank: PRO, C10/1l9/4l, Cl0/120/35. Morley: See 
Appendix-rrI. Vincent:~, C10/492/157. 
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noted that ten out of the fifteen estates which were never 
regained had been deliberately surrendered by their ex-
owners - the title had been "Compounded ••• for cakes and 
ale ..... l • The other five estates had fallen to creditors, 
or to those who could present a better title.' 
~i.t\l 
These findings can be compared ~ the discoveries of 
Dr •. Thirsk with respect to the south-east of England. Only 
130 out of 179 properties couldbe.identified, but 126 of 
these - 97 per cent - were recovered before or after the 
Restoration2 • In the case of Yorkshire, the percentage is 
slightly lower: 87 per cent of theidentif1able estates were 
regained by the delinquents or their heirs3 • But the result 
was the same in each case - the vast majority of the Royalists 
redeemed their lands, even if some of them did have to 
sell their property soon afterwards.-
Yet the price of recovery was extremely high. By pur-
. . 
chase from the Treason Trustees, the cost could be anything 
from half the value of the estate upwards - a crushing burden 
that might take twe~ty to thirty years to discharge. The 
Restoration Settlement allowed the Cavaliers to regain their 
1. See supra, p. 2.2'1, n • .z. • 
2. Thirsk, Ope cit., Table X, p. 270. 
3. This percentag~represents 127 estates - it excludes the. 
compounded lands, and also the estates whicn-were dis-
charged. Mr. G Blackwood is at present workint; on the 
Lancashire sales, but has not, as yet, completed his 
survey of the gentry. 
property at law, but this could prove equally expensive - ---... 
and in any case, such a Royalist was usually in an unsteady 
financial position as a result of living on credit during 
the Interregnuml • Virtually all of those whose lands were 
confiscated, attempted to recover them directly through 
either composition or repurchase: those who were unable to . 
do so were the poorer Royalists, or those in exile, who 
were unlikely to have the resources to afford a long legal 
suit. 
A glance at some families in 1660 will serve to illus-
trate the heavy liabilities involved in recovering property. 
When the Constables of Everingham repurchased their estates 
through John Rushworth, the lands were mortgaged to secure-
the amount due to the Trustees, plus Sir Philip's own debts. 
SOIDe acres were sold jus~ after the Restoration, but even-
in 1663, out of an annual revenue of £1860, '£1259-l6-8d. was 
being paid each year to discharge the interest alone2 • 
The Plumptons, who had repurchased their estates from the 
Commonwealth buyers, were in an even more critical position. 
The receipts for 1661 were £465, of which £345 was paid 
out as interest. In actual fact, if their total disbursements 
are considered, the picture beco/les most alarming. Over 
the four years from 1659 to 1662, the total revenue amounted 
to £2086-5-2d., and the expenses to £4059-l4-0d! Small wonder 
.. 
l~ Langdale asked to be excused from the King's coronation-
because of his heavy debts - he was unable to raise any 
money at all.(C.S.P.D. 1660-1, 564-5). Sir George Radcliffe 
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that the Plumptons did not care to adopt the debts settled 
on Watterton and wolfeparket l 
., Such crushing expenses could be overcome'with care. 
It took the Constables of Everingham well over twenty years 
before they could payoff their debts, but they eventually 
managed to do so", without selling more than a small, isolated 
piece of land2• The Plumptons retained their estates (the 
lands in Watterton and Wolfeparke.which were sold, had been 
in trust for settling over £6400 debts before the civil war), 
although they had to endure a long period of economic"ret-
renchment. In fact, despite the heavy debts and the great 
expense associated with the recovery of property, the 
majority of the Royalists succeeded in regaining their lands, 
and in keeping them, once recovered. Including compositions, 
173 estates can be traced from their sale (or desequestra-
tion) to their ultimate fate. 158 were eventually recovered, 
although at least 28 of these were lost either before or 
after the Restoration, . through resale. Therefore,·· 0'1 all 
the lands which can be fully identified, roughly 74 per 
cent remained in the hands of their original owners for 
at least a decade after 1660. 
1. Gascoigne MSS, GC/E10/l, ff. 45, 56-8, 67. \ . 
2. Constable MSS, DDEV/56/408; Aveling, loc. cit., 112. 
(£2n!._fr2~_~~_glg)· 
fiaa arso 1ncurred heavy debts during his exile (~). 
2. Constable MSS, DDEV/3l/ll0; id.,/l2/25; PRO,C54/4l58/24. 
Debts - Constable MSS, DDEV/Sb/408. Three-quarters of the 
sum represented rent charges for various lengths of time, 
which were repaying half of the debt. 
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Some families were completely ruined by their losses 
during the Interregnum. They had to sell all, or nearly 
all, of their property to payoff their debts. But,-with 
the exception of the'lands bought by independent purchasers, 
the majority of these sales were made by families who were 
already heavily in debt prior to the civil war. John 
Constable of Kirby Knowle died during or Just after the 
war, and his co-heiresses sold the compounded estate to the 
mortgagee, James Danby. William Bulmer was already on the 
brink of insolvency in 1642 - soon ~fter the RestDration, 
all of his lands fell into the hands of creditors. Laurence 
Sayer, who also repurchased his estate with the assistance 
of Gilbert Crouch, was crippled by the expense combined 
. -, 
- I 
with his pre-war debts. 
The 38 parcels of land sold either before or after 
," 
the Resto~ation2 belonged to 15 RoyalistB. Ten had substan-
tial debts dating from before the civil war, and an eleventh, 
Sir ]'{armaduke Langdale, was crippled by the losses he had 
incurred through his unswerving loyalty to ~he King. 
Nothing definite is known of the pecuniary circumstances of 
the remaining lo~~ delinquents, but in each case there is 
1. Constable: VCH, North Ridin~, II, 45-6; CP25(2)/614 (Trin. 
'54). Bulmer: PRO, 010/6 /102, c8/3l7/148, C7/55/189, 
C6/183/80. - Sayer: see supra, p. 268, n. 1. '_ 
2. This total of 38 includes:- 1 estate sold after compos-
ition; 3 sold' after recovery, prior to 1660; 10 where 
t1.tle sold to purchaser, and the lands never recovered; 
2t where lands sold after recovery, after the Restoration. 
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strong evidence of pre-war financial insecurity. Whether 
these debts would have caused the sale of lands had there 
been no anti-Royalist proscription is open to question. 
However, it is significant that other delinquents, of all 
economic stations, succeeded in recovering their estates 
without succumbing to the need for sale: there must therefore 
have been some strong reason which compelled. the unfortuna~e 
Cavaliers to part with their lands. Therefore, although the 
evidence is not wholly conclusive, it seems fairly certain 
that pre-war financial instability was the principal 
cause of the non-recovery of forfeited lands. 
The majority of the Royalists whose estates were con-
fiscated during the Interregnum had recovered their property 
within a few years of 1660. Most of the estates were directly 
regained from the Drury House Trustees.- by composition 
or repurchase through agents.- but those who were unable to 
retrieve their lands immediately generally recovered them 
in 1660. The cost of this was considerable, and in a few 
cases led to the sudden resale of some or all of the lands 
concerned. But the majqrity of the delinquents were able to 
retain their estates: those who were forced to sell were 
normally in some financial difficulties in any case. 
Even so, it was one thing to regain the confiscated 
lands - it was quite another to rebuild them into the position 
of their former prosperity. The larger estates, and those 
. 
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which had been entailed, were usually in the best situation. 
" " 
But the high cost of recovering estates meant that a family 
had to act with the utmost caution, and. practise extensive 
economies for at least a generation, until all the out-
standing debts had been settled. 
SOIDe families,failed to keep their recently;redeemed 
estates - others succeeded in doing so. But the majority 
of Royalists managed to hold on to their property and, by 
the careful exploitation of resources, attempted to restore 
their shattered fortunes. Thus the decades after 1660, 
as much as the barren years of the Interre"gnum, became a 
testing-time for the Cavaliers. 
, .., 
, 
CHAPTER VII - AFTERMATH OF THE INTERREGNUM. 
"For ye Depts your Father left collect them 
all, and yor owne too, Looke uppo your revenew 
as it is clogged with yor mothers joynture wch 
is a full halfe of whatsoever your Estate can be, 
and seriously consider if by thrift yoU may pay 
it out of yor Rents, if not there are but 2 wayes. 
A good Wyfe, or ye Sale of Lands and the sooner 
yoU put either in practise the more will it be 
for yor advantage •••• " 
"There. were in Yorkshire a hundred families 
extinct or undone, so that none of them could 
appear again as gentlemen. Death, plunder, sales 
and sequestrations sent them to another world 
or beggar's bush, and so all -'or most shires." (1) 
The effects of the anti-Royalist legislation upon the 
King's supporters has been a point of contention for many 
, , 
years. Dr. Chesney, working from the Calendar of the Committee 
for Compounding, claimed that, a large number of delinquents 
were forced to sell their lands, although he admitted that 
the main reason for this waS the existence, of pre-war debts 
and liabilities. However, he came to the conclusion that 
the" ••• private sales alone justify the conclusion that 
the actual land settlement at the Restoration was a" triumph 
for the 'new men' ".2 
Dr. Chesney~s thesis has been sharply criticised by 
1. Advice from Walter Pye to his nephew Walter Calverley, 
10 January, 1651/2 (BM, Add. MSS. 27411, f. 68). Sir John 
Oglander, quoted in R7J.Habakkuk, OPe cit., in Ec.H.R., 
2 series, XVIII, 131. 
2.0p. cit., in T.R.H.S., 4 series, XV, 188-9, 210. 
- 277 -
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Professor Habakkuk, who alleged that the number of private 
sales was greatly exaggerated. The maj~rity fl .•••. who were 
not already heavily indebted before the imposition of the 
fine found it easy to pa~ the fine without .. selling any land 
(and with) ••• no obvious long-term effects. "~: 
It is ~y no means easy to analyse the consequences of. 
the civil wars upon the ,Yorkshire Royalists. There are no : 
post-Restoration records which can compare with th~ voluminous 
papers of the various central committees, and the histories 
of many families cannot be trace.d,. But about half of the 
Royalist gentry can be r,oughly documented, thus giving a 
fairly broad picture ,of the post-civil war, period. It is, 
however, sometimes difficult .to distinguish between the 
effects of the compositions, and the results of such inci-
dental circumstances as war debts and damage, and pre-war 
liabilities. We can often only say that the fines were just 
, . 
one of a number of contributory causes in the decline of 
several families, although in some cases it is possible to 
make an accurate estimation of their actual rOle. 
The background to the compositions lay in the civil 
wars, and their consequences upon the county gentry. The 
legacies of the conflict - declining rents and the dis-
location of trade - affected all, Cavalier, Roundhead 
and neutral alike. It is against this picture that the 
results of the Parliamentary proscriptions must be seen. 
. -. 
1. Habakkuk, loc;cit., 139. 
- ......... _---
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The fighting had led to a certain amount of damage, 
especially during the final stages of the conflict. Military 
destruction (in the sense of deliberate devastation by the 
. . 
soldiery) had been slight, with the exception of the burning 
of several fortified houses, such as Howley Hall and Hun-
. 1 
singore Manor. The numerical inferiority of the Parliament-
arians had kept the war in a fluid state, with Lord Fairfax 
. , 
and his son snatching victories wherever they could. But 
the mainte~ance of the armies (especially Newcastle's to 1644, 
and the Scots forces after that time) placed a considerable 
burden on the landowners. Horses were driven off as draueht 
animals, cattle and sheep requisitioned for meat, and corn 
, 
and hay were seized as fodder. In addition to this, each army 
raised money from the countryside to pay its troops. In 
November 1644, Lord Fairfax desc~ibed Yorkshire as " this 
almost ruined country": some of the inhabitants were being 
"rated more than double the value of their lands in the 
. 2 
best times". 
Significantly, nearly everyone placed the blame on the 
Scots army. How much of this was due to actual fact, and 
how much to a traditional dislike of the foreigner, is 
difficult to say. But the Yorkshire County Committee had no 
doubts. It accused the Scots of seizing all the provisions 
1. The first by the Royalists, the second by the Parlia-
mentarians. ' 
2. C.S.P.D., 1644-5, p. 104. 
intended for the local forces, leaving the latter "much 
broken, weakened, and discouraged"and the home-bred Enemy 
here much increased in Number and Strength"l. Among "the 
many complaints which come daily out of the north against 
the Scotch army" were accusations that they were levying 
£140,000 a month (besides free quarter) from Yorkshire, 
making ..... little difference ••• betwixt friends and 
enemies". One Scottish officer even attemp~ed to bribe Alice 
Wandesford's aunt to force the young girl to marry him~2 
It is worth noting that when a party of ex-soldiers of mixed 
nationalities raided the Tickhill area, they disguised 
themselves as Scots trooperst 3 
Even in regions where ,there was no danger from marauding 
troops, estates, ~specially those of notable Royalists) 
suffered from the depradations of the county committees. The 
Ordinance of Sequestration instructed these local officials 
to sell all personal.estate (allowing ,ten days pre-emption 
to the delinquent), ~nd to appropriate the annual revenue 
from landed property. Some sequestrators took these instruc-
tions too literally, and anything that could be moved without 
a charge of gunpowder was seized. Woods were cut down, farm 
buildings dismantled and the materials sold, and rents were 
1. L.J., VII, p. 398. 
2. C.S.P.D. 1645-7, p. 189, 149; "Life of ~~s. Thornton", in 
Surtees Society, LXII, (1878), pp. 44-46. 
3. L.J., VIII, 135. 
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raised wherever possible. Petitions from various sources 
suggest that, in places, the definition of delinquency was· 
based on the theory that everyone who is not for us, is 
. t 1 agaJ.ns us. 
One of the worst characteristics of sequestration in 
wartime was the practice of granting an income from an :, 
estate directly to a military commander as a means of paying 
his troops. It could lead to the merciless stripping of the 
property of all sources of revenue, and unscrupulous officers 
tended to regard such estates as resavoirs, from which to 
draw any and all kinds of supplies, including a substantial 
personal income. Fortunately, such a development was soon 
arrested when the central committee realised the consequential 
loss of revenue to theState~. _. " 
Not only were the 'soldiers, sequestrators and militarY 
commanders accused of plundering estates; tenants were 'also 
charged with taking advantage of the situation. Royalists 
complained that the local officials had not been sufficiently 
careful in controlling sequestered properties. In most . 
cases, these accusations were mostly concerned with the 
cutting of timber and neglecting repairs, but occasionally 
there were charges of stealing cattle and crops from the 
1. ~, Add, MSS. 24464, f. 56-7. 
2. C~C.C., Part I, ~assim; Pennington and Roots, The Co~n1ttee 
at Stafford, 164 -45, p. 32. . 
1 lord's demesne. 
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However, the above picture is local rather than general 
in character. Many districts had hardly been touched by 
the war, and were relatively undisturbed by events else-
where. Whilst some regions·(especially. the Royalist areas 
around the West Riding towns) suffered from sporadic plun-
dering, the sequestration committees usually showed commend-
able vigilance in most cases, and tried to maintain the 
properties intact (except, of course, for the cutting of 
timber) • 
The damage suffered by the Royalists' lands during the 
war was more apparent than real, with the exception of 
individual localities where billet'ed troops or sequestrators 
got out of hand. No serious lasting damage was done to the 
majority of estates - in fact, the Parliamentarians probably 
suffered more than their opponents. Until early 1644, the 
Royalists were (in the main) supreme over most of Yorkshire. 
The West Riding woollen towns, cut off from their markets 
and sources of supply, stagnated, whilst packs of wool were 
readily seized to act as sandbags, as in the defence of 
. 2 Bradford • Newcastle's army maintained itself by assessing 
friend and foe alike, but those whom II •• ~ they esteeme 
not friends, they assesse them at two parts and three parts 
more, and some at four ••• ,,3. 
1. Bilton Park MSS, BL/200. 
2. M. James, Social Problems and Policy durinf the Puritan Revolution, 1640-60, (1930), 58-9. Woolpac s were hung 
around the church tower to protect snipers. 
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Thus' some delinqu~nts felt the effects of the war more 
than 'oth~r~". Th;~e ii~i~~in~ the neighbo-urho~d of important 
", T ,"' " ' , ~-" {~ ~ .. ' , . ': !.. d, J-' _ '. -: ... 
strongholds (such as Pontefract,. Skipton or Scarb'Or~~f"h), , 
or y,;h~'~e' 'the' ·f1ghtiri:g' had be~n fie'rc~'- w'ere~ ii kely 't'o" suffer 
; . .' ~.. ~,.,,~, .1'. .:.. • 
'from war damage, 'and'be assessed and plundered by each 
;victorious~rInY iin turn~' Deli~qu'e'nts ~hos~ 'lands a~d pro~~:e:;ty 
had b'e:en' r'~vaged"in -this way~ could' 'b'e financially :e'~b'arrassed 
, ,'. ,,' " I 
by composition. The' demolition of buildines around the 
walls of Hull, and the flooding of that area during the two 
sieees,.had destroyed a great deal of property, whilst years 
'--- - . _. -. -- . 
of nef,lect had brought the Humber's lev6es to the point of 
,," ; . <' • . . >It 
collapse, necessitating immediate'and expensive repairs2. 
'. , 
.... _The war had ,also precipitated a fall in r0nts, caused 
,. ''-, ' ',.,' "I " 
bY,declining.land v~lues. Some, estates lay waste, but far 
,more conunon was the damage wrought by simple neglect and 
lack of maintenance.~~orexample, crops were sometimes sown 
and harvested late, (or not at all),and without proper 
- '" -, ~ . . ,. - ... 
.1 . ~. l' - • . ". ." . ~.c r • . i 
1. See the cases of Francis Nevile and Henry Currer, supra, 
p. 91. The Parliamentarians and neutrals were also 
. caught up in the effects of the wars. 
2. Thomas Swann of Beverley had'his house, costing £.1.000, 
pulled down by Sir John Hotham to destroy all possible 
cover for the besiegers of Hull: R.C.P.,-I, 15. See 
also R.C.P., II, 139. 
(£2~!~~fE2!_E~_g~g~) .~~-
3. A Remonstrance-of the Present State of Yorkshire, 2nd. 
January, 1643/4, ~, {E 83 (51).). 
l 
, . , ~ : ,-.. 
, " , ~, 
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estate management, the tenants were left largely to" their 
own devices. Richard Knaresborough of Ferrensby used his 
lord's fields as common grazing land, and his brother John 
1 
was accused of stealing corn • Most Cavaliers, however, 
had managed to run their estates as ~ell as fight for the 
King. Both sides had been generally forced to cease hostilities 
'..' ~,., ' 
each winter, as their local supporters tended to drift 
back to their homes~. 
" , 
The Royalists' estates were just recovering from the 
cons~quences of the civil wars when thei ~ere ~urdened with 
the' weight of the c'omposition fines. Thesefeli harder on 
some delinque'nts' ~than o'n others .T'hose "~i th ~mal1 estate's or" 
who, with l'arge debts, had little personal income, ' felt 
the fines far more than the richer Royalists, whose lands 
were' better ab1'e to adapt t'o the changed, circumstances. 
younger sons and othe~s relying on annuities (which had ott'en 
falle'n into' arrea.rs) sometimes found themselves fined on 
the basis of an income which they might not have received 
for several years. 
But probably the most serious effect' of the war -
especially for the more fervent Royalists - was the loss of 
1. Bilton Park MSS, BL/166-1. This damage was done to a 
Parliamentarian's estate - the victim was Thomas Stockdale 
. of' Bilton Park. 
, . 
2. The 'composition papers suggest that a number, of the, 
'Royalists left the army shortly after joining: there 
appears to have been a considerable floating force in 
the King's campt 
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all financial reserves. Gifts to the King in the form of 
plate and money (Sir John Wolstenholme contributed £10,0001 ) 
followed by compulsory assessments and various confiscations, 
often meant that the delinquents were left with no ready 
funds with which to pay their fines. They were therefore 
faced with twounwelco~e alternatives '- to borrow heavily, 
or to sell larid. 
It is, however, difficult to give an accurate state-
ment of the consequences of the wars, as almost all of the 
evidence is strongly biased. The Royalists were only too 
eager to describe their losses during the conflict, and to 
take advantage of the local committees' preoccupations with 
other affairs. Many of the petitions to the Committee for 
Compounding relate volubly how the plaintiff was forced 
against his will to serve the King - several of such claims 
. 
can be proved to be fabrications, but it is often impossible 
to discover the 'truth of the matter. All that can be said 
is that, although the Committee for Compounding was quite 
likely to sequester people on the least suspicion of Royalism2, 
the delinquents were equally ~ikely to lie in their attempts 
to evade the composition fines. 
These "fines were admittedly large,· but not crushing. 
1. B. Boothroyd, The History of the Ancient Borough of 
pontefract, (Pontefract, 1807), 255. 
2. Witness the case of Francis Layton of Rawden, who was 
punished for simply trying to remain neutral, R.C.P., I, 30. 
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Fifty-two per cent of the primary compositions we're; at' a 
tenth or less, forty-two-and-a-half per c~nt ~t as~xth, 
and only five-and-a-half per cent at higher levels" The 
Royal'tsts complained loudly at the time, but in fact 'their ., 
punishment was relatively mild, '~onsidering the' fate" t'hat 
the Parliamentarfans would have' suffered had th'e Cavaliers 
won~ For the vast majority of delinquents~ the fine was 
therefore no more than three times their pre-war annual 
revenues. 
" ' 
Nor was the' methcd of assessing the estates as efficient 
as the governme:nt h'ad' expected. Al thoug'h the lands were 
rated at their pre-war value (and officially no account 
. ' 
was taken of any damages or losses incurred after 20 May 
'1642) ,the calculations were based on the delinquents" own 
declarations, which therefore provided an ideal opportunity 
'for undervaluatio~ and concealment. As has already been noted, 
'the encouragement of informations failed to' solve this 
problem, and several Cavaliers remained under-assessedl • 
But even where the properties were not undervalued, relatively 
few were rack-rented in 1642. The ms.'jori ty still had con-
siderable room for improvement, as is' shown by the stead11y-
rising rents on sequestered properties. Thus, by increasing 
the leases as they fell due, most of the delinquents could 
substantially raise their annual incomes. 
1. Or even completely undiscovered. For the merits and 
demerits of the information system, see supra, pp.52 ff. 
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The short time in which the fines had to be paid (only 
six weeks were allowed to elapse between the two halves) 
presented some difficulties, although only the heavily-
indebted delinquents would have been unable to raise suffic-
ient mortgages on the security of their lands. In any case, 
many of the Royalists took advantage of the administrative 
inefficiencies of the local sequestrators, and delayed 
payment of their fines for as long as possible. l 
. The Royalists had ample opportunities in which to meet 
the costs of their delinquency. For all except those who were 
in dire economic straits, the debts could be easily paid 
off by the time of the Restoration. Such repayment would 
inevitably be assisted by the fact that the Cavaliers were 
in a social vaccuum in the fifteen years following 1645 - ' 
they were exc~uded from all official positions, limitations 
were placed on their freedom of movement, and on the number 
who could legally'congregate in one place at the same time., 
This encouragement towards economy was aided by the 
desire to avoid the unwelcome attentions of the local tax 
collectors. The periodioal mont1il..y assessments, as well as 
the occasional compulsory levies for the militia, were paid 
by everyone, and naturally the Cavaliers attempted to give 
the impression of poverty. :b'orced to dissemble, deprived 
" ••• of all power in the least matter to act as a country 
2 
man," the Royalist thus turned his attention. to improving 
1. See supra,. p. lO9ff. 
2. Sir Henry Slingsby to Slingsby Bethell, 21 Jan., 1650/1, 
in Slingsby's Diarr, 346. 
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his estates. 
Even where the property had been rack-rented before 
the war (as with ,the Beaumonts of Whitley Beaumont), all but 
a few 'delinquents could afford the fine. Thomas Beaumont, 
a prosperous landowner, had no difficulty whatsoever in 
settling his £700 composition. Throughout the Interregnum 
he was steadily acquiring property; .and by his death in 
1668, his personal estate amounted to over £30001 • : Even Sir 
Gervase Cutler's family, who had suffered to some extent 
from plundering soldiers, was not ruined until the heir 
2 
wasted the estate in reckless extravagance. 
However, perhaps the clearest indication of the Roy-
alists' ability to retain their lands and payoff the fines 
is the way in which the victims of the various Acts of Sale 
succeeded in recovering their property. These latter had 
been forced to raise much larger sums, amounting in some 
cases to almost' three-quarters of the value of their lands, 
at their improved assessment. If they' were able to find 
such colossal sums, surely the ordinary delinquents could 
settle their own far. smaller fines? 
The other economic burdens which faced the Royalists -
the twentieth and the Yorkshire Engagement - were far less 
troublesome, and had a correspondingly less effect upon 
1. Whitley-Beaumont MSS., WBL/9l, WBW/35/4,7. 
2. J.Hunter, South Yorkshire, (1828-31),11, 267; J. Wilkinson, 
worsbor~ufh, (1872), 47; Historic Yorkshire Families, 
"cutler' • . 
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those assessed. The twentieth was a realistic appreciation 
of the delinquent's capacity to ,pay: the original estimates 
were scaled,down,making allowances for war damage and the 
effects of compositionl • These amercements seem:tohave 
been settled fairly promptly but, despite the Committee 
for Advance of Money's attempts toassees all Royalists, 
many avoided paying anything at all. The tax represented, 
at the most, one year's income from the current value of the 
estate and, as several delinquents had put part of their 
lands in trust to settle the composition fine, the assess-
ments in ,their final versionseem'to have underestimated, 
2, 
rather than overestimated, the Cavaliers' revenues. 
The Yorkshire Engagement was a nUisance,rather than 
a financial embarrassment, to the Royalists. Those who had 
guaranteed the loan to 'the King had (generally) done so on 
their own initiative, and the sums promised were well 
'within their subscribers' capacity to pay. But the govern-
ment demanded the immediate settlement of the moneys, 
whereas the creditors had been content to let the debts run 
on for several years. In fact, it was really the latter 
\ :.' l _' 
(some of whom were Royalists) who were punished- they lost 
1. See supra, Chapter IV, passim. 
2. Even the original versions of the assessment seem to have 
been under the 1642 estimates of the Royalists' lands. 
Of ," 91 Royalists assessed, 45 of the original assess-
ments were undervalued, 34 over-estimated, and 12 roughly 
correct. These statistics are gained by comparing the 
assessments with the (probably undervalued) 'particulars 
of estate'. All were supposed to pay this tax, although 
many evaded it. 
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all their bonds, whilst the guarantors merely had to meet 
their liabilities rather earlier than was expected. 
Relatively few of the debts were paid: from what little' . 
information remains of the delinquents' financial situation 
during the Interregnum, it appears that the resistance was 
caused more by objections to the nature of the levy, than 
by any inability to pay it. From the pathetic results of the 
Engagement subsidies, it cannot be said that they had any 
substantial financial effects upon the Royalistsl • 
Besides such incidental punishments for delinquency, the 
Cavaliers, with the rest of the population, suffered from 
the various weekly and monthly assessments and occasional 
taxes invoked for the support of the government and armed 
forces. The already financially-weakened Royalists were 
naturally more vulnerable to such incidental expenses, but 
those who had borne the costs of composition were usually 
able to do the same with these periodical imposts. 
The Royalists whose lands had, been confiscated were in 
a much more vulnerable position. If they compounded, they 
had to pay six years' purchase for land in fee simple: if 
they bought their estates from the Treason Trustees, the 
price was generally at least ten years' purchase. The only 
way that such amounts could be raised was by heavy mortgaging 
and borrowing on the London (or local) money markets. In 
1. See Chapter IV,'pp.155ff. 
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most cases, the whole estateiwas settled as security for 
the loan, with the Royalist receiving only a small annuity. 
For the rest of the Interregnum (and often the first decades 
after the Restoration), these delinquents were weighed' 
down with a crushing burden of debt. 
Not only did.the victims of the Acts of.'Sale have to 
pay a considerably higher percentage of their property than, 
the normal delinquents: their estates were also assessed 
far more accurately. Instead of a fine based on the pre-
war value of the lands as certified by their late: owner, the 
Royalists who wished to repurchase their holdings had,to 
pay a sum related to the current value of the property -
but a value accurately estimated by official surveyors, 
and representing the annual income of the lands. at. the 
highest possible rack-rent.-For those who purchased confis-
cated lands (whether delinquent, agent or speculator), there 
was often no~portunity to recoup the price quickly (except 
1 by resale) by increasing the,leases • Apart from denuding 
the property of all its'resources, the only method of 
repaying the purchase price was by a long-term, heavy mort-
gage. 
t f h WerA However, a great percen age 0 t e estateslbought with 
1. No clear decision can be given on,this point. Whereas 
the Constables of, Everingham substantially increased 
even the government's rentals, (Constable MSS., DDEV/56/ 
408, 443, etc~,) the Plumptons apparently had difficulty 
in maintaining the high rentals of Plumpton Manor' ' 
(Gascoigne MSS., GC/ElO/l, passim). 
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public faith bills - paper guarantees issued as security to 
those who had lent the government money in the past, and 
which had steadily depreciated in value through the years. 
The Acts allowed up to half the price of the lands to be 
contracted for with these securities, and Professor Haba-
kkuk's research has shown that the vast majority of the 
forfei~ed estates were, in fact, bought with doubled billsl. 
Considering the large percentage of lands which were pur-
chased by Royalists or their agents, this offers only two 
alternatives: either the latter were acquiring bills on the 
" '" 
London market at deflated rates, or the London speculators, 
who had already gambled in buying the securities, were advan-
cing the necessary money for the repurchase of the confis-
cated~lands at advantageous rates of interest. It is noticeable 
that, whereas the government had invariably to borrow money 
at between six and eight per cent interest, Sir Philip 
Constable raised the £12,488 for the repurchase of his 
2 estat~at only 4.8 per cent. 
The use of these bills thus diminished the actual monetary 
cost of rebuying the lands, although the burden still 
remained considerable. SOIDe families were forced to sell 
property but, as has already been su~gested, in such cases 
1. See supra, Chapter V, p.l98 l H.J.Habakkuk, "Public Fin-
ance", in Ec.H.R., (2 series), XV, 70-88, passim. 
2. Constable MSS., DDEV/50/44, "48a. Even the nigh-bankrupt 
Plumptons received their loans at six per cent interest, 
Gascoigne MSS., GC/Elqjl. " 
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the delinquent was often seriously embarrassed by pre-war 
debts l • A surprisingly large number of Royalists managed to 
overcome their liabilities, although naturally their estates 
were very heavily burdened for many years (and led, in 
some instances, to the eventual sale of the lands concerned: 
Laurence Sayer, af~er surviving on the verge of .. bankruptcy 
for sixteen years,· finally sold his property in 1670/712 ). 
Thertis; unfortunately, considerable difficulty in 
assessing the Royalists' financial position after the Rest-
oration. There are no land valuations (such as the 'particulars 
.. 
of estate'), and most of the families have left no substan-
tial records. Thus the majority of the information must be 
collected at second hand, from fines and recoveries, in-
quisitions for debt, wills and other such evidences. 
The primary problem presented by such material is the 
difficulty in distinguishing (from a fine orr~covery) 
between a sale, a mortgage, and a simple conveyance to break 
a previous" entail. Wills are generally uninformative, as any 
substantial liabilities would be settled on the estates 
prior to the owner's death. Even petitions to the King 
cannot ,be accepted too literally, for obvious reasons. In 
general, therefore, the most useful source of information 
1. See supra, Chapter VI, for a brief summary of some of the 
effects of the sales on the Royalists. . 
2. !:B.Q" CP25(2)/755 (Hil, 1670/1); .Y2!!, Durham, 111;224,5. 
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is again the law courts - indirect evidence in the bills 
and s.rJswers in Chancery often gives a very clear; indication 
of "a:~ delinquent's general financial- posi tionl • 
From these sources, augmented by the various collections 
of family papers and deeds, we can discover the fate of 
about seventy per cent of the Royalist families, (both of 
those who compounded, and the delinquents whose estates 
were sOld)2. All attempted to pay their several fines and 
amercements, and the majority succeeded without'beingforced 
to sell their estates. Certainly, they were extremely reluc-
tant to lose their property, not only because of the land~ 
owner's inherent unwillingness to part with his domains, 
but also because of the adverse state of the land market 
during the decades following the compositions. The flood 
of confiscated estates being sold by the government, and 
private properties disposed of by those who were unable to 
meet their commitments, conspired to force down the-price 
of land, and thus discouraged many Royalists from parting 
with their estates before they were actually compelled to 
do s03. 
1. J.W.Clay's edition of Dugdale's Visitation gives several 
valuable footnotes. Nor must the work of antiquarians be 
ignored (though much must be treated with caution): 
historians such as Joseph Hunter left behind a mass of 
material, from which a considerable amount of information 
can be gleaned. Certain modern historians have also left 
monographs on various families, often working from docu-
ments which are not available to the general public. 
2. Only 49 per cent of these can be traced from their pre-
war financial positions. 
, -, 
3. Habakkuk, OPe cit., in Ec.H.R., (2 series) XVIII, 130-51, 
passim. 
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Mortgages, however, only solved the immediate problem 
of recovering the sequestered property: the Cavaliers had 
still to settle the debts owing to their creditors. This 
was usually accomplished by discovering new, or exploiting 
old resources, so that the annual revenue from the lands 
was substantially increased. 
The majority of the Royalists appear to have recouped 
their losses by developing their estates to the fullest 
extent. Rents had been generally rising during the latter 
half of the sixteen-forties - this was partially due to the 
gradual recovery from the dislocations of war, but was mainly 
caused by the deliberate policy of the Parliamentary seques-
trators. Lands were leased to the highest bidder, and the 
whole machinery was designed to encourage competitive cross-
bidding. When the Cavaliers recovered their property, they 
naturally continued this policy, raising leases as they fell 
due-and demanding high fines when new tenants entered upon 
the estate. 
One of the Royalists who was most active in this field 
was Henry Calverley of Calverley. In 1649 he claimed that 
his estates were worth £505 a year, over half being on the 
rack. Despite this, he speedily raised the rents - in some 
instances by as much as 100 per centl. In 1650, the tenants 
in Calverley alone were paying £620 per annum - an increase 
of nearly 240 per cent over their 1640 "rack" rents2 • 
1. R.C.P., II, 189~ Y.A.S., MS 527. 
2. Compare BM Add MSS., 27411 f. 126 and f. 70. 
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other families employed the same principles. The 
Wartons of Beverley, worth.£2500 per annum in 1640, received 
£3260 each year by the 1680'sf from substantially the same 
estatel • Sir Marmaduke Constable and John Rushworth even 
managed to improve ~bn,the Commonwealth valuations, forcing 
the leases up to a fantastic height. They had escalated by 
an average of thirty per cent between 1650 and 1652 under 
the control of the Yorkshire Co~nittee; but now they rose 
even higher: by 1670, they were over 60 per cent above their 
'2 1650 leve1~~. 
At least one landlord had pricks of conscience over 
the hardships he had inflicted upon his tenants. In his 
will, William Lutton of Knapton requested his brother and 
executor to "reduce ye people of Knapton to their usuall 
& accustomed rate of 6d • for a messuger & 3d ·for a cottager 
But few of the Cavaliers appear to have had any social con-
science about their activities, and continued in their 
attempts to get the most out of their properttQs. 
Along with these developments, several of the Royalists 
attempted to increase the cultivable~area of their estates 
by enclosing the commons or moorland. Legal battles in 
Chancery attest to strong opposition from various sources, 
usually from the tenants. In 1661, Raphe Crathorne was 
1. R.C.P., II, 55-6, 93; Y.A.S., MS 661. 
2. Constable MSS, passim; PRO, SP28/215 (for 7-year leases). 
3. y.W., May 1688 (Box 1): will of William Lutton. 
• • "3 
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planning to fence in the commons on his 1:1anor of Crathorne, 
and Marmaduke Frank, as lord of Middleton Tyas, began to 
annex some neighbouring moorland. Occasionally there was a 
mutual agreement between all parties concerned - Sir Francis 
Hungate claimed that his tenants had broken such a bargain 
when they prevented him from enclosing land in 16681 • 
~ Such enclosures may have been caused, not only by the 
desire to improve an estate, but also as a natural reaction 
to the intensified State control of the 1650's. The seven~ 
year leases granted in 1652 and 1653 contained stringent 
provisions, restricting the occupiers' independence. One of 
the conditions was specifically intended to prevent the 
fencing-in of meadow or pastureland to grow corn. The lessee 
had to promise to raise no rents, and to pay £5 a year 
increase in rental for every acre of land (unp1oughed in 
the last twenty years) which he converted to arable. This 
completely prohibitive figure was obviously intended to 
prevent the farmers of sequestered properties (who were 
usually the delinquents or their agents) from squeezing the 
tenants in an attempt to make a profit on the lands2: 
Such consideration was, however, limited to the estates 
1. PRO, C5/502/105 (Crathorne); id~ CIO/97/48 (Frank); 
~, C78/883/14 (Hungate). --
2. This condition is in John Vavasour's lease, of 13 March 
1652/3, PRO, SP23/G 58/f. 81. A similar provision was 
included in the lease of the Meynells of North Kilving-
ton (Aveling, loc. cit., p. 107). 
j 
J 
1 
I 
I 
i j 
I 
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under sequestration: once a property had been sold or redeemed 
by composition, the government lost all interest in its 
internal management. John Rushworth, as soon as he had-
bought Sir Philip Constable's forfeited estate in the East 
Riding, raised all the rents and generally "improved" the 
value of the property. One of the tenants of Arras, Charles 
Horsley, complained volubly to the Committee for Removing.· 
Obstructions that the leases were at an unjustifiably high 
level: he was bluntly told that Rushworth owned the property, 
and could therefore do what he wanted with the rents. 'Horsley 
then attempted to avoid paying his tithes -he pleaded that 
they must surely be included in his lease. He received an 
equally abrupt reply from the Yorkshire Committee, which 
threatened to distrain his personal estate if the money 
was not quickly forthcoming. Thus Horsley found to his cost 
that the world of officialdom did not care at all about the 
- t 1 fate of its former tenan s • 
In addition to improving the value of his estate, the 
Royalist could always exploit his existing resources. BY 
far the most negotiable of these was timber. The county 
committees had cut down some woods on sequestered estates, 
but,despite the frequent complaints, such practices were 
apparently not too ~idespread. The sale of timber was one 
of the quickest ways in which the delinquent could raise . 
1. Constable MSS., DD EV/3 17 1 , 78-82. ., ,. 
-~------- ------ --------
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the second half of his fine, without having to mortgage 
or sell his lands. There was a considerable market for 
seasoned wood: the ravages of war had led to the destruction 
of houses and bridges, and (especially after 1652), there 
was an increasing demand from the naval shipyards. 
Henry Calverley virtually denuded the whole of his 
estate in this way through trying to raise his co'mposi tion 
fine.' He wrote in anguish from London to his wife, begging 
her to " ••• get the wod sold that I may end wth Goldsmith 
Hall & come home and monie is now soe hard to come unto 
that I thinke I shall let Sr Hugh Calverley's estate fall" •. 
Despite "all his attempts, Calverley was forced to sell a l. 
SUbstantial acreage in order to settle the fine' am his 
own considerable debts l • 
. Among the others who turned their woods into cash were 
Sir John Reresby and Sir Thomas Danby, both' prominent land-
holders, 'though with considerable charges upon their estates. 
Reresby succeeded in settling his liabilities (caused by 
his father's debts and war damage), but Sir Thomas Danby, 
already on the verge of insolvency in 1642, had to sell an 
2 
appreciable amount of property • 
1. Calverley to his wife Joyce, 13 March, 1648/9, BM, Add. 
MSS., 27411, f. 65; Calverley MSS, (DD12) passim; 
2. Reresby, Sir John, Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, (ed. A. 
Browning) (Glasgow, 1936), and the orig~nal in BM, Add. 
MSS., 29440, early pages. Cunliffe-Lister MSS, passi~. 
Another way of raJling money was to let land -for a h~gh 
initial fine, butla very low rental: this was virtually 
a mortgage, and was shunned, if possible, by the Royalists, 
who tried to keep their revenues intact, and at the 
highest possible level. 
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In addition to the exploitation of existing resources, 
some Royalists sear~hed for new fields in which to make 
their fortunes. One of the most profitable of these lay in 
the sphere of mining. It was virtually impossible fOT.the 
sequestrators to estimate the true capital value of mineral 
deposits, and most of the delinquents who already owned 
(or leased) such property had succeeded in concealing its 
existence, or at least its true value. Such resources could 
therefore prove most profitable in the post-war period of 
reconstruction. 
Several of the Roya11.sts had existing mines, the 
principal ones being of coal and. alum. Although the former 
could involve considerable expenditure before workable seams 
were developed, there were many pits in the West Riding coal 
belt, and several owed their origin to the Cavaliers. Lang-
dale Sunderland was forced"to sell his estates in Coley 
Hall and High Sunderla.nd, but bought smaller properties in 
Acton and Featherstone from Thoma.s Beckwith. These proved 
to be an admirable investment, as Sunderland was able to 
develop the rich coal seams which he estimated to be worth 
at least £200 per annum at his death in 1698. He left a 
short homily for his sons, advising them on hd>w to work 
the pits to the best advantage, including a few notes on' 
labour relations. He recommended that, if the colliers 
complained of low wages, they should be paid ~; and·· every 
week the true value of each man's work must be discovered 
"----- --~--.-.-.. .----- --_.--._--_ .. __ .-
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from the "bottom man", ~ "for colliers hate truth". "The 
whole trust lies in the bottom man and bankman" , 'who, with 
four miners working at the coal face, were recommended as 
being quite sufficient for the needs of the small pit. l 
William Lowther was also concerned with coal mining, 
but mainly as a·· side issue to his principal commercial 
interests. ,He had purchased the Manors of Great Preston and 
Astley 'from Coniers Darcy, and naturally worked the rich 
coal seams there. It was this Lowther who bought Roundhay 
from the Treason Trustees, and also acquired the Manor of 
Swillineton, finally building up a considerable landed 
estate in the vicinity of Leeds2 • Several other Royalists 
were also engaged in coal mining (both before and after 
the civil war), 'such as Francis Baildon and Sir Ferdinando 
Leigh3 • 
·Sir Hugh Cholmley made a fortune by establishing alum 
works at Whitby in 1649. By 1665 they had grown to be very 
profitable - in that year, Cholmley's heir leased them to 
the Crown for'twenty-one years, at an annual rent of £1500. 
1. J. Lister, "High Sunderland", in Halifax Antiquarian Soc. 
Transactions, (1907), p. 133 ft; Sunderland, Langdale, 
p. 215~, , 
2. PRO, C5/3l/75, C54/3755/29; W. Wheater, Some historic 
Mansions of, Yorkshire and their associations(1888-9, Leeds), 
I, 241; Boothroyd, Pontefract, 150; Lowther Bouch, C.M., 
"Lowther of Swillington from its origin till 1788", in 
Cumberland & Westmoreland Anti uarian & Archaeolo ical 
, pp. • 
3. La Page, J., The Story 29-30; R.C.P., 
III, 100. 
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This success was mainly due to the aid of friends and the 
Royalis~s own careful management: he showed his appreciation 
to his brother, Sir Henry, by granting him a twenty-six 
year free lease of a sixth of the alum works, which Sir 
Henry was able to sublet for £150 per annum. By the time 
that Sir Hugh died in 1657, he was living in comfortable 
retirement, and was able to leave his daughters a total of 
£2500 in portionsl • 
William Bulmer attempted to recover from the effects 
of repurchasing his confiscated estat~by developing his 
lead mines in the North Riding. He was forced to mortgage 
his lands and defaulted on the repayments, whereupon the 
creditor, Thomas Swinburne, seized the whole property. 
Bulmer claimed that the mines should not have been included 
in the mortgage, but failed in his attempts to secure their 
restoration. He finally sold the title, and the purchaser, 
Lord st. John, redeemed the debt. Bulmer had hoped to retain 
the mjnes (being one of the wealthiest parts of the estates, 
and worth at least £500 a year) from which to payoff the 
debts on the rest of his lands, but. whether through his 
own carelessness or his creditor's underhand methods, the 
2 property was lost to the family • 
1. The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, (1870), taSSim; C.S.P.D., 
1664-5, 461; wi!l - Somerset House, Nabbs 1660), f. 206. 
2. PRO, C7/55jl89, C6jl83/80. The mines are elsewhere valued 
~£1000 per annum, EBQ, SP2~/2l5. 
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Some Cavaliers augmented their landed revenues by 
turning to commerce and the professions. Many had already 
strong connections with the· merchant world - in fact, 
several. of the Royalist gentry had acquired estates with 
the profits of trade. Brian Cooke of Doncaster had made 
his fortune through commercial enterprise and moneylending; 
both Sir Roger Jacques and William Kellam were more mer-
chants than country gentlemen. But several hitherto purely 
landowning members of the gentry found it necessary to 
supplement their incomes from other sources. 
This did not always indicate that the family was 
declining, although a few Royalists turned to trade as the 
only alternative to bankruptcy. Willoughby Skipwith, 
possessing an insignificant estate, was severely affected 
by the compositions. Apart from his landed revenue of £30 
a year, he had been a small creditor, but was unable to 
collect the sums owed to him, although he had compounded for 
them. The family declined through the later years of the 
Interregnum, and Willoughby became apprenticed to a draper 
in 1659. His son and heir,John, refused to turn to commerce, 
and endeavoured to rebuild the family estates. This proved 
to be his ruin, and he was forced to sell all his lands 
in Menthorpe in 1670, living on in poverty in his small 
estate in Skipwith until his deathl • 
1. R.C.P., II, 12; T. Burton, The History and Antiquities 
of the Parish of Hemingborough, (1888), p. 241 • 
. , 
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Sir Richard Maleverer attempted to recoup his fa rtunes 
from the profits of war. His father, the regicide Sir 
Thomas, had cut off his son's annuity, and left Sir Richard 
in straitened financial circumstances. Although Sir Thomas' 
estates were restored to the family in 1660, the Parliament-
arian had exhausted them through his unswerving loyalty 
to his causel • In early 1665, Sir Richard and fourteen 
other gentlemen, all "sufferers for the late King", petitioned 
Charles II.for a commission to sail a.frie:ate in search'of 
Dutch ships in the Straits. Permission was granted, 
although it is not known what fortune favoured Sir Richard 
in his quest for wealth2. 
Colonel Walter Slingsby evolved an,equally adventurous 
method of regaining his·losses.He had been commander of 
the garrison o,f,Pendennis Castle, but apparently paid no 
fine (or at least all record of it has since disappeared). 
With eleven companions, all "Loyal Indigent Officers", he 
petitioned in 1669 for a licence to establish a plate, 
lottery for the term of six years. The results of his 
enterprise are not recorded: however, it seems unlikely that 
walter had been forced to resort to this expedient by his 
ci viI war losses, as he had already r'ecei ved the commission 
. 
of Governor of the Isle of Wight at the Restoration3 • 
1. His losses in the war compelled him to sell the lordship 
'of Armley;. III.Noble, Lives of the English Regicides, (1798), 
II, 34. . , ., 
2. Feb. ? 1665, c.s.p.n. i 1664-5, 229. Apparently he did not mend his fortunes - A lerton lVIaleverer itself was mortgaged 
in 1669, Galway MSS., 9350, 9351, 9357. 
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In general, however, the Cavaliers who turned to 
. commerce or·the professions served in the more orthodox 
r81es of lawyers or farmers of royal revenues. As many 
of the gentry had received a legal education at the Inns 
of court,lthelaw was an ideal field in which to recover 
their fortunes. Peter Foljambe of Steeton became a counsellor 
at law (although his losses were the result of his predecessor~ 
ruinous extravagance, rather than the aftermath of the 
civil war). Robert Morley of Fulford, already heavily in 
debt, had been crippled by the effects of his composition. 
His eldest son, Cuthbert, was arraigned as an outlaw, and 
the whole estate was thus seized by the sequestrators. 
However, Robert's second son, James, trained in the law, 
and a Registrar Accountant to the Revenue Commissioners in 
Ireland, petitioned for time to pay the still-outstanding 
fine. He was allowed the forfeited estates on a fifty-year 
lease, and succeeded in discharging the composition by 
careful mortgages, augmented by his own legal salary. Grad-
ually, by a judi.cious combination of money and influence, 
he regained and reorganised the whole estate2 • 
1. See Cliffe, OPe cit., 140, 327-8. 
2. Foljambe: N. Johnl:'tnn, "History of jambe", in ColI. Top. et Gen., II, 
Morley: R.C.P., III, 1; C.S.P.D., 
North Riding, rI, 162. 
(£2~~~_f~~~_E~_lQ~~) 
the Family of Fol-
rassirn; 655-6, 255; VCH, 
3. ~, C66/3l06/6; YAS, MS 745 c; PRO, C66/2945/31. 
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Another family which likewise turned to the professions 
was the Morrises of North Elmsall •. John Morris was executed 
in 1649 at York for his connection with the murder of .. 
Colonel Rainsborough. His widow successfully gained her 
. .. . .. 
dower on the grounds that her turncoat husband happened to 
, , , 
be fighting for Parliament when the settlement was made. 
- ~ '. 
But the ,family, never wealthy, slowly declined, until John's 
second son and ultimate heir,.Castili~n, augmented his 
income by.bec~~ing Town.Clerk of Leeds in 16841 • 
," The Rer.esbys of Th:-i bergh ~doptedt I?anufacturing as an 
extra source ,of revenue. Sir John's Memoirs paint a dismal 
•• L , • 'S _ ." • 4-
picture of, 'the family ~ s • posi tion when ~e succeeded his 
~ -" . ~ 
father,in 1646~~"ye saile of betweeri two and three hundred 
pounds per _ ann", ,:.- and' the, two ,great jointures of his 
mother and, grandmother had considerably diminished his 
income. Tamworth ReresbY,wrote ,to his nephew'",when I 
consider,your .sequest~ed (estate), and,my Mother undoner,my 
'best expe?tations will proye.but dolorous exchanges"~ However, 
the family slo~ly recovered, and in 1666 Sir John and Sir 
Thomas Strickland were granted a patent for making steel by 
a new process. Whether it was this or careful estate manage-
" 
ment that ~elped_the.estate is.not certain, but'shortly 
afterward~ . Sir John was "~king' considerable extensions to 
.. .. ..... - ." - --. ....... .- ". .' . 2 
his house at Thribergh • 
. , "" 
> • 
1. Historic Yorkshire Families - "Morris"; C.C.C., 2409; 
Dugdale, I, 323. 
2. Reresby's Memoirs, EM, Add. MSS., 29440, f. 1; Reresby 
MSS (Leeds), 1714; ~, C66/30871l; Hearth Tax records 
L 
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:Many of' the Royalists therefore attempted to restore 
their fortunes by developing existing or latent talents or 
resources. Most turned to their'estates as a source of extra 
-revenue. When the leases fell due, the farms were relet on 
··,the rack (often with high entry fines), and the rights and 
iperquisites of the landlord (especiallj those pertai~ing to 
,the;use of:timber'and any'mineral deposits) were carefully 
defined and:rigidly enforced. Waste lands were enclosed, 
'and the Cavaliers 'sought for the most profitable means of 
farming their demesnes. After the initial shock of composi-
I • .' 
tion, when capital resources, such as timber, were often 
ruthlessly exploited, the Royalists aimed at the conservation 
:. : . 
of their assets, turning to more profitable and: ,efficient 
methods of farming. Even the high rents demanded by the 
, ' 
Commonwealth from sequestered properties were improved upon, 
. . ~ ~ . . . . 
as the example of the Everingham estate shows. In fact, 
.~, • •• f. ~. 
the delinquents developed their resources to the utmost, 
, ::' ~... ':; . , .,' '1 
attempting to repair ~he ravages of the civil wars • 
The Cavaliers thus exploited all their capital possessions, 
'. ' 
. " 
and turned to mining and co~~erce to augment their incomes 
: ... : . 
1. The Cavaliers would probably have indulged in this kind 
of economic exploitation even if they had not suffered 
,.l from the anti-Royalist legislation.' 
': (£~!!~!._~;:2!!!_E.!_JQ§.:. ) . 
,for Thri bergh; 1664 and 1673, PRO, El79/210/393, !y262/ 
13 •.. : 
.. . ~ ." 
! 
1/ 
308. 
from land. During the half-century after 1660 the output of 
, " 
the West Riding coalfield expanded considerably, although 
this was due to the enterpris~ of others besides the ROyalists. l 
For the post-Restoration times were also a period when many 
Parliamentarians sought to restore their weakened finances. 
Civil war damage, the non-payment of'salaries, and over-
~ 
generous gifts to the government had strained the economies 
of several erstwhile Roundheads.Like the Royalists, they 
too were fighting to retain their balance after 1660. 
\ 
(, ' 
But the Cavaliers were not simply limited to their own 
resources, both physical ,and material, when it came to 
, , 
remedying the effects of the civil wars and Interregnum. 
Many hoped for financial aid from the King, either in the 
form of a pension, ,the farm of some royal revenue, or the 
profits of office. The Restoration brought an astounding 
c, , 
number of petitions , from suitors, ,extolling,th~ir former 
real or imaginary services to the Crown. In the midst of 
this multitude of suppliants, the appeals of many loyal 
Cavaliers were lost, although a few did benefit from~the 
King's generosity. A total,of,£400 per ann~ was granted 
to the 'wido~'and'daughters ~f Colonel Matthew Boynton, 
, . \ ' 2 
killed in the Worcester'campaign • Sir Jordan Crosland 
t! 
1. J.U.Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry, (1932), 
I, 57; this is supported by sporaaic evidence from 
family papers. 
2. C.S.P.D., 1660-61, 502; ~, C66/2999/24. 
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received an estate at Newby-on-Yore (Ure), and Sir Solomon 
1 Swale got £2000 f~om the profits of the Hearth Tax. 
But far more Royalists benefitted from the profits of 
office, or the farm of the royal revenues. Sir Matthew 
Appleyard was created CustOmer of the Port of Hull in 1660, 
at a salary of £30 a year, and left the post to his son 
on his death. By 1669, the position was worth over £80 per 
annum2 • Sheffield, the son of Sir Christopher Clapham, 
became Farmer· of the Exci se in the West Riding3 • Richard 
Harebred of Wistow gained the lease of certain lead mines 
from the Crown which earned him at least £350 a"year, whilst 
Richard Hutton of Goldesborough petitioned for the farm of 
the Crown tithes in Clayton and Frickley. Captain Legard 
was gra.nted the reversion of a· 31-year lease on the· 
guardianship of York Castle (together with the office of 
gaoler); and William Thompson of Humb1eton received the 
farm of the Crown Manor of Northstead4 • Just over 11 per cent 
1. Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Historl of He1msleY~(1963), 
160; G.H.Harrison, The History of Yorksh1re, (1879), 37; 
H. Speight, Romantic Richmondshire, (1897), 225-8; 
C.S.P.D., 1655-6, 163. 
2. PRO, C66/2947/12; C.S.P.D., 1660-61, 108; id, 1661-2, 39; 
!:W., vol. 51, f. 178. 
3. Cal. Treas. Bk., I, 474 (19 March, 1662/3) •. 
4. Y.W., vol. 54, f. 361 (Harebred); C.S.P.D., 1660-1, 526 
(Hutton); PRO, C66/2971/23 (Le~ard)i J.D.Legard, ~he 
Legards of-xn1aby and Ganton, (1926), 94. ~. 
Hotham of Soutn Dalton lVISS., DDHO/55/21 (Thompson). 
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of the Royalist families in Yorkshire benefitted in some 
way from the King's generosity. The Cavaliers as a whole 
might ~ave been disappointed, but an appreciable number 
received some sort of recognition from the King. 
Not all of these beneficiaries had necessarily been 
financially crippled by the wars. Some, such as Henry 
Hildyard (who was created a Vice-Chamberlain of the Exchequer), 
were wealthy landowners, able to discharge their composition 
fines with relatively little difficultyl. All the Royalists 
naturally hoped for s.orne reward in recognition of their 
past services (for some had lost more than others), but 
it was understandable. that the leaders of county society 
should be selected for the principal offices and positions 
of trust. Thus the lesser gent"ry were the ones who suffered 
-in the scramble for the spoils of office: they had either 
to be content with a minor position or (mori often) received 
nothing at all. 
However, such offices were not necessarily infallible 
routes to financial success: if not handled carefully, they 
.- .. -
could le~d the holder into the govern~ent·s debt. Sir Thomas 
" ' Strickland of Thornton Bridge, not content with being a 
sub~commissioner of excise in the West Riding, petitioned 
" " 
in 1665 for" the farm ~f the tax on Scottish salt for twenty-
one years "at a "rent of "£1860. This speCUlation failed, as 
the alliance with Franceled,to the influx of cheap French 
1- ", 
"' 
1. C.S.P.D., 
I, 3. 
1660-61, 138;~, C66/2942/78; Cal. Treas: Bk., 
I 
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salt. In the first year, Sir Thomas begged for the reduction 
of his rent, which was eventually amended to'iJ.OOO per 
annum. Even so, Strickland still made a loss, and discovered 
to his cost that the only practical use of the farm was as 
a convenient security for a mortgage. He fell deeper into 
debt, and finally sold Thornton Bridge to a cousin for 
£7000. The salt tax-had not been the sole cause of Sir 
Thomas' downfall .;.. his reckless extravagance'- and lavish 
entertainments had already virtually bankrupted the family. 
The only thing that saved the Stricklands from complete 
poverty was Sir Thomas' enforced exile in 1688 when, as a 
Catholic Privy Counsellor, he followed James II to the con-
tinentI. 
Apart from improving or developing their estates, or 
profiting from the royal bounty, the most frequent way in 
which the Cavaliers recouped their losses was through a 
prosperous marriage. This was the ideal of every landowner -
and, indeed, of everyone. Daughters were given as large 
portions as possible to enable them to marry well in the 
social hierarchy, and the sons had to be found rich heiresses, 
who could augment the family estates. 
, 
It was a fortunate marriage that rescued the Calverleys 
from ruin. Henry Calverley's wife was the daughter of Sir 
1. Ca~ Treas. Bk., I, 471; C.S.P.D., 1664-5, 388; PRO, 
c66j31t7/14; H. Hornyold, Genealol1:1cal Memoirs O'rthe 
Femil~.of Strickland of Sizer~h (!tenda!, 1928), 87-9, 
128-1 5; D. Scott, The Strick ends of SizerRh Castle, (Kendal, 1908), 153 ff. 
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Walter Pye, whose money had helped the family over the 
difficult composition period. The son and heir, Walter, 
married the heiress of the Thompsons of Esholt: much of 
her inheritance in Bromfield and the county of Cumberland 
was sold to rescue the Calverley demesnes from the hands 
of creditors. These moves, together. with the sale of the 
Manor of Pudsey, the cutting of timber, and the raising of 
rents, enabled Walter Calverley to retain the rest of his 
property, and gradually to recover from the effects of the 
compositionsl • 
In some families, marriages with heiresses were almost 
cumulative. The Thornhills of Fixby, who had succeeded in 
evading all the anti-Royalist legislation of the civil wars, 
married three co-heiresses and one sole heiress in three 
generations. Miles Stapleton wedded Mary, the sole repres-
entative of the elder branch of the Hopton clan, and, through 
,. 
her mother, co-heiress of the Lindleys. Together, they 
managed to recover from the heavy fine and war damage which 
had been inflicted upon Mary's estates2 • 
Almost as advantageous as an alliance with an heiress 
was the acquisition of a large marriage portion. Sir Richard 
Maleverer's wife brought him £3000, and their son wedded 
Catherine, ultimate heiress of the Hoptons. The Daniels' of 
2. Dugdale, I, 81-2, 172-3. 
1. Du~dale. I, 247-8; ~, Add. MSS., 27412, ff. 222-230. 
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Beswick were only rescued from penury by the large portion 
which George acquired on his marriage with Elizabeth Ireland 
of Nostell. And the recovery of Sir Thomas Slingsby's 
estates was no doubt greatly facilitated by his wife's 
portion of £40001 • 
. Thus the Royalist whose estates had been adversely 
Bffe~ted by the fines and sales of the civil war period 
had many opportunities to retrieve his fortunes. He could 
develop his estates, or he could turn to commerce and 
industry. But probably the most attractive sources of 
income were the office and marriage markets. Endless vistas 
opened before the enterprising Cavalier. Sir John Wolsten-
holme had gone bankrupt when faced with the heavy fine which 
parliament extracted from the customs farmers. His estates 
were all placed in the hands of trustees and sold to pay his 
, 
debts. Yet in 1663 his son was also a customs farmer, in 
1665 a baronet, and by his death in 1670 had restored much 
2 
of the family's lost fortunes. 
Another Royalist who prospered after the Restoration 
was Thomas Fawkes of Farnley. He inherited his father's 
estate just after the war, at the age of seven, and later 
1. EM, Add. MSS., 24455, f. 152; D.N.B., (Daniel); Slingsby 
. f.ifSs, DD56/121. 
2. Harper, Public Bor~§ng, 104-121; C.C.A.M., 131-2; C.C.C., 
2691; PRO, C54!3757 ,C54/3783/8; Cal. Treas. Bk., I, 107, 
, 632; PRO, C66/3034 ,C66/3057/l0, C6673059725. 
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married the soie"heiress 'of' the Mitchells of Arthington. 
He soon completely recovered from any ill effects of the 
c'omposi tiona:~ by' the late 1680' s he was 'a prominent member 
of Yorkshire society, had bought the second Manor of 
Farnley from the: PalJne~of Lindley, was a M~mber of Parlia-
ment' for Knaresborough, and was buildin:g' substantial' additions 
,to hiS' house l • Henry'; Chator' was equally fortunate.' When 
he~ompo~nded in 1649 h~ was merely the you;ger son of'a 
large family, but in 1660 he inherited the Manors of Croft 
, ' 
and Walmire from his nephew, thus setting him firmly on the 
, 2 . , ' 
road to prosperity. 
However, not all of the Cavaliers succeeded in over-
comin~ the financial effects of the anti-Roya1ist·legis1ation. 
Some landowners neglected to economise and husband their 
resources, whilst others were so severely crippled that 
they could 'only mortgage" and finally sell, their estates. 
Naturally" nearly all' of the Royalists had to borrow some 
money in order to pay their composition fines, (or to re-
purchase their lands), but whereas most families succeeded 
in discharging these liabilities, a few were'unable to 
redeem the mortgage and felldeeper'intodebt~ Their loans 
. 
1. Dugaale, I, 206-7; Fawkes MSS, ~assim; Y.W., vol. 73, 
f. 141 (7 August, 1707); N:B:L. evsner t The Buildines of England: Yorkshire, West Riding, (1959), 196. "', " 
2. Dugdale, III, 145. 
. , 
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were renewed at successively higher rates of interest, until 
either the creditor foreclosed, or the owner sold the en-
cumbered estates, as being the only way out of a vicious 
circle. 
i !." 
-- '----.., 
The Constables'of Everingham, 'with debts of over £12,000, 
eventually paid off their mortgages (although it took them 
more than twenty years to do this). In contrast, William 
Palmes of Lindley, despite his marriage to the co-heiress' 
of Sir William Eure, fell'deeper into d.ebt, mortgaging 
. . 
Farnley Manor for two successive terms of 99 years to 
guarantee a loan of £4000. When the sum had not been redeemed 
. , 
after seventeen years, Palmes decided to end the unequal 
struggle, and sold the property to Thomas Fawkes in 16861 • 
For it was not only money, but also clear-headed ability, 
which decided who would succeed and who-would fail in the 
post-Restoration period. 
The problem is to discover how many of the Royalist 
families foundered after the mid-1640's, and to what extent 
this was due to the composition fines or land sales. Both 
parts of the question are difficult to answer because of 
the limited amount of evidence available, but we can trace 
the economic history of slightly under half of the Cavalier 
families 2 • 
1. Constable MSS, DDEV/56/408; see also iUPFa, pp17~J. Dugdale, 
III, 289; Fawkes MSS (deeds relating 0 awkes' purchase 
of the property). 
2. some of these statistics are based on very detailed inform-
ation, and others on scanty records. However, as the 
Royalist~ tended to magnify their losses in the 1640's, the 
errors w1l1 tend to c.anCel\out. . 
~oth~· . 
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Table XX:- SELECTION OF ROYALIST FAMILIES, 1640-c.1670. 
1642 Position 1670 Position 1 
" No. Pros- Comf- Average Weak Declintg 
per's 'table Posit'n 
Prosperous 43 25 10 4 2 2 
Comfortable 52 7 22 9 10 4 
Weak position 29 - 4 3 11 11 
Declining 17 - - 2 2 13 
, 
., 
Totals 141 32 36 18 25 30 
It will be seen from the above table that, after two 
decades in which to recover from the effects of the fines, 
the majority of the Royalisis regained their former economic 
status. 58 per cent of those above the level of financial 
collapse in 1640 had either retained or slightly improved 
their standing, and 21 per cent had declined only slightly. 
It therefore appears that the compositiomwere not the 
crushing blow that has hitherto been maintained. 
Dr. Chesney considered that the fines had seriously 
crippled many of the Royalists. He noted the relatively 
large number of delinquents who apparently took advantage 
of the order of 1 August 1650, to sell parts of their estates 
before composition, in order to raise the money. But, as 
Professor Habakkuk haS co:amented, he did not distinguish 
1. The 1670 position is relative to the pre-war position -
i.e., those who were in a weak position before the 
war are marked 'weak pOSition' if their standing had 
not altered, • average' if they r?seA' and I dec1in, '" if s~h~ they f:tl. 
\ 
317. 
between sales and mortgages. In fact, mere changes of 
tenure prior to composition had to be officially approved 
by Goldsmiths' RaIl - it was the only way in which the Com-
mittee for Compounding could ensure that land held, say, 
in fee simple, was not secretly entailed in order to 
reduce the fine. Many of .the estates which were apparently 
sold were, in fact, only mortgaged. Sir Thomas Danby petitioned 
for permission to dispose of his Manor of Farnley. Although 
he did sell some lands and woods there, .the manor and his 
other properties were only mortgaged, and remained in the 
hands of the family for several more generationsl • 
A considerable number of Royalists sold lands during 
the Interregnum - but several also bought property. The 
sale of esta tes did not necessarily mark' a family as·' a 
declining force: there was generally a fluid market in land, 
for, although the average gentleman was unwilling to sell 
all of his holdings, he often readily exchaneed outlying 
properties in return for more centralised possessions. It 
is settlements and wills, which help to give a picture of 
a family generation by generation, rather than isolated deeds 
of sale, which portray the true standing of the seventeenth-
2 
century landowner • 
1. ,R.E.Chesney, o~. cit. &.loc. cit., passim; H.J.Habakkuk, 
lo~ cit., pass1m. For Danby" see R.C.P.,III,87; Cun-
liffe-Lister lVISS.;' Y .A. S., ~ 279/15778. ' . • 
2. The question of sales is well discussed by Professor 
Habakkuk (loc. cit.); his conclusions are, in the main, 
endorsed by my own results. Sales can help to indicate 
a declininf familYi but care must be taken in distinguishing between sa es, mor eages and conveyances to break entails. 
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;Even.though over half of the Royalists studied 
maintained their financial position, can it be said that 
the remainder had fallen victim to the composition fines? 
On close examination of individual case histories, it 
becomes clear that, although the effects of the wars and 
subsequent fines and sales had .~ disast~rous consequences, 
for a number of Cavaliers, the seed of their financial 
collapse had, in many instances, already been sown. Most 
of those who declined in the 1640's and 1650's were already 
under severe economic pressure before the war. Composition 
merely proved to be the final blow - and a blow that was 
, 1 
probably superfluous in many cases • 
, Fifty-two of the families which can be traced through 
the middle years of the century declined to some extent -
enough is known of forty-five of these to explain their 
failure. Only seven were victims of the anti-Royalist legis-
lation alone: ,the remainder suffered from other contributory 
causes. Four of these thirty-eight families were never 
affected by the Parliamentary proscriptions. William Grim-
ston and Sir Ralph Hansby's executor had only to pay their 
respective sums on the Yorkshire Engagement - money which 
they 'had voluntarily guara.nteed to the King. ~olomon Swale 
1. Civil war damage and gifts to the King as well as the mont~ assessments, are Me. 88~9iQ8P8a.in estimating the 
damage done to the Royalists' estates, as all landowners 
(whatever their allegiance) contributed to some war 
chest, and paid the various assessments exacted by the 
dominant party. 
W not associated with the composition fines 
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and Ambrose Pudsey never suffered anything more than isolated 
war damage to their estates. Thus .the decline of these 
families was purely due to external causes, and cannot be 
attributed to the Parliamentary legislationl • 
The three principal reasons for the financial collapse 
of the Royalist families were over-generosity to the King, 
'war damage, and large families, involving considerable ~ '., 
portions. Together they accounted for twenty-nine out of the 
remaining thirty-four ~asualties of the civil war. Several 
Cavaliers had raised regiments at their own expense - . 
this was an extremely heavy burden for the individual land-
owner to bear. RogerPortington is reputed to'have spent 
over £9000 in raising, equipping, and maintaining a troop 
of horse - he was an ardent Royalist, and after compounding 
for £350 in 1646, fought in the second civil war, having to 
'pay an additional £1540 in 1649. This permanently crippled 
his estate, and forced him to sell much of his property. 
Sir Philip Monckton the younger, also a firm loyalist, 
participated in both wars and several risings, and later . 
alleged that his father had contributed over £20,000 to 
, < 
the Royalist war effort. Although Monckton exaggerated his 
own importance (a failing which led him into trouble after 
, . 
the Restoration), the family had certainly given a great 
deal to the late King2 • 
1. Many other families evaded" the composition fines and 
sequestrations, but did not decline during the middle 
of the century. 
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The cumulative effect of war damage, plunderin~, and 
arbitrary assessments also severely affected the Royalists. 
Sir John Goodricke's house at Hunsingore was burnt down; 
Maulger Norton's estate in Richmondshire was plundered by 
the Scots army, and he was compelled to provide free quarters; 
whilst Richard Harebred lost £800 worth of corn, and all 
his personal estate, with (not surprisingly) the sole exception 
of " 200 load of Manor (manure)"l. 
Sir Gervase Cutler was a victim of both the above mis-
fortunes. He had given £1000 in plate to the King, and also 
advanced £500 on the Yorkshire Engagement. His estate 
suffered severely during the wars, and Sir Gervase died of 
a fever, leaving his four-year-old son and heir under the 
protection of his widow. Although the property was sufficiently 
large to surmount even the hurdle of composition, the wilful 
extravagance and negligence of the young Sir Gervase 
wasted the lands, and eventually precipitated the sale of 
2 the whole estate to Lord Raby • 
Less romantic, but equally important in the decline of 
1. C.A.Goodricke, Ribston, (1902), 50; c.e.c., 878; PRO, 
SP28/249. > ' -
2. Historic Yorkshire Families - Cutler; Hunter, South 
Yorkshire, II, 267; PRO, SP46/134/2l2 (Lady Cutler's 
list of losses). ---
(££~!~_!~~~_E~_~!21· 
2 •. Portington: Hunter, South Yorkshire,> I, 213; R.C.P., II, 
94-5; Battie-Wrightson Mss., Bwlb/c.60, c.61; 
Monckton: Monckton Papers, (ed. E. Peacock, Philobiblon 
Soc., 1884), 85 ff.; R.O.P., II, 67 ff. 
321. 
several Royalists, was the size of their families and,the 
number of children for whom provision had to be made. As 
the amount of a daughter's portion largely determined the 
social'standing'and' financial status of her future husband, 
most fathers attempted to raise the largest dowry they 
could afford. Richard Bowes almost ruined himself by over-
reaching his resources in this way: the Manor of Haethorpe 
was settled on his heir Charles when the latter married in 
1635, and other estates were put in trust .to secure the 
inheritances of his four sons and eight daughters. The 
family was on the brink of insolvency in 1645, and the com-
position fine proved to_be the final blow, forcing.Bowes to 
. 1 
sell the bulk of his lands • 
• '1 ~ Eight families had considerable debts in 1642- all 
'but ~ne":of' these wiere financially unbalanced and beginning 
each of 
to decline. The'compositions faced;them with a peremptory 
demand for a large sum of money, whichJl,any were unable 
to raise. Thus Sir Thomas Danby had to sell a considerable 
amount of land and mortgage heavily to meet his fine .of ' , 
~:£4180 - a fine which took no account of his extensive lia-
I 
bilities, due to the mismanagement· of the estates during ,his 
father's lifetime2 • Matthew Hutton of Marske almost ruined 
" . ' 
, , .. 
1 •. E. Riding Antiruariansoc •. TransactionS"VII,5; Burton, nistory of Hem ngborough, 194; PRO, C54/4181jlO. 
-, ". 
2 •. R.C.P., III, 86; Cunliffe-Lister MSS,passim; Thoresby 
Socie=ty, XXXVII, pp. 1 ff. " ' <, 
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his family by incompetent estate management and extravagance: 
much of his property was sold, and it took his successors 
several generations before they could recover from the 
. , 
effects of his follyl. 
Occasionally the fine was doubled by the excessive 
zeal of the Cavalier concerned. Will~am Armitage, Roger 
Portington, Sir Thomas Strickland and Richard Tempest all 
compounded twice: they had paid ,their first fines, and then 
unwisely took part in the second civil war, which resulted 
in an additional composition at a higher rate. They were, 
in fact, fortunate to be treated so lightly, as they had 
broken an oath of loyalty to Parliament2 • As it was, this 
second punishment was responsible for the decline of the 
Armitages, and acted as a catalyst in the collapse of the 
othert~ families3• 
Several Cavaliers declined, not because composition 
was the final blow to an already heavily-encumbered estate, 
but because they refused to realise the necessity for temp-
orary economic retrenchment until the mortgages ( raised to 
settle the fines) had been discharged. Richard Tempest 
was severely hit by the effects of his double composition, 
1. Y .A.J ., VI, 249 ff; ColI. Top. et Gen.,V t 253-4. 
2. " I. l do swear ••• -that I will not directly or 
incirectly adhere unto or willingly assist the King in 
this war, ••• without the consent of the ,two Houses of 
Parliament in this cause or war". Negative Oath, to be 
taken by all compounders (Gardiner, Const. Docs.,289)~, 
3. R.C.P., II, 45-6; ibid., II, 94-5; ibid., It 160-162. 
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but was unable to cure his passion for gambling. According 
, .' .. 
to legend, Bowling Hall was staked on a single throw of the 
dlc'e l : wheth~rthis' is true or not, the Manor of Bowling 
~as :so'ld to' Henry Savile for '£7180 in August 1649 (alo~g' 
. . . 
with collieries and three mills in Bradford). Despite the 
:> 
heavy mortgages on his other estates, Tempest was soon after-
wards living at Bath in great luxury. The following year, 
all his lands had to be demised to Sir Edward Rhodes and 
John Rushworth as security for debts, Tempest receiving only 
'. .. . . 2 
£400 a year for himself and £135 for his wife • In 1656 
the Roialist wa~ arrested for debt, but was allowed to live 
at home (because of ill health) on Rushworth's security. He 
died a pauper the following year, leaving his daughter a 
portion of £2500, and the remainder of his estate to Rush-
worth, as a reward for aiding him" ••• in all my Extremities 
< 
••• (and) redeeming mee out of a sad condicon in France when 
all othe~ frei~ds failed mee"3. 
The two other principal reasons for the decline of 
otherwise financially stable· families were pure extravagance, 
. , 
and the losses incurred in litigation. Lyon Bamford of Pule 
Hill inherited a small but reasonably prosperous estate: 
1. Wilsom .SS., cited by J. James, The History and Topography 
of Bradford, (1841), 314-5. 
2. Rushworth's colleague, Robert Shireburne, was to admin-
ister the estate. 
3. Tempest MSS, (1!!!, Add. MSS. '40670) f. 8 ff.; y.A.a.R.s., 
IX, 105-6. 
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his wastefulness and expensive tastes led him into 
heavy debts. He sold the majority of. his lands, even including 
the reversion on his mother's dower •. She voluntarily 
reduced her jointure by a fifth to help her son, but (wise 
womanl) refused to exchange her lands in return for an 
annuity. After Bamford's death, his sister unsuccessfully 
attempted to recover the lands at law; the resuil was. that 
. . 
the family only sank deeper into debt,. and most of the 
1 
remaining properties were sold • 
Probably the two greatest victims of litigation were 
Francis Rockley of,Rockley and Cuthbert Morley of Seamer. 
Morley's case is ,discussed in Appendix III: Rockley suffered 
essentially the same.fate. His father, Robert Rockley, had 
been created trustee for the estate of his young grand-
nephew, Francis Burdett of Birthwaite. The following year 
(1644) Robert died and, as no provision had been made for 
the guardianship of the young lad, Sir John Kaye (who had 
recently married the child's mother) took upon this task. 
Independent arbiters allowed Kaye .020 per annum for the 
maintenance of the infant. Francis Rockley, on returning 
home from the wars, unwisely acceded to requests that he 
should adopt hi~ father's position ai truste~ without first 
checking the financial situation of the estate. He was 
1. Hunter, South Yorkshire,' II, 270;', Elmhirst MSS, MT/20,-
63302; PRO, c787629/5; Spencer-stanhope MSS (Sheffield), 
60264. 
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immediately sued by Kaye for'the unpaid maintenance, and 
by numerous creditors' for their long-overdue debts. Rockley 
refused to pay, claiming that the Birthwaite property owed 
money to his father p and that his enemies were guilty of 
conspiracy. The matter went to Chancery in May 1656 -
twelve years later, the case was still unsettled~ 
This lawsuit bankrupted Rockley - in July 1678 he 
appealed to the Lords against a Chancery decree ordering 
him to pay £7l35-19-9!d. as his father's executor, for he 
asserted that it took no account of his counter-claims on 
. . -' 
the Burdett estate. He finally died' irrprison for debt in 
1679, having been ruined by the long legal battle and the 
dishonesty of his confidential servant (who had secretly 
embezzled much of his master's property). Nor was he the 
only victim - legal expenses and Francis Burdett's extrava-
gance led to the eventual loss of the Birthwaite es~esl. 
During the Interregnum and subsequent decades, several 
Royalist families declined. In a few cases, this was solely 
due to the weight of composition, but in the majority of 
instances the causes were more complex. Pre-war instabili,ty 
and post~war extravagance led a number of Cavaliers down 
, some of 
the steep slope to economic deteriorati?n. Even/those who 
1. J. Wilkinson, worsborou~h, (1872), 80 ff.; PRO, C5/3 2/96, 
08/285/14, C5/402/79, C 3/212, 216, 218, 22~231, passim; 
HMC, IX, (ii) (House of Lords MSS) 123-4. 
-
were suffering from the after-effects of the wars still 
squandered money. Francis Baildon, who had been hard-hit 
by wardship·expenses, litigation and his composition fine, 
exacerbated by his mother's wanton profligacy with several 
neighbouring gentry,still spent a great deal of money on 
enlarging his house in 16641 • Nor did Rmchard Tempest's 
impending bankruptcy prevent him from living in great 
luxury (and debt) at Bath2 • 
The Interregnum, although it presented the a~erage del-
inquent with a heavy burden of expense, was not necessarily 
the primary cause of the collapse of several Cavaliers' 
estates. Well over half of,the victims of composition 
succeeded in regaining their pre-war financial status, (as 
did some of those whose lands wereconfiscated)3. In this 
they were helped by their social isolation in the 1650's: 
not only was there little opportunity for the normal expenses 
of lavish entertainment and extravagance, but there was 
every encouragement to disguise their actual economic . 
position (so as to minimise assessments). by retrenchment and 
an outward show of poverty. 
1. J. H. Turner, Historical Notices of Shipley, Idle and 
District, (Idle, 1901), 32. 
2. See supra, p. 323, n. 3. 
3. There is, surprisingly, relatively little information 
concerning the financial.status of .those whose lands had 
p~~p forfeited. A brief post-war sUTImary of these 
families is given in Chapter VI. 
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Where the government had pointed the way with its 
vigorous exploitation of all estate resources and the 
racking of rents, 'the Royalists,were swift to follow. 
Examination of estate records during the twenty years 
after 1650 shows'the general elevation of rents - (not 
• merely a steady increase but, in'several cases, a sudden, 
fierce racking of all·sources of income). By careful economy 
and wise mortgaging, most of the delinquents appear to have 
recovered their former social and financial standing within 
the two decades following the Restoration. 
'In a few instances, the Royalist actually benefitted 
during the'Interregnum~;This was usually due to outside 
circumstances - for example,' opportune deaths led both 
Henry Chator'and:Thomas Stringer of Whiston to inherit 
considerable estates. Even the processes:of composition 
could have a fortunate conclusion - Langdale. Sunderland 
was forced to sell his property and, with the surplus 
remaining after he had paid his fine, he bought a smaller 
estate which layover rich seams of coal. Stephen Hutchinson 
profited from being a Parliamentarian, and his grandson 
(whose father had been loyal to the King) thus found himself 
with a considerable estate. Sir George Wentworth made a for-
tune from buying the property of bankrupt Royalists, as 
apparently did Francis Nevile of Chevet. The·war occasionally 
. " , 
m~de~' 'as well as ruined, fortunes1 • 
1. Chator: Dueda1e, III, 145; Stringer: ibid., I, 32-3; 
• Sunderland: Lister, ~~ cit., 133 ff.; Dupdale, II, 439 
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It would be idle to argue that no lands belonging to 
Royalists were lost in the decades following the civil wars: 
many Cavalier families sold some, and several parted with 
all (or the majority) of their property. The Vaughans, 
Lowthers of Ingleton, Gales, Erringtons, Theakstones and 
other families disappeared completely from the ranks of the 
landowning gentry. But, to a large extent, this was due to 
exceptional circmnstances, where the Royalist was already 
in such a position that the property might have had to be 
sold in any case. Most of those who parted with large 
quantities of land were victims of circumstances other than 
their Royalism. After all, as we have seen, many Cavaliers 
whose lands were forfeited eventually recovered them and, 
although heavily indebted for a lone time, managed to 
meet the high costs involved. If they could face a fine of 
from a half to three-quarters of their estate, surely the 
average delinquent could manage his composition of a mere 
two to three years' annual revenue? 
Dr. Chesney painted far too dark a picture of the fate 
of the Cavaliers - the majority, after having had a little 
time to adjust ,to the changed Circumstances, easily reeained 
their former economic positions. The few delinquents who 
fell by the wayside were viotims of pre-war debts or carel~ss 
(£~~~~_!!~~_E~_~~I~) 
(-Hutchinson); Wentworth: . Y.A.J., XII, 168 ff; Nevile: 
~, C54/3351/15, 054/3440/23. 
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estdB management, as much as the martyrs of Parliamentary 
policy. 
Most Royalists attempted to retain their property for 
as long as possible. The low land values of a flooded market 
during the Interregnum discouraged the delinquents from 
parting with their estates until they were compelled to do 
so. Even after 1660, landlords were reluctant. to sell their 
patrimony unless it was absolutely necessary. But, although 
some unfortunates sold their lands, there was no wholesale 
transfer of property. The composition fines, though high, 
were not unreasonablel : they were not intended to cripple 
the Royalists. Those who were forced to sell their property 
were generally the victims of their own, or their ancestors' 
improvidence. 
Most delinquents were temporarily embarrassed by their 
composition fines or the confiscation of their lands, but 
the majority succeeded in rising to the occasion. The anti-
Royalist legislation was, in itself, generally only one of 
the causes of the Cavaliers' difficulties: some Parliament-
arians and a few Royalists who had evaded the proscriptions 
also declined2 • Composition, far from being the reason for 
1. The government had deliberately eschewed the policy of 
confiscation for the average delinquent - it did not want 
to flood the market with numerous voluntary sales, or a 
great quantity of forfeited property. 
2. For example, the Parliamentarian Sir William Constable 
declined, as did Solomon Swale (a Royalist who had 
avoided discovery). . 
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the downfall of many proud Cavalier families was, for the 
most part, merely a hiatus in their normal social and 
economic development: 
CHAPTER VIII - CONCLUSION. 
" ••• but how wt all discouraged whereby that 
we lie under those 3 heavie Censures, wC 
are, Exile, ever to remain in one place; 
confiscation; and lastly, capitio diminutio, 
that is a depriving of all power in the least 
matter to act as a country man." (1) 
Forty-two-and-a-half per cent of the Yorkshire 
gentry were attached in some way to the Royalist cause. 
The majority suffered for their loyalty, although nearly 
twenty-nine per cent succeeded in evading the heavy hands 
of both Goldsmiths' Hall and Drury House. The punishments 
meted out to the remaining delinquents varied considerably 
in their severity: from the fine of a mere twentieth 
imposed upon Sir John Kaye 2 , to the harsh confiscation of 
all the estates of the Catholic delinquents. But in spite 
of the rigour of such penalties, many Royalists, mainly 
through their own efforts, succeeded in oyercoming these 
burdens. 
Although there is a temp~ation to regard the compounders 
as separate from the victims of confiscation, it is important 
to treat all the delinquents as a single group, as far as 
1. Sir Henry Slingsby to Slingsby Bethell (21 January, 
1650/l), quoted in the Diary of Sir Henry Slin~sby, p. 346. 
2. R.C.P., II, 1-2. 
- 331 -
332. 
1 this ia possible • They had, served, the King together and 
(with,the exception of a handful of leading Royalists), 
2 their punishments were not intended ~o be different. The 
anti-Royalist legislation was basically empirical in character, 
composition being adopted as the pract~cal solution to 
the sequestration problem, and sale as the answer. to the 
government's financial difficulties. Parliament's principal 
need was for money, not land, and thus it permitted the 
. , 
recusants in the later Acts of Sale to compound for their 
forfeited estates whilst, in contrast, those who had 
, " ... 
neglected t.opay their fines suffered the confiscation and 
sale of their'property. Gerrard Lowther of Ingleton lost 
Ir , • • 
his estates because he was unable to pay his father's £400 
, ' 
composition; conversely, the Catholic George Metham, with 
the aid of Lord Fairfax, evaded confiscation, and had only 
to, pay a fine of £13503 • 
1.; However,to some' extent they must be 'treated separately, 
because of the different character of thei~.punishments. 
2. At first all estates were sequestrated. Then a select 
few were allowed to compound (they were chosen~by Parl-" 
iament) and, aa more money was needed, all delinquents 
(excluding certain Royalist leaders and the Catholics) 
were permitted to compound. By 1651, the hitherto seques-
tered estates of the recusants(the latter had been 
allowed to lease their own property) were marked for sale, 
but those in the later Acts of Sale (who were virtually 
all recusants) were granted the option of compou~ding 
at two-sixths. Eventually, even the sequestered,two-
thirds of ordinary Catholics were to be sold. Only the 
Royalist leaders were set apart - they were never offered 
the chance to compound for their property. 
3. R.C.P., II, 156-7; ibid., III, 3-5; Aveling, o~. cit.,. 
109; .E. Riding Ant. Soc. Transactions, XIII (11) 163~4; 
ibid., XvI, 33-39. . 
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The principal difficulty facine, the Cavaliers during 
the middle years of the century was a shortage of ready 
money. Both the composition fine and the purchase price of 
confiscated property had to be paid in cashl. Several 
delinquents had no financial reserves: some had given too 
generously to the King, and others were the victims of 
plundering soldiery. Thus the only solution was to borrow 
money on the security of land or (as a last resort) to 
sell the estate itself. The problem is to decide what effect 
these exactions had upon the average delinquent. 
First, however, consideration must be given to the 
general effects of the conflict. The Royalists, like all 
the landowners, had suffered from the consequences of civil 
war - raiding,looting, and all the results of localised 
fighting. The decade after 1642 had been a period of ereat 
expense for all the gentry: first war damages and then the 
various assessments and taxes burdened their estates. 
Having to pay compositions as well, the Cavaliers naturally 
felt the weight of these exactions more than their opponents 
but, except in isolated circumstances where laree-scale. 
destruction had been wrought, there was no reason why such 
losses should obstruct the payment of the fines. 
War damage was, in fact, the only incidental expense 
which was likely to ruin the average gentleman. A number 
1. The confiscated lands could be bought with doubled bills 
- but these had still to be bought, even if it was at a 
discount. 
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of the Royalists suffered from living too close to military 
strongholds; others were the victims of raiding and foraging 
parties,or simply.of troops,eagerfor.plunder. :But although 
many landowners had to endure a certain amount of this, 
the number-of families who were really crippled by extensive 
destruction seems to have been relatively smalll • 
Nor does high taxation appear to have affected the 
delinquents any more than the average landowner. Even the 
twentieth was originally intended as a universal assessment, 
and the majority of Parliamentarians paid it as their con-
. ;', . 2 
tribution to the government's war effort • Like the other 
assessments, it was calculated principally on income, and 
therefore the Royalists who had put their estates in trust 
to pay their composition fine were correspondingly less 
. .. 
affected. It was not until the decimation tax in the next 
. 
decade that the Cavaliers were again treated as a specific 
I .. ; 
) 
source of income: and even this levy was withdrawn after 
a year, a motion to continue it being defeated in Parliament3 • 
1. Apparently the reports of war destruction by people such 
_ as Lord Fairfax were exaggera.ted. Even where such damage 
is mentioned in 'particulars of estate', it is generally 
limited to the loss of corn, etc., and does not extend 
to·permanent'damage, such as the destruction of buildings. 
The steady rise in rentals on sequestered estates -
suggests that the consequences of the fighting could not 
have been-too rar-reaching •. 
- . 
2. The Royalists, however, had already contributed to the 
King's war chest,and thu& in effect, had to pay, t~ice. 
3. See supra, - p. 86 ., . " . 
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It therefore appears that the Royalists suffered 
little more than their opponents from the effects of the 
government's fiscal·policies.· Their principal financial 
burden was the expense of retrieving their property from 
the hands of the sequestrators - the payment of the com-
position fines and the repurchase of forfeited lands. 
As w~s explained in the previous chapter, the fines 
were relatively lenient - it was only a small minority who 
had to pay more than three years' income. These sums could 
be recouped,by careful economies during the following decade, 
or by reducing the portions and annuities given to younger 
childrenl • Naturally, most of the gentry regretted the need 
for such frugality, and it was the refusal to take precaution-
ary measures that proved to be the downfall of several 
families. They neglected to make the necessary economies, 
with the result that their fortunes steadily declined. 
In assessing the effects of the fines, I have taken 
little notice of the sale of very small portions of land. 
1. The considerable portions given to daughters by Royalists 
who had died soon after compounding seems to indicate 
that either: (i) they had recovered very quickly from 
the fines; (ii) they were making no attempt to economise, 
or (iii) the portions were already settled on trust lands. 
As roost of this information has been gleaned from wills, 
(iii') cannot really apply • See the will of George Dawson 
of Azer1ey (1653) - he left £1000 to his daughter, 
al though he had claimed to be bankrupt when. he': had'~been 
assessed four years previously~ (Somerset House, Alchin, 
f. 337; C.C.A.M., 1042). 
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Many families bought and sold property fairly frequently, 
endeavouring to build up compact estates on rich, productive 
land (or alternatively, land rich in mineral deposits). As 
a Royalist would have to sell at least a tenth of his 
estate to '. raise his fine, anything substantially below that 
amount haa not been regarded as an indication of imminent 
financial cOllapse l • During the Interregnum, Francis Nevile 
made a handsome profit from buying and selling estates, 
including fee farm rents confiscated from the Orown2 • 
The majority of'the delinquents had little difficulty 
in raising their fines. The first half was usually paid 
with conspicuous alacrity, in order to retrieve the family 
estates from the hands of the sequestrators. After thiS, 
however, most Royalists attempted to delay the completion 
of their compositions for as long as possible, with con-
siderable success. The Committee for Compounding later 
offered easy terms to those who were unable to meet their 
fines - they were allowed to sell land in order to raise ,the 
first half, and to delay settlement of the remainder 'upon 
payment of eight per cent interest. 'Hardly any Yorkshiremen 
needed to take advantage of the former provision, and the 
1. I.e., a £400 fine could be settled by selline lands 
worth £20 a year (the fine, at a tenth, would represent 
two years' value of the i200-a-year estate). In such a 
case, the sale of under £10 a year in land has not been, 
of itself, regarded as indicative of economic decline. 
2. PRO, 054/3351/15; PRO,C54/3440/23,C54/3526/21, 054/3660/37. 
- -- • > 
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latter was mainly introduced to expedite the pa.yment of 
overdue fines. Eventually 97 per cent of the delinquents who 
were allowed to compound satisfied the demands of Goldsmiths' 
Hall. 
The results of the compositions were not as disast.rous 
as has been alleged. Some families did decline, but relatively 
few were ruined by the effects of the fines alone. In the 
majority of instances, the fine was only one of a number of: 
contributory causes. War damage, over-generous gifts to 
the King, large families involving considerable portions 
and annuities,gamb11ng and extravagance - all played their 
part in contributing to the fall of the less fortunate 
families. In some cases, such'as-that of the near-bankrupt 
Arthur Aldburgh, it is fairly certain that the delinquent 
would have been forced to sell the bulk of his estates, 
even if there had been no anti-Royalist legislation. l In 
other instances, composition was a catalyst which precipi-
tatedthe decline of already financially-encumbered gentry. 
Most of the delinquents who were ruined during this 
period tried to hold on to their estates for as long as 
possible. The extra expenses resulting from the civil wars 
and compositions had found chinks in the financial armour 
of landowners allover the country, and naturally, in a 
market-flooded with property from both private and state 
1. His position was very critical in 1642 - seeR.C.P., II, 
217. For his debts, see ~, C78/600/11. 
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sources, land prices were depressed. Thus the Cavaliers 
attempted to mortgage rather than sell, and even after the 
Interregnum, tried to retain their esttes for as long as 
possible. As Habakkuk has said, " Even the most debt-ridden 
families were an unconscionably long time dying ••••• it 
, 
took a considerable time before aheerily indebted family 
exhausted the alternatives and was compelled to sell, ••• ,,1. 
, .. 
It is clear that delinquents in no financial difficulties 
. . , 
had very little trouble in raising their fines. Even those 
with debts could usually manage to find the money somewhere. 
Sales, as an indication of economic decline, were generally 
, 
the result of an already-burdened family trying to borrow 
more money. Gerrard Lowther of Ingleton was the only 
delinquent who was completely unable to raise the £400 needed 
2 . 
to pay his fine • But, although the rest of the Cavaliers 
satisfied the demands of Goldsmiths' Hall, their main 
problem lay in repaying the borrowed money. The richer and 
more influential Royalists raised the necessary capital in 
London, or enlisted the aid of their friends: few of these 
families declined sharply, although a number were encumbered 
with debts and trusts for several years. It was the smaller 
1. H. J. Habakkuk, .op. cit., 'in Ec.H.R., (2 series), XVIII, 
pp. 149, 146. 
2. R.C.P., II, l56.As Lowther was neithe~ a Catholic, nor 
excluded from pardon, the only reason why his composition 
was never completed must have been his inability to 
raise the money. The family was in a critical financial 
position - Y.A.S., DD123; PR~CIO/468/l32. 
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Cavaliers, who had no rich friends and little security to 
offer, who were generally the ones to be forced to the wall. 
The confiscation and sale of the property of the 
, 
Catholic delinquents and a few stubborn Royalists was a 
.. ' . 
very severe punishment for those whose only crime was that 
of loyalty to their religion or their King. But such' penalties 
. " 
only succeeded in providing the government with extra revenue -
there was relativ~ly little change in the ownership of 
, ,-
estates. For the principal feature of the sale of confis-
, , 
cated -prop~rty was the way in which the actual sales were 
. - -dominated by the Royalists themselves. Of the 185 parcels 
, , 
of land sold by the Treason Trustees, 120 (65 per cent) 
and probably as many as 134 (72.5 per cent) were regained 
.' .. ' immediately by their former owners, either by composition 
or repurchase from Drury House. A further 13 per cent were 
recovered at a later datel • Those who failed to redeem their 
, 
property were either heavily in debt (the estates then going 
to creditors), or' had sold the title to the Commonwealth 
purchaser. 
For those who retrieved their lands by composition, 
the cost was by no means prohibitive - six years' purchase 
for lands in fee simple. Most of the compounders were paying 
for property which was not entailed, and could therefore 
be sold in perpetuity. These fines were very little different 
1. 6.5 per cent of the estates cannot be traced, and 8 per 
cent were never recovered. 
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to those imposed upon the average delinquents, and few of 
the Royalists concerned appear to have suffered from any 
ill effects. The only person who sold his estates after he 
had regained them was ,John Constable, who was already 
crippled with debt, and had been living an unenviable existence 
in a decaying manor. house. Despite Parliament's orders, the 
remainder of the compounders retained their newly-recovered 
lands, and generally succeeded in avoiding any, further pro-
secutions for their recusancy. 
Where, however, the Royalists regained their lands from 
the Treason Trustees, at second hand from a Commonwealth 
buyer, or relied on the processes of law, the expense 
involved could be considerably greater. The cost of re-
purchasing an estate at Drury House varied from a half to 
three-quarters of the total capital value of the property 
in questionl - this could be reduced by the use of public 
faith bills, which were apparently bought at a discount from 
London profiteers. So~e families regained their estates, 
only to fall victim tO,the heavy debts or to extreme necessity. 
Both the Langdales and Marmaduke Cholmley of Brandsby had 
to sell some lands almost immediately after their recovery; 
the former transaction was made by the Royalist's dependants, 
"', 2 
who had been left with virtually no means of subsistence • 
1. This was for fee simple - estates in tail were assessed 
at only 5 to 7 years' purchase. 
2. See'supra, Chapters V and VI, passim. 
341. 
After the Restoiation, several more estates had to be 
sold. None·of their owners had been in a very stable'economic 
position before the war, with the exception ofSiiFhilip 
Constable and Cuthbert Morley. The former sold some small 
properties, apparently more 'to dispose of outlying estates 
than to raise a large sum of money; and the latter had been 
the victim of the dishonesty of his principal creditorl •. 
With these few exceptions, most of the families who had 
rerainedtheir lands' during or after the Interregnum 
succeeded in holding on to t~eir po~sessions for at least 
one decade following the Restoration2 • 
The legacies of such tenacity were heavy debt's, 
usually involving considerable mortgages and long trusts. 
some families' succeeded in' discharging th'ese liabilities: 
the Constables eventually paid off over'£l2,000 in mortgages, 
and the Plumptons also managed to discharge their incumbrances3 0 
But indebtedness was the cause of the downfall of several 
families. Lord Langdal~ ~old his Manors of Fighill;' and 
Mol.scroft around l67l,'and John Errineton disposed of his 
Durham properties in 1682. Another Royalist family, the 
Danbys of· Leake, also sold th~ bulk of their estates in the -
1. See Chapter VI (Constable) and Appendix III (Morley). 
2 •. 0f those estates recovered at once~ 14 percent were 
later sold (by 1670); of ·those recovered later, 38 per 
cent were later sold. 
3. Constable MSS.,passim; Will of Robert Plumpton, Y.W., 
vol. 50, f. 211. 
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North Riding soon after 16881 •. 
It is, however, not certain that the losses incurred 
during the Interregnum were directly responsible for the 
ultimate sale of the above properties. Langdale had lost a 
great deal during the actual·fighting, almost exhausting 
his resources in the Kingts service2 • Little is known about 
John Errington, but the Danbys did not suffer much for their 
loya1ty~ The·Leake estates were all entailed, and were sold 
at only seven years t purchase3 • It therefore seems likely 
that other misfortunes contributed to the final collapse of 
these families. 
Even so, the Hearth Tax records reveal that the 
majority of the owners of confiscated lands were still in 
possession of their property in the 1670's. Sixty-three 
per cent of these· families held all (or the vast majority) 
of their lands over ten years after the Restor~tion4. By 
judicious economi~s and careful estate management, these 
Royalists gradually discharged their li~bilities and slowly 
recovered their financial equilibrium. 
1. Beverley Record Office: DDX/85/3; PRO, CP25(2)!756 (Trin, 
1672); VCR, Durham, III, 233; ibid.~orth Riding, I, 412-3. 
2. Sunderland, Langdale, passim. 
3. ~, C54/3755/29;leases in PRO, SP28/2l5. 
4. ~, E179/26l/ll, E179/2l6/46l, E179/262/l3. 
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It therefore seems clear that most of the delinquents 
retained their estates, despite the fines and sales of the 
civil war and Interregnum periods. The casualties in the 
fight for survivai were usually those who were already at-a 
financial disadvantage.'However, not all of those in debt 
~ecessarily declin~d ~ careful economies and the assistance 
bf friends helped them to over6ome their disad~antages. " 
surprisingly, a high percentage of the Cavaliers involved 
in the:Acts of Sale succeeded in regaining and keeping 
their properties - apparently the efforts needed to recover 
the lands impressed upon their owners'the necessity for 
urgent and far-reaching reductions in expenditure, and the 
swift expansion of ~ll existing resources. 
The Restoration meant, the return of the Royalist 
gentry to positions of power and profit in county society. 
But although the leading Cavaliers obtained the most lucrative 
and important offices in local (a,nd central) government, 
there was no great expulsion of the eX-Parliamentarians. 
True, those who had been prominent on the Interregnum 
committees, and who had supported the "usurped power" right 
up to the Restoration, were temporarily in eclipse, but 
of the 
many/gentry who had foueht for Parliament took their place 
in the p6st~1660 corridors of local power. 
This relative absence of acrimony and bitter recrimination 
derived its origins from the fairly fluid loyalties -of the 
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civil war era. The division of the two parties in Yorkshire 
into Royalist and Parliamentarian ,had never been absolute -
Bome families had been divided in allegiance whilst, in times 
of stress, blood loyalties usually overrode mere political 
considerations. On the eve of the Restoration, many erstwhile 
Roundheads joined in the clamour for a free Parliament and 
the return of Charles II. Sir Henry Cholmley, John Bright, 
and Barrington, the son and heir of the regicide Sir John 
, 
Bourchier, all transferred their loyalties from the Rump 
, 1 
oligarchy to the traditional forms of government • 
In the post-Restoration period, the Royalists were ever 
mindful of their losses during the previous two decades, as 
they struggled to shake off the burden:of debt inherited 
from the'com~ositions and land sales. Disgust at the,generosity 
of the 1660 settlement inspired many ballads and songs 
levelled at the cynical politicians who were believed to 
have monopolised all the principal-seats of profit and 
2 power • But, at least in Yorkshire, this Royalist antagonism 
towards the erstwhile Parliamentary commissioners and admin-
istrators did not include hostility to the gentry who had 
merely fought for Parliament during the war. 
Exceptions were, however, made in the case~of prominent 
1. C.S.P.D., 1660-61, 446; ibid., 501; PRO, C66/2923/ll. 
2. For examples of such literature, see Mackay, OPe cit., 
and Wilkins, Ope cit., 
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Parliamentarians, such as John Lambert and Francis Lascelles, 
who were both disabled from sitting in the 1660 House of 
Commonsl • If we make allowance for the fact that (excluding 
the divided families), the ratio of Royalist to Parliament-
arian was about nine to four, it is clear that little notice 
was taken of a man's pre-1649 loyalties, provided that he 
wa.s prepared to swear allegiance to Charles II. 
Table XXI:- SELECTION OF POST-RESTORATION OFFICIALS, 
, (by civil war loyalties). 
R 2 Position 'Date I Civil War Allegiance ef. 
HOy. Parol. ChIS Neut. Totals 
:; /,,-!. , ' or " . 
unknown 
a. M.P.' s 1660 14 10 2 4 30 
1661 16 2 2 10 30 
(N.Rdg 1661 18 10 1 2 31 
b. J.P. 's ~E.Rdg 1661 24 19 7 50 -
(W.Rdg 1661 22 14 3 8 47 
c. Sheriffs l660-7(~ 9 , 1 - 1 11 
d. Deputy ) 1661 24 7 3 2 36 Lieutenants) , 
e. Commissioners )1660 52 51 no~ taken -
for Collecting)"1664!5 108 68 4 not taken -, Money ) 'I 
I f. Depty Lieuts. I W.Rdg & Ainst )167 15 12 1 6 34 ( y 
1. Both had been strong supporters of the Interregnum 
r~eimes. , 
• 
2. In the above table,·sons~are·c1a~~e~ with the sam~ part~ 
as the father. Where the family is divided, the allegiance 
of the appointee is counted. References: (a) G.R.Park 
Parliamentar Re resentation of Yorkshire (Hull, l886~, 
~aSS1!!!; _, ger on ,. ; (c) BM, Add MSS, 
4443, f. 87; (d) EEQ, SP29/60/66; (e) Statutes-of the 
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There was naturally a bias towards the Royalists in 
the principal offices, and as a result of the post-Restora-
tion distribution of titles, the majority of the baronets 
and knights were ex-Cavaliers. But this is quite under- , 
standable, as is the relative absence of the principal 
ParliamentarY.- leaders from the ranks of the local officials. 
Some who had supported the Restoration gained prominent 
positions -(for example John Bright, who had been Sheriff of 
Yorkshire during the Interregnum, was created baronet, and 
sat on. the Commission of the Peace). There is no evidence 
of any rift in local society originating from clashes of 
civil war loyalties - life apparently settled down to its 
pre-1642 patternl. 
It is difficult to generalise on the question of the 
Royalists. Some families disappeared in a cloud of financial 
chaos; others emerged from the Interregnum hardly affected 
by their ordeal. But some definite conclusions can be 
reached. 22.2 per cent of the Royalist familes.paid no 
penalties at all, and a further 6.8 per cent had only to 
contri bute towards the Yorksh,ire Engagement. Thus between 
a quarter and a third of the Royalist gentry suffered 
relatively little from the Parliamentary exactions. 
1. Thanks are due to Mr. G. C. F. Forster of Leeds University 
for advice on this problem. 
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Those who compounded had little difficulty in paying 
their fines unless they were heavily burdened with pre-war 
debts or incidental expenses, such as war "damage. Even then, 
'many succeeded in meeting their obligations, and gradually 
discharged their"liabilities1 • A few improvident delinquents 
neglected to economise, and thus fell victims, more to their 
own recklessness than to the composition fines. 
The confiscations were far more serious. The vast 
majority of those whose lands were forfeited succeeded in 
regaining their estates, although the expense involved 
occasionally led to the hasty resale of the property. But 
nearly two-thirds of these Royalists seem to have recovered 
from the sales, retaining their lands, even if their finances 
were somewhat unstable. 
Whatever the complaints they levelled at their oppressors, 
whatever the petitions they submitted to the King, begging 
redress, the Cavaliers (at least in Yorkshire) were by no 
means ruined and prostrate at the Restoration. The Catholics 
had suffered by far the most, and yet the majority of them 
succeeded in overcoming their economic burdens. The Royalists' 
objections to the 1660 settlement were motivated by indigna-
tion, rather than by justified complaints. They wanted to 
fill their pockets with the royal bounty: careful economies 
and rigorous estate management did not at all appeal to the 
average Restoration gentlemant 
1. A number of Cavaliers were back on their feet before 1660. 
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The main victims of the anti-Royalist legislation were 
those who were alre~dy financially unstable, and who might 
have declined even without the added impetus of the Parlia-
mentary fines and exactions. The picture of the ruined 
Cavalier gentleman (as a typical feature of post-1660 
times) ~xisted more in s~ntiment than in actual fact. Those 
who, like Sir Marrnaduke Langdale, claimed hu€,e losses, were 
including war dariage and contributions to their cause -
expenses which the Parliamentarians also suffered.' Admittedly, 
a few of the 'gentry fell victims to the composition fines 
alone, but their number has been greatly exaggerated. The 
forfeitures were more likely to cause the collapse of families, 
but even here it must be noted that many recusants recovered 
from this calami tyl. Seve'ral' of those who were on the economic 
brink were aided by their former enemies. If the post-
Restoration development of parties is to be attributed to 
the events of the "English Re<volution", it must be (at least, 
from the evidence of 'Yorkshire). on grounds other than the 
post-war economic position of the Cavaliers. 
1. Those in the Acts of Sale suffered the most severely of 
all the Royalists, but only 16 per cent of them were 
non-Catholic, and the remainder - the recusants - were 
considered by the average Protestant gentry to be a 
class apart. . 
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APPENDIX I.' 
THE INFLUENCE O:B' SEQUESTRATION UPON COMPOSITION. 
The machinery of sequestration and the procedural workings 
of the local co~nittees have been described in some detail 
because of their direct effect upon the rate of payment of the 
composition fines.·Parliament had seized the estates of all 
delinquents, and had diverted their revenues into the treasury 
of the central Sequestration Committee at Haberdashers' Hall. 
The only means of recovering such sequestered property was 
by paying a fine to the Committee for Compounding, and it 
was this that encouraged the delinquents to compound in the 
, 
months following the King'S defeat in the civil war. 
Before the central committees had formulated regulations 
for the running of sequestered estates, many delinquents 
(especially in Royalist areas) were able to gain advantageous 
leases of their own properties, often at considerable under-
valuations. In order to prevent such practices (which might 
have deterred the Cavaliers from compounding), Parliament 
forba&local officials to farm sequestered estates to Royalists 
or their agents, unless the latter could prove that they 
were in the process of compoundingl • 
1. Resolution of the House of Commons, 10 November, 1646, 
C.J., IV, 718. 
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. 
However, the main problem lay in'expediting the payment 
of the second halves of the· fines, which were due six 
weeks after the first halves had been settled. Resequestra-
tion was the normal punishment for such disobedience, but 
in practice this operation proved to-be far too unwieldy 
and slow. The Royalists, who had regained control of their 
property on paying their first halves,· naturally took 
advantage of the inadequate system, and delayed settle-
ment of their debts for as long as possible. 
The local sequestrators proved to be completely unable 
to cope with the great volume of work, a.nd therefore 
Parliament adopted a different system. Cavaliers who neglected 
to pay their fines on time were charged interest on the 
debt at eight per centl. This gave some welcome respite to 
the poorer Royalists, but broueht no noticeable improve-
ment in the amount of money paid into Goldsmiths' Hall. 
The proper administration of resequestration for the 
non-payment of fines demanded the maintenance of compre-
hensive, up-to-date records, and an adequately staffed, 
efficient bureaucracy. Unfortunately, government parsimony 
limited the number of officials allowed to each county 
committee (irrespective of the volume of its work or the 
size of its area). The whole system of resequestration thus 
gradually fell into arrears, and then slowly lapsed into 
decay. Parliament finally abandoned such methods, but its 
1. See Chapter II, p. 65 • 
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new system of charging interest was hardly any improvement. 
Resequestration failed in its object of compelling the 
delinquents to compound because it could not be fully enforced. 
It was this deficiency in organisation that allowed the 
Royalists to flaunt the authority of the Committee for 
Compounding, and to delay the payment of their fines with 
such success. And, of course, the longer the Cavaliers could 
wait before settling their compositions, the better would be the 
position of their estates to bear the cost of the fines. 
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APPENDIX II-A. 
THE CONFISCATED ESTATES. 
The following table illustrates the sale of the for-
feited lands, and their ultimate fate (where this can be 
tra.ced). 
NOTES 
The' plus sign (+) before a property indicates that the 
property was compounded for, and therefore not sold. 
Column b: Where the delinquent owned many properties, 
only the major ones are listed in detail. 
Column c: The date of the sale is given by month and year 
(where known) - i.e., 8-53 means the ei~ month 
(August) 1653. 
Column d: The price is given to the nearest pound, or con-
venient fraction. 
Column e: The rate of purchase is only given where the 
value of the lands at the 1652/3 survey is known, 
or can be reasonably approximated. It' after this 
indicates that the lands were in trust, and were 
therefore sold for life only. 
Column f: This is the FIRST purchaser, who boufht the lands 
directly from the Treason Trustees. 
Column g: The following abbreviations are used to indicate 
the nature of the sale:-
T - trust purchase. T? - probable trust 
purchase. 
DR - direct repurchase Q - compounded (price 
equals comp. price) 
C - lands to creditor Cb - creditor buys lands 
G - lands to a grantee 
~~~~E~~~~~~_E~E£~~~~E~:­
LG - local gentleman 
LnG - London It 
xG - provincial non-
local gentleman. 
L - local non-gentleman 
Ln - London It II 
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Column h: The fate of the lands is only indicated where 
necessary - i.e., trust lands recovered by the 
Royalist, and not sold at a later date, are not 
specially recorded. Trust lands which were sold, 
and the fate of estates which fell to independent 
purchasers, grantees or creditors, are noted. 
N.B.:-
The followine abbreviation are used:-
TS - title sold before recovery - lands there-
fore not recovered. 
NR - lands non recovered. 
S - lands sold (or mortgaged so heavily that I 
they could not be recovered), with the date. 
R - recovery (and means - if known - by which 
the property was recovered). 
The estates of three Royalists are omitted - the properties 
of Philip Anne of Frickley and Burghwallis, Peter Pudsey 
of Sandhutton, and Sir Richard Theakstone of Bedale. This is 
because these three esttes were discharged, and-never sold. 
1. This refers only to lands sold AFTER recovery. 
1S't. 
c d e f g h a 
Name of 
,- Delinquent 
b 
Estate Date of Price Rate of. Buyer Style of· Fate of Estate 
Buyer Sale Purchase 
AYSCOUGH, Ulan 
(. '" '", • ,"J •. _: : • ~ 11 t' 
AYSCOUG~, Allan 
+ " " " 
AYSCOUGH, James 
'M/Skewsby, etc. 1653 
\ 
Aichmond, Newby 8-1653 
I 
\ 
Durham lands 
\ 
M/Middleton-o-Row 6-54 
" !3~C~W~THt Thos. M/Cold Ingleby 1653 
+ BLA.ND, Adam 
-..... r .,. 
Dower of his wife 
BOYNTON, Matthew Not known 
'If', ."'.; 
+ BRAITHWAITE, Thos MINeesam Abbey 
BRIGHAM, lim. liyton, BrIgham 
8: ~horcelly 
? 
8-53 
7-53 
? 
£390 
? 
. ? 
? 
£1234t c.6-t 
Co£260 
? 
£793 
?-
? 
'; ? 
BULMER, Wmo Ms/Marrlcke, Shawe 7-54 £6400 ? 
Corborne, + lands (incl. debts) 
It .. Tirrington 3-54 £324 9t 
.~- ~ : .. - .~ '. 
+ It " 
. 
CHOLMLEY,. Marm. 
Tirrington 
Ms/Brandsby & 
Brafferton 
+ CHOLM~Y, Henry M/Tunsta11 
+ CONSTAB~t Wm. MIGathorp 
1653 
4-54 
12-53 
? 
? 
£22 
£1106 
£330 
£132t 
£710t 
4t-t 
?-t 
G. Crouch T 
Crouch &; . T 
Robinson 
Q 
.. , 
.. , 
G. Crouch T 
Po Brace 
Walter 
Strickland 
. ~ LnG 
Q 
G 
Q 
Wm. Thompson' L 
Rushworth & T 
Crouch 
• ~., to 
Sir Thos. T 
- Strickland 
G.Crouch 
G.Crouch 
i. ::" 
Q 
T 
T 
Q 
Q 
-lands kept in family 
" " " 
tt 
" " 
T.S.; N.R • 
fate not known. 
fate not known. 
s: lands sold because of 
heavy pre-war debts. 
s: heavily mortgaged & 
not redeemed. 
a b c d e 
CONSTABLE, Sir P. Ms/Everingham + 4; 6-53 £7557 
• 5 parcels of Id. 
7-t 
+ II II Holderness lande 
+ CONSTABLE, John M/Kirby Knowle 
CONSTABLE, Sydney M/Sherborne 4-54 
10-53 II " " 
DANBY, John 
+ DANBY, Edmond 
Brompton 
Me/Brawith, Gt. 1653 
Leake & Borrowby 
t . 
Borrowby 
\ 
+ DANIEL, Sir Ing1eby : 
. Me/Beswick & 
. Thorpe Brantingham 
I 
1 
DOLEMAN, Robert M/Badsyorth 3-53 
" " Me/Gunby & Weedley 
" " 
.,. 
" " 
1-53 
Ms/Waplington, l 
Boulton &: t Fock- 3-53 
1ington 
Wakefield 1ds. 2-53 
DOLEMAN, Philip Bishop Wilton 2-56 
DOLEMAN, Thomas 
DOLEMAN, Wm. 
+ DOLEMAN, Marm. 
ERRINGTON, John 
Duncotes &: Latham 12-53 
Wellambrigg 3-54 
Middleton 
M, llEl ton, + Rudby 3-55 
&: ]1gg1escliffe 
£.7581-
£.373t 
£731 
£5381-
£1474! 
£186 
£.9441 
£9949 23+ . 
£3172t ? 
£3105t 
£1110 
£251-
? 
? 
?-t 
£1240t c.20 
£459t 11 
£1471 
£1417t ?-t 
f g 
J. Rushworth T 
Q 
Q 
Francis Cobb T? 
Anne Godsohalk xG 
.A. Byerley T? 
Q 
Q 
John Bright LG 
Robt.Cutts LnG 
h 
Sale of very minor estate • 
S: 1654 (because of debts). 
R - certainly by 1670·s. 
fate not known. 
R - by 1660. (S, after 1688). 
TS, 1-53 : NR. 
TS, 2-53 : NR. 
J.Rushworth T kept in family. 
R. Buxton, etc. xG R - held by family in 1662. 
By. Rawlins Ln 
H1. Thompson L 
F. Driffie1d L 
G.Crouch &: 
T.Ha11 (, 
creditor) 
Q 
T 
fa te not known. 
fate not known. 
fate not known. 
(sold in 1682). 
a. 
+ FRANK, 1Iarm •. 
.. '" 
" 
GAIE, Robert 
}f.&.::.::SIlTON, Philip 
He LTB Y, lIlarm. 
.. 
lilJNGAT'JS, Gir Philip 
LA.."iGDA.LE, Sir 11arm. 
" " 
" " 
" " 
+ LANGIIlY, Richard 
" " 
LOifrIJEll, Richard 
b 
Middleton Tyas 
& Uorsall 
M/Kneeton & 
Sandhutton 
v../Acomb Gra.nge 
c d 
£104 
2-55 ~1193~-
3-53 
e f 
\lm.Colegrave & 
g 
Q 
By. Savage (agents) Cb 
-14 'Jas. Micklethwaite 10 
, & Thos. Raper 
1!/Purston Jacklin 3-54 £2036, co 12k- Jobn Blount T 
+ 4 parcels of ld. 
l-l/Slcaclcleton 1653 ? 
Saxton + 2 parcels 6-53 
1-l/North Dalton 
M/ITolme 
~lS/Pighill & :Kols-
croft 
lvl/Gatenby 
10-52 
5-50 
5-50 
? 
£1206 
N/Oulstrop; Millington £744 
M/Brough 
2/3 1.1/Byker + Eo 
Craml ingt on , etc. 
M/lngleton 
1.ljFulforth 
l653? ? 
3-53 £6000 
9-53 
£228 
?-t Thos. Redshaw L 
:.? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
Sir Thos. Gower ~ T 
& Fras. Cobb 
Rabt. Prickett . T 
Sir Wmo Constable Q 
Isaac Knight - Q 
John Lambert G 
Q 
J.Rushworth T 
- J .Rushworth + 2 T 
L. Lowther 
(two small esta.tes sold - title had already been sold in 1642.) 
t:lETCALFJ~, Michael Little Ottrin31on 12-53 £246t 4l-t A. Byerley T? 
h 
Recovered at law (data unknown). 
Ra means unknownJ S - o. 1662-4 
fate unknown - not held in 1663. 
s: 10-53 to Edw. Barton 
Rl royal grant, 16600 
HI 1660+; S - 11-11 •. 
Ul c .1660. 
3 - 9-53 (mortgaged t but never 
recovered). 
t sold, 4-52. 
Rl 1660. 
.. ~ 
·~--- -- -~. .-. 
~sl. 
a b c d e f g h 
lUDDillTON, WIll. Ms/Stockheld, + 4 8-53 £10600 c.71--t .ao Lowther + 2 T? R: 1660 0 
MIDDLETON, Sir John Ms/Thrintoft, Walton 7-53 ? ? -t C.Clapham + 3 T? Rz 1660. 
+ Yafforth (via J.Uildman) 
-
l;lORLEY, Cuthbert Haxonby & Northchurch 1653 £21111, ? W'oCommondell & C N.R. 
My. Harvey 
" " 
Ms/Hilton,Ellerbecke, 3-54 £2145O-~ ? J. Elwes C R: at law, c. 1674 ; aold soon aftaro 
Seamer, liar at on , + 1 
" " 
Normanby 3-53 £1159 ? Wm. Toomea Ln not known - unlike ly to be R 0 
" " 
Laclcenby 6-53 1.1452-1- ? Wm. :Jartan C Rs at law, c. 1662J S - c. 1662. 
" " 
Newby 1-56 £300 '( Wm. Mosely Ln not known. 
n It M/Hawnsby 7-56 £700 ? H .PoWlall .& 
R. Dowker L Rs o. 1662; S - o. 1662. 
" 
II M/lformanby 2-57 £612;t ? Dowker & Halsall 01 Re at law, o. 1662; S - o. 16620 
" " 
Hutton Rudby 9-59 £368} ? John Pratt LnC not known 
1m HTON , Miles Ripon 12-55 £152 ? J.CoItman & C N.R. 
J.Hardy 
PALtIES, Sir George b'l/Naburn 6-53 ? ?-t By. Thompson T 
P:zH.CY, John Stubbs Ivalden + 2 2-54 £560 41-t T.'ilentworth & 'f 
T. Humphreys 
PLUMPrON, Sir Ddw. M/Plumpton 12-54 £535Jl 12} ]Jdwo Greene xG Rl repurchased, 1659/60. 
II 
" 
l1/Ruffarlinf;ton 12-54 i.1159:i- 121 Edw. Greene xG Hs repurchased, 2-570 
PLmmOH, John 11juslett 12-54 £3000 ? Robt. Knivett,etc. C Hs 1660 - s - to pay trust debtso . 
ff 
" 
M/~iatterton 9-54 14134 ? S. Foxley C R, 
" " " " " 
" " 
Wolfe Parke 12-54 £291 ? R. Rhodes C Rs repurchased 2-57. 
PUD~Y, Ralph 11jStapleton, + 3 2-53 £12331- ? w. .Arscotte LnG T.S. - c.1658. 
parcels of land 
a 
llADCLIF~~, Sir George 
, II " 
HY'rIICrr, J ob.l:l 
SAT..ld, Laurence 
" + , " 
SLING::::J3Y, Sir Henry 
T .AliC.il2D, Thomas 
+ " " 
TEl,:PE3T, Stephen 
" " 
+ TIIII.:Ci:L13 Y , Char Ie s 
TllA.!'PE3, .F'rancis 
VA'! .AS01JR, Sir I':m. 
II It 
II 
" 
b c 
l;ls/Colton & 12- ? 
Fairburne 
..L I'll" . , "2- .• JJ a~rourni3 10-52 
Thornton llill & 1653 
Burton 
Scarcroft & Shadvrell 3-54 
l:l!Uigh :'iorsall, + 1654? 
Ya.rm 
1.1/1'l'eston + Durhall1 3-54 
la:nds 
1.ls/Harr::vToll + 7; 3-52 
also 4 parcels of ld. 
1.~s/GGvendale, Bramp- 1653 
ton & l~cliffe, + 
6 parcels of land 
Butterset ? 
M/Roundhay 1653 
r.ls/Brou.;;hton, Thorpe,5-54, 
& Burnsall 
M/Snydall 
l.r/Nidd 
IJI/Addingham, + Ids 
La /.b.zlewood + 2 
Gutton 
3-54 
9-53 
1653 
3-56 
d 
? 
£ 12432-
? 
i.36:r~· 
£2156;t 
£1200 
, £1.0no+ 
? 
£1Jrr 
£1083 
£603 
£2083~' 
£~28 + 
£150/yro 
£280 
? 
£360 
e f g 
? li. I:lmhirst C 
Of li. Price etc. Ln 
"/ WIn .. Dodsworth LO 
& T. ~~harton 
:r.t--t? J. iiildman T 
.; 
'(-t ' G. Crouch T 
? Crouch + Martin 
Lister (a creditor) 
? s. Ilethell + T 
R. ::;tapleton 
?-t G. Crouch T 
? Wm. Lowther 
?2-t? To Heber + 3 
? 
? 
? 
?-t 
Rushworth & 
Crouch 
T 
Lambert, Ballasis, T 
In';'Tam, £{ushworth 
& Crouch 
Crouoh & Rushw'th T 
J.Troutbeck T 
T 
h 
H: by Act of Parliament, 
13 Car. 110 
~: (classed with above for 
statistical purposeo.) 
11 .R. (buyers had olaim to lands) 0 
S, IIilary 1671, because of pre-
war debts. 
T.S., Easter 1654: - IJR. 
3SC). 
a b 0 d e f g h 
+ VAV.A.OOUR, John ~/illitoft ? i.335z '01. 
r( 
vn~C:81:T, :aiohard M/Great 3meaton 1-53 ;.: 1183 at S. Foxley (for C T.::;. , 1-49 - If .R. 
; . IIyo Simpson) 
~--" ~- ~ .... , ..... 
.' ilA.::;:;lIrmTON, Daroy US/Arlwioke & Harn- 1654 i:.2155! 4-t Robert Washing'ton DR ~,,' I':' ... , pole & Hampole Idso 
• 
mlAR'.rOll, Sir .Anthony :CPI)leby (=Gilling) 3-54 .t362i 91~ Jo Fullerton & T Hepurchased from trustees by A:l's ;d 
J. Knott relations, 7-54. 
+ YOUNG, Sir Andrew r,:s/Burn, Bedling- ? £.3075-ff 
ton & Scrimston, 
+ lands. 
.. 
~ )' . 
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APPENDIX II-B. 
LIST OF PURCHASERS OF FORFEITED LANDS. 
(The numbers indicate the numbers of'mano~s and non-
manors bought by the respective purchasers.) 
J-. TRUSTEES:-
(a). Londoners: 
BETHELL, Slingsby (Muswe1l Hill, Mx.» 
STAPLETON, Robert ) 
BLUNT, John (Clemen~s Inn) 
CROUCH, Gilbert (Staple Ihn)- by self 
with Rushworth 
with others 
FULLERTON, John (clothworker, London» 
KNOTT, John (gent., London) ) 
RUSHWORTH, John (Lincoln's Inn) 
8 4 
1 - 4 
5 - 2 
8 - 4 
2 - 5 
0-1 
by self 12 -12 
with others 1 - 2 
(also with Crouch, q.v.s.) 
WILDMAN, John (Westminster) - by self 0 - 2 
* (as agent for others) 7 - 1 
(b). Local: 
BELLASIS, Sir John (Worlaby, Lincs.) 
INGRAM, Sir Thomas (Sheriff Hutton) 
* BYERLEY, Anthony (Midridge Grange, 
. Durham) 
, I 
* COBB;. Sir Francis (Ottringham) (with GOWER, Sir Thos. (Stittenham) 
HEBER, Thomas (Marton) & other~ 
HUMPHREYS, Toby (Askerne) ) 
WENTWORTH, Thomas (Bretton) ) 
PRICKETT, Robert (AU.erthorpe) 
STRICKLAND, Sir Thomas (Thornton Br.) 
~ 
44 -37 
o - 2 
3 - 2 
1 
- 0 
0 
- 3 
3 - 0 
0 
- 3 
1 
- 0 
0 -·1 
'. 
THO~~SON, . Henry (merchant, alderman 
,; . of York) 
TROUTBECK, John (surgeon, of York) 
, .. 
1 
o 
9 -12 . 
_ .. , 
(~ before a name indicates that the purchase is 
a probable trust purchase.) 
2. DIRECT REFURCHASES:-
LOWTHER, Lancelot (second son of 
the Royalist) 1 -'0 . 
WASHINGTON, Robert (merchant, second 
son of the ,Royalist) 2 -.0 
3 
3. PURCHASE BY CREDITORS:-
'.' (The name of the delinquent· whose estate is 
,being sold follows that of the creditor, 
in brackets.) , " .•. , , 
COLEGRAVE,Wm. & SAVAGE," Hj. (agents for 
the Marquis of DOrOester) 
o 
" . (estate of Marmaduke F~ank).. 1 - 1 
COLTMAN, John,merchant of London 
HARDY; John, cooper of London 
(estate o~ Miles New.ton) 
COMMONDELL, William of Ormesby, gt. 
HARVEY, Dame Mary, of co. Warks. (estate of Cuthbert Morley) 
DOWKER,' Robert of York ) ( ) 
HALSALL, Robert of London) C. Morley 
ELMHIRST, Richard of Houndhill,' yeo. 
(estate of Sir George Radcliffe) 
ELWES,. Jeremy ,of Broxborne, Herts. 
(estate of C. Morley) " 
FOXLEY, Samuel of Westminster, gt. 
(John Plumpton - SF to pay debts) 
(Richd. Vincent - SF to pay debts) 
KNIVETT, Robert of London (& others) 
(estate of John Plumpton) 
0- 1 
t 
-
0 
-
2 
1 
-
0 
2 0 
I , 
4 - 1 
1 
-
0 
1 
-
0 
1- 0 
. 
. 3(., ,; 
.; 
'. 
RHODES, Richard of Knaresborough, gt. 
(estate of John Plumpton) 
SARTAN, Wm., stationer of London 
(estate of Cuthbert Morley) 
4. GRANTS OF FORFBITED LANDS:-
CONSTABLE, Sir William of Flamborough 
KNIGHT'~! Isaac, Hector of Fulham -
LAMBERT, John of Cal ton, esq •. 
STRICKLAND, Walter (later Lord S.) 
5. SALES TO INDEPENDENT PURCHASERS:~ 
(The name' of the Royalist ex-owner is 
brackets - the initials indicate the 
status of the purchaser, and are the 
those used in Appendix II-A.) 
ARSCOTTE, WIn., of Neesden, Mx - LnG (Ralph Pudsey of Stapleton) 
BRACE, Philip, of st. Giles-in-the-
Fields, Mx. - LnG (Thos. Beckwith) 
BRIGHT, John of Carbrook, esq. - LG (Robert Doleman) 
BUXTON, Richard of Flegg, Derby (& 
2 others) - xG (Robert Doleman) 
CUTTS, Robert of Grays Inn, gt. - LnG (Robert Doleman) 
DODSWORTH,Wm., & WHARTON, Thos. - LG 
(Sir John Redmaine) 
DRIFFIELD, Francis of Easingv'Iold - L (William Doleman) 
GODSCHALK, Anne of Plaisto~, Essex, 
widow - xG (Sydney Constable) 
GREENE, Edward of Matthorne, Monmouth, 
esq., - xG (Sir Edward Plumpton) . 
LOWTHER, William of Leeds, gt. - LG (Stephen Tempest) 
- - - --.-- -----...;,.. 
0-1 
0-1 
11 - 7 
1'--0 
2 - 0 
1 - 0 
0-1 
4 - 1 
given in 
origin and 
same as 
1 - 3 
1 - 0 
1 0 
0-1 
2 - 0 
0-2 
0-1 
0-1 
2 - 0 
1 0 
3bJl •. 
'. 
. ", 
MICKLETHWAITE, Joseph of Swyne & York, 
gt., & RAPER, Thomas, merchant of 
York - LG (Robert Gale) .. 
MOSELY, William of Chancery Lane - Ln . (Cuthbert Morley) . 
POUNALL, Henry of York & DOWKER . 
Robert of York - L (0. Morley~ 
PRATT, John of London - Ln G (0. Morley) 
RAWLINS,' Henry of London, tailor - Ln (Philip Doleman) 
REDSHAW, Thomas of Ripon (?) - L 
(Marmal'duke Holtby) 
THOMPSON, Henry of York, merchant & 
i. alderman (& Thomas Rider, merchant· 
and John Pickersgill, ex-Lord Mayor 
of York) - L (Thomas Doleman) 
THOMPSON, William of ? - L (Wm. Brigham) 
TOOMES, William of Honburg, Mx, alder-
man of London - Ln (C. I,Iorley) 
1 - 0 
o - 1 
1 - 0 
0-1 
. ; 
0-1 
1 - 0 
0-2 
0-3 
0-1 
11 -17 
II 
. ~ -- _._---.---......-
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APPENDIX III. 
THE CASE OF CUTHBERT MORLEY. 
Cuthbert Morley was a man of some financial standing -
when he inherited his father's estate in 1642" he had an 
annual income of at least £2500 a year. Though not one of 
the King's principal lieutenants, he was of sufficient 
prominence to be included in the First Act of Sale, and 
accordingly his property was confiscated in mid ,16511. 
Morley was given no opportuni ty to ma~ any al ternati ve 
plans for the disposal of his estates. He had been in exile 
since 1649, when he had., fled after murdering a sergeant 
i. .. ' 
who had attempted to arrest him without a warrant2 • His 
property, ,comprising mainly of several manors in the North 
, ' 
Riding, had~een bought fairly recently, and some of the 
debts incurred in their purchase were still outstanding. 3 
, ' 
The creditors hurried to claim their just shares and 
Laurence Maidwell, who had discovered the estate, demanded 
. 
the fifty per cent of the profits which had been promised 
to him in the Act of Sale. Soon the claimants quarrelled 
over their respective portions: Maidwell accused Jeremy 
1. Firth & Rait, II, 520 ff. 
2. C.S.~.D.l 1660-61, 173 (Petition fo~ ~ Pardon); H.M.C., 
VIII, 11 •. '. , ' ,~ 
3. For the various claims on the estat~s, see C.C.C., 2394 ff. 
i 
I !, 
I ! ' [, 
I 
l 
t , 
I 
'. 
i' 
Elwes (a prosperous London merchant, who held a large mort-
gage on much of the property) of cheating the state, and 
taking more than was his share •. The London Committee for 
Compounding immediately pricked up its ears - Elwes had 
already .been involved. in SOme suspicious dealings with other 
properties in the same area. The case dragged on until 
1655 - finally,' certain lands were granted to Elwes, and the 
remainder were sold· for the benefit of Maidwell and the 
statel • 
Elwes received the majority of the estates - the 
Manors of Seamer, Hilton, Ellerbecke, Haraton and half 
Castle Levington. Other minor portions were disposed of 
to the various creditors and small purchasers who appeared 
on the scene. In all, the sale of the Morley property 
netted £3714-2-0d. for the government, a~d£24,440-I-llid. 
in debts due to Morley's various creditors {of which nearly 
£21,000 was for Elwes)2. 
When Morley returned in 1660, he attempted to regain 
his lands at law, according to the ·terms of the Restoration 
Settlement. Writs of ejectment were issued against the 
tenants of Lackenby, Hawnby and Normanby. Morley received 
1. C.C.C., 2395-7; Grant of claims, C.S.P.D.,1655· ,64-5, 
18'{ • 
2. Sales: PRO, C54/3664/5, C54/3724/20, C54/3743/13, C54/3748/ 
36, 37,-c?4/3749/30, C54/3753/9, 24, C54/3894/5, 
C54/3963/2, C54/4029/46. 
l 
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.. 
a favourable v,erdict in the first two cases at York 
Assizes, but .John Hill, the occupier of Normanby, used 
.legal manoeuvering to postpone his trial. The ex-tenants 
of Lackenby and Hawnby therefore delayed execution of the 
, ' 
judgements in.their 9ases by suing out write of error. 
Morley appealed to the Lords against this, but was instructed 
to proceed at Common Law. He apparently recovered Hawnby 
and some of the other lands (which had been sold to 
credi tors) " for he was fOTced to introduce a bill in' .,' 
the Commons.to.break the entail on the property, and sell 
. 1 
, some of the lands to pay outstandine debts • 
. -However, the most interesting part of the Morley case 
is the long legal battle with the Elwes family. Jeremy 
Elwes still retained the manors he had claimed as security 
for his mortgage in 1651. In 1662, Cuthbert Morley exhibited 
a bill in Chancery against him. He claimed that the relevant 
lands (which he val?ed at over £3000 a year) had been 
mortgaged to Elwes in 1641 as security for a £10,000 debt, 
:the lands' to be.held by the mortgagee and· returned when the 
rents had cancelled the debt. Four years later Cuthbert had 
been offered a composition if he wo:u1d go.abroad - he 
accepted, and requested,Elwes to pay the fine, and also. to 
pay him (i.e., Morley) maintenance fr?m.the estate, using 
the remainder of the annual revenue to discharge the 
existing debts. But, before he left, ~Iorley conveyed the 
1.HMC, VII (House of Lords MSS) 147; L.J., XI, 434; C.J., 
VITI, 314. 
'. 
3~i-----r 
lands to Elwes (1646), ostensibly as security for the debt, 
but in actual fact to transfer title, and thus avoid seques-
tration. 
However, so Cuthbert's petition continues, Jeremy Elwes 
proved to be a false friend, and misappropriated the. revenues. 
He also revealed the lands to the Commonwealth sequestrators, 
and connived at selling them, in order to gain absolute 
ti tIel. ' 
Naturally Elwes denied this claim - he alleeed that 
the lands were grossly overvalued, and that the majority 
of the accusation had come out of Korley's vivid imagination. 
The court decided that the debt stood at £16,500 in 1646 
and, with the consent of both parties, ruled that Cuthbert 
Morley should pay £16,000 within one year to Elwes, upon 
which he would recover all the lands (with the exception of 
the lease of Ellerbecke, which was valued at £450 more). 
Should the sum not be paid, then the full title would rest 
with Elwes, for the debt exceeded the value of the property 
(much of which was only life estate), and the interest was 
2 greater than the annual revenue • 
This decision was made in November 1663. It was clearly 
impossible for Cuthbert to raise the money within a year, 
end thus Elwes extended the time limit, though with no more 
success. The Chancery decree was therefore enrolled and 
1. PRO, C5/42/69. 
-2. PRO, C5/42/69, C78/745/5. 
-
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made absolute, and Morley's petition was officially dismissed1 • 
One might have thought that an ordinary man would 
have accepted the inevitable, but not Cuthbert~ He next 
appeared before the ~ar ofth~ Housi of Lords iri late l66?, 
complaining volubly about the injustice of Chancery. 
Their Lordships considered the problem, and referred it to 
the Comrni ttee of Petitions. From here the Duke 'of Richmond 
~ 
informed the House that the case was "not releivable in 
the ordinary courts". The Lords therefore debated the matter, 
and finally, on 31 March 1668, voted in favour of'Cuthbert. 
They accepted that the release of l64~as in the nature of 
a trust, and ordered that the decree of' Chancery be reversed, 
and that the Lord Keeper should proceed as in the case of 
an equitable mortgage. 2 
'By now Cuthbert Morley had associated his son-in-law 
and' heir, Bernard Grenville,' in the case. Armed 'with the' 
Lords' decision, they presented a new petition in Chancery. 
After enum~rating the various debts and charges upon the 
, estates, the Master concluded that the face value of the 
property was insufficient to meet the commitments -'. thus' 
E1wes was not to be charged with the accu~u1ated interest 
,.1. See Answer of Jeremy E1wes, read to the. Lords, 4 Nov., 
1669 - House of Lords MSS, n66~, 10?,(f).' .,. ' 
2. House of Lords MSS, 107 (petition of, 11 Nov., ;1667); 
ibid., MS Minute Book, III, (1667-8)(Book of Petitions) 
passim. 
'. 
over the twenty-five years; "which.Decree", the London 
merchant remarked smugly, "was most agreeable to the Rules 
of Justice and Equity". Twice r:~orley attempted' to" obtain a 
rehearing, but each time the original decision was, upheld. 
A few months later, poor Morley died - probably in'despairl l 
Too much was now'involved to allow the matter to 
rest there. Bernard Grenville, the new heir to the Morley 
claims, appealed: to the Lords in'. October .1669. !'TheLord 
Keeper had terminated the case'orithe grounds that Grenville 
was not sufficiently 'a party to the ,issue; he therefore 
petitioned the House, as a Supreme Court, to give its ruling. 
The House supported Grenville. This did him little good, 
however, aSethe Lord Keeper was firmly on Elwes' side, and 
declined to accept the Lords' decision, again claiming that, 
as Grenville only held the title,to the lands through his 
marriage with Anne, Cuthbert's Morley's daughter, the heiress 
should', have been a party to the original claim. As she was 
not, the petition in Chancery lapsed of necessity on Morley's 
2 death .• 
Once again the initiative passed back to the Lords. The 
House firmly 're-iterated its decisions. Grenville was 
, : 
sufficiently rela.tedto the case tocont1nue as plaintiff, 
the Lords intended to send instructions to the Court of 
Chancery, and Jeremy Elwes w'as to account for mean profits' 
1. House of Lords MSS, 107, c, d, e, f. 
2. Ibid., 107, h, i, k. 
:, 
, 
'. 
from life, as well as fee estates1 • 
Communications between the House of Lords and the 
Court of Chancery were getting continually sharper in tone, 
so the Lord Keeper, Sir Orlando Briidgeman, explained his 
position to Westminster. The Lords had claimed that Gren-
ville was a party to the suit - he fully agreed, but'since 
the plaintiff's wife was the true heiress, she also should 
become a party. He advised a Bill of Revivor, "not" (as 
he explained) "with any attempt to hinder him (i.e., Gren-
ville) of the Benefit of the Lords Votes • • • but to preserve 
the course and Justice of the Court, and the Conscience of 
J d ,,2 the u ge ••• • 
At last a breakthrough seemed possible. The Lords voted 
that Grenville should bring in a Bill of Revivor, but prev-
ented any further delay by declaring that all their previous 
decisions were to stand as if the bill ha. not been brought. 3 
With the way ahead clear at last, Grenville apparently won 
his case - in 1673 a bill was introduced to break Elwes' 
entail on the lands, and allow them to be sold to Grenville. 
Thus the original owners finally recovered their estates. 4 
1. House of Lords MSS., 107, 1. 
2. Ibid., 107, m. L.J., XII, 314. 
3. 23 March, 1669/70, L.J., XII, 321. 
4. ~, IX (ii),{House of Lords MSS) 29, 45. ~, IX, 276. 
'. 
J'fl 
Matters did not quite end there, however. The costs of 
the long-drawn out suit had financially embarrassed both 
parties. Elwes had to sell some lands to pay his debts, and 
virtually the whole of the Morley inheritance went the same 
way. In 1682, the Manors of Hawnby and Hilton were sold to 
Christopher Berkeley, and Seamer, followed five years later. 
The Morley estates had finally been recovered, but the 
cost had proved to be too greatl • 
1. YQg, North Riding, II, 33, 292. 
. 
• 
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APPENDIX IV. 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF 75 ROYALIST FAMILIES. 
ALDBURGH of Aldborough, Arthur: 
Financially embarrassed before the war. Fined £400, 
and lost at least £200 by plundering. Sold Aldborough 
to John Wentworth of,Woolley, 1653, and later died in 
prison, in debt. 
BAILDON of Baildon, Francis: 
, . 
Slight pre-war debts due to wardship and mother's 
extravagance. Suffered considerably from war damage. 
Fined £360,but concealed a large portion of his property. 
Spent a great deal in law suits over his mother's trustee-
ship of the estate, and the coal mines on Baildon Moor. 
Recovered by the Restoration, and, although still 
financially unstable, built additions to his house. 
BAM]'ORD of Pule Hill, 'Lyon: 
Small estate ,burdened by large portions in 1642. 
Fined £294, assessed at £30. This caused sone financial 
embarrassment, but L.B.'s own extravagance and wasteful-
ness was the true cause of the family's collapse. The 
bulk of the lands were sold during the Interregnum. 
BARNBY of Cawthorne, Thomas: 
----Several pre-war debts; fined £188, assessed'at £25~, 
and had £777 debts in 1647. The composition, added to 
earlier charees on the small estate, led T.B. to mort-
gage heavily, and.several parcels of land were not 
redeemed. 
BEAUJ'JIONT of Whitley Beaumont, Thomas: 
Prominent Royalist. Inherited, 1631, the extensive 
lands of the elder branch of the family. These were rack-
rented, and the Cavalier suffered no visible ill~effects 
from the compositions. A leading figure in post-
Restoration society, T.B. died a very wealthy man in 
1668. 
BLAND of Kippax Park, ~Sir Thomas: 
Important Royalist, although large debts in 1642. 
He was forced to pay these, along with his £405 composition, 
to Goldsmiths' Hall, and this led him to mortgage 
much land. But succeeded in paying off these debts after 
the wars. 
___ ~ __ .__ _ ~ .• ,- •. r _-::-:-...;,. .. 
~"'J 
BOWFS of Babthorpe, Richard: 
Large family, and estate crippled before the war 
because of the many portions. The composition fine 
(£2~9) proved the final blow, and most of the lands had 
to be sold •. 
BRAITHWAITE of Catterick, Richard: 
Prominent and wealthy Royalist - married two 
heiresses. Soon recovered from the effects of the fines. 
BULMER of Marricke, William: 
Large estate, but heavily in debt in 1642. Estates 
confiscated and. sold: bought in trust by Gilbert Crouch 
and John Rushworth. This expense proved to be the final 
blow - the lands were mortgaged to Thomas Swinburne, 
and could not_be redeemed - virtually the whole estate 
was lost, although Bulmer regained some of his losses 
by sellin~ the equity of redemption on the morteage to 
Lord st. John. 
BUNNEY of Newland, Francis: 
• 
Small estate - fined £90, and suffered from war 
damage. But was a good businessman, and quickly reoreanised 
his property: by 1660, he was financially secure again. 
CALVERLtY of Calverley, Henry: 
Pre-war situation unknown for certain. Estate in 
tail, but assessed for composition as though in fee. 
Fined £1455, assessed at £200. Fell heavily into debt, 
selling woods and lands to raise his composition. Left 
over £2000 debts on his death in 1652: his son 
redeemed his fortunes by rack-renting, marrying an 
heiress (and selling part of her inheritance), and 
mortgaginr, wisely. Although the family eventually recovered 
its stability, it never again rose to its former 
position of wealth and influence. 
CHOLMLEY of Brandsby, Marmaduke: 
Pre-war situation unknown. M.C. was a Catholic 
delinquent, and was included in the Third Act of S91A~ 
Estates repurchased through the services of Gilbert 
Crouch, and then morteaged to repay the cost of their 
redemption. Brandsby Manor was retained by the family, 
but Brafferton, mortgaged to Ralph Rymer, could not be 
redeemed. When Rymer was attainted in 1663, Cholmley 
petitioned in vain for the restoration of his lands. 
r 
I 
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CHOLMLEY of Whitby, Sir Hugh,kt.: 
Parliamentary Governor of Scarborough Castle who 
defected to the King's side. Much of his estates were 
in trust, and therefore could not be fined. Paid £850 
composition. Subjected to legal persecution by his 
personal enemies, but rescued by the loyalty of his 
Parliamentarian brother, Sir Henry. Created alum works 
at Whitby, 1649, which proved a most profitable enter-
prise. Careful budgeting and the aid of friends enabled 
H.C. to recover his former prosperous position. 
CONSTABLE of Cathorp, William: 
Catholic delinquent. Estates in Third Act of Sale, 
but compounded for £7l0i. Lands then put into the hands 
of trustees, to pay debts and then provide portions for 
his children. This enabled the family to recover, albeit 
slowly, from the effects of the anti-Royalist legislation. 
CONSTABLE of Everingham, Sir Philip: , 
Catholic delinquent. Lands in the Third Act of Sale. 
Repurchased by John Rushworth, in trust for Sir Philip's 
children. Heavily mortgaged, but careful administration 
and rack-renting enabled the debts to be discharged, 
although this operation took over 20 years. 
COOKE of Doncaster, Brian: 
Prosperous merchant-gentleman, and creditor to 
several other Royalists. Very heavy fines - at least 
£2700, including two undervaluations. His son estimated 
that over £15,000 lost in the wars. Despite this, the 
family were buying land in the 1650's, acquiring the 
Manors of Bentley and Wheatley before the Restoration. 
B.C.'s son and heir given a baronetcy in recognition of 
his services. 
COPLEY of Sprotborough, Godfrey: 
Royalist major: large estates, though considerable 
debts. Fined £1366, assessed at £150 (debts stated to 
be over £8000), and suffered a great deal from these 
exactions. But eventually recovered - his son was an 
extremely prosperous landowner, and an important member 
of local society. 
CROSLAND of Helmsley, Sir Jordan: 
Small estate, and severely affected by the civil 
wars. But married the heiress of the FleminF,s of 
Rydall, whose domains helped to revive J.C.'s failing 
"fortunes. Granted estates in Newby at the Restoration, 
and took a leading part in northern society. 
, 
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CUTLERo~ Stainborough, Sir Gervase: 
Staunch Royalist, who contributed a great deal to 
the King's cause. Died in 1645, and the estate left in 
his widow's care. The fine was paid without much 
difficulty, but the heir's extravagance and love of 
gambline: ruined the family fortunes: the properties were· 
eventually sold to Lord Raby later in the century. 
DANBY of Farnley, Sir Thomas: 
During the life of T.D.'s father, the family estate 
had been in the hands of an unscrupulous steward, who 
had embezzled the majority of the profits, leaving 
the property in a precarious position. Before it had 
time to recover, T.D.'s fine (fA780) became an extra 
burden, and the estate was almost continuously mortgaged. 
T.D. sold lands in order to raise the composition fine, 
and about twenty years after the Restoration, further 
economic deterioration compelled the sale of other 
portions of the Danby inheritance. 
DOLm~AN of Badsworth, Robert: 
Catholic delinquent. Lands confiscated: R.D. planned 
to have them boup,ht in trust by John Rushworth, but 
was unable to raise the money. He therefore sold the 
lar~er part of his domains, and with the profit redeemed 
his lands in the East Riding. 
FAWKES of F'arnley,· Michael: 
Fairly prosperous Royalist - died 1647, and his 
widow compounded for the young heir. Due to ente,ils on 
the property, the family did not suffer much from 
the anti-Royalist legislation. In the 1680's, Thomas 
(the son) bought the Manor of }'arnley. 
FRANK of ~ighton, Marmaduke: 
Catholic delinquent - in Third Act of Sale. Lands 
bought by agents for the mortgagee (although M.F. com-
pounded for some outlying portions). M.F. fell into 
debt during the Interregnum. He tried to recover his 
lands in Chancery - the outcome of the case is unknown, 
but his co-heiresses held the property later in the 
century. 
GALE of Acomb Grange, Robert: .. 
Catholic delinquent - in the Third Act of Sale. 
Recovered his property at the Restoration, but was 
forced by debts to sell it almost immediately afterwards. 
• 
. '. 
GIBSON of Welburn,'Sir John: 
Prosperous. Royalist. Fined £1000.: Spent a great 
deal of time in prison due.to.his anti-Parliamentary 
activities~ Soon,recovered from his losses. 
GOODRICKE of Hunsingore, Sir John: 
Prominent Cavalier, seriously wounded in the war. 
Hunsingore Manor destroyed by enemy soldiery; fined 
£1650. Sold some lands to raise his fine (he had suffered 
considerably during the fighting) - was apparently 
helped by his Parliamentarian-cousins. Built Ribston 
Hall after the Restoration, and was a.prominent member 
of local. society. ' " 
GRAHAM of Norton Conyers, Sir Richard:, 
Very rich Cavalier, though suffered from billeting 
and free quarter. Apparently hardly affected by the 
£2384 fine: after the Restoration, he built many additions 
to his house. 
BANSBYof Tickhill Castle, Sir Ralph: 
Garrisoned Tickhi11 during the war - died'in 1643, 
and entailed" estates prevented any fine beine levied. 
However, heavy pre-war debts, and the considerable 
expenses incurred, through Sir Ralph's contributions to 
the King's cause, forced the family to mortgage heavily 
in the years following the wars. The Hansbys were still 
in a delicate.financial position in the late. 1670's. 
HILDYARD of Winestead,Henry: 
Royalist Colonel· of trained bands, but soon retired 
to his Surrey estates. Very wealthy, and fined £4661 • 
. The payment of this amercement necessitated some mort-
.' gages, and H.H. also sold some property in Holbeach. But 
his wealth carried him safely throueh to the Restoration, 
after which he was soon taking a leading part in county 
society. . 
BOLTBY of Skackleton, Marmaduke: 
Catholic delinquent - in the Third Act of Sale. He 
engaged Thomas Reynolds of York to lease his property, 
paying him the profits. Reynolds broke the trust, and 
M.H. had to. sue him in Chancery in 1660 before he re-
gained his lost revenues. It is not known whether he 
recovered his manor, but there was no Holtby in Skackleton 
in the 1670's. 
HOPTON of Armley, Sir Ingram: 
Killed at Winceby, October 1643. Left only an 
heiress, who married Miles Stapleton of Wifhill. Estate 
fined £660, and this, together with the Royalist's 
debts and wardship expenses, necessitated some land 
sales and considerable mortgages. Eventually the 
estate recovered, due prinCipally to Stapleton's 
resources. 
HOTHAM of Scorborough, Sir John: 
Parliamentary Governor of Hull, he defected to the 
Royalists when the news of his own son's disloyalty made 
it essential for him to take action. Arrested, tried 
and executed. Estates sequestered, but soon released, 
and no fine was imposed. The Hothams· fortunes were not 
materially affected by J.B.'s Royalism. 
HUTTON of Goldesborough, Sir Richard: 
A prosperous Cavalier, he took a leadinp, part in 
the Yorkshire campaigns, and was later killed at the 
Battle of Sherburn, October 1645. The entail on the 
estates prevented the imposition of any fine, although 
the property was periodically sequestered due to his 
son Richard's pro-Royalist sympathies. Rich and pros-
perous after the Restoration. 
HUTTON of Marske, Matthew: 
Poor administrator, and his lands were heavily mort-
gaged in 1642. The war and the fine (only £132, as much 
property had already been sold off to pay his debts) . 
nearly ruined the estate. :F'ortunately, M.B.'s successors 
were careful managers, and succeeded in redeeming most 
of the lands Matthew had been forced to sell. 
INGRAM of Sheriff Hutton, Sir Thomas: 
Younger brother of Sir Arthur Ingram,(who supported 
Parliament}. Had large estates, but heavily fined,(£3649), 
and sold or mortgaged much of his property, retiring 
to the south on the proceeds. However, after the 
Restoration he must have been fairly wealthy, as he lent 
considerable SUIDS of money. to his well-nigh bankrupt 
nephew. 
JENKINS of Grimston, Toby: 
Small estate, and was severely affected by the 
fines. Assessment discharged because of debts. However, 
the death of his elder brother, William, of Great Busby, 
redeemed his failing fortunes, as he inh~r1ted a consid-
erable estate. 
KAYE of Woodsome, Sir John: 
Oneof·the first Royalists to surrender, J.K. was 
. treated very . leniently , and fined at·· only a twentieth. 
He readily.adjusted his allegiance to each successiv.e· 
government. Hardly affected by the civil wars, he 
,appears tO,have been prosperous and influential.in 
the post-Restoration era. 
LANGDALE of North Dalton, Sir Marmaduke: 
,Noted cavalry commander, ,he fought loyally for . 
the King until the end~ and then went into exile. His 
lands ,were forfeited, and the majority were granted to 
Parliamentary supporters. The one manor that was sold" 
was bought by Langdale t s daughters (throueh a trustee), 
but they were forced to relinquish their claim, due to 
impoverished.circumstances; M.L. returned in 1660, almost 
crippled by his war losses (due as much to his expenditure, 
in the King's cause, as to the sales): most·of his lands 
were restored, but for a long while the family was in 
a state of economic distress. 
~IIALEVERER of Allerton Maleverer, Sir Richard: 
. Son of the regicide, Sir Thomas. He was heavily fined, 
(£3292), but. much of this was in recognition of his 
annuity from his father, which the latter had stopped. 
R.M. was left in some distress, and was several times 
outlawed for debt (he was already outlawed for treason, 
and in exile). His father died shortly before the 
Restoration, . and in 1660 R.M. reeained the family estates, 
and became a prosperous member of local society, although 
the aftermath of the wars can be seen in the several 
mortgages on.,~~e estates. 
MALLORY of Studley Park, Sir John: 
Leading Royalist, his lands were already heavily 
burdened with debt in 1642, and the fine-of £3323 proved 
. to be the final blow. Nuch of the property was sold by. 
trustees to pay debts, and the family swiftly declined 
into poverty. 
METCALFE of Nappa Hall, Scroope: 
Family heavily in 'debt in 1642. S.M. killed in 1645 
( he was a cadet of the family), and no fine was imposed. 
Due to careful management and the aid of the Slingsbys 
(relations), the Metcalfes were redeemed from their 
indebted state, b~t the family was now only a shadow 
of its former greatness. 
METHAM of r,1etham, George: 
G.M.'s two predecessors had been Royalists, but 
had died during the war, leaving entailed estates. G.rR. 
took part in the second civil war, and his property was 
sequestered: two-thirds fell to the government, and the 
remaining third was occupied by a creditor. The whole 
estate should have been sold (G.M. was a Catholic delin-
quent), but Lord Fairfax used his influence, and G.M. 
was able to com~ound for £1350. Careful management 
preserved the bulk of the property, although the lands 
in trust for paying debts had to be sold to satisfy 
the creditors. The family thus kept control of the 
majority of its lands, although it was in a weaker fin-
ancial position than before. 
MEYNELL of West Dalton,~George: 
- Two of his sons were delinquents, and G.M., a Catholic, 
was accused of Royalism. He successfully disproved the 
charge, and took the Oath of Abjuration to avoid seques-
tration for recusancy (although after the Restoration. 
he returned to his old religion). He was apparently not 
affected by the wars to any visible extent. 
MONCKTON of Cavil, Sir Philip the younger: 
Prominent local Royalist: he suffered considerably 
from plundering. He had an inflated view of his services 
to the Crown, and caused Charles II much embarrassment 
by his persistent petitions for recompense. The 
family recovered from their civil -war losses fairly 
quickly. 
NEVILE of Chevet, Francis: 
Firm Royalist who changed sides, and later actively 
aided Parliament over the Yorkshire Engaeement. Fined 
£lOOO, , but apparently this hardly affected his financial 
position, as he bought ex-Crown fee farm rents on his 
property, and lent money to several penurious Royalists. 
Much of the evidence relating to Nevile is highly-coloured, 
and paints him as a cynical opportunist, ready to 
cheat and bribe in order to make money. 
NORTON of Dishforth, Peter: 
Very small estate - fined £40, which he paid by 
careful estate manaeement and wise borrowing. The 
family steadily increased its position, and P.N.'s son 
was fairly prominent in the Yorkshire of the 1680's. 
OSBORNE of Kiveton Park, Sir Edward: 
Prosperous Royalist, he was heavily fined (£1649), 
but the family does not seem to have suffered unduly, 
once the first shock of composition was over. E.O. 
died in 1647, and his son, Thomas, rose to prominence 
as the Earl of Danby, building up an extensive landed 
estate in south Yorkshire. 
PENNYMAN of Ormesby, James: 
Fairly large estate, but spent a great deal in 
raising a troop of horse at his own expense. To pay 
the fine, had to sell some lands, includinr the Manor 
of Marske, which he had inherited from another branch of 
'the family. The Pennymans later recovered their 
financial stability. 
PERCY of stubbs Walden, John: 
Catholic delinquent. He repurchased his confiscated 
estates through two close friends, who acted'as trustees. 
This had apparently little effect on J.P.'s financial 
posi tion, as at his son l,8 death in l66?, the family 
had few debts, and yet W8S owed money by several 
nei ghbours. 
PORTINGTON of Barnby-Don, Roger: 
Reputed to have spent over £9000 in the Kine's 
service. Compounded in 1646, foueht for the Kinp in 
the second civil war, and therefore had to recompound. 
This virtually crippled him, he fell heavily into 
debt, and had to sell considerable estates. His family 
never recovered from these losses. 
PUDSEY of Bolton, Ambrose: 
Never discovered as a Royalist until 1659, when it 
was teo late for action to be taken. The family 'were in 
considerable difficulties prior to the war, and had to 
sell the bulk of their estates. 
RAMSDEN of Longley and Byrom, Sir John: 
Wealthy Royalist, who was not discovered before his 
death in 1646 (the lands were entailed, and therefore 
safe from composition). The family were hardly affected 
by the war years. 
RICBARDSON,of North Bierley, Richard: 
Royalist, who supported Parliament after the 
Kine's defeat. Hardly suffered from the war - bought 
lands and extended his house during and after the Inter-
regnum. 
ROCKLEY of Rockley, Francis: 
Family prosperous until the civil wars. Involved in 
a long legal battle with the Kayes and Burdetts, which 
ruined him. By 1654, he was heavily in· debt, and by 
his death in 1679, was bankrupt.The composition fines 
played only a minor part in these losses. 
SAVILE of Thornhill, Sir William: 
Royalist Colonel - died 1643, leavin~ entailed 
estates that could not be sequestered, and therefore 
avoided composition. His son thus inherited the extensive 
estates,and was one of the prosperous leaders of local 
society in 1660. (His son, George, is better known as 
the'Marquis of Halifax.) 
SAYER of Worsall, Laurence: 
In'financial difficulties before the war. Estates 
confiscated and sold, though repurchased through 
trustees. This additional expense proved fatal, and 
L.S. had to sell the bulk of his properties in 1671. 
SLINGSBY of Scriven, Sir Henry: 
staunch Royalist, executed for his undyin~ loyalty 
to the throne. Lands confiscated and sold, though repur-
chased through his nephew, Slingsby Bethell. Despite the 
great cost involved, the family do not appear to have 
been unduly affected, and took a leadin~ role in post-
Restoration society. Sir Thomas, the son and heir, married 
a girl with a £4000 portion. 
STRICKLAND of 'l'hornton Bridge, Sir Thomas: 
Royalist Lieutenant-Colonel; owned considerable 
estat~ but ran into heavy debts due to his extravagance 
and wastefulness. Attempted to recoup his fortunes after 
the Restoration by farming the tax on Scottish salt -
this unfortunate speculation led him deeper into debt. 
Only his enforced exile after 1688 saved the family from 
complete collapse. 
STRINGER of Whiston, Phomas: 
Fought for the King in the second civil war. Only 
a small estate, but soon after compounding, he inherited 
extensive lands from an elder branch of the family. 
From the 1650's, he became a creditor for several less 
fortunate Cavaliers. 
SUNDERLAND of High Sunderland, Langdale: 
Royalist Captain. Paid £1080 in composition and 
assessments. This forced him to sell his Halifax 
estates, but with the surplus he bought lands in Feather-
stone and Acton, Reworked the valuable· coal mines in 
the area, and soon became quite prosperous. 
SWALE of South Stainley, Solomon: 
Paid no compost tion fine, _, 'but suffered from 
plundering soldiers. Bought lands during the Interregnum 
period as portions for his younger children. Granted 
£2000 interest-free loan by the King for his services 
during the wars. Fell into debt, although the cause 
of this is not certain. 
TANCRED of Whixley, Sir Richard: 
Prosperous -major in Royalist army. Bought some 
la.nds in 1647, and sold others in 1654. Apparently not 
severely affected by the Interregnum. 
TN~EST of Bracewell and Bowling, Richard:. 
Royalist Colonel. In dire financial straits before 
the war, due to his extravagance and incurable love of 
gambling. Had to compound twice, 1647 and 1649 (a total 
of £2800)~Went bankrupt soon afterwards, and his estates 
were put in trust to pay his debts. 
THOMPSON of Humbleton, Stephen: 
Prosperous merchant family. Despite his fine,·con-
tinued to buy lands, including some confiscated Crown 
property in Pickering. The family were among; the 
leading post~Restoration merchants in Yorkshire. 
THORNHILL of Fixby, 'John: 
Royalist major, but also aided the Parliamentarians, 
and avoided ,being too firmly attached to either side. 
Never fined: the family's prosperity increased by 
successive marriages with heiresses. 
VAUGHAN of Whitwell, !Sir Henry: 
In financial difficulties before the wars - war 
damage and the effects of the fines led H.V. into heavy 
debts. His grandson was outlawed for manslaughter, and 
lawsuits over the subsequent ownership of the property 
led to its final sale by the co-heiresses in 1670. 
VINCENT of Great Smeaton, Richard: 
Heavily in debt before· the war - sold the estate to 
the creditor, 'Henry Simpson; in 1646 p on condition" 
that H.S. should pay the profits to R.V. until the 
total purchase price was paid. H.S. took E1dvanta€,:e of 
the civil war to force another agreement on the Royalist. 
R.V. appealed against this settlement, ~nd H.S.'s son's 
breach of it)in Chancery in 1671 - but Vincent never 
recovered his property. (The lands were confiscated 
and sold during the Interre~num, being bought by 
Henry Simpson,. the creditor, .through Samuel Foxley.) 
WANDESFORD of Kirklington, Christopher: 
Royalist sympathiser. Never fined. Considerable 
estates, which were apparently little affected by 
the civil wars. A leading member of post-Restoration 
society. 
WARTO}T.. of Beverley Tark, Sir Michael: 
Prosperous Royalist, but heavily fined, and 
suffered considerably from plunderinp,. Bou~ht and sold 
property in the Beverley area during the Interregnum. 
Although severely affected by composition, he slowly 
recovered by raising rents and reorganising his 
estates. 
WENTWORTH of West Bretton, Sir Thomas: , 
Prosperous Royalist. Compounded on the Oxford Article~! 
and this,. together with the entails on his property, 
reduced the amount of his fine. Lost a great deal by 
plundering, and had to mortgage much of his lands. 
But he soon recovered, and by 1660 he was in a 
comfortable position - his son bought the Burdett 
estate in 1676. 
WENTWORTH of Woolley, Sir George: 
Royalist colonel - a very wealthy man. Most of 
his estates were in tail, which thus reduced the level 
of his fine. Although temporarily embarrassed with 
the composition, he soon recovered. Acted as trustee 
for the Catholic Gascoignes of Barnbow, and he (or 
his brother) acquired the lands of the Aldburghs, 
Brettons and Wheatleys - all Cavalier families who 
collapsed during the Interregnum. A leading member 
of post-Restoration society. 
WOLSTENHOLME of Nostell Priory, Sir John: 
Contributed a great deal to the Royalist cause. 
A wealthy gentleman, but rnined by the heavy fine imposed 
by Parliament for his activities as a customs farmer. 
went bankrupt, and the bulk of his estates were handed 
over to trustees, and sold to meet the demands of his 
credi tors. However, his so n repurchased so:')e of the 
lands, and succeeded in rebuilding part of the family's 
past fortunes. 
WORTLEY of Wortley, Sir Francis: 
Prosperous landowner, who spent a ereat deal in the 
Royalist cause. Fell heavily into debt, but succeeded 
in keeping the bulk of his estates together, and grad-
ually, by raising rents and realising his capital assets 
(such as timber and coal), he recovered his pre-war 
position, (although it took the family over three 
decades to do this). 
WYVELL of Burton Constable, Sir r.larmaduke: 
Royalist committee-man - suffered a ereat deal from 
the ravages of the Scots: this, together with the 
composition fine, placed him in severe financial 
difficulties. Virtually all his estates were heavily 
mortgaged during the Interregnum for periods varying 
from 21 to 99 years. Some outlying manors were sold as 
a result of the civil war losses. 
YOUNG of Burn, Sir Andrew: 
Catholic delinquent. Died during the wars, and his 
widow compoundrl for all the forfeited estates in 1653. 
The property, which was quite extensive before the wars, 
was put in trust to raise the money, and none was 
apparently sold. 
APPENDIX V. 
KEY TO GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF ROYALISTS IN MAP I. 
N.B.: For the purposes of the maps, Yorkshire has 
been divided into eight areas, mainly on a regional 
basis. The county was first separated into the four 
seventeenth century administrative districts - the 
three ridings and the Ainsty. Further subdivisions were 
made on the following principles:-
East Riding:-
The town of Hull, with a ten mile radius, and South 
Holderness, was sepaxated from the East Riding - this 
area was the district generally under Parliamentary 
control, except when Hull lay under siege. 
North Riding:-
Divided into two, Richmond and Cleveland (these are just 
convenient names, and do not represent the old regions 
which were so called), by a north to south line just 
east of Northallerton. This is a purely arbitrary 
division, 'intended "to make the North Riding less large 
and ~wieldy. 
West Riding:~ 
Divided into three. 'Pennine' is the region east of 
Skipton, the hilly Pennine area, sparsely populated, 
and geographically separate from the rest of the riding. 
, The remainder has been somewhat summarily divided into 
two, on the basis of the Leeds-Bradford region, and 
. . 
the Barnsley-Sheffield district. It also separates 
the north, with its closely-grouped Royalist fa.milies, 
from the· south, whe.re the Parliamentarians were far 
more in evidence. The actual line of demarcation runs 
from Goole to Oldham (in'Lancashire) • 
REFERENCE LIST TO MAP I. 
1. ALDBURGH, Arthur of 
2. AND~~SON, Sir Henry 
3. ANNE,· Philip 
4. ANSTRUTHER, Sir Robert 
5. APPLEBY, Francis 
6. APPL:F;YARD,. Sir Matthew 
7. ARMITAGE, Sir Francis 
8. ARlVlITAGE, Gregory & Wm. 
9. AYSCOUGH, Allan & ~Tancis 
10·. BAILDON, Francis 
11. BAMFORD, Lyon 
12. BARN BY , Thomas 
13. BATTE, John 
14. BATTlE, Francis 
15. BEALE, Paul 
16. BEAlmONT, Thomas 
17. BECKWITH, Leonard 
18. BECKWITH, Thomas 
19. BELT, Sir Robert 
20. BERRY, Richard 
21. BEV~~LEY, John 
22. BISHOP, Thoma.s 
23. BLAKISTON, WID., Rye, Peter 
24. BLAND, Sir Thomas & Adam 
25. BLYTHMAN , William 
26. BOOTH, John 
27. BOWES, Richard 
28. BOYNTON, Matthew 
29. BRA(I)THWAIT(E), Richard 
& Thomas 
30. BRIGHAM, William 
31. BULMER, William 
32 • BUNNEY,; Fr.anc i s 
33. BURDETT, Francis 
34. BUTLER, Sir George 
35. CALEY, Sir Wm. & Arthur 
36. CALEY, James & 4 sons 
37. CALVERLEY, Henry 
Aldborough 
Long Cowton (ch. sides) 
Frickley 
Wheatley 
Lartington 
Burstwick Grange (brother 
Thomas changed sides) 
Kirkle.s (divided) 
Netherton 
Skewsby (divided) 
Bailoon 
Pule Hill (changed sides) 
Cawthorne 
Oakwell Hall, Birstall 
Wadsworth 
York (changed sides & divided) 
Whitley Beaumont 
Handall Abbey 
Cold Ingleby (divided) 
York (divided) 
Howden (changed sides) 
Great Smeaton 
Pocklington 
Old Malton 
Kippax Park 
Newlaithes 
Pontefract 
Babthorpe (divided) 
Barmaton (changed sides) 
Catterick 
Wyton 
Marricke 
Newland (changed sides) 
Birthwaite 
Ellerton 
Brompton (changed sid es) 
Thormondby 
Calverley 
38. CHATOR,Renry 
39. CHILDERS, Francis 
40. CHOLMLEY, Marmaduke 
41. CHOLMLEY, Henry 
42. CHOLMLEY, "Sir Hugh 
43~ CLAPHAM, Sir Christopher 
44. COBB;: ~ Sir Francis 
45; COCKERELL, Edmund & Nich. 
46. CONSTABLE, William 
47. CONSTABLE, Sir Philip 
48. CONSTABLE, John 
49~ CONSTABLE, Ralph 
50. CONSTABLE, Sydney 
51. CONYERS, Leonard 
52. COOKE, Brian 
53. COOPER, Sir Edmund 
54. COPLEY, John, Edw. & Savile 
55. COPLEY, Godfrey 
"56. CRATHORNE, Rafe (Ralph) 
57. CREYKE, Greg~ry 
58. CROFTS, Sir Christopher 
59. CROMPTON, Thomas 
60. CROSLAND, Nathaniel 
Croft 
Doncaster 
Brandsby 
Tunstall (divided) 
Whitby (changed sides) 
Beamsley 
Ottrine:ham 
Whitby 
Cathorp 
Everingham 
Kirby Knowle 
Selby 
Sherborne 
Whitby 
Doncaster 
York 
Batley 
Sprotborough 
Crathorne 
Marton 
York (divided) 
Great Driffield (divided) 
Crosland Hill 
61. CROSLAND, Sir Jordan & Henry Helmsley 
62. CURRER,; Henry 
63. CUTLER, Sir Gervase 
64. DALTON, Sir William & John 
65. DANBY, Sir Thomas 
66. DANBY, John & Edmond 
67. DANBY, Francis 
68. DANIEL, Sir Ingleby, etc. 
69. DAWNEY, Sir Christopher 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
DAWSON, George 
DAWSON, ? 
DOLEMAN, Robert & Philip 
DOLEEAN, Thos., Wm., etc. 
DUNCOMBE, Sir Edmund 
ELL ERKER , James 
ELLIS, John 
ERRINGTON, John 
ETHERINGTON, William 
79. FAIRFAX, Thomas & Nich. 
80. FAWKES, Michael 
81. FERRAND, Thomas 
82. FERRAND, Thomas 
83. FLETCHER, Anthony 
84. FOLJAI'i1BE, Peter 
85. FORSTER, Richard 
86. FRANK, Marmaduke 
87. FRANK, Robert 
Skipton 
Stainborough 
Heath (main home) & Hauxwell 
Farnley (It It) & Massam 
Great Leake 
South Cave 
Beswick 
Sessay (main home) & Cowicke 
(divided) 
Azerley 
Heworth 
Badsworth 
Duncotes 
Crake 
Stillingfleet 
Kiddal Hall 
Rudby 
Great Driffield 
Dunsley 
Farnley 
Flasby 
Westhall 
Towton 
Steeton 
Stokesley 
Knighton 
Spenn (changed sides) 
, 
88. FRANKLAND, Thos., & Anthony Aldwark ( & Ellerton) 
89. FREEN'AN, Robert New Malton 
90. GALE, Robert' . 
91. GASCOIGNE, William 
92. GEE, 'Thomas 
93. GIBSON, Sir John 
94. GILBY, Emmanuel 
95 ~ GIRLINGTON," Christopher 
96~ GLEDHILL, Richa.rd 
97. GOODRICKE, Sir John 
98. GOWER, Sir Thos. (etc.) 
99. GRAHAM, Sir ·,Richard 
100. GREENE, Robert 
101. GREY, Wm. & Robert 
102. GRICE, Francis & Henry 
103. GRIFFITH, Sir Henry 
104. GRIMSTON, William 
105; HALDENBY, Robert 
106. HAr,~MERTON, Philip 
101. HANSBY, 'Sir Ralph 
108. HAREBRED, Richard 
109. HARRISON, Cuthbert 
110. HARWOOD, James' 
Ill. HAWKESWORTH, Walter 
112. HEBBLETHWAITE, Thomas 
113. HILDYARD, Ry., Robt., & 
Christopher 
114. HI~DYARD, Chris. & John 
115. HODGSON, John 
116. HOLME, Chris. & Henry 
117. HOLTBY, Marmaduke 
118. HOLTBY, Robt. & Lance10t 
119. HOPTON, Sir Ingram 
120. HOPTON, John & Chris. , 
121. HORSFALL, Richard 
122. HOTHAM, Sir John & John 
123. HUNGATE, Sir Philip 
124. HUNT, Gilbert 
125. HUTCHINSON, Edward 
126. HUTTON. Sir Richard 
127. HUTTON, Matthew 
128~ INGLEBY, John 
129~ INGLEBY, Sir William 
130. INGRAM, Sir William 
131. INGRAM, Sir Thomas 
132. IRELAND, William 
Acomb Grange 
Thorpe-on-the-Hill 
Bishop Burton (divided) 
Welburn 
Pontefract 
Wycliffe' ( divided) 
Barkisland 
Ribston (& Hunsingore) (divide~ 
Stittenham 
Norton Conyers 
Thundercliffe Grange (chane,ed 
sides) 
Beverley 
Sandall (& Streethaggs) 
Agnes Burton 
Grimston Garth 
Haldenby 
Monkrode (& Purston Jacklin) 
Tickhill Castle 
Wistow (changed sides) 
Acaster Selby 
Nunmonckton 
Heworth (divided) 
Norton (changed sides) 
Wine stead 
Ottringham 
Beeston (changed sides) 
Paul Holme 
Skackleton 
Sancton 
,Armley 
Ar~ley 
Storthes Hall 
Scorborouph (changed sides) 
saxton 
Woodeford 
wykeham (divided) 
Goldesborough 
Marske 
Lawkland 
Ripley (changed sides) 
Cattal 
Sheriff Hutton (divided) 
Crofton 
133. JACKSON, Stephen 
134." JACQUES, Sir Roger 
135. JENKINS, WID. Toby & Henry 
136." JENNINGS, Peter, Jonathan 
. . , 
137. KAYE, Sir John 
138. KELLAM, William 
139 •. KERES}4'ORTH, Thomas ,. 
140. KILLINGBECK, Thomas 
141.' LACY, William 
142 .. LANGDALE, ,Sir Marmaduke 
143" LANGLEY, Richard ' 
144. LAWSON, Sir John 
Burrell-cum-Cowling 
Elvington 
Great Busby (& Grimston) 
Ripon (changed sides) 
Woodsome 
Pontefract 
Dodworth (changed sides) 
Chapel Allerton 
Beverley 
North Dalton 
Millington 
Brough 
145." LAYTON, Francis 
146; LAYTON, Sir Thomas 
147. LEE, Cormelius 
148. LEEDS,Robert 
149.' LEGARD, Richard 
. Rawden 
Sexhow 
Hatfield 
Molscroft 
150. LEIGH, Sir Ferdinando 
151.' LISTER,' Thomas 
152. LOVELL, Thomas " 
153. LOWTHER, Sir Richard 
154. LOWTHER, William 
155. LUTTON, William 
156. 
157. 
158; 
159~' 
160~ 
161~ 
162. 
163. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
169. 
170. 
. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177~ 
178~ 
179. 
180. 
, 
MALEVERER, Sir Richard 
MAL HAM , Francis, 
MALLORY, Sir John 
MAN, William 
MARSHALL, Henry, 
METCALFE, Thomas 
METCALFE, Alexander 
METCALFE, Scroope 
METCALFE, Chris. & Michael 
MET HAM , Sir Thos, Jordan 
. & George 
MEYNELL, George 
MEYNELL, Charles 
MEYNELL, Thomas 
MIDDLETON, .Wm. & Sir John 
MONCKTON, Sir Thos, Sir 
Philip I &,Sir Philip II 
MONCKTON, Edmund, Marmaduke 
&'John 
MORLEY, Robert & Cuthbert 
MORRIS, John, 
MOUNTAIGNE, Isaac & Geo. 
NElLE, Sir Paul 
NEVILE, "Francis & Gervase 
NEWTON,Miles 
NORTON, Maulger 
NORTON, William 
NORTON, Peter 
Ganton (changed sides) 
Middleton 
Manningham, Bradford (divided) 
Skelton 
Ingleton 
Leeds 
Knapton 
Allerton Maleverer (divided) 
Els1ack 
Studley Park 
Bramley Grange (changed sides) 
Fulforth 
Bellarby 
Leeds 
Nappa 
Little Ottrington 
Metham 
Dalton 
Hawnby (& Hilton) 
North Kilvington 
Middleton-cum-Stockheld Park 
Cavil (Sir P. I changed sides) 
Howden 
Seamer (& Fulford) (divided) 
North Elmsall (changed sides) 
Westow (changed sides) 
Hutton Bonville 
Chevet (chan~ed sides) 
Littlethorpe (nr. Ripon) 
Richmond 
Sawley 
Dishforth 
181. OGLETHORPE, Sutton 
182. OSBORNE, Sir Edward 
183. PALMES, Sir Brian 
184. PALMES, Sir George 
185. PAYLER, Sir Edward, 
186. PENNYMAN, Sir James & Jas. 
187.' PENNYMAN, Sir William 
188. PERCY, Josceline 
189. PERCY, John 
190. PILKINGTON, Richard 
191., PILKINGTON, Sir Arthur 
& Richard 
192. PLU1~TON, Sir Edward & Jo~ 
193. PORTINGTON, Roger, Robt. 
& Henry 
194. PORTINGTON, ~Uchael . 
195. PUDSEY, Ambrose, etc. 
196. PUDSEY, Peter:, 
197. PUDSEY, Ralph 
198.' RADCLIFFE, Sir George 
199.' RAMSDEN, Sir John 
200.' REDHEAD, Henry 
201. R1"1>nAINE, Sir John 
202. RERESBY, Sir John 
203; RICHARDSON, Richard 
204; ROBINSON, Sir William 
205. ROCKLEY". Francis 
206. ROKEBYi Thomas 
207. RUDSTON,' Sir Walter 
208. RYTHER, John ' 
-< 1: < 
209. SALTONSTALL, Samuel 
210. SAVILE, William 
211." SA VILE, John, 
212. SAVILE, Sir William 
213. SAVILE, William 
214.' SAVILE, Samuel & Gabriel 
215.' SAYER, Laurence 
216. SHIRCLIFFE, William 
217. S IlI-IP SON , John 
218. SKELTON, William 
219. SKIPWITH, Willoughby 
220. SLINGSBY, Sir Henry & Thos. 
221. SLINGSBY, Sir Robert, 
Walter & Guildford 
222. SMITH, John 
223. SOTHABY, Robert 
224. SOTHARY, Henry 
225. STANHOPE, Edward 
226. STAPLETON, Sir Robert 
227. STAPLETON, Sir Brian 
228. STAPLETON, Sir Miles 
Oglethorpe 
Kiveton Park 
Lindley 
Naburn. 
Thoraldby 
Ormesby 
Marske 
Beverley 
stubbs Walden., 
Kirkheaton 
Stanley' 
Plumpton Hall 
Barnby-on-Don 
Portington ' " 
Bolton-in-Bowland 
Sandhutton 
Stapleton-on-Tees 
Thornhill- r' 
Byrom (& Longley) 
Howden 
Thornton-in-Lonsdale 
Thribergh (changed sides) 
North Byerley (changed sides) 
Newby Hall 
Rockley Hall 
Burnby (divided) 
Hayton, 
Scarcroft 
Rogersthorpe 
Copley i • , 
Welburn (divided) 
Thornhill 
Wakefield (& Halifax) 
Mexborough 
Worsa1l 
Ecc1esfield 
Wetherby 
Osmanthorpe 
Skipwith 
Scriven 
Hemlington 
Snainton' 
Pocklington 
Birdsall' 
Grimston 
Carleton 
Templehirst 
Wighil1 (divided) 
229. STRICKLAND, Sir Robt. & 
Sir Thomas 
230. STRINGER"Thomas 
231. STRINGER, Thos. & Francis 
232. STYLE, 'Thomas~ 
233. SUNDERLAND, Langdale 
234. SWALE, Solomon 
235. SWINBURNE, Tobias 
236. TALBOT, 1 John & Roger 
237. TANCRED, Charles 
238. TANCRED,' Sir Richard', 
239. TANCRED, Thomas 
240. TAYLOR, John ' 
241. TEMPEST, Richard 
242. TEMPEST, Stephen, etc. 
243. THEAISTONE, Sir William 
244. THIMELBY, Charles 
245. THOMLINSON, Thomas 
246. THOMLINSON, John 
247. TH01vlPSON, Richard, 
248. THOMPSON, Francis, Stephen 
& Chris. 
249. THORNHILL, John 
250. THORPE, John 
251. THWEtro;" George 
252. TINDALL, Francis 
253. TOPHAM, Francis 
254. TRAPPES, Robert 
255. TUNSTALL, Marmaduke 
256. TURBUTT, William 
257. VAUGHAN, Sir Henry 
258. VAVASOUR, Sir walter 
259. VAVASOUR, William & Thos. 
260. VAVASOUR, John 
261. VAVASOUR, William 
262. VINCENT, Richard 
263. WADE, Cuthbert 
264. WALLER, Thos. & Edward 
265. WALTERS, Robert 
266. WANDESFORD, Christopher 
267. WARTON, Sir Michael, 
Michael 2 & Michael 3 
268. WASHINGTON, Darcy 1, 
Darcy 2 & James 
269. WATERTON, Thomas 
270. WENTWORTH,Thomas 
271. WENTWORTH, Sir George, 
Matthew & John 
272. WHARTON, Sir Anthony 
ThorntonBridge (changed sds) 
Sharleston (chanped sides) 
Whiston 
Kellington (changed sides) 
High Sunderland 
South Stainley (changed sds) 
York 
Thornton-Ie-Street 
Arden 
Whixley 
Brompton 
Tadcaster 
Bowling '& Bracewell~' (latter is 
main home) 
Broughton (& Roundhay) 
Bedale 
Snydall 
Birdforth (changed sides) 
Thorganby 
Killam (changed sides) 
Hwnbleton (changed sides) 
Fixby Hall (changed sides) 
Danthorpe 
Heworth (& Kilton) 
Brotherton 
Agglethorpe 
Nldd 
Wycliffe 
York 
Whitwell 
Hazlewood Castle 
Weston 
Willitoft 
Copmanthorpe 
Great Smeaton 
Kilnsea 
Beverley (changed sides) 
Ouseburn 
Kirklington 
Beverley (change~ sides) 
Hampole (& Adwicke) (divided) 
Walton 
West Bretton 
Woolley 
Eppleby (& Gilling) 
273. WHEATLEY, Thomas, Edward 
274. WILBORE, John 
275. WILKINSON, Thos. & Wm. 
276. WITHAM, John 1 & 2 
277. WITHES, Francis 
278. WOLST~~HOLME, Sir John 
279. WOMBWELL, William 
280. WOOD, Thomas 
281. WORTLEY, Sir Fra.ncis 
282. WRIGHT, William 
283. WYVELL, Sir Marmaduke 
284. WYVELL, Roger & William 
285. WYVELL, Solomon 
286. WYVELL, William 
287. YARBOROUGH, Sir Nicholas 
288. YOUNG, Sir Andrew 
~--
Woolley 
Knottingley 
Pontefract 
Cliffe 
Skewesby 
Nostell Priory 
Wombwell ' 
Beeston 
Wortley 
Plowland 
Constable Burton 
Osgodby (changed sides) 
Great Burton 
Sad bury 
BaIne 
, Bourn (Burn) 
3~ 
, . 
APPENDIX VI. 
KEY TO MAP II THE VICTIMS OF THE ACTS OF SALE. 
N.B.:- In this map, the 61 Royalists are shown as living 
on their own'personal properties, irrespective of where the 
hea&of their fami~ resided. Thus Thomas Braithwaite of 
Neesam Abbey is placed at Neesam, in Durham, although 
his father (the head of the family) lived at Catterick in 
Yorkshire. 
1. ANNE, Philip 
2. AYSCOUGH, Allan 
3." " James 
4. BECKWITH, Thomas 
5. BLAND, Adam·' 
6. BOYNTON, Matthew 
7. BRAITHWAITE, Thomas 
8. BRIGHAM, William 
9. BULMER, William 
10. CHOLMLEY, Marmaduke 
11. CHOLMLEY, Henry 
12. CONSTABLE, William 
13. CONSTABLE, Sir Philip 
14. CONSTABLE, John 
15. CONSTABLE, Sydney 
16. DANBY, John 
17. "" Edmond 
18. DANIEL, Sir Ingleby 
19. DOLID~AN, Robert 
20. " " Philip 
21. DO LEMAN , Marmaduke 
22. " " ,William 
23. " " Thomas 
24. ERRINGTON, John 
25. FRANK, Marmaduke 
26. GALE, Robert 
27. HAMJI:fERTON, Philip 
Frick1ey 
Skewsby (or Skewesby) 
Middleton-on-Row (Durham) 
Cold Ingleby 
South Cave 
Barmston , 
Neesam Abbey (Durham) 
Wyton'(or Wighton) 
Marricke 
Brandsby 
Tunstall 
Cathorp 
Everingham 
Kirby Knowle 
Sherborne 
Great Leake 
Borrowby 
Beswick 
Badsworth 
Bishop Wilton 
Midd1eton-on-the-Wo1ds 
, We1la.mbrigg (see note at end) 
Duncotes 
Rudby 
Knighton 
Acomb Grange 
Monkrode 
28. HOLTBY, :Marmaduke 
29. HUNGATE, Sir Philip 
30. LANGDALE, Sir Marmaduke 
31. LANGLEY, Richard 
32. LAWSON, Sir John 
33. LOWTHER, Sir Richard 
34. MARSHALL, Henry 
35. HETCALFE, Michael 
36. MIDDLETON, William 
37 ." "Sir John 
38. MORLEY, Cuthbert 
39. NEWTON, Miles 
40. PALMES, Sir George 
41. PERCY, John 
42. PLUMPTON, Sir Edward 
43." .. John 
44. PUDSEY, Peter 
45. PUDSEY, Ralph 
46. RADCLIFFE, Sir George 
47. REDMAINE, Sir John 
48. RYTHER, John 
49. SAYER, Laurence 
50. SLINGSBY, Sir Henry 
51. TANCRED, Thomas 
52. TE~.1PEST, Stephen 
53. THEAKSTONE, Sir William 
54. THHlELBY, Charles 
55. TRAPPES, Robert 
56. VAVASOUR, Sir Walter 
57. VAVASOUR, John 
58. VINCENT, Richard 
59. WASHINGTON, Darcy 
60. WHARTON, Sir Anthony 
61. YOUNG, Sir Andrew 
Skackleton 
Saxton 
North Dalton 
, Millington 
Brough 
Ingleton 
Fulforth 
Little Ottrington 
Stockheld Park 
Thrintoft Hall 
Seamer 
Littlethorpe (nr. Ripon) 
Naburn 
Stubbs Walden 
Plurnpton Hall 
Usfleet (Ouseflete) 
Sandhutton 
Stapleton-on-Tees 
Thornhill 
Thonnton-in-Lonsdale 
Scarcroft 
Worsall 
Scriven 
Brompton 
Broughton 
Bedale 
Snydall 
Nidd 
Hazlewood 
Willitoft 
. Great Smeaton 
Hampole (& Adwicke) 
Eppleby (nr. Gilling) 
Bourn (Burn) 
(Note: Wellambrige, the residence of William Doleman, 
cannot be located, and I have1herefore arbitrarily 
, placed him at the village of Wellam, on the River 
Derwent.) 
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APPENDIX VII • 
• • "". -.; ..! ' 
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE ROYALIST 
.; '.' . & PARLIAMENTARIAN GENTRY. , ... ; 
The Yorkshire gentry were closely linked by ties of 
\' ; .. '1'; ,-1 ,~, i ... ~ ; .~ r ,"" ~ 
marriage, usually made irrespective of political beliefs 
J ~ j 
.'. ' 
and allegiances. Fam~lies allied with those of a simaar 
social and ,financial 'status, or with other landowners.in 
, .' , 
, 
the same neighbourhood. It is true that 'the extremists'of 
! .; i~ ~ • l; 
both parties tended to marry within their o!,n particular 
ci rcles, ,but many of the "middle gentry" - those with no 
firm affiliations for either side - formed part of a .tightly-
interwoven ,network of family alliances. Thus, "when war 
eventually came, such people found themselves on opposing 
sides, and the ties of blood and marriage were bro~en by 
. , 
political and religious expediences. .. ' : 
To illustrate this point in the form of a eenealogical 
I _ 
table is virtually impossible: the constant intermarriaee, 
: . 
between families makes such a task far too complicated •. 
I have therefore listed the names of fifty-seven of the most 
, 
prom~nent\ Parliamentam f8milies whose genealogies: can be '" 
• 
traced, (and who were related to other families~who took 
part ~~ the wars), in order to show the extent of the union 
.. ,", 
between the rival sides. In calculating this table, 
396.' 
the following marriages have been taken into account:-
. Those made by the Parliamentarian,. his fat~er, his 
brothers and sisters (and, if not of a separate! family, his 
uncle~; :~~ts aD:d cousins), plus the unions ,made by his 
. ~ : 
children prior to 1665. The table below indicat~s the families 
with whom such alliances were made (provided that such 
families itook part in the civil 'wars). 
Parliamentarian 
family 
ADAMS of Owston 
'ALLANSON of York 
; : 
! .",,' 
ANLABY of Etton 
-
,! " 
BETHELL of Alne/ 
Rise 
BOSEVILE of 
Gunthwaite 
Families to whom the'Parliamentarian 
was related, by allegiance:-
Royalist Parliament- Divided! 
arian Changed 
Tankard of 
Whixley, 
Jacques of 
Elvington' 
Slingsby of 
. Scrt ven 
. ; 
Marwood of 
Busby, 
Frankland. 
of Thirkleby 
sides 
Dawney of 
60wicke 
Hotham of 
Scorborough, 
Boynton of 
Barmston, 
Beckwi th of !I 
Aldborough/ .~ 
Cold Ingleby,' 
Bowes of :1 
Babthorpe :~ Ii 
<1 
Bunney of 
Newland 
130URCHIER of 
Benningborough 
BRIGHT of Carbrook 
CHOLMLEY of 
Braham 
CONSTABLE of 
Flamborough 
COPLEY of 
Wadworth 
COPLEY of 
Doncaster 
CURRER of 
Kildwick 
DAVILE of 
Kirkby Fleetham 
DODSWORTH of 
Thornton Watlas 
FAIRFAX of Steeton 
FOULIS of 
Ingleby 
FRANK of 
Camps all 
FRANKLAND of 
Thirkleby 
Royalist 
-, 
Cockerell of 
Whitby 
Wentworth of 
W. Woodhouse 
Lowther of 
Ingleton 
Hutton of 
Marske 
'Layton of 
Sexhow 
Bland of 
Kippax Park 
Talbot of 
Thornton-Ie-
street 
Cutler of 
Stainborough 
Parl'arian 
strickland of 
Boynton 
Westby of 
Ravenfield, 
Hatfield of 
Laughton, 
Norcliffe of 
Langton 
Fairfax, Lord 
Fairfax of 
Cameron 
Copley of 
Doncaster 
Copley of 
Wad worth 
Smelt of 
Kirkby E'leetham 
Challenor of 
Guisborough 
Bethell of 
Alne 
Div Ch.sds. 
Hawke'Sworth of 
Hawkesworth, 
vVarton of 
Beverley 
Caley of 
Brompton 
stapleton 
of Wiphill 
Herebred of 
Wistow 
GRIMSTON of 
:B'rasthorpe 
HALL of East 
Lilling 
HARRISON of 
Copgrove 
HATFIELD 'of 
Laughton 
HEBER of 
Stainton 
HEBER of 
Hollinghall 
HUTTON of 
Poppleton 
LASCELLES of 
stank 
LISTER of 
Thornton 
LISTER of Hull 
Hoyalist 
Grimston of 
G. Garth 
(cousin) 
Lord Darcy 
. Lowther of 
Ingleton, 
Clapham of 
Beamsley 
Hutton of 
Marske 
(cousin) 
Hamerton of 
Hellifield, 
Kaye of 
Woodsome, 
Sayer of 
Wars all 
Lutton of 
Knapton, 
Sothaby of 
Birdsall 
Parl'arian 
strickland of 
Boynton 
Westby of 
Ravenfield, 
Bright of 
Carbrook, 
Norcliffe 
of Langton, 
Heber··of 
Hollinghall 
(cousin) 
Heber of 
Marton 
(cousin) 
Lord 
Fairfax 
st. Quintin 
.of Harpham 
Bright of 
Carbrook, 
Fairfax of 
steeton, 
Lambert of 
. Calton, 
Norcliffe 
'of Langton 
Div Ch.sds. 
Rokeby of 
Burnby 
Crofts of 
York. 
Lord Faucon-
berg, 
Hawkesworth of 
Hawkesworth 
MALEVERER of 
Arncliffe 
MARWOOD of 
Little Busby 
MICKLETHWAITE 
of Swyne 
NARY of Malton 
NEWARKE of 
Akeham 
NORCLIFFE of 
Langton 
PEARCEHAY of 
Ryton 
REMINGTON 
of Lund 
RHODES of 
Great Houghton 
ROBINSON of 
Thickett 
Royalist 
Aldburgh of 
Aldborough, 
Hutton of 
Marske, 
Blakiston of 
Old Malton 
Lord Darcy 
Jacques of 
Elvington 
Vavasour of 
Hazlewood (1) 
Pennyman of 
Ormesby, 
Conyers of 
Whitby, 
Payler of 
Thoraldby, 
Grimston of 
G. Garth 
Wyvell of 
Constable 
Burton 
Edmunas of 
Worsborough 
(non gent.) 
Parl'arian 
Tempest of 
Tong, 
Div Ch. sds. 1 
l 
i 
! 
Bethell of Al e Hebblethwaite ~ 
of Norton r: 
Stillington 
of Kelfield 
Armitage of 
Doncaster, 
Lister of 
Thornton, 
Bright of 
Carbrook 
strickland of 
Boynton 
Hutton of Pop-
pleton 
Hebblethwaite 
of Norton 
Goodricke of 
Ribston, 
Savile of 
Welburn, 
Anderson of 
Long Cowton, 
Wyvell of 
Osgodby 
jl 
il 
II 
~I ~ ~ I 
! 
:1 
Crompton of ~ 
Driffield, i 
~t~!,BishOP ~ 
Boynton of ,1 
Barmston, l 
Hotham of ,1 
Scorborough .i 
j 
;1 
Royalist 
• 
ROBINSON of Thorn- Oglethorpe 
ton Riseborough of Oglethorpe 
ROBINSON, of 
Rokeby 
ST. QUINTIN 
of Harpham 
SALTMARSH of 
Saltmarsh 
SALVEIN of 
Newbiggin 
SAVILE of 
Lupset 
SAVILE of 
Methley 
SLINGSBY of 
Kippax 
Layton of 
Rawden 
Wentworth of 
Woolley, 
Kaye of 
Woodsome 
Grimston of 
G. Garth, 
Payler of 
Thoraldby, 
Topham of 
Agglethorpe, 
Ireland of 
Crofton 
Cholmley of 
Brandsby 
Savile of 
Thornhill 
(cousin) 
Tempest of 
Bowling 
Slingsby of 
Scriven, 
Slingsby of 
Hemlington 
(cousins) 
Parl'arian 
Hutton· of 
Poppleton, 
Strangeways 
of South 
House, (Rymer of 
Brotherton) 
Smelt of 
Kirkby 
Fleetharn 
Lascelles 
of Stank 
Fairfax of 
Steeton 
Div/Ch.sds~ 
Stapleton of 
Wiphill, 
Caley of 
Brompton 
Armitage of 
Kirklees 
Goodricke of 
Ribston, 
Ingleby of 
Ripley, 
Cholmley of 
Whitby 
SMELT .. of Kirkby 
Fleetham 
SMITHSON of 
Moulton 
SPENCER of 
Attercliffe 
STILLINGTON 
of Kelfield 
STRANGEWAYS 
of South House 
STRICKLAND 
of Boynton 
THORNTON of 
East Newton 
TROTTER of 
Skelton Castle 
WENTWORTH of 
North Elmsall 
Royalist 
Lord Darcy 
Parl'arian 
Dodsworth of 
Thornton Watlas, 
Robinson of 
Rokeby 
Lord Fairfax 
Bright- of 
Carbrook 
Micklethwaite 
of Swyne 
Robinson of 
Thornton Rise-
borough 
. . 
Pearcehay 
of Ryton, 
Barwick of 
York, 
Bourchier of 
Benningborough, 
st. Quintin 
of Harpham 
Metham of Darley of 
Metham, Buttercrambe 
Wandesford of 
Kirklington, 
Crathorne of 
Crathorne, 
Cholmley of 
Brandsby 
Witham of 
Cliffe, 
Wandesford of 
Kirklington, 
Wombwell of 
Wombwell 
a,o,. 
Div/Ch.sds. 
Crompton of 
Driffield, 
Cholmley of 
Whitby 
Cholmley of 
Whitby 
Goodricke of 
Ribston, 
Hawkesworth 
Hawkesworth 
1 
1 
. \ 
! 
1 
ofl I 
I 
; 
WEST of 
Firbeck 
WESTBY of 
Ravenfield 
Royalist 
Savile of 
Copley 
stringer of 
Whiston 
Parl'arian 
Bright of 
Carbrook, 
Hatfield of 
Laughtan, 
Spencer of 
Attercl1ffe 
Div/Ch.sds. 
Hodgson of 
Beeston 
Thus these fifty-seven Parliamentarian families were 
closely linked by birth or marriage to 52 Parliamentarian 
families, 56 Royalists, and 37 of uncertain loyalties (i.e., 
who chan?ed sides or were divided in allegiance). 
APPENDIX VIII. 
NOTE ON SOURCES. 
"The basic sources for a study of the Royalists lie in 
the records of·the central committees of the civil war 
1 
and Interregnum periods - the Committee for Compounding, 
which dealt with.the Cavaliers for most purposes, and the 
Committee for Advance of Money2, which was concerned with 
the assessments, and informations of delinquency. For 
Yorkshire, the former's records have been calendared fairly 
fully 'by J.W.Clay in the Yorkshire Archaeological Society's 
Record Series3 : this series includes the ,'particulars of 
es~ate', which are omitted in the official calendars. 
Additional material is provided by the state Papers - these 
are most informative in the post-Restoration period when, 
. . 
together with the Calendar of Treasury Books, they contain 
many revealing petitions to the King. 4 
The proceedings and activities of the Yorkshire County 
Committee are not recorded before 1649: after this date 
l~ EBQ, SP23, calendared by M.A.E. Green in 5 parts, 1889-92. 
2. PRO,·oSP19, calendared by M.A.E. Green in 3 parts, 1888. 
3°. Royalist Composition Papers, 3 vols., in Y.A.S.R.S., 
n, XVIII, X!. (,,,,,Ii). The first volume is almost a trans-
cript of the cases, the later vdnmes are more abbreviated. 
4. Calendar of Treasury Books,I, 1660-67 (ed. W.A. Shaw)(1904). 
there are order and letter books continuing to 16551 • other 
correspondence relating to local administration appears 
in the State Papers, and the General Proceedings of the 
commi ttee for Compounding2 • But none of the records of the local: 
sub-committees have survived, with the exception~ of one 
manuscript book relating to the activities of the Ainsty 
committee3 • 
To compile full case histories of individual Royal-
ists, much reliance has to be placed on actual family 
records. Unfortunately, many Cavaliers have left little 
or no documents behind them. What family records there are, 
are distributed between the British Museum, County Record 
Offices, and various private collections. SupplementRry 
information can be gleaned from the cases in Chancery. 
and the wills of both the Royalists and their opponents 
(especially the Commonwealth purchasers), proved at London 
and York4. 
1. Order Books of Yorks. Committee, 1650-52, in PRO, SP28/215; 
two books of orders and letters to the Committee, 1649/50 
-1655, PRO, SP46/107. The "Commonwealth Exchequer Papers", 
PRO, SP~ cont~in many records of the county committees 
for this period. 
2. Calendared in Part I of C.C.C. 
3. 1645-52, in York Reference Library. 
4. Chancery records:- C5 - CI0 (PRO) are the bills and answers 
of the individual cases, C33 \Uecrees and orders) trace 
the cases through to the final judgement, and C78 (decree 
rolls) contain a summary of the petition and defence, with 
the final judgement, in cases where the Chancery decree 
was enrolled, in order to make it more binding. 
Wills:- Proved in London (Province of Canterbury, and 
all wills proved 1649-60), Somerset House; Proved at 
York t Borthwick Institute (both original wills and regis-tereC1 copies). 
Indirect information comes from various sources. The 
Memoranda Rolls record inquisitions for debt, and the Recusant 
Rolls of the Interregnum period give valuable evidence 
as to the estates held by many of those who had (apparently) 
, 1 
lost their property in the Acts of Sale. The Hearth Tax 
,Records are especially useful: in the lists of hearths, it 
is generally easy to identify the manor house, and this 
helps to trace estates after the Restoration2 • 
No records of the Drury House Trustees (who controlled 
the sale of confiscated Royalist land) have survived, but 
the vast majority of the transactions with purchasers are 
recorded on the Close Rolls3 • These, together with the 
evidence of the Feet of Fines and Common Recoveries, help 
to identify the purchasers, and also the subsequent owners 
of the properties. 4 
The fate of many of the families after the Restoration 
cannot be traced because of lack of evidence. For many of 
the smaller families, the only information is provided by 
an occasional will, or a brief mention in Dugdale's Visitation. 
The genealogical information in this work is invaluable 
in making any close study of the ROyalists 5 • To this must 
1. PRO, El59 (Memoranda Rolls), E377/59,61,63,65 (extant 
ReCusant Rolls for Yorkshire). 
2. PRO, El79. This only relates to the tracing of manors • 
........ 
3. PRO, C54 • 
......... 
4. ~, CP25(2); CF43. 
5. The best edition is that by J.W.Clay, (1899). 
be added the works of several antiquaries and local 
historians, who have often studied'documents which are now 
unavailable, or have: since disappeared. 
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